Case Details
- Citation: [2014] SGHC 223
- Title: Re Michael Fordham QC
- Court: High Court of the Republic of Singapore
- Date: 05 November 2014
- Judges: Steven Chong J
- Coram: Steven Chong J
- Case Number: Originating Summons No 595 of 2014
- Tribunal/Court: High Court
- Decision Date: 05 November 2014
- Legal Area: Legal Profession — Admission
- Application Type: Application for ad hoc admission under s 15 of the Legal Profession Act
- Applicant: Mr Michael Fordham QC
- Applicant’s Representation: Abraham Vergis and Clive Myint Soe (Providence Law Asia LLC)
- Respondent: Attorney-General (as required in applications involving the Attorney-General and the Law Society)
- Attorney-General’s Representation: Jeffrey Chan Wah Teck SC and Terence Tan (Attorney-General’s Chambers)
- Law Society of Singapore’s Representation: Christopher Anand Daniel, Harjean Kaur and Aw Sze Min (Advocatus Law LLP)
- Parties: Re Michael Fordham QC
- Statutes Referenced: Advocates and Solicitors Ordinance; Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 2009 Rev Ed); Medical Registration Act (Cap 174, 2004 Rev Ed)
- Key Statutory Provisions (as reflected in the extract): Legal Profession Act s 15; Legal Profession Act s 85(6); Legal Profession Act s 85(1); Medical Registration Act s 45(1)(d)
- Cases Cited: [2011] SGHC 131; [2014] SGHC 223
- Judgment Length: 27 pages, 16,371 words
Summary
In Re Michael Fordham QC [2014] SGHC 223, the High Court (Steven Chong J) considered an application for ad hoc admission under s 15 of the Legal Profession Act (“LPA”). The applicant, Mr Michael Fordham QC, sought permission to represent a litigant, Mr Deepak Sharma (“Mr Sharma”), in judicial review proceedings arising from a complaint made to the Law Society of Singapore against two solicitors, Mr Alvin Yeo SC and Ms Melanie Ho. The complaint had been considered by a Review Committee (“RC”) constituted under s 85(6) of the LPA, which dismissed the complaint wholly against Mr Yeo SC and partially against Ms Ho.
The application was notable for its unusual procedural and evidential features. The court highlighted that the underlying judicial review was not brought by the person directly liable for costs in the earlier proceedings (Dr Susan Lim), but by her husband, Mr Sharma. Further, Mr Sharma’s stance on whether standing was required appeared to shift, and the applicant’s own affidavit initially conceded that the statutory requirements for ad hoc admission were not satisfied, only to later file a corrective affidavit without leave and without adequate explanation. These matters fed into the court’s assessment of whether the application should be granted.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
The dispute has its roots in disciplinary proceedings involving Dr Susan Lim, a medical practitioner who faced charges of professional misconduct before the Singapore Medical Council (“SMC”). Those disciplinary proceedings culminated in a finding of professional misconduct for overcharging, with Dr Lim suspended from medical practice for three years, censured, and fined $10,000. Dr Lim appealed to the High Court, and the appeal was ultimately dismissed. The High Court’s decision upholding the disciplinary findings is referenced in the extract as Lim Mey Lee Susan v Singapore Medical Council [2013] 3 SLR 900 (“Susan Lim”).
Before the High Court appeal, Dr Lim challenged certain procedural decisions of the SMC by initiating two applications: one was withdrawn, and the other proceeded through to the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal dismissed Dr Lim’s appeal and ordered costs against her. When no agreement could be reached on the costs, the SMC’s solicitors, Wong Partnership LLP (“Wong P”), filed bills of costs for taxation in the High Court. Following taxation, the costs were significantly reduced.
Mr Sharma’s complaint to the Law Society arose from this costs saga. On 23 January 2014, Mr Sharma lodged a complaint under s 85(1) of the LPA against Mr Yeo SC and Ms Ho (who were associated with Wong P) alleging professional misconduct in seeking grossly excessive party-and-party costs against Dr Lim in three matters: OS 1131/2010, OS 1252/2010, and CA 80/2011. These matters were connected to the earlier proceedings between Dr Lim and the SMC. Mr Sharma’s complaint was accompanied by a written opinion from Queen’s Counsel, Mr Ian Winter QC (“Mr Winter QC”), dated 8 December 2013, which concluded that there was “due cause” to believe that the solicitors were prima facie guilty of professional misconduct due to grossly excessive fees.
In the opinion and the complaint narrative, Mr Sharma was described as a third-party “co-funder” of the proceedings between Dr Lim and the SMC. This description is significant because it suggests that Mr Sharma’s involvement was not merely incidental; he had contributed to the legal expenses. However, the extract indicates that during the hearing before Chong J, Mr Sharma adopted a position that the complaint could be filed by anyone without establishing standing. This contrasted with the earlier emphasis on his role as co-funder, and it raised questions about locus standi and the proper basis for bringing the complaint.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The first legal issue concerned the court’s approach to an application for ad hoc admission under s 15 of the LPA. Ad hoc admission is an exceptional mechanism allowing a person who is not ordinarily entitled to practise in Singapore to be admitted for a specific matter. The court therefore had to consider whether the applicant met the statutory requirements and whether the circumstances warranted granting the privilege.
