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Re Teo Jun Kiat, Evan (alias Zhang Junjie)

Analysis of [2015] SGHC 274, a decision of the High Court of the Republic of Singapore on 2015-10-23.

Case Details

  • Title: Re Teo Jun Kiat, Evan (alias Zhang Junjie)
  • Citation: [2015] SGHC 274
  • Court: High Court of the Republic of Singapore
  • Decision Date: 23 October 2015
  • Coram: Edmund Leow JC
  • Case Number: Admission of Advocates and Solicitors No 197 of 2015 (HC/Summons No 1927 of 2015)
  • Applicant: Mr Nicholas Jeyaraj s/o Narayanan (Nicholas & Tan Partnership LLP)
  • Practice Trainee: Mr Teo Jun Kiat, Evan (Zhang Junjie) (“Mr Teo”)
  • Respondents/Objects: Attorney-General’s Chambers; Law Society of Singapore
  • Non-objector: Singapore Institute of Legal Education (“SILE”)
  • Counsel for Applicant: Nicholas Jeyaraj s/o Narayanan (Nicholas & Tan Partnership LLP)
  • Counsel for Attorney-General’s Chambers: Jeyendran Jeyapal and Ang Ming Sheng Terence
  • Counsel for Law Society of Singapore: Christopher Daniel and Aw Sze Min
  • Legal Area: Legal Profession – Admission; Practice Training; Right of Audience / Part-call
  • Statutes Referenced: Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 2009 Rev Ed) (“the Act”); Legal Profession (Amendment) Act 2011 (Act 8 of 2011)
  • Subsidiary Legislation Referenced: Legal Profession (Admission) Rules 2011 (Cap 161, S 244/2011) (“the 2011 Rules”)
  • Key Provision: s 32(3) of the Legal Profession Act
  • Cases Cited: [2015] SGHC 274 (as provided in metadata)
  • Judgment Length: 6 pages, 3,262 words

Summary

In Re Teo Jun Kiat, Evan (alias Zhang Junjie) [2015] SGHC 274, the High Court considered how its discretion under s 32(3) of the Legal Profession Act should be exercised in an application for a “part-call” order. The applicant sought permission for a practice trainee to appear in court on behalf of a Singapore law practice for limited purposes (before specified judicial officers and registrars), even though the trainee had not yet completed Part B of the Singapore Bar Examinations.

The court accepted that s 32(3) does not expressly state that Part B Course completion and Part B examination passage are mandatory prerequisites for part-call. However, the court held that the statutory scheme and the broader admission framework assume that practice trainees seeking to be part-called have already completed the relevant courses and examinations prescribed by the Singapore Institute of Legal Education. On the evidence before it, the court was not satisfied that the trainee had acquired the basic procedural and ethical knowledge that Part B is designed to impart.

What Were the Facts of This Case?

The application arose from the practice training pathway for admission to the Singapore Bar. Under the Legal Profession Act, a “qualified person” who has served at least three months of practice training and is serving that training under a practice training contract may apply to be “part-called” so as to obtain a limited right of audience. In this case, the applicant was an advocate and solicitor in active practice, Nicholas Jeyaraj s/o Narayanan of Nicholas & Tan Partnership LLP (“the Firm”). He applied for an order allowing his practice trainee, Teo Jun Kiat, Evan (alias Zhang Junjie) (“Mr Teo”), to be part-called.

At the time of the part-call application, Mr Teo was serving his practice training period but had not yet undertaken Part B of the Singapore Bar Examinations. The Law Society of Singapore and the Attorney-General’s Chambers objected. They argued that permitting a practice trainee to appear in court without completing Part B was inappropriate because Part B is intended to provide foundational procedural and ethical competence required of advocates and solicitors when they appear before the courts.

