Case Details
- Citation: [2025] SGCA 22
- Title: Ramdhan bin Lajis v Public Prosecutor
- Court: Court of Appeal of the Republic of Singapore
- Date of Decision: 20 May 2025
- Court Motion No: Criminal Motion No 9 of 2025
- Judges: Steven Chong JCA
- Applicant: Ramdhan bin Lajis
- Respondent: Public Prosecutor
- Legal Area: Criminal Sentencing and Procedure — Criminal review
- Procedural Posture: Second application for permission to make a review application under s 394H(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code (2010) (2020 Rev Ed)
- Statutes Referenced: Criminal Procedure Code (CPC); Misuse of Drugs Act (MDA)
- Key Statutory Provision: Sections 394H, 394J, 394K of the CPC
- Substantive Offence: Trafficking in diamorphine (s 5(1)(a) of the MDA)
- Sentence: Mandatory death penalty
- Prior Appellate History: Appeal against conviction and sentence dismissed on 1 March 2019 (CA/CCA 23/2018)
- First Review Application: Dismissed on 1 August 2024 (in Pausi bin Jefridin v Public Prosecutor and other matters [2024] 1 SLR 1127)
- Judgment Length: 16 pages, 3,980 words
- Related High Court Decision: Public Prosecutor v Ramdhan bin Lajis and another [2018] SGHC 104
- Cases Cited (as provided): [2018] SGHC 104; [2024] SGCA 34; [2025] SGCA 22
Summary
In Ramdhan bin Lajis v Public Prosecutor ([2025] SGCA 22), the Court of Appeal dismissed, at the permission stage, a second application by a death row prisoner seeking leave to make a criminal review application under s 394H(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC). The applicant, Ramdhan bin Lajis, had previously been convicted of trafficking in not less than 29.51g of diamorphine and sentenced to death. His conviction and sentence were upheld by the Court of Appeal on 1 March 2019.
The present application was brought after the applicant’s first review application was dismissed in 2024. The Court of Appeal held that the statutory requirements for leave under s 394J were not satisfied, and that the application was also barred by s 394K of the CPC. Further, the court found that the applicant did not introduce genuinely new material that would warrant the exercise of any inherent power of review.
Practically, the decision underscores the strict gatekeeping function of the CPC’s criminal review framework, particularly for repeat applications in capital cases. It also clarifies that re-labelling or re-framing previously rejected arguments, without credible new evidence capable of showing a miscarriage of justice, will not overcome the statutory barriers.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
The underlying criminal case arose from events on 19 March 2014. At about 1.05pm, CNB officers observed one Mr Steve Crocker boarding a car driven by Mr Mohammad Firaza bin Ahmad. The applicant, Ramdhan bin Lajis, was seated in the front passenger seat. Approximately five minutes later, Mr Crocker alighted and was arrested by CNB officers.
At the time of arrest, CNB found multiple items on Mr Crocker, including two bundles wrapped in black tape containing a total of not less than 29.51g of diamorphine (the “Drugs”), a golden metal box containing four packets of heroin totalling not less than 0.63g of diamorphine, and a brown envelope referred to as the “B1-PP1A envelope”. These items formed the evidential basis for the prosecution’s trafficking theory.
At about 1.30pm, CNB intercepted the car. The applicant was seen counting money scattered on the floor mat of the front passenger seat during the interception. Items found in the car included: (a) a brown envelope (“A1 envelope”) containing cash totalling $4,600 bound with a rubber band on the floor mat; (b) scattered cash amounting to $4,600 on the same floor mat; and (c) a white envelope containing cash totalling $3,850 in the front passenger door compartment. The prosecution’s case was that the applicant had received money in exchange for the Drugs.
At trial in the High Court, the applicant claimed trial to one charge under s 5(1)(a) of the MDA. His defence was essentially that the alleged transaction never took place. The High Court rejected this defence and found that the prosecution proved trafficking beyond a reasonable doubt. The court’s findings relied on, among other things, the orchestrated nature of the trip, forensic evidence linking envelopes manufactured consecutively from the same sheet of paper and on the same machine, and corroborative evidence regarding how the money was found in the car and the precise amounts Mr Crocker had given in contemporaneous statements.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The Court of Appeal had to determine whether the applicant met the statutory threshold for permission to make a criminal review application under s 394H(1) of the CPC. This required the court to consider the requirements set out in s 394J, which governs when leave may be granted. The court also had to consider the effect of s 394K, which imposes a statutory bar on certain repeat or successive review applications.
Beyond the express statutory framework, the court also addressed whether there was any basis to invoke an “inherent power of review” despite the statutory scheme. This is a critical issue in criminal review jurisprudence: where the CPC sets out specific conditions and bars, the court will only consider inherent powers if there is a compelling justification, typically involving genuinely new and material evidence indicating a possible miscarriage of justice.
Accordingly, the legal issues were not whether the applicant’s underlying trafficking conviction was factually correct, but whether the applicant could clear the procedural and evidential hurdles for a second review attempt after an earlier review was dismissed and after the Court of Appeal had already dismissed his appeal.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
The Court of Appeal began by situating the application within the CPC’s criminal review architecture. Section 394H(1) requires an applicant to obtain leave before making a review application. The court emphasised that leave is not automatic; it is granted only where the applicant demonstrates a legitimate basis for the court’s exercise of review jurisdiction. In this case, the court held that the requirements in s 394J were not met.
