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Sahara Energy International Pte. Ltd. v Chu Said Thong & Anor

In Sahara Energy International Pte. Ltd. v Chu Said Thong & Anor, the High Court of the Republic of Singapore addressed issues of .

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Case Details

  • Title: Sahara Energy International Pte. Ltd. v Chu Said Thong & Anor
  • Citation: [2020] SGHC 272
  • Court: High Court of the Republic of Singapore
  • Date: 2020-12-09
  • Judges: Lai Siu Chiu SJ
  • Proceedings: High Court — Suit No 795 of 2018 (Summons No 2835 of 2020)
  • Plaintiff/Applicant: Sahara Energy International Pte. Ltd.
  • Defendants/Respondents: Chu Said Thong; Jo Choon Ho
  • Plaintiff in Counterclaim: Chu Said Thong
  • Defendants in Counterclaim: Sahara Energy International Pte Ltd; Sahara Energy Int’l Pte Ltd Singapore (Geneva Branch)
  • Plaintiff in Counterclaim: Jo Choon Ho
  • Defendant in Counterclaim: Sahara Energy International Pte Ltd
  • Legal Areas: Evidence; Employment (breach of employment agreements; summary dismissal); Civil procedure (pre-trial management; video link evidence)
  • Statutes Referenced: Evidence Act (Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed); Residential Property Act (as referenced in the metadata)
  • Cases Cited: [2020] SGHC 272 (as provided in the metadata)
  • Judgment Length: 23 pages, 5,514 words

Summary

Sahara Energy International Pte Ltd (“Sahara”) sued its former employees, Chu Said Thong (“Chu”) and Jo Choon Ho (“Jo”), for alleged breaches of their employment agreements in connection with trading losses arising from back-to-back propane contracts. The dispute was not only about whether the employees had breached contractual duties, but also about whether Sahara had sufficient information to mitigate losses and whether the employees were entitled to damages on counterclaims, including reputational harm said to have been caused by an internal email.

Before trial, Sahara applied under s 62A of the Evidence Act for leave for two witnesses—Valéry Antoine Guillebon (“Guillebon”) and Nabil Alami Merrouni (“Nabil”)—to give evidence through video link. Guillebon was the CEO of Sahara’s Geneva branch (“Sahara Geneva”) and Nabil was a senior trader in that branch. The application was made in the context of Covid-19 travel restrictions and quarantine requirements, with trial scheduled for August 2020.

The High Court (Lai Siu Chiu SJ) dismissed Sahara’s application for video link evidence at that stage. Instead, the court issued an “unless order” requiring Sahara to first seek permission from the Immigration and Checkpoints Authority of Singapore (“ICA”) for the witnesses to come to Singapore and, if quarantine was required, to complete a 14-day quarantine before trial commenced. The court also granted Sahara liberty to apply again for video link evidence if the witnesses were still in quarantine when trial began, but only if the court was satisfied that Sahara had complied with the earlier directions. The practical effect was that Sahara’s claim would be dismissed with costs and judgment would be entered on the counterclaims unless Sahara took the specified steps.

What Were the Facts of This Case?

Sahara is a wholesaler in crude petroleum, and solid, liquid and gaseous fuels and related products. Chu was employed as Sahara’s CEO under an employment agreement dated 16 May 2017, with his services ending on 9 July 2017. Jo was employed as a Senior Trader under an employment agreement dated 6 April 2017 and a letter of offer dated the same day, with his services also ending on 9 July 2017. Both employment agreements required reporting to Sahara’s Executive Director, Tope Shonubi (“Shonubi”), though Jo’s reporting lines also included Chu and Jo’s team leader (who was also Chu).

Sahara’s pleaded case focused on alleged failures in monitoring, reporting, and risk management in relation to trading activities. Jo’s duties included monitoring day-to-day trading, generating profit and loss statements from trading activities, and coordinating with colleagues for business optimization and profit maximization. The profit and loss and market-to-market (“MTM”) valuations were entered into an internal management system called “Nova”. Jo’s reports were said to feed into management oversight by Chu, Sahara’s Risks Manager Paolo Ascerbis (“Ascerbis”), and Sahara’s Chief Financial Officer Chew Saw Kim (“Ms Chew”).

