Case Details
- Citation: [2005] SGCA 8
- Case Number: CA 72/2004
- Decision Date: 07 February 2005
- Court: Court of Appeal of the Republic of Singapore
- Coram: Chao Hick Tin JA; Lai Siu Chiu J; Yong Pung How CJ
- Judges: Chao Hick Tin JA, Lai Siu Chiu J, Yong Pung How CJ
- Plaintiff/Applicant: Riduan bin Yusof
- Defendant/Respondent: Khng Thian Huat and Another
- Parties (as stated): Riduan bin Yusof — Khng Thian Huat; Choy Mei Har
- Counsel Name(s): Appellant in person; Hri Kumar and Wilson Wong (Drew and Napier LLC) for the respondent
- Legal Areas: Civil Procedure — Appeals; Civil Procedure — Striking out
- Statutes Referenced: Civil Law Act (Cap 43, 1999 Rev Ed)
- Rules Referenced: Order 57 r 3 Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2004 Rev Ed)
- Related Procedural Provision: Order 57 r 4(c) Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2004 Rev Ed)
- Prior/Related Case: Khng Thian Huat v Riduan bin Yusof [2005] 1 SLR 130
- Judgment Length: 9 pages, 4,845 words
Summary
Riduan bin Yusof v Khng Thian Huat and Another [2005] SGCA 8 concerned an application to strike out an appellant’s notice of appeal. The respondents, who had succeeded in part at trial, sought to have the appeal dismissed on the basis that it was irregular and/or frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process. The Court of Appeal emphasised that the power to strike out a notice of appeal is exceptional and should be exercised only in “clear and obvious” cases, where there is no possibility that the grounds of appeal are capable of argument.
The appeal arose from a tenancy dispute. The High Court had awarded damages for damage to the property and loss of use, but dismissed the respondents’ main claim for double rent. A key feature of the case was that the parties had agreed to abide by a court-appointed expert’s decision on the identification and quantification of the alleged damage, with an express clause stating that no appeal or revision would be brought in respect of the expert’s decision. The Court of Appeal addressed whether this clause prevented the appellant from appealing, and whether the judge’s decision was separate from the expert’s decision.
Ultimately, the Court of Appeal dismissed the respondents’ application to strike out the notice of appeal. The court held that the respondents had not discharged the burden of showing that the appeal was plainly not competent or that it was frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process. The decision is therefore a procedural authority on the restraint the appellate court must exercise when asked to strike out a notice of appeal, particularly where the notice is timely and the grounds are not demonstrably hopeless.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
The dispute concerned a tenancy of a property at 95 Telok Kurau Road, Singapore 279022. The appellant, Riduan bin Yusof, was the tenant for three successive periods: January 1995 to March 1997; April 1997 to March 2000; and April 2000 to March 2003. Although a formal lease for the third tenancy was never signed, the parties did sign a letter of intent containing the material terms of that third tenancy.
After the letter of intent was signed, the parties’ relationship deteriorated. The appellant was habitually late in making rental payments. The respondents then asserted through correspondence that the property was occupied on a periodic basis, thereby denying the validity and existence of the third tenancy. The respondents subsequently served a notice of “termination”, which the appellant rejected. He refused to vacate and also denied the respondents access when they sought to inspect the property.
The respondents then commenced proceedings in the District Court seeking payment of double rent under s 28(4) of the Civil Law Act for wrongful holding over from 1 May 2001 to 10 April 2003. As time passed, the claim for double rent increased. After an application for summary judgment failed, the parties consented to transfer the proceedings to the High Court as Suit No 929 of 2003.
At trial in the High Court, the respondents claimed (i) double rent for holding over after the expiry of the second tenancy; (ii) damages for failure to restore the property to its original condition when the appellant vacated on 19 April 2003; and (iii) damages for consequential loss of usage arising from the property’s disrepair. It was not disputed that the appellant had caused some damage. However, the parties could not agree on the degree of damage, the apportionment of fair wear and tear, and the quantum of the claim.
To resolve the quantum dispute, both parties engaged experts. The disparity between their experts’ evidence was substantial. At the court’s suggestion, the parties agreed to abide by the decision of a court-appointed expert on identifying and quantifying the alleged damage. Importantly, the agreed terms of reference included a clause providing that the expert’s decision on quantum would be final and binding and that no appeal or revision would be brought in respect of the expert’s decision.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The Court of Appeal had to consider several interrelated procedural and substantive questions arising from the notice of appeal and the respondents’ application to strike it out. First, the respondents argued that the appellant was prevented from appealing because of the clause in the terms of reference that purported to make the court expert’s decision final and binding, with no appeal or revision. The issue was whether that clause barred the appellant’s appeal and, crucially, whether the trial judge’s decision was separate from the expert’s decision.
Second, the respondents contended that the appeal should be struck out because the appellant had failed to obtain leave to appeal in relation to damages. The Court of Appeal therefore had to examine the competence of the appeal and whether the failure to obtain leave rendered the appeal automatically liable to striking out, including in relation to the appellant’s challenge to costs.
Third, the respondents argued that the notice of appeal was irregular and/or frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process under the striking out jurisdiction. This required the Court of Appeal to restate the principles governing when a notice of appeal may be struck out, and to assess whether the grounds of appeal were capable of argument or were “clear and obvious” cases for dismissal.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
The Court of Appeal began by setting out the principles applicable to striking out notices of appeal. It referred to the inherent jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal to strike out a notice of appeal where the appeal is plainly not competent, or where it is frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process. The court also cited the “clear and obvious” threshold, cautioning that the striking out power is capable of abuse and should be confined to cases where it is evident that the appeal cannot succeed or is otherwise improper.
