Case Details
- Citation: [2025] SGCA 22
- Title: Ramdhan bin Lajis v Public Prosecutor
- Court: Court of Appeal of the Republic of Singapore
- Court of Appeal / Criminal Motion No: Criminal Motion No 9 of 2025
- Date of Decision: 20 May 2025
- Judge: Steven Chong JCA
- Applicant: Ramdhan bin Lajis
- Respondent: Public Prosecutor
- Legal Area: Criminal Sentencing and Procedure — Criminal review
- Procedural Posture: Application for permission to make a second review application under s 394H(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code
- Prior Conviction: High Court conviction for trafficking in not less than 29.51g of diamorphine; sentenced to suffer death
- Prior Appeal: Dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 1 March 2019 (CA/CCA 23/2018)
- First Review Application: Filed 5 December 2023; dismissed 1 August 2024
- First Review Decision: Pausi bin Jefridin v Public Prosecutor and other matters [2024] 1 SLR 1127 (“Pausi”)
- Key Statutory Provisions Referenced: Criminal Procedure Code 2010 (2020 Rev Ed), including ss 394H, 394J, 394K; Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed), s 5(1)(a)
- Other Statutory Provision Mentioned: CPC s 370(1)(a) (for forfeiture report)
- Misuse of Drugs Act Charge: Trafficking in diamorphine under s 5(1)(a)
- Notable Evidence/Items: Two bundles wrapped in black tape containing not less than 29.51g diamorphine; golden metal box with four packets of heroin totalling not less than 0.63g diamorphine; envelopes A1 and B1-PP1A; cash totals $13,050
- New Material Relied On: CNB letter dated 23 June 2022 stating forfeited cash ($13,050) was ascertained to be from illegal debt collecting activities
- Disclosure/Non-disclosure Allegations: Alleged failure to disclose statements of two witnesses; alleged failure to address source of $3,850 and reason for $9,200
- Other Allegation: Challenge to Public Prosecutor’s decision not to issue a certificate of substantive assistance (“CSA”)
- Cases Cited (as provided): [2018] SGHC 104; [2024] SGCA 34; [2025] SGCA 22
- Judgment Length: 16 pages, 3,980 words
Summary
In Ramdhan bin Lajis v Public Prosecutor [2025] SGCA 22, the Court of Appeal dismissed an application for permission to make a second review application against a capital conviction and sentence. The applicant, Mr Ramdhan bin Lajis, had been convicted of trafficking in not less than 29.51g of diamorphine and sentenced to death. His conviction and sentence were upheld by the Court of Appeal on 1 March 2019, and a first review application was dismissed on 1 August 2024.
The present application sought leave under s 394H(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code (“CPC”) to review the Court of Appeal’s earlier decision. The Court of Appeal, in a decision by Steven Chong JCA, held that the statutory requirements for leave were not met. In particular, the court found that the requirements in s 394J were not satisfied, that the application was statutorily barred by s 394K, and that there was no new material warranting the court’s exercise of its inherent power of review. The application was therefore summarily dismissed without a hearing.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
The underlying criminal case arose from events on 19 March 2014. At about 1.05pm, one Mr Steve Crocker was seen boarding a car driven by Mr Mohammad Firaza bin Ahmad. Mr Ramdhan bin Lajis (“the Applicant”) was seated in the front passenger seat. Approximately five minutes after boarding, Mr Crocker alighted from the car and was arrested by officers from the Central Narcotics Bureau (“CNB”).
At the time of arrest, Mr Crocker was found with multiple drug-related items. These included two bundles wrapped in black tape containing a total of not less than 29.51g of diamorphine (the “Drugs”), a golden metal box containing four packets of heroin totalling not less than 0.63g of diamorphine, and a brown envelope referred to as the “B1-PP1A envelope”. The arrest and the items found formed the evidential basis for the trafficking charge.
Shortly thereafter, at about 1.30pm, CNB officers intercepted the car. The Applicant was counting money scattered on the floor mat of the front passenger seat during the interception. The car contained several cash-related items: an “A1 envelope” containing $4,600 bound with a rubber band on the floor mat; scattered cash amounting to another $4,600 on the floor mat; and a white envelope containing $3,850 in the front passenger door compartment. The prosecution’s case was that these sums were linked to the drug transaction involving Mr Crocker.
