SHEE SEE KUEN & 5 Ors v SUGIONO WIYONO SUGIALAM & 9 Ors

"In my judgment, the weight of case law in Singapore leans clearly in favour of the position that claims for punitive and aggravated damages must be pleaded and particularised, in order to be considered by the court." — Per S Mohan JC, Para 23

Case Information

• Citation: [2021] SGHC 34 (Para 0)
• Court: General Division of the High Court of the Republic of Singapore (Para 0)
• Date of hearing: 18 August 2020 and 10 December 2020 (Para 0)
• Date of decision: 16 February 2021 (Para 0)
• Coram: S Mohan JC (Para 0)
• Case numbers: Suit No 564 of 2018; Suit No 565 of 2018 (Para 0)
• Counsel for the plaintiffs: Goh Kok Leong / Dillion Chua Hong Bin (Cai Hongbin) (Ang & Partners) (Para 0)
• Counsel for the fifth defendant: Not stated in the extraction (Para 0)
• Area of law: Damages — Assessment; Damages — Punitive Damages; Damages — Aggravation; Civil Procedure — Pleadings (Para 0)
• Judgment length: Not stated in the extraction (Para 0)

Summary

This judgment arose from assessment of damages following interlocutory judgments in default of appearance entered against the fifth defendant in two related suits. The underlying claims concerned notes issued by Trikomsel Pte Ltd and guaranteed by PT Trikomsel Oke Tbk, and the plaintiffs sought recovery of principal sums and contractual interest after default judgment had already been obtained. The court granted the principal sums and interest, but refused the plaintiffs’ additional claims for punitive and aggravated damages because those claims had not been pleaded or particularised in the Statements of Claim. (Paras 2, 4, 5, 6, 12, 14, 34)

The central legal question was whether punitive damages and aggravated damages must be pleaded before a court can award them. The plaintiffs argued that the Singapore Rules of Court did not expressly require punitive damages to be pleaded, and they relied on older and more recent authorities to contend that aggravated damages likewise need not be specifically pleaded. The judge rejected that submission, holding that the weight of Singapore authority points clearly toward a pleading and particularisation requirement for both categories of damages. (Paras 16, 19, 21, 23, 26, 27, 28, 30, 32)

The decision is important because it reinforces the notice function of pleadings and limits the ability of a plaintiff to seek exceptional damages for the first time in evidence or submissions. The court treated the absence of pleading as fatal even though the fifth defendant did not appear at the assessment hearing. In doing so, the judgment aligns punitive and aggravated damages with the broader procedural principle that a defendant should know the case it has to meet and should not be taken by surprise. (Paras 3, 23, 26, 30, 33, 34)

What Were the Underlying Suits and How Did the Assessment of Damages Arise?

The case concerned two related suits, Suit No 564 of 2018 and Suit No 565 of 2018, in which the plaintiffs had obtained interlocutory judgments in default of appearance against the fifth defendant under Order 13 of the Rules of Court. Those interlocutory judgments were entered on 15 November 2019, and damages were left to be assessed. The assessment hearing then took place before S Mohan JC on 18 August 2020, with a further hearing date of 10 December 2020, and the decision was delivered on 16 February 2021. (Paras 0, 2, 3)

"On 15 November 2019, interlocutory judgments in default of appearance were entered by the plaintiffs against the fifth defendant in both suits pursuant to Order 13 of the Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed) (the “ROC”), with damages to be assessed." — Per S Mohan JC, Para 2

The fifth defendant did not attend the assessment hearing and took no part in the proceedings. That procedural posture mattered because the plaintiffs later sought to enlarge their recovery by asking for punitive and aggravated damages in submissions, even though those heads of loss had not been pleaded in the Statements of Claim. The court nevertheless proceeded to assess the claims on the basis of the pleadings, the AEICs, and the written submissions. (Paras 3, 12, 14, 16)

"The assessment of damages hearing took place before me on 18 August 2020. The fifth defendant was absent and took no part in the hearing." — Per S Mohan JC, Para 3

The court ultimately awarded the principal sums and contractual interest in both suits, but it refused the punitive and aggravated damages claims. The judgment therefore turned not on liability, which had already been established by default judgment, but on the proper scope of recoverable damages at the assessment stage and the procedural prerequisites for exceptional damages. (Paras 4, 5, 6, 34)

What Damages Were Awarded in Suit 564 and Suit 565?

