Case Details
- Title: SELENA CHIONG CHIN MAY v ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF SINGAPORE & Anor
- Citation: [2021] SGHC 167
- Court: High Court of the Republic of Singapore (Court of Three Judges)
- Date: 30 June 2021
- Judges: Sundaresh Menon CJ, Andrew Phang Boon Leong JCA and Chao Hick Tin SJ
- Originating Process: Originating Summons No 1 of 2021
- Applicant: Selena Chiong Chin May
- Respondents: (1) Attorney-General of Singapore; (2) The Law Society of Singapore
- Legal Area: Legal Profession; Disciplinary/Reinstatement; Professional Conduct
- Statutes Referenced: Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 2009 Rev Ed) (notably s 102)
- Other Statute Mentioned: Legal Profession Act (as referenced in metadata)
- Key Provision: Section 102 of the Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 2009 Rev Ed) (reinstatement to the Roll)
- Procedural Posture: Application for reinstatement after being struck off the Roll
- Decision: Application dismissed; reinstatement refused
- Judgment Type: Ex tempore judgment
- Judgment Length: 11 pages; 2,884 words
- Cases Cited (as provided): [2021] SGHC 167 (self-citation in metadata); Nathan Edmund v Law Society of Singapore [2013] 1 SLR 729; Knight Glenn Jeyasingam v Law Society of Singapore [2007] 3 SLR(R) 704; Law Society of Singapore v Chia Choon Yang [2018] 5 SLR 1068; Re Lim Cheng Peng [1987] SLR(R) 582; Kalpanath Singh s/o Ram Raj Singh v Law Society of Singapore [2009] 4 SLR(R) 1018
- Core Factual Background: Applicant struck off in 2014 after convictions for criminal breach of trust; mental illness (depression/bipolar disorder) relied upon as mitigating context
Summary
In Selena Chiong Chin May v Attorney-General of Singapore & Anor ([2021] SGHC 167), the High Court (Court of Three Judges) dismissed an application by a former advocate and solicitor for reinstatement to the Roll of advocates and solicitors under s 102 of the Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 2009 Rev Ed). The applicant had been struck off the Roll on 20 August 2014 following convictions on several counts of criminal breach of trust (“CBT”), an offence involving dishonesty. Although the court had previously taken into account the applicant’s psychiatric history, the court held that she had not discharged the burden of demonstrating that she was “fully rehabilitated”.
The court applied the established three-factor framework for reinstatement: (a) whether an adequate interval has passed since striking off; (b) whether the applicant has been fully and completely rehabilitated; and (c) whether reinstatement would undermine the public interest and the reputation of the legal profession. While the court accepted that the interval was substantially adequate in the particular circumstances, it found that the applicant’s evidence did not sufficiently address the risk of recurrence of misconduct linked to her mental condition, nor did it show that compliance with treatment could be assured in a way that would protect the public and the profession.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
The applicant, Selena Chiong Chin May, was struck off the Roll on 20 August 2014 after being convicted of several counts of criminal breach of trust. The convictions arose from her retention of client monies instead of placing the sums into the required client account. The sentencing court imposed a custodial term of nine months, and the applicant appealed both conviction and sentence. The High Court dismissed the appeal on conviction but allowed the appeal on sentence, reducing the sentence to a day’s imprisonment and some fines. In doing so, the High Court was sympathetic to the applicant’s mental condition, noting her long history of bipolar disorder and that it could have affected her judgment adversely.
Before the striking off, the applicant had faced two sets of disciplinary proceedings. A recurring theme across these disciplinary matters was the applicant’s mental illness. The applicant’s psychiatric history began after the birth of her first child in 1996, when she was diagnosed first with depression and later with bipolar disorder. The court’s earlier disciplinary decisions recognised that the applicant’s acts should be viewed through the prism of her mental illness, and that she might need professional help and attention to resolve her mental issues. The court also indicated that, once her issues were behind her, it might view a reinstatement application sympathetically even if brought earlier than is customarily expected.
In January 2021, the applicant applied for reinstatement to the Roll. The application was opposed by both the Attorney-General and the Law Society of Singapore. The respondents’ opposition reflected the seriousness of the underlying misconduct (dishonesty) and the need to ensure that any reinstatement would not compromise the public interest or the reputation of the legal profession. The court therefore had to assess not only the passage of time since striking off, but also whether the applicant had achieved full rehabilitation and whether reinstatement would be safe and appropriate.