Mr Teo’s circumstances were described as unusual. He completed the final examinations of his Juris Doctor degree from the University of Sydney on 23 November 2013. Because of the timing of his return to Singapore, he commenced his relevant legal training (“RLT”) with Selvam LLC on 2 January 2014 and completed it six months later. The court noted that overseas graduates typically undertake RLT after completing Part A examinations, but Mr Teo’s timeline meant he did not have the opportunity to complete Part B before starting practice training.

After completing Part A, the National University of Singapore certified on 24 December 2014 that Mr Teo had passed the Part A examinations. By then, he had already commenced his practice training contract with the Firm on 4 December 2014. SILE approved the manner in which he would serve his practice training period in February 2015, and by 30 January 2015 his name had been entered into the register of qualified persons maintained by SILE. The part-call application was filed about four months after he began practice training. In support, Mr Teo’s application materials described practical exposure gained through internships and training, including attendance at pre-trial conferences, criminal sentencing hearings, a civil trial in the State Courts, and an appeal against a summary judgment before a judge in chambers. He also attended a hearing involving a worldwide Mareva injunction and an application for pre-action discovery. During his training contract, he attended a 10-day criminal trial in the State Courts and assisted in a striking-out application. He further argued that as an Australian graduate he had studied civil procedure, criminal procedure, and professional ethics, and that these overlapped with modules in Part B, equipping him with a basic understanding of those subjects.

The core legal issue was the proper approach to the court’s discretion under s 32(3) of the Legal Profession Act. Specifically, the court had to decide whether a practice trainee should be permitted to be part-called when he or she had not completed Part B of the Singapore Bar Examinations, particularly where Part B completion was not stated as an express statutory requirement in s 32(3).

A related issue concerned the weight to be given to the statutory and regulatory context. The Law Society and the Attorney-General’s Chambers contended that although s 32(3) does not expressly mention Part B, the overall admission scheme—especially the requirements for admission as an advocate and solicitor—indicates that Part B is a foundational component. The court therefore had to determine whether it could treat Part B completion as a relevant (even if not express) criterion when deciding whether to grant part-call relief.

Finally, the court had to consider what evidence is required to satisfy the court that a trainee who has not completed Part B nonetheless possesses the “basic skills and knowledge” that Part B would normally provide, including procedural competence and ethical awareness, given that those duties apply equally to persons appearing in court.

How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?

Edmund Leow JC began by framing the matter as an “interesting question of law” about how the court should exercise its discretion under s 32(3). The provision grants a judge a discretionary power: on application by an advocate and solicitor in active practice in a Singapore law practice, the judge may allow a qualified person who has served not less than three months of practice training and is serving under a practice training contract at the time of application to appear before specified judicial officers and registrars.

The court accepted the applicant’s submission that s 32(3) contains mandatory requirements but does not expressly require completion of Part B Course and Part B examinations. The applicant’s position was that the purpose of part-call is to allow a practice trainee some introduction to pleading and direct experience, and that Mr Teo’s practical experience and academic background were sufficient for that purpose.

However, the court did not treat the absence of an express Part B requirement as determinative. Instead, it held that s 32(3) must be read in light of the “entire schema” of the Legal Profession Act and the rules made under it. The court pointed to the admission requirements in s 13(1), which include, among other things, attendance and satisfactory completion of courses of instruction and passing examinations as prescribed by the Board of Directors of the Institute (SILE). This statutory structure indicates that Part B is not an optional add-on but part of the prescribed pathway to admission.

The court then connected the statutory admission requirements to the Legal Profession (Admission) Rules 2011. Under the 2011 Rules, Part B Course and Part B examinations are prescribed for the purposes of s 13(1)(d) and s 13(1)(e). The court also observed that while the part-call requirements in s 32(3) focus on the duration of practice training completed (at least three months), they do not address the other admission requirements. This omission, the court reasoned, is explained by the structure of the rules: Part IV of the 2011 Rules sets out that a qualified person is not entitled to serve practice training unless he or she has attended and satisfactorily completed the preparatory course leading to Part B and has sat for the written examinations for all examinable subjects in Part B, subject to exceptions.

