Case Details
- Citation: [2024] SGHC 299
- Title: Sang Cheol Woo v Spackman, Charles Choi and others
- Court: High Court of the Republic of Singapore (General Division)
- Date of Judgment: 26 November 2024
- Date Judgment Reserved: 11 November 2024
- Judge: Kwek Mean Luck J
- Case Type: Registrar’s Appeal
- Suit No: HC/S 211/2019
- Registrar’s Appeal No: Registrar’s Appeal No 186 of 2024
- Plaintiff/Applicant: Sang Cheol Woo
- Defendants/Respondents: Charles Choi Spackman; Kim Jae Seung; Kim So Hee; Richard Lee; Funvest Global Pte Ltd; Spackman Media Group Limited; Plutoray Pte Ltd; Vaara Pte Ltd; Starlight Corp Pte Ltd
- Legal Areas: Civil Procedure — Amendments; Abuse of Process — Riddick principle
- Statutes Referenced: Civil Law Act; Civil Law Act 1909; Legal Profession Act; Legal Profession Act 1966
- Key Procedural Provisions: O 20 r 5(1) Rules of Court (2014 Rev Ed) (“ROC 2014”)
- Principal Authorities Cited: [2020] SGCA 64; [2021] SGHC 154; [2022] SGHC 298; [2024] SGHC 299
- Length: 23 pages; 6,317 words
Summary
This decision concerns a plaintiff’s appeal against an Assistant Registrar’s grant of leave to amend a defence in ongoing High Court proceedings. The underlying suit, HC/S 211/2019 (“S211”), had been bifurcated. In the first stage, the High Court determined the enforceability in Singapore of a Seoul High Court judgment against the first defendant. The second stage—still pending—concerns the liability of other defendants for conspiracy, including lawful and unlawful means conspiracy.
The amendments sought by the second and third defendants (“2D” and “3D”) were triggered by statements made by the plaintiff in a separate defamation action (HC/S 592/2020). In a sixth affidavit filed there, the plaintiff described a contingency fee arrangement with foreign counsel, Kobre & Kim LLP, under which he agreed to pay an additional amount out of net recovery from enforcement of the Seoul judgment. The defendants sought to amend their defence in S211 to plead that this arrangement was champertous/maintainable and that the plaintiff’s enforcement claim was therefore tainted and an abuse of process.
The High Court addressed five interlocking issues: whether the “proceedings” were still “afoot” for the purposes of O 20 r 5(1) ROC 2014; whether the amendment application was an abuse of process; whether the Riddick principle applies to non-parties; whether it applies to documents disclosed only to resist discovery applications rather than under compulsion of a court order; and whether there was a “real question to be determined” by the amendments. The court’s analysis demonstrates a careful approach to amendment discretion, the boundary between challenging a final judgment and raising related defences in a bifurcated trial, and the scope of the implied undertaking underpinning the Riddick principle.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
The plaintiff, Sang Cheol Woo, brought S211 against nine defendants. The first defendant (“1D”) was the primary target of the enforcement claim. The plaintiff sought to enforce a Seoul High Court judgment (“SHCJ”) in Singapore. Because the enforceability question could be separated from subsequent issues, the proceedings were bifurcated by an earlier decision on HC/SUM 4716/2021 (“SUM 4716”). The first stage trial focused on whether the SHCJ was enforceable in Singapore. The other defendants were given leave to provide submissions at the end of the first stage and agreed to be bound by the decision reached in that stage.
On 30 November 2022, the High Court allowed the plaintiff’s claim for enforcement of the SHCJ in Singapore in Sang Cheol Woo v Charles Choi Spackman and ors [2022] SGHC 298 (“Judgment”). That meant the enforcement of the SHCJ against 1D was determined. The second stage trial in S211, however, had not yet proceeded. In the second stage, the plaintiff’s claims in lawful and unlawful means conspiracy against all defendants were to be determined.
While S211 was pending, a separate defamation action, HC/S 592/2020, was brought by Spackman Entertainment Group Limited (“SEGL”) against the plaintiff. In that defamation action, the plaintiff filed a sixth affidavit on 4 April 2024 (“Plaintiff’s 6th Affidavit”). In that affidavit, the plaintiff stated that he had entered into a contingency fee arrangement with foreign counsel, Kobre & Kim LLP (“KK Fee Arrangement”). The arrangement provided for an additional amount to be paid out of the net recovery from enforcement of the SHCJ. The defendants in S211—particularly 2D and 3D—contended that this statement potentially contradicted the plaintiff’s position during the first stage trial in S211 that he was “not in any agreement to share the fruits of this proceeding with any third party.”