In assessing the interval, the court noted that almost seven years had passed since 20 August 2014. Ordinarily, a period significantly longer than five years is expected before reinstatement will be considered favourably. However, the court also considered two contextual factors. First, at the time of striking off, the court had already acknowledged that the CBT offences were committed when the applicant was suffering from psychiatric illness, which reduced her culpability. Second, the applicant had voluntarily ceased practice in July 2010—about four years before the striking off order—after police reports were made and criminal proceedings were brought. At the Law Society’s request, she surrendered her Practising Certificate (“PC”). The court treated this voluntary suspension as relevant to the interval analysis, though not as a full substitute for the court’s own assessment of rehabilitation.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The central legal issue was whether the applicant met the statutory and jurisprudential requirements for reinstatement under s 102 of the Legal Profession Act. The court reiterated that the law is settled: three crucial factors must be considered in assessing reinstatement applications. These factors are not merely procedural; they reflect the dual purpose of the disciplinary regime—protecting the public and maintaining confidence in the legal profession—while also allowing for the possibility that an errant lawyer may rehabilitate and return to practice.
The first issue concerned the adequacy of the interval between the striking off order and the reinstatement application. Although the applicant’s seven-year gap was longer than five years, it was still not automatically sufficient in the ordinary course. The court therefore had to decide whether the particular circumstances—especially the earlier recognition of mental illness as mitigating and the applicant’s voluntary cessation of practice—justified treating the interval as substantially adequate.
The second and most significant issue concerned rehabilitation. The applicant bore the burden of demonstrating that she had been fully and completely rehabilitated. This required more than general assertions of fitness; it required objective evidence of conduct during the interval and credible assurances that the risk of recurrence of misconduct arising from her psychiatric condition could be discounted.
The third issue was whether reinstatement would undermine or prejudice the protection of the public interest and the reputation of the legal profession. Given that the underlying offences involved dishonesty, the court had to be particularly cautious. Even if the applicant had improved personally, reinstatement could not be granted if the court was not satisfied that the public would be protected and that confidence in the profession would not be eroded.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
The court began by restating the three-factor framework for reinstatement, citing Nathan Edmund v Law Society of Singapore [2013] 1 SLR 729 at [10]. It then considered each factor in turn. On the interval, the court acknowledged that almost seven years had passed since striking off. It also referenced the general rule from Knight Glenn Jeyasingam v Law Society of Singapore [2007] 3 SLR(R) 704 that a period significantly longer than five years should have passed before an application would be considered favourably. The court observed that, in the ordinary case, seven years may not typically be regarded as sufficient.
However, the court accepted that the interval was adequate in the particular circumstances. Two reasons drove this conclusion. First, the court had previously noted that the CBT offences were committed at a time when the applicant was suffering from psychiatric illness that reduced her culpability. This earlier recognition suggested that the court’s “sympathetic” approach to earlier reinstatement might be relevant once the applicant’s issues were resolved. Second, the applicant had voluntarily ceased practice in July 2010 and surrendered her PC at the Law Society’s request. The court treated the effective period of non-practice as much longer than the seven years between striking off and application—approximately 11 years in substance—because she had not been practising for a substantial period prior to the formal striking off.
The court also discussed the relevance of voluntary suspension. It accepted that voluntary cessation can, in suitable cases, be treated as a mitigating factor and may indicate genuine remorse and contrition. It also recognised a public interest in incentivising lawyers to cease practice voluntarily in advance of formal disciplinary determinations, citing Law Society of Singapore v Chia Choon Yang [2018] 5 SLR 1068 at [52]. Nevertheless, the court emphasised that the credit given for voluntary suspension is discretionary and must be approached with due regard to the specific circumstances. It also referred to the principle that the court will typically not give credit for the full period of voluntary suspension because it is ultimately not for the lawyer to determine his or her own punishment, citing Chia Choon Yang at [53] and Re Lim Cheng Peng [1987] SLR(R) 582 at [25]. Applying these principles, the court accepted that the applicant’s voluntary suspension was borne out of genuine remorse and contrition and therefore treated the interval as substantially and adequately in excess of five years.
Turning to rehabilitation, the court stressed that the applicant must demonstrate, by reference to her conduct during the interval, that she has been fully rehabilitated. It cited Kalpanath Singh s/o Ram Raj Singh v Law Society of Singapore [2009] 4 SLR(R) 1018 at [19] for the proposition that objective evidence of what the applicant has been involved in during the interval, and references from members of the legal fraternity, are key. The court then found that the applicant had not discharged her burden for three reasons, the first of which was decisive.