In Suit 564, the court entered final judgment for the plaintiffs against the fifth defendant for $3,750,000, broken down by the number of board lots held by the various plaintiffs, together with interest at 5.25% per annum from 10 May 2015 to the date of judgment. The breakdown included $1,750,000 for the first and second plaintiffs having seven board lots in total, $500,000 for the third plaintiff having two board lots, $250,000 for the fifth plaintiff having one board lot, and $1,250,000 for the sixth plaintiff having five board lots. (Para 4)

"In Suit 564, judgment was given in favour of the plaintiffs against the fifth defendant for the following sums: the sum of $3,750,000, broken down as follows:6 (i) $1,750,000 for the first and second plaintiffs having seven board lots in total; (ii) $500,000 for the third plaintiff having two board lots; (iii) $250,000 for the fifth plaintiff having one board lot; and (iv) $1,250,000 for the sixth plaintiff having five board lots; and (b) interest on the sum of $3,750,000 at the rate of 5.25% per annum from 10 May 2015 to the date of judgment." — Per S Mohan JC, Para 4

In Suit 565, final judgment was entered for $3,000,000, again broken down by board lots, together with interest at 7.875% per annum from 5 June 2015 to the date of judgment. The judgment records that the plaintiffs held board lots of 2016 Notes and 2017 Notes, each with a principal amount of $250,000, issued by the sixth defendant and guaranteed by the fifth defendant. The assessment therefore reflected the principal debt and contractual interest, not any additional punitive or aggravated component. (Paras 4, 5)

"In Suit 565, final judgment for the plaintiffs was granted against the fifth defendant for the following sums: the sum of $3,000,000, broken down as follows:7 (i) $250,000 for the first plaintiff having one board lot; ... and (b) interest on the sum of $3,000,000 at the rate of 7.875% per annum from 5 June 2015 to the date of judgment." — Per S Mohan JC, Para 5

The court also ordered the costs of and incidental to the assessment of damages in both suits to be taxed and paid by the fifth defendant to the plaintiffs, because counsel for the plaintiffs expressed a preference for taxation. The result was therefore a conventional damages assessment on the pleaded debt claims, with costs following the event. (Para 5)

"As counsel for the plaintiffs expressed a preference for costs to be taxed, I ordered the costs of and incidental to the assessment of damages in both suits to be taxed and paid by the fifth defendant to the plaintiffs." — Per S Mohan JC, Para 5

Why Did the Plaintiffs Seek Punitive and Aggravated Damages, and What Was Their Position on Pleading?

The plaintiffs’ position was that the fifth defendant’s conduct justified exceptional damages beyond the principal sums and interest. In submissions, they asked for punitive damages at 150% of the principal amount of the Notes and aggravated damages of $150,000 for each board lot of the Notes. They characterised the conduct as sufficiently serious to warrant punishment and special condemnation. (Paras 14, 18)

"In particular, the plaintiffs submitted that “punitive damages of 150% of the principal amount of the Notes should be awarded”21 (the “Punitive Damages Claim”) and that “$150,000 be awarded as aggravated damages for each board lot of the Notes” (the “Aggravated Damages Claim”)." — Per S Mohan JC, Para 14

On the pleading point, the plaintiffs argued that punitive damages did not need to be pleaded because the Singapore Rules of Court contained no express requirement equivalent to the English rule they cited. They contrasted the Singapore position with Order 18 rule 8(3) of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1972 (UK), which expressly required a claim for exemplary damages to be specifically pleaded together with the facts relied on. They also argued that aggravated damages need not be specifically pleaded, relying on Lee Kuan Yew v Vinocur John. (Paras 19, 21)

"With regard to punitive damages, the plaintiffs submitted that “it is not necessary for exemplary or punitive damages to be pleaded”. In contrast with the English position where a “claim for exemplary damages must be specifically pleaded together with the facts on which the party pleading relies” (O 18 r 8(3) of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1972 (UK)), the Singapore ROC stipulates no such requirement." — Per S Mohan JC, Para 19

"The plaintiffs also submitted that a “claim for aggravated damages need not be specifically pleaded” relying on the decision of Goh Joon Seng J in Lee Kuan Yew v Vinocur John [1995] 3 SLR(R) 38 (“Lee Kuan Yew”) at [37]." — Per S Mohan JC, Para 21

The court rejected those submissions. It held that the absence of an express rule in the Singapore Rules of Court did not mean that punitive or aggravated damages could be raised without pleading. Instead, the court treated the issue as governed by the general principles of pleadings, notice, and particularisation, as reinforced by later amendments and subsequent case law. (Paras 23, 26, 27, 28, 30, 32)

How Did the Court Approach the Pleading Point as the Central Issue?