Crucially, the court treated the default scenario as one in which Part B would normally be completed before practice training begins. It therefore concluded that s 32(3) was drafted on the assumption that practice trainees applying to be part-called would have already completed the necessary preparatory courses and examinations required for admission as an advocate and solicitor of the Supreme Court. This interpretive approach supported the Attorney-General’s submission that the court should be “slow” to exercise discretion to allow appearance without Part B completion.

Although the court accepted that exceptions exist under r 16(1) of the 2011 Rules (which allowed Mr Teo to complete his practice training period prior to attending the Part B Course), the court treated those exceptions as contextual rather than as a basis to dilute the competence rationale underlying part-call. In other words, the existence of an exception for training logistics did not automatically justify granting a right of audience without the knowledge and ethical grounding that Part B is designed to provide.

On the evidence, the court was not satisfied that Mr Teo had acquired the relevant “basic skills and knowledge” that he would otherwise have gained through Part B. While the court acknowledged Mr Teo’s practical exposure—such as attending hearings and assisting in litigation tasks—it accepted the Law Society’s and Attorney-General’s concerns that practical experience alone does not necessarily vest a comprehensive understanding of court processes, their rationales, and the ethical awareness required when appearing in court.

The court also considered the effect of amendments to the Legal Profession Act in 2011. The Law Society argued that the scope of what a part-called qualified person may do expanded after the Legal Profession (Amendment) Act 2011, including the ability to appear in open court on behalf of the Singapore law practice. That expansion, the Law Society submitted, should lead to more stringent qualifying criteria. While the court’s reasoning primarily relied on the statutory scheme and the assumption underlying s 32(3), the amendment context reinforced the view that appearance rights carry professional responsibilities that should not be granted without the prescribed training and examinations.

What Was the Outcome?

The High Court dismissed the part-call application. Although Part B completion was not an express statutory requirement in s 32(3), the court held that the legislative and regulatory framework assumes Part B completion as part of the competence pathway. The court was not persuaded that Mr Teo had adduced sufficient evidence to show that he had acquired the procedural and ethical knowledge that Part B would have provided.

Practically, the decision meant that Mr Teo could not be granted limited right of audience under the part-call mechanism at that stage of his training. The order preserved the integrity of the admission and training framework by ensuring that court appearance rights are tied to the competence and ethical safeguards embedded in the prescribed Part B curriculum and examinations.

Why Does This Case Matter?

Re Teo Jun Kiat, Evan is significant for practitioners and law students because it clarifies how the court approaches discretion under s 32(3) of the Legal Profession Act. The case demonstrates that even where a statutory provision does not expressly list a particular prerequisite (such as Part B completion), the court may still interpret the provision in a manner consistent with the overall admission scheme and the purpose of the prescribed courses and examinations.

For firms seeking part-call orders for practice trainees, the decision underscores the evidential burden. Applicants should anticipate that the court will ask whether the trainee has acquired the foundational procedural and ethical competence that Part B is intended to impart. General assertions of practical exposure, overlapping academic content, or commendable academic grades may not be enough unless supported by concrete evidence addressing the specific competencies Part B targets.

From a compliance and risk-management perspective, the case also signals that the court will be cautious about granting audience rights before the completion of the Bar examinations pathway. This caution is particularly relevant after amendments that expanded the scope of appearance for part-called qualified persons. Practitioners should therefore plan training timelines and applications so that part-call requests are made only when the trainee has completed the relevant prescribed instruction and examinations, or when there is robust evidence demonstrating equivalent competence.

Legislation Referenced

  • Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 2009 Rev Ed), in particular s 32(3) and s 13(1)
  • Legal Profession (Amendment) Act 2011 (Act 8 of 2011)
  • Legal Profession (Admission) Rules 2011 (Cap 161, S 244/2011), including Part II and Part IV (notably r 16(1))

Cases Cited

  • [2015] SGHC 274 (as provided in the supplied metadata)

Source Documents

This article analyses [2015] SGHC 274 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.

Written by Sushant Shukla

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