First, the court was not satisfied that the applicant had adequately resolved her psychiatric issues. The applicant relied on a report from her psychiatrist certifying that she was “fit to return to work as an Advocate and Solicitor” provided she continued strict adherence to medication and follow-up appointments. However, the court noted that the same report also stated that prior to the commission of the CBT offences, the applicant had been assessed as fit to return to work as a lawyer so long as she complied with appointments and medication. In other words, the present assessment was not materially different from the earlier assessment that existed before the misconduct occurred. The court held that the report did not explain how the risk of recurrence of misconduct could be adequately managed or addressed.
Second, the court was concerned that compliance with treatment could not be assumed. The psychiatrist’s report made compliance a proviso to fitness to practise, but the court observed that the report itself indicated the applicant had been somewhat irregular in keeping medical appointments in the past. The applicant argued that her children could intervene if she relapsed. The court accepted that such interaction might be relevant, but it held that this did not address the real question: what steps had been taken, and would be taken, to assure that the applicant would remain compliant with her treatment regimen. The court’s reasoning reflects a practical, risk-focused approach: the legal profession requires not only theoretical fitness but reliable safeguards against relapse that could lead to further misconduct.
Third, the court considered a supplementary psychiatric report submitted on the eve of the hearing. The court criticised the manner of submission: it was provided without leave, without being filed as part of an affidavit, and without explanation. The court inferred that it was sought by the applicant because it was addressed to the solicitors for the Law Society and copied to the Attorney-General, and it referred to the applicant’s reinstatement application. While the court said it considered the report despite the irregularity, it found that it did not help the applicant’s case. The supplementary report, after reviewing the applicant’s past records with the Institute of Mental Health, confirmed a real risk of relapse triggered by major life changes, over-exertion, insufficient rest, emotional stress, or poor attention to one’s own health. Again, the court found nothing before it to satisfy it that these concerns had been adequately addressed prior to making the application.
Although the provided extract truncates the remainder of the judgment, the court’s conclusion was clear: the applicant had not shown full rehabilitation. This finding necessarily fed into the third factor—public interest and the reputation of the profession—because reinstatement could not be granted where the court was not satisfied that the risk of recurrence had been sufficiently mitigated.
What Was the Outcome?
The High Court dismissed the application for reinstatement. The court held that the applicant had not discharged the burden of demonstrating that she had been fully rehabilitated. The practical effect is that the applicant remained struck off the Roll and therefore could not resume practice as an advocate and solicitor.
For the applicant, the decision closes the door to reinstatement at least at that time. For future applicants, it underscores that even where an interval is adequate and mental illness is recognised as a mitigating context, reinstatement will still be refused unless the applicant can provide credible, objective evidence that the risk of relapse and misconduct has been effectively addressed.
Why Does This Case Matter?
This case is significant for practitioners because it illustrates how the reinstatement framework operates in practice, particularly where the underlying misconduct is dishonesty and the applicant relies on psychiatric evidence. The court accepted that the interval could be treated as substantially adequate due to the applicant’s circumstances, including voluntary cessation of practice and the earlier recognition of mental illness as mitigating. However, the court’s refusal turned on rehabilitation—specifically, the adequacy of the evidence addressing relapse risk and compliance assurance.
From a doctrinal perspective, Selena Chiong Chin May reinforces that “fitness to practise” in a medical sense is not automatically equivalent to “full rehabilitation” for disciplinary purposes. The court scrutinised whether the psychiatric report meaningfully addressed why the risk of misconduct had been reduced compared to the period before the offences. It also required more than reliance on family support; it demanded concrete steps and safeguards to ensure ongoing compliance with treatment.
For lawyers advising clients in disciplinary proceedings, the case highlights the evidential burden. Applicants should be prepared to provide objective, detailed and credible evidence of rehabilitation, including how treatment compliance will be maintained, what relapse triggers exist, and what measures have been implemented to mitigate those triggers. Where psychiatric evidence is used, it must show a material change from the pre-offence position and must address risk management rather than merely certifying conditional fitness.
Legislation Referenced
- Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 2009 Rev Ed), s 102 (Reinstatement to the Roll of advocates and solicitors) [CDN] [SSO]
- Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 2009 Rev Ed) (general reference as reflected in metadata)
Cases Cited
- Nathan Edmund v Law Society of Singapore [2013] 1 SLR 729
- Knight Glenn Jeyasingam v Law Society of Singapore [2007] 3 SLR(R) 704
- Law Society of Singapore v Chia Choon Yang [2018] 5 SLR 1068
- Re Lim Cheng Peng [1987] SLR(R) 582
- Kalpanath Singh s/o Ram Raj Singh v Law Society of Singapore [2009] 4 SLR(R) 1018
- Selena Chiong Chin May v Attorney-General of Singapore & Anor [2021] SGHC 167
Source Documents
This article analyses [2021] SGHC 167 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.