The judge made clear that the dispute turned on the pleading question rather than on any broader merits inquiry. After setting out the plaintiffs’ submissions, the court stated that its decision revolved around the pleading point and that it would turn to that issue directly. This framing is important because it shows that the refusal of punitive and aggravated damages was procedural as well as substantive: the claims failed because they were not properly put before the court. (Paras 16, 34)

"As my decision revolved around the pleading point as set out above at [15(a)], it is to that issue that I now turn." — Per S Mohan JC, Para 16

The court then examined the relevant authorities and the effect of the Rules of Court. It began from the principle that pleadings serve to notify the opposing party of the case to be met and to prevent surprise. That principle was then applied to aggravated damages, and from there extended to punitive damages. The reasoning was cumulative: older authority was read in context, later authority was treated as more directly supportive, and the modern procedural framework was said to require pleading and particularisation. (Paras 26, 27, 28, 30, 32)

Because the fifth defendant did not appear, one might have thought the absence of prejudice made pleading less important. The court did not accept that approach. Instead, it treated the pleading requirement as a rule of fair process and case management, not merely as a technicality that could be waived whenever the defendant defaulted. That is why the court disallowed both claims even though the plaintiffs had advanced them in evidence and submissions. (Paras 3, 23, 30, 34)

Why Did the Court Hold That Aggravated Damages Had to Be Pleaded and Particularised?

The court’s analysis of aggravated damages began with the proposition that pleadings exist to give notice and avoid surprise. The judge quoted the principle underlying Order 18 rule 7 as being that a party should know the opponent’s case and should not be caught by surprise at trial. That principle was then linked to the need for a defendant to know the facts and matters relied upon in support of aggravated damages, because such damages depend on conduct and circumstances that must be identified in advance. (Paras 26, 27, 28, 30)

"the principle underlying O 18 r 7” is that “a party should be given the opportunity to know what his opponent’s case is and should not be caught by surprise at the trial”" — Per S Mohan JC, Para 26

The judge rejected the plaintiffs’ reliance on Lee Kuan Yew as a general authority for the proposition that aggravated damages need not be pleaded. In the court’s view, that case had to be understood in its own context and did not establish a broad rule that aggravated damages could be claimed without pleading, still less without being sought as specific relief. The court therefore declined to treat Lee Kuan Yew as displacing the ordinary pleading requirement. (Para 26)

"Understood in its proper context, it cannot be said, and I disagree that Lee Kuan Yew stands as authority for the proposition that, as a general starting position, aggravated damages need not be pleaded, much less that it need not even be sought as a specific relief (as in the case against the fifth defendant)." — Per S Mohan JC, Para 26

The court then relied on the post-1997 pleading regime. It quoted Order 78 rule 3(3A), which requires the plaintiff to give full particulars in the statement of claim of the facts and matters relied on in support of a claim for damages, including details of conduct alleged to have increased the loss suffered and of any loss peculiar to the plaintiff’s own circumstances. The judge said that, after the amendments, even in defamation actions the plaintiff must specifically plead and particularise the facts and matters supporting aggravated damages. That reasoning was decisive against the plaintiffs’ aggravated damages claim. (Para 27)

"Without prejudice to Order 18, Rule 12, the plaintiff must give full particulars in the statement of claim of the facts and matters on which he relies in support of his claim for damages, including details of any conduct by the defendant which it is alleged has increased the loss suffered and of any loss which is peculiar to the plaintiff’s own circumstances." — Per S Mohan JC, Para 27

"As such, the undoubted position after the 1997 amendments to the ROC is that, even in defamation actions, the plaintiff must now specifically plead and particularise the facts and matters on which he will rely in support of his claim for aggravated damages" — Per S Mohan JC, Para 27

The court reinforced that conclusion by citing Li Siu Lun v Looi Kok Poh and Noor Azlin bte Abdul Rahman v Changi General Hospital Pte Ltd. Those cases were used to show that aggravated damages must be specifically pleaded and that the amount awarded must be separately identified, because the defendant must be given notice of the claim and the opportunity to respond. The court also referred to Ma Hongjin v SCP Holdings Pte Ltd as supporting the broader objective of ensuring that neither party is taken by surprise. (Paras 28, 30)