On the basis of the Plaintiff’s 6th Affidavit, 2D and 3D applied to amend their defence in S211. The amendments were designed to plead that the KK Fee Arrangement was prohibited and/or unenforceable under Singapore law, and that, in light of that, the plaintiff’s enforcement claim was tainted by maintenance and/or champerty and thus constituted an abuse of process. The Assistant Registrar granted leave to amend. The plaintiff appealed that decision to the High Court, arguing that the amendment was impermissible and abusive, and that it improperly sought to reopen matters already finally determined in the first stage.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
First, the court had to determine whether the “proceedings” in S211 were still “afoot” for the purposes of O 20 r 5(1) ROC 2014, given that the first stage trial on enforceability had been resolved, while the second stage on conspiracy liability remained pending. This issue mattered because O 20 r 5(1) governs when and how amendments may be made, and the plaintiff argued that the enforcement claim had already been finally and conclusively determined.
Second, the plaintiff contended that the amendment application amounted to an abuse of process. The argument was that the amendments were targeted at undermining the final enforcement judgment against 1D, and that the defendants were effectively seeking a “second bite at the cherry” after choosing not to challenge the enforcement judgment at the appropriate time.
Third, the court considered whether the Riddick principle—arising from Riddick v Thames Board Mills Ltd [1997] QB 881—applies to non-parties. This was relevant because the Plaintiff’s 6th Affidavit was filed in a different action (the defamation suit), and the defendants in S211 were not necessarily the same parties as those in the defamation proceedings.
Fourth, the court addressed whether the Riddick principle applies to documents that were disclosed for the purpose of resisting a discovery application, but not under compulsion of a court order. This issue required the court to examine the scope of the implied undertaking and whether “compulsion” is limited to formal court orders or extends to disclosures made in response to interlocutory applications.
Finally, the court had to decide whether there was a “real question to be determined” by the proposed amendments. This is a central amendment threshold: even where amendments are procedurally permissible, the court must consider whether the proposed pleading raises a genuine issue fit for determination rather than a tactical or irrelevant point.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
The High Court began by framing the appeal as a challenge to the Assistant Registrar’s exercise of discretion to allow amendments. The court’s approach reflects the established principle that amendments should generally be allowed if they can be made without injustice, and if they raise a real issue for trial. However, where amendments are alleged to be abusive or to undermine finality, the court must scrutinise the purpose and effect of the proposed changes.
On the “proceedings still afoot” question, the court considered the bifurcated structure of S211. Although the first stage trial on enforceability had been determined, the second stage trial remained pending. The court treated the suit as ongoing for amendment purposes because the litigation had not concluded; the enforcement decision was only one stage of the overall dispute. This analysis supported the view that O 20 r 5(1) ROC 2014 could still apply, notwithstanding that one discrete issue had been resolved earlier. In practical terms, the court recognised that bifurcation does not necessarily create separate “proceedings” for amendment purposes; rather, it segments the trial into stages within the same action.
Turning to abuse of process, the court examined whether the amendments were truly aimed at reopening the enforcement judgment, or whether they were directed at a different question—namely, the effect of the KK Fee Arrangement on the plaintiff’s claims in the second stage, including conspiracy. The plaintiff argued that the amendments were targeted at the enforcement claim and would allow 2D and 3D to attack a final and binding judgment. The court, however, accepted that it was open to the defendants to plead relevant defences and issues in the remaining stage, provided the amendments did not amount to an impermissible collateral attack on the earlier determination.
In assessing the substance of the proposed defence, the court considered the common law doctrine of maintenance and champerty and the public policy rationale behind it. The plaintiff’s position was that the doctrine should not apply to contingency fee arrangements with foreign counsel lacking a direct or necessary relationship to Singapore litigation. The defendants’ position was that the arrangement was champertous and that the enforcement claim was therefore tainted. The Assistant Registrar had indicated that the Singapore court could consider the English approach in Lyubov Andreevna Kireeva v Zolotova & Anor [2024] EWHC 552 (Ch), or even adopt a stricter approach, and that the issue should be ventilated with evidence and full submissions. The High Court’s analysis aligned with this procedural logic: the amendments were not inherently unsustainable, and the court was not persuaded that the application was made in bad faith.
On the Riddick principle, the court addressed two related questions: whether the implied undertaking binds non-parties, and whether it applies to disclosures made to resist discovery applications rather than under a court order. The court relied on Singapore authority, including ED&F Man Capital Markets Ltd v Straits (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2020] 2 SLR 695, which had been cited for the proposition that the Riddick undertaking binds third parties who were not party to the suit in which the document or information was disclosed by compulsion. The court then considered whether the Plaintiff’s 6th Affidavit was disclosed under compulsion. The Assistant Registrar had found that it was not accompanied by a court order compelling disclosure, and therefore the Riddick principle was not engaged on that basis.
