Case Details
- Citation: [2025] SGHC 257
- Title: Ser Kang Wei and another v Salas Porras, Carlos Luis and others
- Court: High Court of the Republic of Singapore (General Division)
- Date of Decision: 19 December 2025
- Originating Claim No: OC 545 of 2025
- Summons No: SUM 2924 of 2025
- Related Summons: SUM 1957 of 2025
- Related Order/Originating Relief: ORC 4167 of 2025
- Judges: Tan Siong Thye SJ
- Hearing/Reservation: Judgment reserved (4 November 2025)
- Plaintiff/Applicant: Ser Kang Wei (Xu Kangwei) and Lucent Trading Limited
- Defendant/Respondent: Salas Porras Carlos Luis; Yong Khong Yoong Mark; Emily Hwang Mei Chen
- Legal Area: Civil Procedure — Mareva Injunctions
- Procedural Posture: Application to set aside (or vary) a worldwide Mareva injunction; alternative application to fortify undertaking as to damages
- Length of Judgment: 69 pages; 19,958 words
- Key Relief Sought in SUM 2924: Set aside ORC 4167; alternatively vary the permitted living expenses; order fortification of undertaking as to damages
- Core Amounts Referenced: Mareva cap up to US$38,614,846; permitted ordinary living expenses of $1,000 per week; claimants’ alleged principal and profits totalling US$38,614,846 and US$39,264,479.20 respectively
- Cases Cited (as provided): [2016] SGHC 102; [2025] SGHC 257
Summary
This decision concerns a challenge by two defendants, Mark and Emily, to a worldwide Mareva injunction (ORC 4167) granted ex parte on 21 July 2025 in support of a main claim (OC 545). The claimants, Ser Kang Wei (“Jack”) and Lucent Trading Limited (“Lucent Trading”), alleged that the defendants perpetuated a fraudulent gold investment scheme. The Mareva injunction prohibited the defendants from disposing of assets worldwide up to a value of US$38,614,846, while permitting each defendant to spend $1,000 per week on ordinary living expenses.
In SUM 2924, Mark and Emily sought to set aside ORC 4167 on multiple grounds: first, that the claimants had not demonstrated a good arguable case; second, that there was no real risk of dissipation; and third, that the claimants failed to make full and frank disclosure in the earlier ex parte application (SUM 1957), including allegations that the earlier process was used improperly to extract information and/or coerce testimony. They also sought, in the alternative, to increase the living-expenses allowance and to have the injunction varied. The High Court dismissed the application to set aside, but ordered fortification of the claimants’ undertaking as to damages by requiring payment of $100,000 into court.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
The underlying dispute is factually complex and centred on two alleged investment schemes connected to gold trading in South Africa and Zimbabwe. The claimants’ narrative begins in or around March 2019, when Carlos allegedly enticed Jack to invest in a South African gold trading structure. The claimants’ case is that only licensed refineries could refine and export gold in South Africa, and that this regulatory environment created an opportunity for a licensed trading company, Ultra Trading 014 (Pty) Ltd (“Ultra Trading”), to consolidate gold from smaller artisanal miners and sell it to Precious Metals Tswane (Pty) Ltd (“Precious Metals SA”), a gold refinery owned by Patrick Chinondo (“Patrick”). The claimants further alleged that profits would be shared with investors through what was described as the “SA Scheme”.
Jack’s participation, as pleaded, involved transfers of cryptocurrency Tether (USDT). He allegedly invested US$2,759,534 by making two USDT transfers to a crypto wallet controlled by Carlos on 31 October 2019 and 9 November 2019. Later, Carlos proposed formalising the SA Scheme through a fund called Pinnacle Liquid Enhanced Returns Commodities Strategy 50, Segregated Portfolio (“PIERCE50”), described as the flagship fund of Coinful Capital Fund SPC (“Coinful Capital”), a hedge fund set up by Carlos in the Cayman Islands in 2018. Jack agreed to have his investment transferred to Coinful Capital around 5 January 2020.