Chu’s duties included overseeing operations and staff in the Singapore office, evaluating assigned responsibilities and preparing weekly reports for Shonubi, and reviewing work supporting energy supply acquisition and trading. Sahara alleged that Chu failed to monitor Jo’s trading activities and failed to instruct Jo to hedge more to mitigate losses. Sahara further alleged that Jo misrepresented the extent of losses to management, thereby preventing Sahara from taking timely mitigation steps.

The alleged losses stemmed from two back-to-back contracts. Jo, on behalf of Sahara, entered into a contract with Toyota Tsusho Corporation (“Toyota”) around 25 September 2017 for Toyota to sell and deliver six cargo lots of refrigerated commercial propane (“the Product”). Jo then contracted, around 10 May 2018, to sell the Product to a Korean company, E1 Corporation (“E1”). The sale under the E1 contract was concluded on 17 May 2018. The profitability of Sahara’s position depended on the differential between two pricing indices: Argus Far East Index (“AFEI”) and Platt’s quotations for Naptha as published in Platt’s Asia Pacific/Arab Gulf Market Scan (“MOPJ”). Sahara’s purchase price under the Toyota contract depended on AFEI plus US$1.15 per metric ton, while its sale price under the E1 contract was linked to 83.4% of the average mean of Platt’s MOPJ quotations. A differential above 83.4% was said to cause losses for Sahara; a differential below that threshold would produce profit.

Sahara alleged that Jo hedged Sahara’s position by buying 300 lots of AFEI/MOPJ around 11 May 2018, but that MTM valuations showed losses of about $1 million per day after the E1 contract. Sahara’s case was that the spread between AFEI and MOPJ increased sharply, worsening the position. Sahara further alleged that Jo concealed or downplayed losses as early as May 2018, including an alleged communication on 14 May 2018 that the E1 contract had incurred losses of $1,851,281.30. Sahara claimed that between 14 May 2018 and 27 June 2018, losses increased to $5.9 million, and that it was only after a telephone call involving Chu, Ascerbis and Ms Chew to Shonubi around 28 June 2018 that Sahara became aware of the full extent of losses. By the first week of July 2018, Sahara alleged overall losses were at least $6 million.

In response to ballooning losses, Sahara alleged that Ascerbis hedged 40% of August and September positions on 29 June 2018, and that Chu was pressed to hedge 56% of October to December positions on 2 July 2018. Sahara’s case was that Jo misrepresented losses to Shonubi on 27 June 2018, stating losses were $882,000 rather than at least $6 million, and that without full information Sahara could not mitigate losses effectively. Sahara summarily terminated the defendants’ services on 9 July 2018 and commenced the suit shortly thereafter.

Chu and Jo denied Sahara’s allegations. Chu counterclaimed, among other things, for damages for defamation said to have been caused by an email sent by Guillebon on 9 July 2018 to staff in Singapore, Geneva and Dubai. Jo counterclaimed for salary and related entitlements, and disputed that he had falsified reports or exceeded stop-loss limits or acted with gross negligence. Jo also contended that by terminating his employment, Sahara prevented him from trading further to mitigate exposure.

The immediate legal issue before the court was procedural and evidential: whether Sahara should be granted leave under s 62A of the Evidence Act for its two witnesses, Guillebon and Nabil, to give evidence through video link. This required the court to consider the statutory framework for video link evidence and the broader case management context, including fairness to parties and readiness for trial.

A second issue was whether Sahara had taken sufficient steps to secure the witnesses’ attendance in Singapore despite Covid-19 travel and quarantine constraints. The court’s approach suggests that the discretion to allow video link evidence would be exercised only where it was justified, and that the applicant should first demonstrate compliance with practical directions aimed at ensuring in-person testimony where possible.

Thirdly, the court had to manage the consequences of non-compliance. By issuing an “unless order”, the court effectively linked the grant of video link evidence to Sahara’s compliance with steps directed at obtaining ICA permission and completing quarantine before trial. The issue was therefore also about proportionality and the appropriate sanction for failure to meet procedural requirements.