"aggravated damages have to be specifically pleaded and the amount awarded as aggravated damages must be identified separately in the court’s final award" — Per S Mohan JC, Para 28

"It is critical that a claim for aggravated damages is pleaded because the defendant must be given notice" — Per S Mohan JC, Para 28

"to ensure that each party was aware of the respective arguments against it and that neither was therefore taken by surprise" — Per S Mohan JC, Para 30

On that basis, the court concluded that the plaintiffs’ aggravated damages claim against the fifth defendant could not be entertained. The claim had not been pleaded, it had not been particularised, and it had not been sought as specific relief in the Statements of Claim. The court therefore disallowed it. (Paras 27, 28, 34)

Why Did the Court Extend the Same Pleading Requirement to Punitive Damages?

Having concluded that aggravated damages must be pleaded and particularised, the court turned to punitive damages. The judge reasoned that the same logic applied: punitive damages are exceptional, they are awarded to punish and deter outrageous conduct, and they therefore require the opposing party to know in advance that such relief is being sought and on what basis. The court expressly stated that, while the earlier discussion concerned aggravated damages, punitive damages should likewise be pleaded and particularised before the court may entertain them. (Paras 18, 32)

"punitive damages is a “response to conduct which is beyond the pale and therefore deserving of special condemnation,” and hence “may be awarded in tort where the totality of the defendant’s conduct is so outrageous that it warrants punishment, deterrence, and condemnation”" — Per S Mohan JC, Para 18

The judge rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the absence of an express pleading rule in the Singapore Rules of Court meant punitive damages could be raised without notice. Instead, the court treated the pleading requirement as flowing from the general structure and purpose of pleadings, not from a single express rule. The court’s approach was therefore functional: if the claim is exceptional and fact-sensitive, it must be pleaded so that the defendant can respond to it. (Paras 19, 23, 26, 30, 32)

"As such, while the cases discussed at [23]–[29] above concerned aggravated damages, claims for punitive damages should, in my view, likewise be pleaded and particularised before they may be entertained by the court." — Per S Mohan JC, Para 32

The court also relied on later authorities that were consistent with this approach. In Aries Telecoms (M) Bhd v ViewQwest Pte Ltd, punitive damages were considered because they had been pleaded and continued to be claimed. In AKRO Group DMCC v Discovery Drilling Pte Ltd, by contrast, punitive damages were disallowed because they had not been pleaded. Those cases supported the proposition that pleading is not a mere formality but a condition for the court’s consideration of punitive damages. (Para 33)

"the plaintiff “initially pleaded” and “subsequently continued to claim” punitive damages" — Per S Mohan JC, Para 33

"the claim for punitive damages was disallowed as it was not pleaded" — Per S Mohan JC, Para 33

Accordingly, the court held that the plaintiffs’ punitive damages claim failed for the same reason as the aggravated damages claim: it had not been pleaded or particularised in the Statements of Claim, and no such relief had been sought against the fifth defendant there. The court therefore disallowed both claims. (Paras 32, 34)

How Did the Court Deal with the Plaintiffs’ Reliance on Older and More Recent Authorities?

The plaintiffs relied on a number of authorities to argue that pleading was unnecessary. The court addressed those authorities in sequence and explained why they did not assist the plaintiffs. The most important of these was Lee Kuan Yew v Vinocur John, which the plaintiffs treated as support for the proposition that aggravated damages need not be specifically pleaded. The judge disagreed, saying that the case had to be understood in context and did not establish a general starting position. (Paras 21, 26)

The court then considered Tan Harry v Teo Chee Yeow Aloysius. The extraction indicates that this case was cited by the plaintiffs in relation to aggravated damages, but the court noted that the claim there had not been allowed because it was not pleaded and because there was an absence of evidence. That made Tan Harry consistent with, rather than contrary to, the proposition that aggravated damages must be pleaded. (Para 29)

"In view of the absence of evidence as well as the point that this claim and its grounds were not pleaded, I did not allow the plaintiffs’ claim for aggravated damages." — Per S Mohan JC, Para 29

The court also relied on Li Siu Lun v Looi Kok Poh, which it treated as authority for the proposition that aggravated damages must be specifically pleaded and separately identified in the final award. Noor Azlin bte Abdul Rahman v Changi General Hospital Pte Ltd was used to reinforce the notice rationale. Together, these cases showed that the modern Singapore position is not permissive but demanding: if a party wants aggravated damages, it must say so clearly and set out the supporting facts. (Paras 28, 30)

Finally, the court referred to Ma Hongjin v SCP Holdings Pte Ltd for the broader principle that pleadings are meant to ensure that each party knows the arguments against it and is not taken by surprise. That principle was then applied to both aggravated and punitive damages. The court’s treatment of the authorities was therefore cumulative and confirmatory, not isolated or technical. (Para 30)

What Was the Court’s Final Order on the Punitive and Aggravated Damages Claims?