Crucially, the Court of Appeal distinguished the present application from the more conventional scenario where notices of appeal are struck out for being filed out of time. Here, the notice of appeal was filed within the one-month time limit under O 57 r 4(c) of the Rules of Court. The appellant also deposited security for costs. As a result, the respondents bore the burden of demonstrating that the grounds of appeal were not capable of argument, or that the appeal was frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.
On the “irregularity” argument, the Court of Appeal examined the nature of the alleged irregularities in the notice of appeal. While the extract provided is truncated, the court’s approach reflects a careful procedural analysis: it did not treat any alleged defect as automatically fatal. Instead, it assessed whether the notice of appeal was so defective that it could not properly be regarded as a competent appeal, or whether the alleged defects were matters that could be addressed without resorting to the drastic remedy of striking out.
The court then addressed the substantive effect of the clause in the terms of reference relating to the court expert. The respondents’ position was that the appellant had agreed that the expert’s decision on quantum would be final and binding and that no appeal or revision would be brought. The appellant, however, challenged the findings and sought to appeal on damages and costs. The Court of Appeal considered whether the trial judge’s acceptance of the expert’s views meant that the judge’s decision was merely a mechanical adoption of the expert’s decision, or whether the judge’s judgment constituted a separate judicial determination that could be appealed.
In this context, the Court of Appeal’s reasoning turned on the relationship between the expert’s decision and the judge’s role. Even where parties agree to abide by an expert’s decision, the trial judge still has to decide the case and give judgment. The court therefore treated the appeal as not plainly incompetent merely because the expert’s decision was contractually final and binding. The court’s analysis indicates that the “no appeal” clause could not be read as eliminating the court’s adjudicative function, nor could it automatically foreclose appellate review of the judge’s decision where the appellant raised arguable grounds.
On the leave to appeal issue, the Court of Appeal considered whether the appellant’s failure to obtain leave to appeal against damages meant that the entire notice of appeal should be struck out, including the costs component. The court did not accept that striking out was automatic. Instead, it required the respondents to show that the appeal was plainly not competent or that the grounds were hopeless. Given that the notice of appeal raised issues on both damages and costs, and given the procedural posture, the court was not persuaded that the appeal met the stringent “clear and obvious” standard for striking out.
Finally, the Court of Appeal considered whether the notice of appeal was frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process. The appellant’s grounds, as summarised in the judgment, included allegations that the respondents removed items from the property before the court expert’s inspection, thereby affecting the evidence; that the respondents failed to carry out maintenance obligations; and that the respondents altered rental receipt terms without informing the appellant. On costs, the appellant argued that the respondents wasted the court’s time by retracting unmeritorious arguments and that the respondents’ conduct and omissions should have been reflected in the costs order. The Court of Appeal treated these as arguable matters rather than manifestly hopeless claims.
What Was the Outcome?
The Court of Appeal dismissed the respondents’ application to strike out the notice of appeal. It held that the respondents had not met the burden of showing that the appeal was plainly not competent or that it was frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process. The court therefore allowed the appeal to proceed.
In the procedural hearing below, the Court of Appeal had already refused the appellant’s request for an adjournment to engage counsel and dismissed the application without an order on costs. The reasons given in the present judgment confirm that the striking out jurisdiction was not properly invoked on the facts and procedural circumstances.
Why Does This Case Matter?
Riduan bin Yusof v Khng Thian Huat and Another [2005] SGCA 8 is significant for practitioners because it reinforces the high threshold for striking out a notice of appeal. Even where a notice of appeal is challenged on grounds of irregularity or alleged incompetence, the Court of Appeal requires a “clear and obvious” case before exercising the drastic power to terminate the appeal at an early stage.
For litigators, the decision is also a useful reminder that contractual clauses in expert terms of reference—such as “final and binding” provisions with “no appeal” language—do not necessarily eliminate the possibility of appellate scrutiny of the trial judge’s judgment. While such clauses may affect how the court treats the expert’s findings, they do not automatically render an appeal incompetent where the appellant challenges the judge’s decision or raises arguable grounds.
From a civil procedure perspective, the case also illustrates that failure to obtain leave to appeal on one aspect (here, damages) does not automatically mean that the entire notice of appeal—including costs—must be struck out. Courts will look carefully at competence and the specific procedural defects, rather than applying a blanket approach. This is particularly relevant where notices of appeal are drafted by litigants in person and where issues are separable.
Legislation Referenced
- Civil Law Act (Cap 43, 1999 Rev Ed), s 28(4) [CDN] [SSO]
- Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2004 Rev Ed), Order 57 r 3
- Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2004 Rev Ed), Order 57 r 4(c)
Cases Cited
- Aviagents Ltd v Balstravest Investments Ltd [1966] 1 W.L.R. 150; [1966] 1 All E.R. 450
- Burgess v Stafford Hotel Ltd [1990] 1 W.L.R. 1215; [1990] 3 All E.R. 222
- Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin v Lee Kuan Yew [1991] SLR 118
- Ooi Phee Cheng v Kok Yoon San [1951] 1 M.L.J. 135
- Khng Thian Huat v Riduan bin Yusof [2005] 1 SLR 130
- [1990] SLR 1251
- [1991] SLR 798
- [2005] SGCA 8
Source Documents
This article analyses [2005] SGCA 8 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.