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Shiraz Abidally Husain and Another (executors of the estate of Abidally Abdul Husain, deceased) v Husain Safdar Abidally and Others

In Shiraz Abidally Husain and Another (executors of the estate of Abidally Abdul Husain, deceased) v Husain Safdar Abidally and Others, the High Court of the Republic of Singapore addressed issues of .

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Case Details

  • Citation: [2009] SGHC 130
  • Case Title: Shiraz Abidally Husain and Another (executors of the estate of Abidally Abdul Husain, deceased) v Husain Safdar Abidally and Others
  • Court: High Court of the Republic of Singapore
  • Decision Date: 27 May 2009
  • Case Number: OS 1440/2008
  • Judge: Tan Lee Meng J
  • Coram: Tan Lee Meng J
  • Parties (Plaintiffs/Applicants): Shiraz Abidally Husain and Another (executors of the estate of Abidally Abdul Husain, deceased)
  • Parties (Defendants/Respondents): Husain Safdar Abidally and Others
  • Executors/Executrix: Mr Shiraz Abidally Husain (executor) and Mrs Salma Moiz nee Salma d/o Abidally Abdul Husain (executrix)
  • Deceased: Mr Abidally Abdul Husain
  • Deceased’s Date of Death: 16 May 2003
  • Estate Value (as stated): more than $6,000,000
  • Commission Sought: $60,000
  • Duration of Administration: more than 5 years
  • Legal Area: Probate and Administration – Executors – Principles for awarding commission
  • Core Issue: Whether professional assistance should affect the quantum of commission
  • Counsel for Plaintiffs/Applicants: Mirza Namazie and Chua Boon Beng (Mallal & Namazie)
  • Counsel for Defendants/Respondents: Gopalan Raman (G Raman Law Corporation)
  • Cases Cited (as provided): [2009] SGHC 130 (self-citation in metadata) and also authorities discussed in the judgment: Tan Soo Lock v Tan Jiak Cho and Anor [1930] SSLR 38; Re Chew Joo Chiat Deceased [1933] MLJ 187; Syed Ahmad, deceased v Syed Hussain [1915-23] 15 SSLR 236
  • Judgment Length: 3 pages, 1,786 words

Summary

This High Court decision concerns an application by executors for commission from a deceased’s estate. The executors, Shiraz Abidally Husain and his sister (as executrix), sought $60,000 as commission for administering an estate worth over $6,000,000 for more than five years. The beneficiaries, including a sibling, opposed the claim and argued that the executors should receive no commission and that the quantum should be reduced because the estate had incurred legal fees for professional assistance.

The court (Tan Lee Meng J) allowed the executors’ claim. The judge held that the award of executor’s commission is discretionary under s 66(1) of the Probate and Administration Act (Cap 251). In exercising that discretion, the court must be guided by its approval or otherwise of the executors’ conduct in administering the estate. Although professional assistance had been used, the court accepted that commission is ultimately paid for the “pain and trouble” necessarily taken by the executor, and that the executors had done substantial work beyond purely routine administration.

What Were the Facts of This Case?

The deceased, Mr Abidally Abdul Husain, died in Singapore on 16 May 2003. He was a Muslim and was survived by two sons, four daughters, and a number of grandchildren. His will contained provisions for distribution of his estate after a period of time. Under clause 3(a), one-third of the estate was bequeathed to the grandchildren in equal shares, to be distributed five years after death. Under clause 3(b), the remaining two-thirds was to be held on trust for five years and then distributed to the children.

The executors were his son, Mr Shiraz Abidally Husain, and his daughter (or sister of the executor), Mrs Salma Moiz nee Salma d/o Abidally Abdul Husain, who acted as executrix. The executors administered the estate for more than five years, during which time they carried out tasks required to realise assets, manage property, and deal with disputes among beneficiaries. The estate’s value was stated to be more than $6,000,000.