Although the judgment extract provided is truncated, the court’s reasoning is clear in its structure: first, it found that the s 394J requirements were not satisfied; second, it held that the application was statutorily barred by s 394K; and third, it concluded that there was no new material that would justify any inherent power review. This sequencing reflects the court’s approach: if the statutory gatekeeping requirements fail, the court need not (and will not) proceed to a substantive review of conviction or sentence.
On the applicant’s proposed “new evidence”, the court considered a CNB letter dated 23 June 2022. The applicant argued that the letter stated that $13,050 had been forfeited because it was ascertained to be from illegal debt collecting activities, which he claimed supported his defence that he was merely a debt collector. The Court of Appeal treated this as insufficient to meet the leave threshold. The court’s implicit concern is that forfeiture-related characterisations do not necessarily undermine the trial findings on possession and trafficking, especially where the trial court and appellate court had already found that the applicant received money in exchange for the Drugs.
The applicant also argued that the prosecution failed to address the source of $3,850 found in the white envelope and failed to explain why Mr Crocker gave him $9,200. However, the Court of Appeal noted that the applicant appeared to accept that he received the money from Mr Crocker, and the applicant’s attempt to recast the receipt as “debt collection” did not, without more, create a legitimate basis for review. The court’s approach suggests that review is not a forum to re-litigate matters already canvassed or to substitute a new narrative that does not materially disturb the evidential foundation of the conviction.
Third, the applicant challenged the prosecution’s proof of possession and trafficking beyond a reasonable doubt, including by attacking Mr Crocker’s credibility and suggesting that the Drugs were already in Mr Crocker’s possession before he boarded the car. The Court of Appeal rejected these arguments at the permission stage. This is consistent with the criminal review framework’s purpose: it is designed to address miscarriages of justice arising from specific categories of error or newly discovered material, not to provide a second appeal on the same evidential record.
Fourth, the applicant alleged non-disclosure of statements of two witnesses material to his defence. The court had previously dealt with disclosure-related arguments in the context of the first review application, and it held in the present case that the applicant’s submissions did not amount to sufficient material to conclude that there had been a miscarriage of justice. The court’s reference to the first review decision (Pausi) indicates that it considered whether the applicant’s new points were genuinely distinct and whether they could overcome the earlier dismissal.
Fifth, the applicant challenged the propriety of the Public Prosecutor’s decision not to issue him a certificate of substantive assistance (CSA). While CSA decisions can be relevant to sentencing outcomes and prosecutorial discretion, the Court of Appeal treated this as not providing a basis for review permission in the context of the statutory requirements and bars. In capital cases, the court remains cautious about expanding review to issues that do not directly bear on the conviction’s validity or on a miscarriage of justice supported by new material.
Finally, the Court of Appeal addressed the applicant’s procedural explanation that he intended to raise these arguments during the hearing of his first review application but was unable to do so due to counsel’s failure to include them and counsel’s subsequent discharge. The court did not accept this as a sufficient reason to bypass the statutory restrictions. This reflects a broader principle: procedural shortcomings in earlier applications do not automatically entitle an applicant to a second attempt where the CPC’s scheme bars it.
In addition to failing s 394J, the court held that the application was “statutorily barred” by s 394K. While the extract does not reproduce the exact statutory language, the conclusion indicates that the CPC limits successive review attempts and that a second permission application cannot be used to circumvent those limits. The court also found that there was no new material warranting the exercise of any inherent power of review. This reinforces that inherent power is exceptional and cannot be invoked merely because an applicant disagrees with prior findings or wishes to repackage arguments.
What Was the Outcome?
The Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s second application for permission to make a review application. The court ordered that the application be summarily dismissed without a hearing, reflecting its view that the application was devoid of merit and did not satisfy the statutory requirements.
As a result, the applicant remained convicted and sentenced to death, with no further review application permitted under the CPC’s leave framework on the basis of the materials and arguments he advanced.
Why Does This Case Matter?
This decision is significant for practitioners because it clarifies the strictness of the CPC’s criminal review gatekeeping provisions, especially for repeat applications in capital cases. The Court of Appeal’s reasoning demonstrates that courts will apply s 394J requirements rigorously at the permission stage and will not allow review to become a disguised second appeal.
Second, the case highlights the practical effect of s 394K’s statutory bar. Even where an applicant presents a new document or reframes arguments, the court will assess whether the material is genuinely new and whether it is capable of supporting a miscarriage of justice. The decision therefore discourages speculative or narrative-based “new evidence” submissions that do not meaningfully undermine the evidential basis of conviction.
Third, the judgment reinforces the limited role of inherent power. Inherent power will not be used to bypass statutory bars absent compelling justification. For lawyers, this means that the focus should be on identifying truly material new evidence or legal errors that fit within the CPC’s review framework, rather than relying on dissatisfaction with earlier outcomes or on procedural explanations for why arguments were not fully raised earlier.
Legislation Referenced
- Criminal Procedure Code 2010 (2020 Rev Ed) — sections 394H, 394J, 394K (criminal review permission and statutory bars)
- Criminal Procedure Code 2010 (2020 Rev Ed) — section 370(1)(a) (forfeiture report context, as referenced in the facts)
- Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed) — section 5(1)(a) (trafficking offence)
Cases Cited
- Public Prosecutor v Ramdhan bin Lajis and another [2018] SGHC 104
- Pausi bin Jefridin v Public Prosecutor and other matters [2024] 1 SLR 1127
- [2024] SGCA 34
- [2025] SGCA 22
Source Documents
This article analyses [2025] SGCA 22 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.