Rajagopal Muralitharan

"There being no other impediment save the moment of carelessness, and there being no objections from relevant parties, and sensing that he has learnt his lesson, in exercise of my discretion, I allowed the originating summons to be reinstated, trusting that he will pay closer attention to the rules when in practice." — Per Choo Han Teck J, Para 7

Case Information

• Citation: [2023] SGHC 133 (Para 0)
• Court: In the General Division of the High Court of the Republic of Singapore (Para 0)
• Date: 8 May 2023 and 9 May 2023 (Para 0)
• Coram: Choo Han Teck J (Para 0)
• Case Number: Admission of Advocates and Solicitors No 33 of 2022 (Summonses Nos 1182, 1187 and 1345 of 2023) (Para 0)
• Area of Law: Legal Profession — Admission (Para 0)
• Counsel for the Applicant: Applicant in person (Para 0)
• Counsel for the Attorney-General: Clement Lim, Attorney-General’s Chambers (Para 0)
• Counsel for the Law Society of Singapore: Naomi Ho (Para 0)
• Counsel for the Singapore Institute of Legal Education: Avery Chong (Para 0)
• Judgment Length: Not stated in the extraction (Para 0)

What was the applicant trying to achieve in this admission application?

The applicant, Mr Rajagopal Muralitharan, was seeking admission as an advocate and solicitor, and the judgment makes clear that his intended call was on 10 May 2023, the Monthly Call for that month. The procedural difficulty was not about his substantive eligibility alone, but about whether his originating summons could still be kept alive and whether his affidavit could be treated as filed in time despite being lodged one day late. (Para 1)

"The applicant wishes to be admitted on 10 May 2023, the date of the Monthly Call for the month of May. He was informed, however, that he filed his affidavit of admission one day late, as the deadline for the Monthly May Call being was 18 April 2023." — Per Choo Han Teck J, Para 1

The court’s treatment of the matter shows that admission proceedings, although often administrative in appearance, are still governed by strict procedural rules. The applicant’s request therefore required the court to consider not only whether he had ultimately satisfied the academic and professional prerequisites, but also whether the procedural defaults could be excused or cured. (Para 1)

That procedural posture framed the entire judgment: the court was not deciding a contested disciplinary or substantive professional-competence issue, but rather whether the applicant’s lapse in timing should prevent him from being called. The answer depended on two linked applications, one for reinstatement of an expired originating summons and the other for abridgement of time. (Para 3, Para 4, Para 8)

How did the applicant’s Part B examination history affect the court’s view of the procedural lapse?

The chronology mattered. The applicant sat for Part B in 2021, filed the admission application in February 2022 in anticipation of passing, failed that examination, retook it in 2022, and then passed. Only after that did he file his affidavit in support of admission on 19 April 2023. The court used this sequence to explain why, at one stage, there was nothing further the applicant could have done to advance the application while he remained unsuccessful in Part B. (Para 1, Para 5)

"The applicant, Mr Rajagopal Muralitharan sat for the Part B examinations in 2021 as required for admission to the Bar. He filed HC/AAS 33/2022 on 11 February 2022 for admission to the Bar in expectation of passing Part B. But he failed. He had to retake the examination in 2022. This time he passed, and so, on 19 April 2023, he filed his affidavit in support of his application for admission as an advocate and solicitor." — Per Choo Han Teck J, Para 1

The court then noted that the Registry informed him on 22 April 2023 that the originating summons had expired on 11 February 2023, more than a year after it had been filed. That fact was central because it meant the application had lapsed before the affidavit was filed, creating the need for reinstatement rather than merely a routine extension. (Para 2)

"However, on 22 April 2023, the applicant was informed by the Registry of the Supreme Court, that his originating summons had expired on 11 February 2023, more than a year after it was filed." — Per Choo Han Teck J, Para 2

The court’s reasoning on this point was practical and procedural at once. It accepted that the applicant’s inability to take steps earlier was not because he had neglected the matter, but because he had not yet passed Part B. That distinction between indolence and impossibility became decisive in the reinstatement analysis. (Para 5)

What were the two procedural applications before the court, and how did the court frame them?