The second issue related to the unusual posture of the underlying judicial review. Although judicial review is typically brought by a party directly affected by the administrative decision, here the complaint to the Law Society had been filed by Mr Sharma rather than by Dr Lim, the person who was liable for the costs in the earlier proceedings. The court had to consider whether the complaint and the resulting judicial review were properly brought, and whether the applicant’s proposed representation was appropriate in light of the apparent standing concerns.
Third, the court had to address credibility and procedural propriety in the ad hoc admission application itself. The extract notes that the applicant’s statement in support asserted that he should be admitted notwithstanding that he did not satisfy all requirements under s 15. The applicant later filed a corrective affidavit without leave of court, without explaining why his position had changed, and without disclosing what caused the reversal. These features raised concerns about the integrity of the application and the court’s willingness to grant relief where the evidential foundation was unstable.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
Chong J began by framing the application as one for ad hoc admission under s 15 of the LPA, but he treated it as inseparable from the context of the underlying judicial review. The court emphasised that the application was not a typical judicial review brought by the directly aggrieved party. Instead, the complaint to the Law Society was lodged by Mr Sharma, who was not the costs-liable party. This contextual point mattered because it went to the legitimacy of the complaint and, by extension, the appropriateness of granting ad hoc admission to counsel to prosecute a judicial review that might be procedurally defective.
In addressing locus standi, the court noted the tension between the written opinion’s description of Mr Sharma as a co-funder and Mr Sharma’s later position that standing need not be established. Chong J observed that the earlier statement in Mr Winter QC’s opinion appeared to anticipate concerns about Mr Sharma’s interest in the complaint. The court therefore treated the shift in position as a red flag: it suggested that the factual basis for standing was not being presented consistently, and it created uncertainty as to whether the complaint was brought for a proper legal purpose.
On the ad hoc admission application, the court’s analysis focused on the applicant’s own admissions. Chong J highlighted that this was the first ad hoc admission application where the applicant himself accepted that the requirements under s 15 were not satisfied. While the applicant attempted to correct the position by filing a corrective affidavit, the court noted that the corrective affidavit was filed without leave and without explanation for the earlier concession or the subsequent reversal. The court therefore treated the procedural irregularity and the lack of explanation as relevant to whether the application should be granted.
Although the extract does not reproduce the full reasoning in the truncated portion of the judgment, the approach described indicates that Chong J applied a principled and cautious stance. Ad hoc admission is discretionary and exceptional; it is not merely a formality. The court would therefore consider not only whether the formal statutory criteria were met, but also whether the application was made in a procedurally proper manner and supported by reliable evidence. Where the applicant’s own position undermined the statutory basis for admission, and where the underlying proceedings raised standing concerns, the court would be slow to grant the privilege.
Chong J also placed the complaint within the broader disciplinary narrative. The court recounted the procedural history of Dr Lim’s disciplinary proceedings and the subsequent costs taxation and review. This served to show that the complaint against the solicitors was anchored in the reduction of costs on taxation, which had occurred in the course of the earlier litigation. The court’s description of the “ironic twist” underscores that the complaint was effectively a collateral attempt to re-litigate or reframe issues already determined in the disciplinary and costs processes. That context likely informed the court’s assessment of whether the judicial review was being pursued in good faith and with a proper legal foundation.
What Was the Outcome?
The extract provided does not include the final operative orders. However, given the court’s emphasis on the applicant’s concession that s 15 requirements were not satisfied, the procedural irregularity in filing a corrective affidavit without leave, and the unresolved standing concerns arising from the unusual complaint posture, the case is best understood as a cautionary decision on ad hoc admission applications where the evidential and procedural basis is unstable.
For practitioners, the practical effect of the decision is that ad hoc admission will not be granted as a matter of course where the applicant’s own affidavit evidence is inconsistent, where the statutory basis is conceded to be lacking, and where the underlying proceedings raise serious threshold concerns about the proper bringing of the complaint or judicial review.
Why Does This Case Matter?
Re Michael Fordham QC is significant for two overlapping reasons: it illustrates the court’s strict approach to ad hoc admission under the LPA, and it demonstrates that the court will scrutinise the procedural integrity of the underlying litigation context. Ad hoc admission is a privilege granted to enable representation in a specific matter, but it is not intended to facilitate proceedings that are procedurally questionable or evidentially unsupported.
For lawyers, the case underscores that affidavits and applications must be internally consistent and procedurally compliant. Where an applicant concedes that statutory requirements are not met, any subsequent attempt to reverse that position must be supported by a clear explanation and must follow the procedural rules (including obtaining leave where required). The court’s attention to these matters signals that procedural propriety and candour are central to the exercise of discretion.
For law students and practitioners researching admission and professional regulation, the case also highlights how disciplinary and costs-related disputes can generate downstream complaints to the Law Society and subsequent judicial review. The court’s discussion of standing and the identity of the complainant provides a useful lens for analysing how “interest” and “affectedness” may be argued in regulatory complaints, particularly where the complainant is not the direct costs-liable party.
Legislation Referenced
- Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 2009 Rev Ed) — s 15 (ad hoc admission); s 85(1) (complaint to the Law Society); s 85(6) (Review Committee)
- Advocates and Solicitors Ordinance (historical reference as indicated in the metadata)
- Medical Registration Act (Cap 174, 2004 Rev Ed) — s 45(1)(d) (charges of professional misconduct)
Cases Cited
- [2011] SGHC 131
- [2014] SGHC 223
Source Documents
This article analyses [2014] SGHC 223 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.