Case Details
- Citation: [2025] SGCA 54
- Title: Saminathan a/l Selvaraju v Attorney-General
- Court: Court of Appeal of the Republic of Singapore
- Case Type: Court of Appeal — Originating Application (OAC) No 3 of 2025
- Date of Decision: 26 November 2025
- Judges: Tay Yong Kwang JCA
- Applicant: Saminathan a/l Selvaraju (a prisoner awaiting capital punishment)
- Respondent: Attorney-General
- Legal Area: Criminal Procedure and Sentencing — Stay of execution
- Statutory Provision Invoked: s 60G(1) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969 (2020 Rev Ed) (“SCJA”)
- Capital Case Context: Application for permission to make a post-appeal application in a capital case (“PACC application”)
- Related Constitutional Challenge: HC/OA 1213/2025 (“OA 1213”) seeking retrospective declarations that the mandatory death penalty under s 33(1) of the Misuse of Drugs Act (“MDA”) read with its Second Schedule is unconstitutional
- Execution Date at Issue: Scheduled for 27 November 2025
- Key Relief Sought in OAC 3/2025: (i) stay of execution pending permission and any consequent PACC application; (ii) permission to file a PACC application seeking a prohibiting order against execution and a quashing order for the notice of execution dated 20 November 2025
- Misuse of Drugs Act Provisions Mentioned: s 5(1)(a), s 5(2), s 12 (for abetment), s 33B(2)(a) (courier), s 33(1) and Second Schedule (mandatory death penalty context), and s 18 (in earlier related applications)
- Supreme Court / Procedural Statutes Referenced: SCJA; Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969 (as amended/2020 Rev Ed); Rules of Court 2021 (procedural history)
- Criminal Procedure Code References: CPC (including provisions on review and costs in criminal proceedings, and permission to review)
- Post-appeal Applications in Capital Cases Act 2022: Mentioned in the procedural history (including ss 60G(7)(d) and 60G(8) of the SCJA)
- Judgment Length: 21 pages, 5,324 words
Summary
This Court of Appeal decision concerns a last-minute procedural application by a prisoner under sentence of death, seeking a stay of execution and permission to file a post-appeal application in a capital case (“PACC application”). The application was brought under s 60G(1) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969 (2020 Rev Ed) (“SCJA”), which governs permission for post-appeal applications in capital cases. The applicant, Saminathan a/l Selvaraju (“Mr Saminathan”), was scheduled to be executed on 27 November 2025.
The central feature of the application was the applicant’s reliance on a separate constitutional challenge pending before the High Court: HC/OA 1213/2025 (“OA 1213”). In OA 1213, members of the Transformative Justice Collective sought retrospective declarations that the mandatory death penalty under the Misuse of Drugs Act (“MDA”) is unconstitutional for violating Articles 9(1) and 12(1) and for infringing Article 93 of the Constitution. Although Mr Saminathan was not a party to OA 1213, he argued that the outcome could affect his conviction and sentence, and that execution should therefore be stayed pending the determination of OA 1213.
Applying the statutory framework for permission and stays in capital cases, the Court of Appeal addressed whether the existence of a pending constitutional challenge in another case could justify granting permission for a PACC application and, consequentially, a stay of execution. The Court’s reasoning emphasised the narrow and structured nature of post-appeal relief in capital cases, the need for procedural finality, and the requirement that the applicant satisfy the legal threshold for permission under s 60G(1) rather than rely on general or speculative possibilities arising from other proceedings.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
Mr Saminathan was tried jointly in the High Court with two co-accused, Mr Mohammad Rizwan bin Akbar Husain (“Mr Rizwan”) and Mr Zulkarnain bin Kemat (“Mr Zulkarnain”). The convictions arose from drug trafficking offences under the Misuse of Drugs Act. In Public Prosecutor v Zulkarnain bin Kemat and others [2018] SGHC 161, Mr Zulkarnain was convicted for possession of diamorphine for the purposes of trafficking under s 5(1)(a) read with s 5(2) of the MDA. Mr Rizwan was convicted for abetting by instigating Mr Zulkarnain to be in possession of the drugs for the purposes of trafficking under s 5(1)(a) read with s 5(2) and s 12 of the MDA. Mr Saminathan was convicted for trafficking by delivering the drugs to Mr Zulkarnain under s 5(1)(a) of the MDA.