The final order was straightforward: the court disallowed both the punitive damages claim and the aggravated damages claim against the fifth defendant. The judge stated expressly that those claims were neither pleaded nor particularised, and that no such relief had been sought in the Statements of Claim. That procedural defect was decisive. (Para 34)

"The plaintiffs’ Punitive Damages Claim and Aggravated Damages Claim against the fifth defendant were neither pleaded nor particularised by the plaintiffs; nor was any such relief sought against the fifth defendant in the Statements of Claim. I thus disallowed both claims." — Per S Mohan JC, Para 34

The court’s order did not disturb the principal awards or the interest awards already granted in the two suits. Nor did it alter the costs order, which required the fifth defendant to pay the taxed costs of the assessment. The only heads of claim rejected were the exceptional damages claims that had not been properly pleaded. (Paras 4, 5, 34)

In practical terms, the judgment demonstrates that even where liability is established by default and the defendant does not appear, the plaintiff cannot expand the scope of recovery at the assessment stage without having pleaded the relevant heads of damage. The court treated the pleading defect as fatal notwithstanding the default posture of the fifth defendant. (Paras 2, 3, 34)

Why Does This Case Matter for Singapore Pleading Practice?

This case matters because it clarifies the procedural discipline required for claims of punitive and aggravated damages in Singapore civil litigation. The court made clear that such claims are not automatic add-ons to a damages assessment; they must be pleaded and particularised in the originating pleadings. That is especially important in default judgment settings, where there may be a temptation to treat the assessment hearing as an opportunity to enlarge the claim. (Paras 2, 16, 23, 27, 32, 34)

The judgment also narrows any overbroad reading of older authority, particularly Lee Kuan Yew v Vinocur John. By reading that case in context and refusing to treat it as a general exemption from pleading requirements, the court aligned the law with the modern emphasis on notice, fairness, and case management. The result is a more coherent pleading regime in which exceptional damages must be identified early and clearly. (Paras 26, 27, 30)

For practitioners, the lesson is practical and immediate: if punitive or aggravated damages are contemplated, they must be expressly pleaded, particularised, and sought as specific relief. Failure to do so may result in the claim being rejected even if the underlying facts might otherwise have supported it. The case therefore serves as a cautionary authority on the limits of post-pleading expansion of damages claims. (Paras 27, 28, 32, 34)

Cases Referred To

Legislation Referenced

• Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed), Order 13 (Para 2)
• Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed), Order 18 rule 7(1) (Para 26)
• Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed), Order 78 rule 3(3) (Para 27)
• Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed), Order 78 rule 3(3A) (Para 27)
• Rules of the Supreme Court 1972 (UK), Order 18 rule 8(3) (Para 19)
• Rules of the Supreme Court 1972 (UK), Order 18 rule 12 (Para 27)

"The approach adopted by the courts in recent years would also be more consistent with the underlying purpose of pleadings, ie, “to ensure that each party was aware of the respective arguments against it and that neither was therefore taken by surprise”" — Per S Mohan JC, Para 30

"I disallowed the claims of the plaintiffs in both suits for punitive and aggravated damages." — Per S Mohan JC, Para 6

"The earliest mention of “punitive, exemplary or aggravated damages” against the fifth defendant was in the affidavits of evidence-in-chief (“AEICs”) of the respective plaintiffs dated 7 August 2020." — Per S Mohan JC, Para 12

"The plaintiffs’ Punitive Damages Claim and Aggravated Damages Claim against the fifth defendant were neither pleaded nor particularised by the plaintiffs; nor was any such relief sought against the fifth defendant in the Statements of Claim. I thus disallowed both claims." — Per S Mohan JC, Para 34

Source Documents

• Original Judgment — Singapore Courts
• Archived Copy (PDF) — Litt Law CDN

This article analyses [2021] SGHC 34 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.