After completing the administration, the executors claimed commission of $60,000. The claim was framed as less than 1% of the estate’s value, and the executors emphasised that they had conducted the administration properly over the relevant period. Their position was that the deceased’s instructions required distribution after five years, and that the executors had complied with those instructions while also managing practical difficulties that arose during the administration.

The principal opponent was Mr Husain Safdar Abidally, a sibling of the executor and father of some of the other defendants. He and the other beneficiaries asserted that the executors should not be paid any commission. Their objections included allegations that the executors wasted estate resources and that the executors’ conduct was deficient. They also argued that because the estate had incurred legal fees by instructing a law firm, any commission should be reduced.

The first legal issue was whether the executors were entitled to commission at all, given the statutory discretion under s 66(1) of the Probate and Administration Act. While the statute permits the court to allow commission up to a maximum percentage of the value of assets collected, the court must be guided by its approval or otherwise of the executors’ conduct in administering the estate. The court therefore had to assess whether the executors’ conduct merited approval.

The second issue concerned the quantum of commission, particularly whether the use of professional assistance should reduce the commission payable. The opponents argued that because the estate had incurred legal fees, the executors should receive less commission. The executors, by contrast, argued that their claim reflected work actually done by them and that commission is paid for the pain and trouble necessarily taken by the executor, not merely for tasks delegated to professionals.

Related to these issues was the court’s approach to specific complaints about administration. The court had to decide whether the alleged “waste” of time and resources—such as steps taken to determine whether there was a 14th grandchild—was justified and whether the executors’ actions in relation to the sale of a property were defensible in light of the will’s trust provisions and Muslim law considerations.

How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?

The court began by setting out the governing statutory framework. Section 66(1) of the Probate and Administration Act provides that the court or a judge may, in its discretion, allow executors or administrators a commission not exceeding 5% on the value of assets collected. Crucially, the statute also directs that in allowing or disallowing commission, the court shall be guided by its approval or otherwise of the executors’ conduct in administering the estate. This meant the court’s task was not mechanical; it required an evaluative assessment of conduct and effort.

In approaching the discretion, the judge relied on earlier authority. In Tan Soo Lock v Tan Jiak Cho and Anor [1930] SSLR 38, Murison CJ emphasised that commission is discretionary and varies according to the nature of the estate and the work done by the executor. That decision also highlighted that commission should be less where considerable costs have been incurred for professional assistance. The judge treated these principles as guiding factors rather than rigid rules, and then examined the facts to determine whether the executors’ work justified the commission sought.

On the issue of entitlement, the court rejected the defendants’ contention that the deceased did not intend to pay commission. At the hearing, it was common ground that there was no credible evidence before the court that the deceased had wished to exclude commission. Accordingly, the court did not treat the will as an absolute bar to commission and focused instead on the executors’ conduct and the work performed.

The defendants’ complaints about administration were then considered. Mr Safdar’s allegations were described as a “litany of complaints” but were not substantiated. The court addressed two main categories of complaint. First, the defendants criticised the executors for spending time and resources attempting to determine whether there was a 14th grandchild. The court found this complaint groundless because the executors had a duty to determine who qualified as the deceased’s grandchildren for the purposes of distribution. The court also observed that Mr Safdar was the alleged father of the child in question, and therefore he was not well placed to complain about the executors taking steps to clarify legitimacy and entitlement.

The court explained the procedural history. The executors sought information from Mr Safdar through estate lawyers in 2005, requesting a statutory declaration clarifying whether he fathered Ms Tan’s child and whether the child was legitimate and alive at the time of the deceased’s death. Mr Raman, acting for Mr Safdar, refused to provide the information, prompting the executors to file an originating summons to compel disclosure. That application was struck out, but the court held that the striking out did not necessarily undermine the executors’ entitlement to commission. The true test, the judge said, was whether the executor had done his duty according to law, citing Re Chew Joo Chiat Deceased [1933] MLJ 187. The court reasoned that the executors were entitled to take steps to determine once and for all the relevant facts affecting shares.