At trial, the Applicant claimed trial to a single charge under s 5(1)(a) of the Misuse of Drugs Act. His defence was narrow: he asserted that the alleged transaction never took place. The High Court rejected this defence and found that the prosecution proved trafficking beyond a reasonable doubt. The key reasoning included: (i) Mr Crocker’s evidence that the trip was orchestrated to facilitate the transaction; (ii) forensic evidence that the A1 and B1-PP1A envelopes were manufactured consecutively from the same sheet of paper on the same machine, making coincidence unlikely; and (iii) the manner in which the money was found in the car corroborated Mr Crocker’s contemporaneous statements about passing two sums of $4,600 to the Applicant. The High Court therefore convicted the Applicant and imposed the mandatory death sentence.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The central legal issue in the present case was procedural and statutory: whether the Applicant satisfied the requirements to obtain permission under s 394H(1) CPC to make a second review application. The Court of Appeal had to consider the leave criteria in s 394J, and whether the application was barred by s 394K, which restricts repetitive or successive review attempts.
A second issue concerned the scope and limits of the Court of Appeal’s inherent power of review. Even where statutory requirements are not met, courts may consider whether there is sufficient new material to justify an exceptional exercise of inherent power to prevent a miscarriage of justice. The Court of Appeal had to assess whether the Applicant’s proposed “new” evidence and arguments were genuinely new and material, and whether they could undermine confidence in the conviction.
Finally, the Court of Appeal had to address whether the Applicant’s grounds—ranging from alleged non-disclosure, challenges to witness credibility, and a challenge to the Public Prosecutor’s decision not to issue a certificate of substantive assistance (“CSA”)—could amount to a legitimate basis for review. The court’s task was not to re-try the case, but to determine whether the statutory and exceptional thresholds for review were met.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
The Court of Appeal began by framing the leave requirements under s 394H(1) CPC as a threshold gatekeeping mechanism. The applicant must first obtain permission to make a review application. For leave to be granted, the applicant must show a legitimate basis for the court’s exercise of its review jurisdiction. The court emphasised that this is not a broad invitation to re-litigate matters already decided on appeal or in a prior review application.
On the first prong, the court held that the requirements in s 394J CPC were not met. While the judgment extract provided is truncated, the court’s reasoning is clear in its conclusion: the Applicant’s affidavit and submissions did not demonstrate the kind of basis contemplated by the statute. In substance, the Applicant’s grounds largely rehashed arguments that had either been considered previously or did not reach the threshold of materiality and relevance required for review. The court therefore found that the statutory leave criteria were not satisfied.
Second, the Court of Appeal held that the application was statutorily barred by s 394K CPC. This provision is designed to prevent endless or repetitive review applications. The court’s approach indicates that where an applicant has already made a review application and failed, a second attempt must satisfy strict conditions. The court treated the Applicant’s second application as falling within the class of applications that the statute seeks to curtail, absent genuinely new and compelling material.
Third, the Court of Appeal considered whether there was any new material that could justify the exercise of its inherent power of review. The Applicant relied on a CNB letter dated 23 June 2022 stating that the $13,050 forfeited cash had been ascertained to be from illegal debt collecting activities. The Applicant argued that this letter supported his defence that he was merely a debt collector. The court, however, did not accept that this amounted to new material capable of undermining the conviction. The court’s reasoning reflects a common appellate principle: even if later administrative or forfeiture-related characterisations exist, they do not necessarily negate the trial evidence establishing trafficking. The court also noted that the Applicant’s defence at trial was that the transaction never occurred, whereas the Applicant’s present position appeared to accept that he received money from Mr Crocker but claimed it was in a different role.
In addition, the court addressed the Applicant’s other grounds. The Applicant argued that the prosecution failed to address the source of the $3,850 and the reason why Mr Crocker gave him $9,200. He also challenged the prosecution’s proof of possession and trafficking beyond a reasonable doubt, including by attacking Mr Crocker’s credibility and suggesting that the Drugs were already in Mr Crocker’s possession before he boarded the car. The Court of Appeal treated these as insufficient to establish a miscarriage of justice. These were essentially challenges to factual findings and credibility assessments that were already resolved at trial and upheld on appeal. The court also noted that the Applicant had no coherent alternative explanation that could displace the forensic and corroborative evidence relied on by the High Court and accepted by the Court of Appeal in 2019.
