Case Details
- Citation: [2025] SGCA 16
- Title: Roshdi Bin Abdullah Altway v Public Prosecutor and another matter
- Court: Court of Appeal of the Republic of Singapore
- Originating Application No: 9 of 2025
- Originating Application (OAC) No: 1 of 2025
- Date of Decision: 10 April 2025
- Judge(s): Belinda Ang Saw Ean JCA
- Applicant: Roshdi Bin Abdullah Altway
- Respondent: Public Prosecutor
- Second Respondent (in OAC): Attorney-General of Singapore
- Legal Area: Criminal Procedure and Sentencing — Stay of execution
- Procedural Posture: Summarily dismissed applications for permission to file a post-appeal application in a capital case (“PACC”) and for a stay of execution
- Statutes Referenced (as indicated in metadata/extract): Supreme Court of Judicature Act (2020 Rev Ed) (“SCJA”); Legal Profession Act; Applications in Capital Cases Act 2022; Misuse of Drugs Act (1973 and 2020 Rev Ed)
- Key Statutory Provisions Mentioned in Extract: s 60G(8) SCJA; s 60I(1) SCJA; s 5(1)(a) read with s 5(2) MDA 1973; s 17(c) MDA (presumption context)
- Related Prior Decisions Mentioned: Public Prosecutor v Roshdi bin Abdullah Altway [2020] SGHC 232; Roshdi bin Abdullah Altway v Public Prosecutor [2022] 1 SLR 535 (“Roshdi CA”); CA/CCA 29/2020 (decision on 11 November 2021); CA/SUM 16/2023; CA/CA 2/2023
- Execution Context: Applicant was awaiting capital punishment; execution scheduled for 10 April 2025
- Judgment Length: 30 pages, 8,047 words
Summary
In Roshdi Bin Abdullah Altway v Public Prosecutor [2025] SGCA 16, the Court of Appeal dealt with two urgent applications filed on the eve of a scheduled execution. The applicant, a prisoner awaiting capital punishment, sought (i) permission to file a post-appeal application in a capital case (“PACC”) against the Court of Appeal’s earlier decision in CA/CCA 29/2020, and (ii) a stay of execution pending the determination of that permission application and any consequential PACC.
The applications were dismissed summarily under s 60G(8) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act (2020 Rev Ed) (“SCJA”), without an oral hearing. The court accepted that the applicant was effectively seeking a stay pending the determination of constitutional proceedings (CA/SUM 16/2023 and CA/CA 2/2023) and, alternatively, sought to revisit findings on knowledge and presumptive knowledge under the Misuse of Drugs Act regime. However, the court concluded that the grounds advanced did not meet the threshold for granting permission to bring a PACC and therefore could not justify a stay of execution.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
The applicant, Mr Roshdi Bin Abdullah Altway (“the Applicant”), was convicted of a capital charge under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1973 (“MDA”). The charge concerned his possession for the purpose of trafficking of 267 packets and 250 straws containing 2,201.22g of granular/powdery substance, analysed to contain not less than 78.77g of diamorphine. The offence was charged under s 5(1)(a) read with s 5(2) of the MDA 1973. On 17 August 2020, the trial judge imposed the mandatory death penalty because the Applicant was not a courier and had not been issued a certificate of substantive assistance.
At trial, the Applicant claimed trial. The only element in dispute was whether his possession of the drugs was “for the purpose of trafficking”. The Applicant’s defence was that he was merely safekeeping the drugs for a third party, Chandran Prasanna Anu (“Chandran”), and that he intended to return the drugs to Chandran. This “safekeeping defence” (also referred to as the “bailment defence”) was raised at trial for the first time and, critically, it materially contradicted the Applicant’s earlier statements recorded during investigations.
The prosecution’s case relied heavily on the Applicant’s admissions in multiple statements. In particular, in a fifth long statement recorded on 27 September 2016, the Applicant identified the drugs as “heroin”, described them as for sale at $70–80 a packet, and explained his method of packing. He also described the use of digital weighing scales and other items found stained with diamorphine, as well as extrinsic evidence such as spoons and pieces of paper used for packing and weighing. The trial judge concluded that the prosecution proved the element of possession for the purpose of trafficking beyond reasonable doubt, relying essentially on these admissions and corroborating extrinsic evidence.