The trial judge made findings relevant to the sentencing regime for capital offences. The judge found that Mr Zulkarnain was a “courier” within the meaning of s 33B(2)(a) of the MDA and that the Public Prosecutor issued a certificate of substantive assistance. Exercising discretion, the trial judge did not impose the death penalty on Mr Zulkarnain; instead, he received life imprisonment. Mr Zulkarnain was also not liable to caning because he was above 50 years of age.
By contrast, the trial judge found that Mr Rizwan was not a courier and that he did not receive a certificate of substantive assistance. Accordingly, the mandatory death sentence was imposed on him. Similarly, the trial judge found that Mr Saminathan was a courier but he did not receive a certificate of substantive assistance, and the mandatory death sentence was therefore imposed on him. Mr Zulkarnain did not appeal. Mr Rizwan and Mr Saminathan appealed against their convictions in CA/CCA 9/2018 and CA/CCA 13/2018 (“CCA 13”). Both appeals were dismissed on 8 May 2020 by the Court of Appeal.
After the dismissal of CCA 13, Mr Saminathan pursued multiple post-appeal applications over several years. These included petitions for clemency (rejected by the President on 22 February 2021, and a further petition rejected on 6 November 2025), and various applications in the High Court and Court of Appeal seeking declarations and other reliefs, including challenges to the Attorney-General’s conduct and to aspects of the legal framework affecting capital cases and prisoners’ rights. Some applications were dismissed or struck out; others were withdrawn or failed due to procedural time limits. The procedural history is significant because it demonstrates that the applicant had already litigated extensively after his conviction and appeal were finalised.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The immediate legal issue in OAC 3/2025 was whether Mr Saminathan should be granted permission under s 60G(1) of the SCJA to file a PACC application, and whether execution should be stayed pending the determination of that permission application and any consequent PACC application. This required the Court to consider the statutory threshold for permission and the circumstances in which a stay of execution is justified in the context of capital sentencing.
A second, closely related issue was whether the pending constitutional challenge in OA 1213 could provide a sufficient basis for granting permission and a stay. Mr Saminathan’s argument was that OA 1213 was an ongoing case before the courts whose outcome might affect the constitutionality of the mandatory death penalty provisions under the MDA, and that it would be unjust to proceed with execution while that constitutional question remained sub judice.
Finally, the Court had to address the interaction between procedural finality in capital cases and the availability of post-appeal mechanisms. The Court’s analysis necessarily involved balancing the applicant’s interest in avoiding execution before potentially relevant constitutional determinations against the legal system’s interest in ensuring that post-appeal relief is not used as a general mechanism to delay execution absent a legally sufficient basis.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
The Court of Appeal began by situating OAC 3/2025 within the statutory architecture for post-appeal applications in capital cases. Section 60G(1) of the SCJA provides a permission stage before a prisoner can file a PACC application. This permission stage is not a formality; it is designed to filter out applications that do not meet the legal requirements for post-appeal intervention after the appeal has been dismissed. The Court therefore approached the matter as one requiring careful scrutiny of whether the applicant’s proposed PACC application had a sufficient legal foundation.
On the stay of execution, the Court treated the request as consequential to the permission application. A stay is an exceptional measure in capital cases because execution dates are set after the appellate process has concluded and after the legal system has already determined guilt and sentence. Accordingly, the Court’s analysis focused on whether the applicant had demonstrated a legally relevant basis for permission and, by extension, whether a stay was warranted pending the outcome of the permission and PACC processes.
The Court then addressed the applicant’s reliance on OA 1213. The Court accepted that OA 1213 involved a constitutional challenge to the mandatory death penalty regime under the MDA, and that it was scheduled to be heard in the High Court. However, the Court emphasised that Mr Saminathan was not a party to OA 1213 and that the existence of a pending constitutional case does not automatically translate into a right to a stay of execution. The Court’s reasoning reflected the principle that post-appeal relief must be anchored in the statutory criteria for permission, rather than in the mere possibility that another case might later produce an outcome favourable to the applicant.