As the relationship developed, the claimants alleged that Jack was induced to invest further, this time through a BVI company, Master Dragon Global Enterprises Holding Ltd (“Master Dragon”), which Carlos suggested would offer higher returns because it was “unregulated” and would not incur regulatory fees. The claimants’ account states that between 5 February 2020 and 21 September 2021, Jack invested cryptocurrency totalling US$35,855,312 with Master Dragon through Lucent Trading, based on assurances and representations made by the defendants. The judgment notes that the claimants were not entirely consistent as to the precise amount in their pleadings, but treated US$35,855,312 as the relevant figure for simplicity.
The claimants then alleged a shift from South Africa to Zimbabwe. In late 2021, Carlos allegedly told Jack that COVID-19 had created difficulties with gold trading in South Africa, but that a similar scheme could be executed in Zimbabwe. Under the “Zimbabwean Scheme”, BetterBrands Investments (Private) Limited (“BetterBrands Investments”) would purchase gold and sell it to Fidelity Printers and Refiners (“Fidelity”) for profit, which would be shared with investors. Jack was said to have believed BetterBrands Investments was part of a well-known conglomerate associated with Pedzai Sakupwanya (“Scott”), and that Fidelity was wholly owned by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe. The claimants’ case, however, was that BetterBrands Investments was a separate entity with no relation to the BetterBrands Jewellery Group, and that the purported structure did not reflect the true relationships.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The High Court had to determine, in the context of a Mareva injunction challenge, whether the injunction should be set aside or varied. The judgment frames the issues around three main pillars: (1) whether the Mareva injunction “encapsulated” in ORC 4167 should be set aside; (2) the legal foundation for granting Mareva relief in Singapore; and (3) whether the claimants met the evidential thresholds required for such relief.
First, the court had to consider whether the claimants had shown a good arguable case against Mark and Emily in the main suit (OC 545). This required the court to examine, at a high level, the alleged roles of Mark and Emily in the SA Scheme and the Zimbabwean Scheme, including the claimants’ assertions about their involvement in the investment chain and the representations made to Jack.
Second, the court had to assess whether the claimants demonstrated a real risk that Mark and Emily would dissipate assets. This is a central requirement for Mareva injunctions: the court must be satisfied that there is a credible risk of frustration of judgment by asset dissipation, not merely a speculative fear.
Third, the court had to address whether the claimants failed to make full and frank disclosure in SUM 1957, the ex parte application that led to ORC 4167. The defendants alleged undue delay in filing SUM 1957, and further alleged that ORC 4167 was used improperly—described as coercive or “weaponised”—to extract information about assets and/or to influence testimony. Finally, the court had to consider whether ORC 4167 should be varied (including increasing the living-expenses allowance) and whether the claimants should be ordered to fortify their undertaking as to damages.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
The court began by setting out the procedural context and the nature of the relief. ORC 4167 was a worldwide Mareva injunction granted ex parte on 21 July 2025, in support of OC 545. The injunction restrained the defendants from disposing of assets worldwide up to US$38,614,846, while allowing limited ordinary living expenses of $1,000 per week. Mark and Emily’s application in SUM 2924 sought to set aside ORC 4167, or alternatively to vary it by increasing the permitted spending, and to require fortification of the undertaking as to damages.
On the substantive Mareva framework, the court’s analysis proceeded through the familiar Singapore approach: the claimants needed to show (i) a good arguable case; and (ii) a real risk of dissipation. Although the judgment extract provided does not reproduce the full reasoning, the structure of the issues indicates that the court examined the claimants’ pleaded and evidential basis for alleging misrepresentation, conspiracy, and unjust enrichment in OC 545, and then assessed whether Mark and Emily’s involvement was sufficiently arguable at this interlocutory stage.
In relation to the “good arguable case” requirement, the court considered the claimants’ narrative of how Jack’s investments were channelled. The judgment highlights that Jack allegedly invested US$2,759,534 into the SA Scheme via Carlos-controlled wallets and later invested through Coinful Capital and PIERCE50. It also describes the alleged redirection of investments into the Zimbabwean Scheme when payouts ceased, including the February 2022 Fidelity letter and the Master Sale and Purchase Offtake and Underwriting Agreement. The court also addressed the claimants’ allegations that Mark and Emily were involved from the outset and had roles in both schemes. The analysis therefore necessarily involved evaluating whether the claimants’ account—particularly as to Mark and Emily—was not merely speculative, but supported by evidence sufficient to clear the “good arguable case” threshold.