Although the trial judge noted that the presumption under s 17(c) of the MDA was applicable, the judge considered there was sufficient evidence to prove the charge beyond reasonable doubt without relying on the presumption. In other words, the conviction did not turn solely on the statutory presumption; it was supported by direct admissions and supporting circumstances. The trial judge rejected the bailment defence as incoherent and inconsistent with the Applicant’s earlier statements, and further found that the bailment defence was not factually applicable because the Applicant’s possession was not merely to safekeep but was connected to facilitating the drugs’ passage along the supply chain.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The immediate legal issues in the 2025 applications were procedural and threshold-based: whether the Applicant should be granted permission to file a PACC after the Court of Appeal’s earlier decision (CA/CCA 29/2020), and whether a stay of execution should be ordered pending the determination of that permission application and any consequential PACC.
Substantively, the Applicant advanced multiple grounds for permission. First, he sought a stay pending the determination of CA/SUM 16/2023 and CA/CA 2/2023, which “engage the constitutionality of the presumptions” in the MDA (2020 Rev Ed). Second, he argued that, in the alternative, the High Court and Court of Appeal were demonstrably wrong in finding that he had both actual knowledge and presumptive knowledge. Third, he sought to raise an “intended complaint” ground relating to alleged misconduct by his previous counsel, and a “fresh clemency ground” relating to the need for more time to file a second clemency petition to the President.
Finally, the court had to address an additional procedural complication: the SCJA generally restricts the filing of a second PACC permission application while a previous PACC application is pending (s 60I(1) SCJA). The court noted this potential bar but indicated it was prepared to overlook the defect for the purpose of analysis, because the two applications sought the same reliefs in substance.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
The Court of Appeal, through Belinda Ang Saw Ean JCA, began by setting out the urgent context. The Applicant’s execution was scheduled for 10 April 2025. On 9 April 2025, he filed two applications: CA/OA 9/2025 (“the First Application”) filed at about 5.06pm by counsel, and CA/OAC 1/2025 (“the Second Application”) filed at about 5.27pm by the Applicant himself. The First Application sought permission to file a PACC against the Court of Appeal’s decision in CA/CCA 29/2020, and a stay pending the permission application and any subsequent PACC. The Second Application sought a stay and permission to file a PACC seeking a prohibiting order of the execution and a quashing order of the notice of execution dated 3 April 2025.
Although the court observed an inconsistency between the originating applications and the submissions—particularly that the submissions referenced a stay pending CA/SUM 16/2023 and CA/CA 2/2023, while the originating application did not expressly pray for that stay—the court was prepared to accept that the Applicant sought a stay pending those proceedings. This approach reflects a pragmatic willingness to interpret the relief sought in a manner consistent with the applicant’s substantive position, especially given the extreme urgency and the capital context.
On the procedural bar under s 60I(1) SCJA, the court noted that ordinarily a second application for PACC permission cannot be filed while a previous PACC application is pending. However, the court indicated it would overlook the procedural defect and treat the two applications as a single PACC permission application for the purposes of analysis, because they sought the same essential reliefs. This is important for practitioners: even where statutory procedural bars exist, the court may still proceed to consider the merits where the applications are functionally aligned and the capital execution timeline demands immediate determination.
Turning to the merits, the court summarily dismissed both applications under s 60G(8) SCJA. While the extract provided does not reproduce the full reasoning, it indicates the court’s focus on the grounds advanced. The “fresh clemency ground” concerned the need for more time to file a second petition for clemency to the President, after the first petition had been rejected on 7 June 2022. The court would have assessed whether this amounted to a legitimate basis for permission to file a PACC, and whether it could justify a stay of execution. In capital cases, the court’s approach typically requires more than general assertions of time or opportunity; it must be shown that the proposed PACC has a real prospect of success or engages a legally relevant and sufficiently compelling basis.
The “intended complaint ground” related to the Applicant’s desire to file a complaint to the Law Society of Singapore about his previous counsel’s conduct. The court would have considered whether this was capable of supporting a PACC permission application, particularly where the complaint is not itself a substantive legal ground that undermines the conviction or sentence, or where it does not connect to a legally cognisable error within the PACC framework.
