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Royal & Sons Organisation Pte Ltd v Hotel Calmo Chinatown Pte Ltd [2024] SGHC 248

In Royal & Sons Organisation Pte Ltd v Hotel Calmo Chinatown Pte Ltd, the High Court of the Republic of Singapore addressed issues of Landlord and Tenant — Covenants, Landlord and Tenant — Termination of leases.

Case Details

  • Citation: [2024] SGHC 248
  • Title: Royal & Sons Organisation Pte Ltd v Hotel Calmo Chinatown Pte Ltd
  • Court: High Court of the Republic of Singapore (General Division)
  • Originating Claim No: OC 216 of 2023
  • Date of Judgment: 30 September 2024
  • Judge: Kwek Mean Luck J
  • Hearing Dates: 2–5, 9, 16 September 2024
  • Judgment Reserved: Yes
  • Plaintiff/Applicant: Royal & Sons Organisation Pte Ltd (“Royal”)
  • Defendant/Respondent: Hotel Calmo Chinatown Pte Ltd (“Calmo”)
  • Legal Areas: Landlord and Tenant — Covenants; Landlord and Tenant — Termination of leases (forfeiture); Landlord and Tenant — Recovery of possession; Holding over; Double rent
  • Statutes Referenced: Civil Law Act 1909 (2020 Rev Ed) (“CLA”); Conveyancing and Law of Property Act 1886 (2020 Rev Ed) (“CLPA”); Conveyancing and Law of Property Act (1886/1909 references as stated in metadata)
  • Key Statutory Provisions (as reflected in the extract): s 18(1) and s 18(8) of the CLPA; s 28(4) of the CLA (double rent)
  • Cases Cited: [2024] SGHC 108; [2024] SGHC 248 (as per metadata)
  • Judgment Length: 50 pages, 14,311 words

Summary

Royal & Sons Organisation Pte Ltd v Hotel Calmo Chinatown Pte Ltd [2024] SGHC 248 concerns a landlord’s attempt to forfeit a six-year lease and recover double rent after the tenant allegedly breached covenants restricting subletting, sharing, and parting with possession of the demised premises. The landlord, Royal, owned the premises at #01-01 & #01-12, 25 Trengganu Street, Singapore. The tenant, Calmo, operated a hotel business on the premises under a tenancy agreement that contained strict restrictions on assignment, subletting, and sharing/parting with possession, subject to a limited exception for unit #01-12 for food and beverage (“F&B”) use.

The dispute turned on whether Calmo wrongfully allowed an entity known as “MoNo Foods” (“MoNo”) to occupy and use parts of the premises (including the lobby) for storage and sale of food items, without Royal’s consent. Royal relied on (i) a covenant breach under cl 2(22) of the tenancy agreement; (ii) alleged non-rectification of defects identified in a “Cure Notice”; and (iii) an alleged repudiatory breach evidenced by multiple failures, including failure to give notice of damage and failure to rectify defects. Calmo resisted forfeiture, contending that it did not know of MoNo’s activities until late January 2023 and that it took steps to stop the activities, including terminating the relevant sub-tenancy.

In the High Court, Kwek Mean Luck J analysed the statutory framework for forfeiture notices under the CLPA, the contractual scope of the tenant’s covenants, and whether the tenant’s conduct amounted to a breach justifying forfeiture. The decision also addressed the practical consequences of holding over and the landlord’s claim for double rent under the Civil Law Act. The judgment provides a structured approach to forfeiture claims where both statutory notice requirements and contractual drafting are in issue.

What Were the Facts of This Case?

Royal and Calmo entered negotiations in 2021 for the lease of the premises. On 11 May 2021, they entered into an Agreement to Lease, and on 31 May 2021 they executed a Tenancy Agreement under which Royal leased the premises to Calmo for a term of six years. Calmo’s business was operating hotels, and Royal’s business was property investment. The tenancy arrangement included covenants restricting Calmo’s ability to assign, sublet, license, share, or part with possession or use of the demised premises, except for a specific exception: unit #01-12 could be used for F&B.

Royal’s concerns began with the condition of the premises. In October 2022, Royal’s personnel conducted inspections and took photographs. Ivy, Royal’s Head of Business Development contact, testified that she was shocked by the condition of the premises after an impromptu visit. Josh, Royal’s property manager, conducted a walkaround and later Royal provided Calmo with a document containing photographs of defects. On 21 October 2022, Royal issued a “Cure Notice” under s 18 of the Conveyancing and Law of Property Act 1886, giving Calmo an opportunity to remedy the defects within 30 calendar days of receipt.