Second, the defendants complained about the executors’ conduct regarding the disposal of the sale proceeds of a property, No 3 Haigville Drive. The executors’ explanation was that under Muslim law, the trust for five years under clause 3(b) of the will was void and unenforceable, but could be applied on a consensual basis if all affected beneficiaries agreed. The executors had assumed that Mr Safdar would agree with his siblings to respect the deceased’s wishes and enforce clause 3(b) consensually. When it became clear that he would not, the executors moved quickly to distribute the sale proceeds. The court accepted this explanation and held that the executors’ conduct in disposing of the sale proceeds could not be faulted.

Turning to the quantum issue—particularly the effect of professional assistance—the court addressed the defendants’ argument that legal fees should reduce commission. The judge accepted the general principle that where much money has been incurred for hiring professionals, an executor may be said to have passed on some work to professionals, and commission may be reduced accordingly. This principle was traced to Syed Ahmad, deceased v Syed Hussain [1915-23] 15 SSLR 236, where Barrett-Lennard J explained that such a rule was required to check the English practice of handing over responsible work to courts or professional gentlemen whose fees absorb a significant portion of estate funds.

However, the judge also emphasised that the proposition does not go further than the principle that commission is paid for pain and trouble necessarily taken by the executor. In Tan Soo Lock, Murison CJ had adopted this approach, stating that the commission proposition does not extend beyond the executor’s necessary work. Applying these principles, the court found that the executors were claiming commission based on work actually done by them. The court also considered the practical burdens described by the executors, including managing properties and dealing with disputes regarding grandchildren’s education and maintenance funds. The judge therefore concluded that the presence of professional assistance did not justify reducing commission in the circumstances.

After considering all the circumstances, including the nature of the work performed and the lack of substantiated complaints, the court allowed the claim for commission of $60,000.

What Was the Outcome?

The High Court allowed the executors’ application and awarded commission of $60,000 from the estate. The practical effect was that the executors received remuneration for their administration, despite the beneficiaries’ objections that commission should be disallowed entirely or reduced due to professional legal fees.

By doing so, the court reaffirmed that commission decisions under s 66(1) are fact-sensitive and guided by the court’s assessment of the executors’ conduct and the extent of work actually undertaken by them, rather than by a simplistic rule that any professional assistance automatically diminishes entitlement.

Why Does This Case Matter?

This case is significant for practitioners because it clarifies how Singapore courts approach executor’s commission where beneficiaries contest both entitlement and quantum. The decision demonstrates that the statutory discretion under s 66(1) is not merely a percentage calculation. Instead, the court will examine whether the executors’ conduct merits approval and whether the work performed justifies the commission claimed.

In particular, the judgment provides useful guidance on the role of professional assistance. While earlier authorities recognise that commission should be less where considerable costs have been incurred for professional help, the court in this case treated that principle as limited. The court’s reasoning indicates that professional fees do not automatically reduce commission; rather, the relevant question is whether the executor’s remuneration reflects pain and trouble necessarily taken by the executor. This is helpful for estate administrators who must decide how much work to do personally versus delegating to lawyers or other professionals.

For law students and litigators, the case also illustrates the evidential and analytical approach to disputes about administration. The court was willing to reject unsubstantiated complaints and to apply the “true test” of whether the executor has done his duty according to law. Additionally, the judgment shows how courts may accept executors’ explanations where their actions were driven by legal constraints and the need to manage beneficiary disputes, including issues arising under Muslim law and the consensual application of will provisions.

Legislation Referenced

Cases Cited

  • Tan Soo Lock v Tan Jiak Cho and Anor [1930] SSLR 38
  • Re Chew Joo Chiat Deceased [1933] MLJ 187
  • Syed Ahmad, deceased v Syed Hussain [1915-23] 15 SSLR 236

Source Documents

This article analyses [2009] SGHC 130 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.

Written by Sushant Shukla
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