On the “real risk of dissipation” issue, the court would have assessed whether there was evidence pointing to a risk that Mark and Emily might move or dispose of assets in a manner that would frustrate enforcement of any judgment. The judgment’s framing indicates that the court considered whether the claimants had shown such a risk specifically in relation to Mark and Emily, rather than relying on general allegations about the defendants’ conduct. In Mareva applications, the court typically looks at factors such as past conduct, the defendants’ financial position, the nature and location of assets, and any indications of intent to defeat enforcement. The court ultimately dismissed the application to set aside, suggesting that the evidential basis for risk was sufficient at the interlocutory stage.
The judgment also addressed the defendants’ disclosure-based challenges. The court had to determine whether the claimants failed to make full and frank disclosure in SUM 1957, and whether SUM 1957 was an abuse of process. The defendants alleged undue delay in filing SUM 1957, and further alleged that ORC 4167 was used to coerce Gloria into testifying against Mark and Emily, and/or to weaponise the injunction to extract information about assets. These are serious allegations because non-disclosure or abuse of process can lead to the setting aside of an ex parte Mareva injunction. The court, however, dismissed the set-aside application, indicating that either the alleged non-disclosure was not established to the required standard, or that any shortcomings did not warrant the drastic remedy of setting aside the injunction.
Finally, the court considered whether ORC 4167 should be varied and whether the claimants should fortify their undertaking as to damages. The judgment indicates that the court dismissed SUM 2924 “save for the issue of fortification”, and ordered the claimants to pay $100,000 into court. This outcome suggests that while the court was not persuaded to remove or materially relax the Mareva restraint, it considered that the circumstances warranted additional protection for the defendants against the risk of wrongful injunction—consistent with the function of fortification as a safeguard where appropriate.
What Was the Outcome?
The High Court dismissed Mark and Emily’s application to set aside ORC 4167. The Mareva injunction therefore remained in place, continuing to restrain the defendants from disposing of assets worldwide up to the specified cap, subject to the existing allowance for ordinary living expenses.
However, the court ordered fortification of the claimants’ undertaking as to damages. Specifically, the claimants were ordered to pay $100,000 into court. Practically, this means that while the defendants did not obtain the immediate lifting (or increased spending) they sought, they obtained enhanced financial security against the possibility that the injunction was ultimately found to have been wrongly granted.
Why Does This Case Matter?
This case is significant for practitioners because it illustrates how Singapore courts approach challenges to Mareva injunctions granted ex parte, particularly where defendants allege non-disclosure, abuse of process, and improper use of the injunction to obtain information. The court’s refusal to set aside the injunction—despite detailed allegations—signals that defendants face a high evidential burden when seeking to overturn urgent, interlocutory relief, especially after the injunction has already been granted and is tied to the alleged value of the principal investment at stake.
At the same time, the court’s decision to order fortification underscores that even where a Mareva injunction is not set aside, the court may still calibrate the balance of risk by requiring additional security. For claimants, this serves as a reminder that undertakings as to damages are taken seriously, and that courts may respond to perceived risk or procedural concerns through fortification rather than removal of the injunction.
For defendants, the decision highlights the importance of framing disclosure and abuse allegations with precision and evidential support. Allegations that an injunction was “weaponised” or used coercively are not merely rhetorical; they must be substantiated. For lawyers advising either side, the case provides a useful template for how courts structure Mareva challenges: good arguable case, real risk of dissipation, disclosure compliance, and proportionality/variation, with fortification as a potential middle ground.
Legislation Referenced
- (Not provided in the supplied judgment extract.)
Cases Cited
- [2016] SGHC 102
- [2025] SGHC 257
Source Documents
This article analyses [2025] SGHC 257 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.