Most importantly, the court addressed the “MDA presumptions ground” and the alternative “demonstrably wrong” argument. The Applicant sought to stay execution pending CA/SUM 16/2023 and CA/CA 2/2023, which engage the constitutionality of MDA presumptions. However, the court’s earlier factual record (as reflected in the trial and the Court of Appeal’s 2022 decision) suggested that the conviction was supported by the Applicant’s admissions and corroborative extrinsic evidence, and that the trial judge had found the charge proved beyond reasonable doubt without relying on the presumption. The 2022 Court of Appeal decision (Roshdi CA) upheld that approach, concluding that the element of possession for the purpose of trafficking was made out on the evidence “taking all the evidence together in the round”, and that the bailment defence was not accepted as a matter of fact.
Accordingly, the court in 2025 would have had to consider whether the constitutional challenge to presumptions could meaningfully affect the Applicant’s case where the conviction was not dependent solely on the presumptions. If the conviction rested on actual admissions and corroboration, the presumptions’ constitutionality may not be legally material to the Applicant’s guilt. Similarly, the “actual knowledge and presumptive knowledge” argument would have faced the difficulty that the appellate findings in 2022 were already final and were based on the evidence, including the Applicant’s own statements. The court also referenced an “inconsistency ground” in the judgment outline, suggesting it scrutinised discrepancies between the applicant’s positions and the procedural record.
Finally, the court’s decision to summarily dismiss under s 60G(8) SCJA indicates that it found the applications to be clearly unmeritorious or not meeting the statutory threshold for permission. In capital cases, summary dismissal is not lightly applied; it reflects a conclusion that the grounds advanced did not warrant further proceedings, and therefore could not justify a stay of execution.
What Was the Outcome?
The Court of Appeal dismissed both the First and Second Applications summarily under s 60G(8) SCJA, without an oral hearing. As a result, the Applicant was not granted permission to file the PACC applications sought, and the stay of execution was not granted.
Practically, the dismissal meant that the execution scheduled for 10 April 2025 was not stayed pending the determination of the permission application or any consequential PACC. The court’s refusal to grant a stay underscores the strict approach to capital execution timelines and the high threshold for reopening matters through PACC permission applications.
Why Does This Case Matter?
This case is significant for practitioners because it illustrates how the Court of Appeal manages urgent capital execution applications under the SCJA framework. Even where constitutional proceedings relating to MDA presumptions are pending, the court will still examine whether those proceedings are legally material to the applicant’s conviction and whether the proposed PACC has a sufficiently compelling basis to warrant permission and a stay.
From a doctrinal perspective, the decision reinforces the importance of the evidential foundation of the conviction. Where the trial judge and the Court of Appeal have found the charge proved beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of admissions and corroborative evidence—without reliance on presumptions—the constitutional challenge to presumptions may not provide a pathway to permission for a PACC. Practitioners should therefore carefully assess whether the conviction genuinely depends on the presumptions, or whether the conviction is independently supported by other evidence.
Procedurally, the case also highlights the court’s willingness to overlook certain technical defects (such as potential procedural bars under s 60I(1) SCJA) to address the substance of the relief sought, while still applying the statutory threshold for permission. Finally, the case demonstrates that clemency-related timing and intended complaints about counsel, without a direct and legally relevant link to the conviction or sentence within the PACC framework, may not be sufficient to obtain permission or a stay.
Legislation Referenced
- Supreme Court of Judicature Act (2020 Rev Ed) (“SCJA”), including ss 60G(8) and 60I(1)
- Misuse of Drugs Act 1973 (Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed), including ss 5(1)(a), 5(2), and 17(c)
- Misuse of Drugs Act (2020 Rev Ed) (presumptions context as referenced)
- Applications in Capital Cases Act 2022 (as referenced in metadata)
- Legal Profession Act (as referenced in metadata)
- Supreme Court of Judicature Act (as referenced in metadata)
Cases Cited
- [2020] SGCA 102
- [2020] SGCA 70
- [2020] SGHC 232
- [2022] SGCA 50
- [2022] SGCA 26
- [2022] SGCA 46
- [2022] SGHC 291
- [2024] SGCA 56
- [2025] SGCA 15
- [2025] SGCA 16
- Public Prosecutor v Roshdi bin Abdullah Altway [2020] SGHC 232
- Roshdi bin Abdullah Altway v Public Prosecutor [2022] 1 SLR 535
- Muhammad Nabill bin Mohd Fuad v PP [2020] 1 SLR 984
Source Documents
This article analyses [2025] SGCA 16 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.