In analysing whether OA 1213 could justify a stay, the Court considered the nature of constitutional litigation and the procedural posture of the constitutional challenge. While constitutional declarations can have significant legal consequences, the Court’s approach indicates that the timing and procedural status of such challenges matter. In particular, the Court was concerned with whether the applicant’s proposed PACC application would be legally viable and whether it would fall within the intended scope of the PACC regime under the SCJA and the related capital-case legislation.
The Court also took into account the applicant’s extensive history of post-appeal litigation. The judgment’s structure, as reflected in the headings and procedural narrative, shows that the Court reviewed the “present and historical proceedings” to understand whether the present application was part of a continuing, legally coherent attempt to obtain post-appeal relief within the statutory framework, or whether it was effectively another attempt to delay execution by reference to ongoing litigation. This contextual review is important because it informs how courts assess whether an application is genuinely grounded in the statutory permission criteria or whether it is being used to circumvent finality.
Ultimately, the Court’s analysis led it to determine that the applicant had not satisfied the threshold for permission to file a PACC application in the manner sought, and therefore the stay could not be granted on the basis advanced. The Court’s reasoning underscores that capital-case post-appeal mechanisms are structured and limited, and that constitutional challenges in other proceedings cannot be treated as a blanket basis for staying execution absent the legal requirements being met in the specific permission application.
What Was the Outcome?
The Court of Appeal dismissed Mr Saminathan’s application for permission under s 60G(1) of the SCJA to file a PACC application, and consequently did not grant the stay of execution sought for 27 November 2025. The practical effect of the decision was that execution was not stayed pending the determination of the permission application or any consequent PACC application.
In other words, the Court did not accept that the pending constitutional challenge in OA 1213, standing alone, was sufficient to justify the exceptional procedural relief of a stay in this capital case. The decision therefore reinforced the narrow scope of post-appeal permission and the importance of procedural finality once the appellate process has concluded.
Why Does This Case Matter?
This decision is significant for practitioners because it clarifies the limits of using parallel constitutional litigation as a basis for seeking stays of execution and permission for post-appeal applications. While constitutional challenges to the mandatory death penalty regime are of profound importance, the Court’s approach indicates that capital-case procedural relief must still satisfy the specific statutory permission framework. Lawyers should therefore avoid assuming that the mere pendency of a constitutional case automatically entitles a prisoner to a stay.
From a procedural standpoint, the case highlights the Court of Appeal’s emphasis on structured post-appeal mechanisms. The SCJA permission stage serves as a gatekeeping function. Practitioners should carefully assess whether the proposed PACC application can be framed within the statutory criteria and whether it is legally and procedurally viable, rather than relying on general fairness arguments or the existence of other ongoing litigation.
Finally, the decision has practical implications for how defence counsel should plan litigation timelines in capital cases. Given that execution dates may be imminent, counsel must be prepared to demonstrate, at the permission stage, a concrete legal basis for the PACC application and a corresponding justification for a stay. The Court’s reasoning suggests that courts will scrutinise both the legal merits and the procedural context, including the applicant’s prior litigation history, when deciding whether to grant exceptional relief.
Legislation Referenced
- Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969 (2020 Rev Ed) (“SCJA”), in particular s 60G(1) (permission to make a post-appeal application in a capital case)
- Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969 (as referenced generally)
- Applications in Capital Cases Act 2022 (as referenced in the judgment’s discussion of the legislative framework)
- Post-appeal Applications in Capital Cases Act 2022 (as referenced in the procedural history, including ss 60G(7)(d) and 60G(8) of the SCJA)
- Criminal Procedure Code (2020 Rev Ed) (“CPC”) (as referenced in the procedural history of other applications)
- Misuse of Drugs Act (MDA) (including ss 5(1)(a), 5(2), 12, 18, 33(1), Second Schedule, and 33B(2)(a))
Cases Cited
- [2018] SGHC 161
- [2020] SGCA 45
- [2025] SGCA 54
Source Documents
This article analyses [2025] SGCA 54 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.