The Applicant further alleged non-disclosure: that the prosecution failed to disclose statements of two witnesses material to his defence. The court’s approach, consistent with its earlier review jurisprudence, suggests that not every alleged non-disclosure warrants review. The court likely assessed whether the alleged statements were truly material and whether their absence could have affected the trial outcome. The court’s conclusion that the application was devoid of merit indicates that the alleged non-disclosure either did not meet the threshold of materiality, or was not supported in a way that could show a miscarriage of justice.
Finally, the Applicant challenged the Public Prosecutor’s decision not to issue him a certificate of substantive assistance (“CSA”). The Court of Appeal did not treat this as a basis for review. A CSA decision is typically governed by prosecutorial assessment and statutory framework; absent a clear legal error or procedural impropriety that could affect the fairness of the conviction, such a challenge is unlikely to satisfy the stringent requirements for review.
Importantly, the court also dealt with the Applicant’s procedural complaint that he intended to raise these arguments at the hearing of his first review application but was unable to do so due to counsel’s failure to include them and counsel’s subsequent discharge. The Court of Appeal’s dismissal indicates that the court did not accept this as a justification to circumvent the statutory limits on successive review applications. The court’s reasoning underscores that review is not a substitute for proper presentation of arguments at the appropriate stage, particularly where the statute restricts successive attempts.
What Was the Outcome?
The Court of Appeal summarily dismissed the Applicant’s second application for permission to make a review application. The court held that the requirements in s 394J CPC were not met, that the application was barred by s 394K CPC, and that there was no new material warranting the exercise of the court’s inherent power of review.
Practically, the dismissal means that the Applicant’s conviction and death sentence remain undisturbed. The decision also confirms that successive review applications face strict statutory barriers, and that applicants must present genuinely new, material grounds capable of demonstrating a miscarriage of justice.
Why Does This Case Matter?
This case matters because it reinforces the gatekeeping function of the CPC’s criminal review provisions. Section 394H(1) CPC requires permission before a review application can be made, and the court’s analysis demonstrates that the statutory criteria in s 394J and the bar in s 394K are not formalities. They are substantive thresholds that prevent repetitive litigation and preserve finality in criminal adjudication, especially in capital cases where the review process is closely regulated.
For practitioners, the decision is a reminder that “new evidence” must be both genuinely new and materially capable of affecting the conviction. A later letter concerning forfeiture characterisation, without more, may not be enough to undermine the trial evidence establishing trafficking. Similarly, arguments that largely revisit credibility or evidential weight—particularly where the Court of Appeal has already upheld the conviction—are unlikely to satisfy the statutory and exceptional standards.
The decision also highlights the limited role of inherent power of review. While inherent power exists to prevent miscarriages of justice, the court will not exercise it where statutory requirements are not met and where the proposed grounds do not demonstrate a compelling basis for reconsideration. This has direct implications for how defence counsel should frame review applications: they must identify material developments that could realistically change the outcome, rather than repackage earlier arguments.
Legislation Referenced
- Criminal Procedure Code 2010 (2020 Rev Ed) — Section 394H(1)
- Criminal Procedure Code 2010 (2020 Rev Ed) — Section 394J
- Criminal Procedure Code 2010 (2020 Rev Ed) — Section 394K
- Criminal Procedure Code 2010 (2020 Rev Ed) — Section 370(1)(a)
- Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed) — Section 5(1)(a)
Cases Cited
- Public Prosecutor v Ramdhan bin Lajis and another [2018] SGHC 104
- Pausi bin Jefridin v Public Prosecutor and other matters [2024] 1 SLR 1127
- Ramdhan bin Lajis v Public Prosecutor [2025] SGCA 22
- [2024] SGCA 34
- [2018] SGHC 104
Source Documents
This article analyses [2025] SGCA 22 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.