However, the plaintiff’s appeal also required the court to grapple with the broader line of cases indicating that the implied undertaking may attach even where disclosure is made to resist interlocutory applications. The court referred to Priscilla Lim Suk Ling and anor v Amber Compounding Pharmacy Pte Ltd and anor and anor appeal [2020] 2 SLR 912, where the Court of Appeal had stated that the core principle applies equally to documents disclosed to resist interlocutory applications, even if not made under compulsion of a court order. The court also drew support from comparative reasoning, including Helicopter Aerial Surveys Pty Ltd v Garry Robertson [2015] NSWSC 2104, which treated the implied undertaking as attaching not only to documents produced due to compulsory process but also to documents produced in response to an informal request for disclosure where a formal order could have been obtained.
In addition, the court considered Singapore authority on the application of the implied undertaking to affidavits. It referenced Ong Jane Rebecca v Lim Lie Hoa and others [2021] 2 SLR 584, which supports the proposition that the Riddick undertaking can apply to affidavits filed under compulsion in the same way it applies to documents. The court’s reasoning thus treated the Riddick principle as a functional doctrine concerned with the protection of the integrity of the disclosure process and the fairness of using disclosed material beyond its intended purpose.
Finally, the court assessed whether there was a real question to be determined. This involved evaluating whether the proposed amendments would raise issues that were not merely speculative or irrelevant. The court’s reasoning suggests that where the amendments are tethered to a potentially champertous fee arrangement and its legal consequences for the plaintiff’s claims, and where the factual matrix requires evidence and submissions, the threshold of a real question is satisfied. The court therefore treated the amendment as raising matters suitable for determination at the second stage trial rather than as a purely tactical manoeuvre.
What Was the Outcome?
The High Court dismissed the plaintiff’s appeal against the Assistant Registrar’s decision. In effect, the leave to amend the defence granted to 2D and 3D remained in place, allowing the amended defence to be filed and the relevant issues to be ventilated at the second stage trial of S211.
Practically, the decision means that the defendants could plead the KK Fee Arrangement and its alleged legal consequences, and the court would consider those issues in the ongoing proceedings. It also confirms that, in bifurcated litigation, amendments may still be permitted even after an earlier stage has been decided, provided the amendments do not amount to an impermissible collateral attack on the final determination and raise genuine questions for trial.
Why Does This Case Matter?
This case is significant for civil litigators in Singapore because it clarifies how amendment discretion operates in the context of bifurcated proceedings and alleged abuse of process. The court’s approach indicates that the existence of a prior stage judgment does not automatically freeze amendment rights for the remainder of the action. Instead, the court will examine the suit’s procedural posture and the relationship between the proposed amendments and the issues already determined.
From a substantive perspective, the case also illustrates how maintenance and champerty arguments may be pleaded in modern litigation, particularly where fee arrangements with foreign counsel are said to have public policy implications. While the court did not finally determine the merits of champerty, it treated the proposed defence as not inherently unsustainable and suitable for full ventilation with evidence. This is useful for practitioners assessing whether to strike out or resist amendments on public policy grounds.
Finally, the decision is a useful reference point on the Riddick principle and the implied undertaking. It engages with the scope of the undertaking for non-parties and for disclosures made to resist interlocutory applications. For lawyers dealing with discovery, disclosure, and affidavits filed in interlocutory contexts, the case underscores that the protective rationale of the implied undertaking may extend beyond formal court-ordered compulsion, depending on the procedural circumstances and the fairness concerns at stake.
Legislation Referenced
- Civil Law Act
- Civil Law Act 1909
- Legal Profession Act
- Legal Profession Act 1966
Cases Cited
- [2020] SGCA 64
- [2021] SGHC 154
- [2022] SGHC 298
- [2024] SGHC 299
- Choo Cheng Tong Wilfred v Phua Swee Khiang and another [2022] SGHC(A) 5
- Lyubov Andreevna Kireeva v Zolotova & Anor [2024] EWHC 552 (Ch)
- ED&F Man Capital Markets Ltd v Straits (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2020] 2 SLR 695
- Dennis Foo v Ang Yee Lim and another [2015] 2 SLR 578
- Riddick v Thames Board Mills Ltd [1997] QB 881
- Foo Jong Long (as referenced in the judgment extract)
- Priscilla Lim Suk Ling and anor v Amber Compounding Pharmacy Pte Ltd and anor and anor appeal [2020] 2 SLR 912
- Ong Jane Rebecca v Lim Lie Hoa and others and appeals and/or matters [2021] 2 SLR 584
- Re Vanguard Energy Pte Ltd [2015] 4 SLR 597
- Mansell v Robinson [2007] All ER (D) 279 (Jan)
- In re Trepca Mines Ltd (No. 2) [1963] Ch 199
- Helicopter Aerial Surveys Pty Ltd v Garry Robertson [2015] NSWSC 2104
Source Documents
This article analyses [2024] SGHC 299 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.