Royal later alleged that Calmo did not properly rectify the defects. In parallel, Royal discovered a separate issue: between 3 November 2022 and 3 February 2023, Calmo allegedly allowed MoNo to occupy and use the premises for storage and sale of food items. Royal’s case was that MoNo’s use began by 3 November 2022 at the latest, supported by MoNo’s Instagram activity. Royal alleged that Calmo did not seek Royal’s consent before allowing MoNo to use the premises, and Royal only discovered the MoNo activity on 3 February 2023 through a Channel News Asia article.

Calmo’s response was that MoNo’s activities were facilitated by Calmo’s sub-tenant, Reiwa Pte Ltd, which occupied unit #01-12 to operate an F&B business. Calmo maintained that it did not know about MoNo’s use of the lobby and storage/sales activities until 25 January 2023, when its manager William discovered the activities. Calmo then informed Reiwa via WhatsApp on 26 January 2023 to cease the storage and food sale activities. When Calmo learned on 3 February 2023 (again through the CNA article) that the activities had not ceased, it emailed Reiwa to stop immediately. Calmo subsequently terminated Reiwa’s sub-tenancy on 14 March 2023. Royal, however, treated Calmo’s conduct as a wrongful repudiation and commenced OC 216 of 2023 on 6 April 2023 seeking forfeiture and double rent.

The case raised multiple interlocking legal issues typical of landlord forfeiture litigation. First, the court had to determine whether Royal could rely on Calmo’s alleged breach of the tenant’s covenant in cl 2(22) of the tenancy agreement (prohibiting assignment, subletting, licensing, sharing, or parting with possession or use of the demised premises, except for unit #01-12 for F&B) as a ground for forfeiture. A central sub-issue was whether the statutory notice regime under s 18(1) of the CLPA applied to this contractual breach, or whether s 18(8) excluded it because the covenant was, in substance, a covenant against assigning/underletting/parting with possession or disposing of the land leased.

Second, the court had to consider whether Royal’s “Cure Notice” and subsequent inspection findings supported forfeiture on the basis that Calmo failed to rectify defects. This required the court to examine whether the cure notice provided sufficient particulars of the breaches, whether Calmo failed to rectify within the required time, and whether any alleged breaches were waived by Royal’s acceptance of rent payments. The judgment also addressed whether Calmo could seek permission to amend its defence to include relief against forfeiture.

Third, the court had to decide whether Calmo’s overall conduct amounted to a repudiatory breach of the tenancy agreement. Royal’s repudiation argument aggregated several alleged failures: failure to give notice of damage under cl 2(11), failure to conduct business in a reputable manner consistent with the agreed understanding of operating a high-quality boutique hotel (cl 2(17)(ii)), failure to satisfactorily rectify defects identified in the Cure Notice and at the 12 January 2024 inspection, and breach of cl 2(22) by allowing MoNo to use the lobby of the premises. Finally, if forfeiture succeeded and Calmo remained in possession, the court had to address the landlord’s claim for double rent during holding over under s 28(4) of the CLA.

How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?

The court’s analysis began with the statutory and contractual architecture governing forfeiture. Forfeiture is a drastic remedy, and Singapore law requires careful compliance with both statutory notice requirements and the terms of the lease. Royal relied on s 18 of the CLPA for the Cure Notice and argued that, for the cl 2(22) covenant breach, the statutory notice requirement did not apply because s 18(8) excluded covenants against assigning/underletting/parting with possession or disposing of the land leased. The court therefore had to interpret the scope of s 18(8) and determine whether Royal’s reliance on cl 2(22) fell within the excluded category.

On Royal’s first ground—MoNo’s use of the premises—the court examined the substance of the covenant breach. Royal argued that Calmo “wrongfully allowed” MoNo to occupy and use the premises for storage and sale of food items without consent. Calmo’s defence focused on knowledge and authorisation: it asserted that Reiwa and MoNo’s activities were not known to Calmo until William discovered them on 25 January 2023, and that Calmo acted promptly thereafter by instructing Reiwa to cease and terminating the sub-tenancy. The court’s task was not merely to decide whether MoNo used the lobby, but whether Calmo’s conduct amounted to a breach of the covenant prohibiting parting with possession or use beyond the permitted exception.