How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?

The court’s reasoning, as reflected in the grounds of decision, began with the procedural posture and the timing of the application. Sahara applied on 9 July 2020 for leave for video link evidence, with trial scheduled for 17 August 2020. The court had already conducted a pre-trial conference on 5 June 2020 and had granted an extension for exchange of affidavits of evidence in chief (“AEIC”) until 26 June 2020. The application for video link evidence was therefore made relatively close to trial, and the court had to weigh the practical realities of Covid-19 restrictions against the need for orderly trial preparation.

While the judgment extract does not reproduce the full detail of the court’s analysis of s 62A, the court’s orders make clear the governing principle: video link evidence is not an automatic substitute for in-person testimony. Instead, the court required Sahara to first attempt to bring the witnesses to Singapore by applying to ICA for permission and, if quarantine was required, to complete the 14-day quarantine before trial commenced. This indicates that the court treated the statutory discretion as conditioned by the applicant’s efforts and by the feasibility of in-person evidence within the trial timetable.

The court’s “unless order” reflects a structured approach to case management. Rather than granting video link evidence immediately, the court directed Sahara to take concrete steps that would likely enable the witnesses to testify in person. The court also provided a safety valve: Sahara was given liberty to apply for video link evidence from Singapore if the witnesses were still in quarantine when trial commenced. However, the court required that it be satisfied Sahara had complied with the earlier directions before it would exercise its discretion to grant video link evidence. This effectively created a compliance threshold for any subsequent application.

Finally, the court addressed the consequences of non-compliance. The unless order stated that unless Sahara took the steps directed above, its claim would be dismissed with costs to the defendants and judgment would be awarded on the defendants’ counterclaims. This is significant because it demonstrates that the court viewed the attendance of witnesses and the integrity of the trial process as sufficiently important to justify a serious procedural sanction. The court’s approach also suggests that it was concerned about prejudice to the defendants and about the risk of delay or uncertainty if video link evidence were permitted without first attempting in-person attendance.

What Was the Outcome?

The High Court dismissed Sahara’s application for leave to adduce video link evidence at that stage. In its place, the court issued directions requiring Sahara to apply to ICA for permission for the two witnesses to come to Singapore and to complete any required 14-day quarantine before trial commenced on 17 August 2020. The court also granted liberty to apply for video link evidence if quarantine had not ended by the trial date, but only if the court was satisfied that Sahara had complied with the earlier orders.

Critically, the court made an unless order: if Sahara did not take the specified steps, its claim would be dismissed with costs and judgment would be entered on the defendants’ counterclaims. Sahara, dissatisfied with the decision, appealed to the Court of Appeal after leave was granted following the High Court’s refusal to grant leave to appeal. The present grounds of decision were furnished by the High Court to explain its dismissal of the application and the rationale for the unless order.

Why Does This Case Matter?

This decision is practically important for litigators in Singapore because it illustrates how courts manage evidence in the context of Covid-19 restrictions and how they approach applications for video link testimony under the Evidence Act. The court’s refusal to grant video link evidence immediately, coupled with a structured unless order, underscores that applicants must demonstrate concrete efforts to secure in-person attendance where feasible, rather than treating video link as a default option.

From a precedent and advocacy perspective, the case highlights that the discretion under s 62A is likely to be exercised with reference to readiness for trial, fairness to parties, and the applicant’s compliance with court directions. The court’s insistence on ICA permission and quarantine completion suggests that evidence by video link may be viewed as a contingency measure, not a substitute for attendance unless circumstances genuinely prevent it.

For practitioners, the case also serves as a cautionary example of the potential consequences of non-compliance with case management orders. The unless order—dismissal of the claim with costs and judgment on counterclaims—demonstrates that procedural directions relating to evidence can have substantive effects. Lawyers should therefore treat evidence-related applications and follow-up steps as time-sensitive and should ensure that any subsequent application for video link evidence is supported by evidence of compliance with the court’s directions.

Legislation Referenced

Cases Cited

Source Documents

This article analyses [2020] SGHC 272 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.

Written by Sushant Shukla
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