Case Details
- Citation: [2018] SGHC 100
- Title: Resorts World At Sentosa Pte Ltd v Sze Siu Hung
- Court: High Court of the Republic of Singapore
- Date: 27 April 2018 (judgment reserved; heard 18 and 30 April 2018)
- Judge: Choo Han Teck J
- Case Number: HC/Suit No 1245 of 2016
- Registrar’s Appeals: HC/Registrar’s Appeals No 84, 85 and 86 of 2018
- Summons: HC/Summons No 1791 of 2018
- Plaintiff/Applicant: Resorts World at Sentosa Pte Ltd
- Defendant/Respondent: Sze Siu Hung
- Legal Areas: Civil procedure; service of process; judgments and orders; default judgment; service out of jurisdiction
- Statutes Referenced: Rules of Court (Cap 332, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed) (in particular O 11 r 2(1)(c))
- Cases Cited: [2018] SGHC 100 (as reflected in the provided metadata)
- Judgment Length: 7 pages; 1,737 words
- Counsel for Plaintiff: Shankar s/o Angammah Sevasamy and Qiu Jiehao Ivan (Straits Law Practice LLC)
- Counsel for Defendant: Chan Ming Onn David, Tan Su Hui, Chng Yan and Lee Ping (Shook Lin & Bok LLP)
Summary
Resorts World at Sentosa Pte Ltd v Sze Siu Hung concerned the defendant’s attempt to set aside, in Singapore, a sequence of procedural orders that had enabled the plaintiff to serve the claim out of jurisdiction, effect substituted service, and obtain default judgment. The defendant, a Hong Kong citizen, had used a credit facility from the plaintiff’s casino and left an outstanding balance of $8,380,577 after partial payments and rebates. When the defendant did not enter an appearance, the plaintiff proceeded to default judgment. The defendant later challenged the Singapore orders after the default judgment was registered in Hong Kong.
On appeal, the High Court dismissed the defendant’s arguments that the plaintiff failed to make full and frank disclosure when seeking leave to serve out of jurisdiction, and that the substituted service order should be set aside. The court also rejected the defendant’s attempt to set aside the default judgment on the basis of alleged repayment and a purported unilateral mistake in the credit agreement. The judge found that the defendant had notice of the proceedings by at least mid-December 2016 and had evaded service, and that the proposed defences were not credible when tested against the documentary timeline of payments.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
The plaintiff, Resorts World at Sentosa Pte Ltd, operates a casino in Singapore. In November 2011, the defendant, Sze Siu Hung, visited the casino and used $15m drawn from a credit facility provided by the plaintiff. The credit agreement recorded a Hong Kong address as the defendant’s residential address. Over the period from December 2011 to March 2015, the plaintiff applied partial payments totalling $5,571,073 and rebates of $1,048,350 against the $15m owed. After these set-offs, the defendant remained liable for a balance of $8,380,577.
After the defendant failed to settle the outstanding sum, the plaintiff’s solicitors sent a letter of demand dated 26 October 2016 to four addresses connected to the defendant. Three addresses were in Hong Kong and the fourth was in Fujian, China. These addresses were identified through searches conducted by the plaintiff. The plaintiff’s evidence indicated that the defendant’s Hong Kong addresses were connected to him and were the addresses the plaintiff used for initial attempts at contact.
In response, the defendant’s Hong Kong solicitors, M/s Michael Li & Co (“MLC”), wrote on 2 November 2016 to the plaintiff’s solicitors, stating that they were taking instructions from the defendant. On 10 November 2016, MLC sent another letter denying the plaintiff’s claim and requesting particulars and documents. The plaintiff then commenced suit in Singapore on 23 November 2016 for repayment of the $8,380,577.
Because the defendant was outside Singapore, the plaintiff applied for leave to serve the cause papers out of jurisdiction. Leave was granted on 1 December 2016. The plaintiff appointed Hong Kong solicitors, M/s Winnie Mak, Chan & Yeung (“WMCY”), to effect personal service. WMCY asked MLC whether they had instructions to accept service on the defendant’s behalf. MLC replied on 15 December 2016 that they did not have such instructions. WMCY therefore attempted personal service six times at the three Hong Kong addresses, without success. The plaintiff then sought and obtained an order for substituted service.
Substituted service was effected on 2 February 2017 by advertisement in an English-language newspaper and a Chinese-language newspaper, with copies of the advertisements sent to the three Hong Kong addresses. The defendant did not enter an appearance. Accordingly, the plaintiff entered default judgment on 2 March 2017. The default judgment was registered in Hong Kong, and notification of the registration order was sent to the same three Hong Kong addresses.
Only on 2 August 2017 did the defendant make his “debut” by applying in Hong Kong to set aside the registration order. In Singapore, he then applied to set aside the earlier orders for leave to serve out of jurisdiction, substituted service, and the default judgment itself. The assistant registrar dismissed the defendant’s applications, and the defendant appealed to the High Court.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The first major issue was whether the plaintiff’s application for leave to serve out of jurisdiction was defective due to alleged non-disclosure. The defendant argued that the plaintiff did not make full and frank disclosure, specifically by failing to inform the court that it knew or had reason to believe the defendant’s place of residence was in Fujian, China. This argument was framed as a procedural irregularity that should invalidate the leave granted under the Rules of Court.
The second issue concerned the order for substituted service. The defendant contended that substituted service should be set aside on multiple grounds: (i) that the plaintiff did not make reasonable efforts to locate the defendant’s residential address; (ii) that the substituted service methods were unlikely to bring the cause papers to the defendant’s notice; and (iii) that the plaintiff again failed to make full and frank disclosure about the Fujian address.