In assessing whether Calmo breached cl 2(22), the court considered the factual matrix of control and possession. The key question was whether Calmo had “parted with” possession or whether it had merely permitted an unauthorised use by a sub-tenant without transferring possession in the relevant legal sense. Calmo’s argument that it did not “part with possession of the lobby” and did not “share” possession required the court to distinguish between (i) a tenant’s contractual breach arising from allowing unauthorised occupation/use, and (ii) a breach that necessarily involves a legal transfer or sharing of possession. The court’s reasoning reflected the importance of covenant interpretation: the wording of cl 2(22) was broad, but the legal consequences depend on how the covenant is construed in context.

Turning to the Cure Notice and defect rectification, the court addressed whether the Cure Notice provided sufficient particulars. This is a recurring issue in forfeiture litigation: a landlord must specify the breaches with enough clarity to enable the tenant to remedy them. The judgment also addressed whether Calmo failed to rectify breaches identified in the Cure Notice and at the 12 January 2024 inspection. Royal further argued that any alleged breaches were not waived by rent payments. The court therefore analysed the interplay between acceptance of rent and waiver, including whether Royal’s conduct was consistent with an intention to forgo the right to forfeit for the relevant breaches.

On repudiation, the court considered whether the alleged breaches, taken together, demonstrated an intention by Calmo to no longer be bound by the tenancy agreement. Repudiatory breach requires more than isolated non-compliance; it requires conduct that undermines the essential obligations under the lease. Royal’s case aggregated failures relating to notice of damage, standards of operation, rectification of defects, and the MoNo/lobby issue. Calmo’s response was that it acted within its obligations once it became aware of the MoNo activity and that it did not intend to repudiate the tenancy. The court’s approach emphasised that repudiation is fact-sensitive and depends on the seriousness and cumulative effect of the breaches.

Finally, the court addressed the remedy consequences. If forfeiture was granted and Calmo remained in possession, the landlord sought double rent under s 28(4) of the CLA. The court therefore had to determine the appropriate period for double rent and whether the statutory conditions for such relief were satisfied. This required the court to connect the forfeiture findings to the holding-over period and to ensure that the remedy aligned with the statutory basis.

What Was the Outcome?

The High Court’s decision addressed Royal’s application for forfeiture and double rent, and it also dealt with procedural and substantive disputes such as whether the Cure Notice was sufficiently particularised and whether Calmo’s conduct amounted to repudiation. The court’s orders reflected its conclusions on whether the pleaded breaches were made out and whether they justified forfeiture as a matter of law and contract.

Practically, the outcome determined whether Calmo’s continued occupation of the premises could be treated as holding over following a valid termination, and whether Royal was entitled to double rent for that period. The judgment therefore has direct implications for landlords seeking forfeiture and for tenants defending by challenging notice sufficiency, waiver, and the legal characterisation of alleged covenant breaches.

Why Does This Case Matter?

This case matters because it illustrates how Singapore courts approach forfeiture claims that combine statutory notice requirements with contractual covenants restricting possession and use. The decision is particularly relevant for practitioners dealing with lease covenants that prohibit subletting, licensing, sharing, or parting with possession, and for landlords who must decide whether to rely on statutory cure mechanisms or on contractual breaches that may fall within statutory exclusions.

For tenants and their counsel, the judgment underscores the importance of (i) responding promptly to cure notices with clear evidence of rectification, (ii) challenging the sufficiency of particulars where cure notices are vague, and (iii) addressing waiver arguments tied to rent acceptance. For landlords, it emphasises the need to plead and prove the factual basis for authorisation/parting with possession, not merely the existence of unauthorised activity by a sub-tenant.

From a remedies perspective, the case also highlights the link between termination/forfeiture findings and claims for double rent during holding over. Practitioners should treat the judgment as a guide to structuring forfeiture litigation: it demonstrates that courts will scrutinise both the legal characterisation of breaches and the procedural compliance required to support forfeiture and monetary consequences.

Legislation Referenced

  • Civil Law Act 1909 (2020 Rev Ed) (“CLA”), including s 28(4)
  • Conveyancing and Law of Property Act 1886 (2020 Rev Ed) (“CLPA”), including s 18(1) and s 18(8)
  • Conveyancing and Law of Property Act (as referenced in metadata)

Cases Cited

  • [2024] SGHC 108
  • [2024] SGHC 248

Source Documents

This article analyses [2024] SGHC 248 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.

Written by Sushant Shukla

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