The third issue related to the default judgment itself. The defendant sought to set aside the default judgment by asserting a prima facie defence. Two lines of defence were advanced: first, that the defendant had fully repaid the $15m to an individual (Ms Gao) through intermediaries due to China’s exchange control regulations; second, that the credit agreement was void due to unilateral mistake, because the defendant believed he would only be liable for up to 70% of the debt. The defendant also sought leave to adduce fresh evidence on appeal to support these claims.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
On the non-disclosure argument, the judge focused on the statutory requirement for the leave application. Under O 11 r 2(1)(c) of the Rules of Court, the plaintiff was required to state what place or country the defendant is, or probably may be found. The court accepted that the defendant was a Hong Kong citizen and that the credit agreement listed a Hong Kong address as his residential address. The searches conducted by the plaintiff also revealed Hong Kong addresses, and the 26 October 2016 letter was replied to by Hong Kong solicitors engaged by the defendant. In those circumstances, the judge held that it was reasonable and permissible for the plaintiff to state that the defendant was, or probably may be found, in Hong Kong.
Crucially, the judge rejected the claim that the Fujian address was material to the leave application. The defendant’s argument relied on three alleged facts: that the defendant told a plaintiff employee he was resident in Fujian; that a Hong Kong search revealed he was born in Fujian and had multiple listed addresses including one in Fujian; and that the demand letter was sent to the Fujian address. The judge found that even if the Fujian address was connected to the defendant, it was not a residential address but an office address. As a result, the omission of that office address from the leave application did not amount to a failure of full and frank disclosure in the relevant sense required by O 11 r 2(1)(c).
The judge also inferred that the defendant’s conduct suggested evasion of service. The procedural history showed that the defendant had engaged solicitors and responded to the demand letter, but then did not take steps to ensure service was accepted or to enter an appearance once the proceedings were commenced. The court treated the defendant’s later challenge as an attempt to avoid the consequences of not responding earlier.
Turning to substituted service, the judge addressed the three grounds advanced by the defendant. The third ground—again alleging non-disclosure about Fujian—was rejected for the same reasons as the earlier argument on service out of jurisdiction. The remaining two grounds were treated as afterthoughts. The judge emphasised that the defendant knew of the proceedings at the latest by 15 December 2016. This conclusion was supported by the communications between WMCY and MLC, and by the fact that WMCY informed MLC of the proceedings and asked whether they had instructions to accept service. MLC asked the defendant, who declined to give instructions for acceptance.
In other words, the court did not accept that the defendant could later claim lack of notice. The judge reasoned that the defendant’s refusal to instruct acceptance of service meant that the plaintiff’s efforts to bring the papers to his attention were not undermined by any procedural deficiency. The court also noted the defendant’s own explanation that the demand letter had been forwarded to him by staff at the Fujian address, which further undermined the claim that he was unaware of the plaintiff’s attempts to contact him.
Finally, the court considered whether there was a prima facie defence to the default judgment. The judge rejected the proposed defences as lacking credibility when compared with the documentary timeline of payments. The defendant’s repayment narrative was that the $15m was repaid to Ms Gao through intermediaries, and that this was connected to exchange control regulations. The judge observed that these allegations only emerged in the Singapore proceedings and were not mentioned when the defendant applied in Hong Kong to set aside the registration of the default judgment. This omission suggested that the defence was not genuinely advanced at the earliest opportunity.
As to the fresh evidence, the judge dismissed the application to adduce further evidence and found that the proposed evidence did not reconcile with the plaintiff’s accounts. The fresh evidence indicated that the $15m was paid to intermediaries between 6 January 2012 and 17 April 2012. Yet the plaintiff’s accounts showed repayments beginning on 24 December 2011, continuing until 6 January 2015. The judge found it implausible that the plaintiff could have received repayments in December 2011 if the defendant’s alleged repayment to intermediaries only began in January 2012. This discrepancy led the court to conclude that the defendant’s story did not add up and that the credibility of the defence was weak.
What Was the Outcome?
The High Court dismissed the defendant’s appeals against the assistant registrar’s decisions and dismissed the defendant’s application to adduce further evidence. The practical effect was that the orders permitting service out of jurisdiction, the substituted service order, and the default judgment remained in force.
The court indicated that it would hear submissions on costs at a later date. For the plaintiff, the decision confirmed that the procedural steps taken to bring the defendant before the court were not fatally defective, and that the default judgment would not be disturbed on the basis of the defences advanced.
Why Does This Case Matter?
This case is a useful authority on how Singapore courts approach challenges to service-related orders, particularly where a defendant engages with the proceedings through solicitors but later attempts to contest service after default judgment. The decision illustrates that the court will scrutinise whether alleged non-disclosure is actually material to the statutory requirement for leave to serve out of jurisdiction. Where the plaintiff’s application complies with the relevant rule—stating the place or country where the defendant is or probably may be found—the court may reject non-disclosure arguments that rely on peripheral or non-residential connections.
For practitioners, the judgment also highlights the importance of notice and evasion. The court’s reasoning turned on the defendant’s refusal to instruct acceptance of service once the plaintiff’s solicitors sought instructions. This is a significant practical point: even if substituted service is used, the court may still uphold the order where the defendant had actual or at least clear knowledge of the proceedings and declined to facilitate service.
Finally, the case demonstrates the evidential burden on an applicant seeking to set aside default judgment. The court did not treat the defendant’s assertions as sufficient; it tested the defence against the documentary timeline and found internal inconsistencies. The refusal to admit fresh evidence on appeal further underscores that courts will not allow late-stage evidential supplementation to cure credibility problems or reconcile contradictions with existing records.
Legislation Referenced
- Rules of Court (Cap 332, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed), O 11 r 2(1)(c)
Cases Cited
- [2018] SGHC 100
Source Documents
This article analyses [2018] SGHC 100 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.