The judgment identifies two separate procedural questions. First, whether the expired originating summons could be reinstated. Second, whether time could be abridged so that the applicant could be called on 10 May 2023 despite the late filing of the affidavit. The court expressly treated them as distinct issues, even though they arose from the same underlying timing problem. (Para 4, Para 8)

"The summons for reinstatement was made under O 21 r 2(8) of the ROC 2014, which provides: (8) Where an action, a cause or a matter has been discontinued under paragraph (5) or (6), the Court may, on application, reinstate the action, cause or matter, and allow it to proceed on such terms as it thinks just." — Per Choo Han Teck J, Para 4

The court also stated the second issue directly: whether time should be abridged for the applicant to be called to the bar on 10 May 2023. That framing matters because it shows the court was not merely deciding whether to forgive a late filing in the abstract; it was deciding whether the applicant could still be processed for the imminent Monthly Call. (Para 8)

"The second issue was the abridgement of time for the applicant to be called to the bar on 10 May 2023." — Per Choo Han Teck J, Para 8

In substance, the court’s framing reveals a layered procedural structure. The first layer was whether the originating summons had ceased to exist and could be revived. The second layer was whether, even if revived, the applicant’s affidavit could be treated as sufficiently timely for the scheduled call. The court addressed both, and it did so in a way that linked procedural fairness with professional responsibility. (Para 4, Para 8, Para 9)

Why did the court allow reinstatement of the expired originating summons?

The reinstatement issue turned on the reason why no step had been taken while the originating summons was still alive. The court accepted that the applicant had failed Part B in 2021, and therefore there was nothing he could have done in furtherance of the action during that period. On that basis, the absence of steps was not treated as neglect. (Para 5)

"However, as the applicant had failed to fulfil his Part B examination requirements in 2021, there was nothing he could have done in furtherance of his action." — Per Choo Han Teck J, Para 5

The court then drew the key distinction: the lack of any step was “not due to indolence but impossibility.” That is the core reasoning for reinstatement. The court accepted that the matter had expired, but it did not treat the expiry as a consequence of disregard for the process. Instead, it viewed the lapse as arising from the applicant’s inability to progress the application until he had passed the necessary examination. (Para 5)

"Thus, the lack of any step in the action, was not due to indolence but impossibility. The correct procedure, however, was to apply for an extension of time for the originating summons under O 21 r 2(6B) of the ROC 2014 while it remained valid." — Per Choo Han Teck J, Para 5

That said, the court did not ignore procedural correctness. It observed that the proper course would have been to apply for an extension of time while the originating summons remained valid. The court therefore distinguished between the merits of the applicant’s explanation and the technical correctness of the steps taken. Reinstatement was granted not because the applicant had followed the ideal route, but because the court considered the lapse excusable in the circumstances and just to cure. (Para 5)

The result was a discretionary restoration of the proceeding. The court’s language shows that it was influenced by the absence of any substantive impediment, the absence of objections, and the fact that the applicant’s failure was tied to a practical impossibility rather than a deliberate omission. (Para 5, Para 7)

How did the court deal with the applicant’s late affidavit and request for abridgement of time?

The abridgement issue was more difficult for the applicant because the explanation for the late filing was weaker. The court recorded that the applicant said he had made an honest mistake in miscalculating the 21 intervening days required for the affidavit to be filed before the date of call. The court did not treat that explanation as strong. (Para 8)

"He says that it was an honest mistake involving his miscalculation of 21 intervening days required for the affidavit to be filed before the date of call." — Per Choo Han Teck J, Para 8

The court expressly described the explanation as weak, especially for someone seeking admission to the profession. It emphasised that an advocate and solicitor has a “constant and abiding duty” to be careful and meticulous, particularly where deadlines and punctuality are concerned. That observation is important because it shows the court was not merely forgiving a technical slip; it was also articulating the standard expected of a future practitioner. (Para 6)

"The explanation is a weak one for a person seeking to be admitted as an advocate and solicitor who has a constant and abiding duty to be careful and meticulous, especially when it involves deadlines and punctuality." — Per Choo Han Teck J, Para 6

Even so, the court ultimately allowed the abridgement. The decisive factors were that there were no objections from the SILE and the Law Society, and that the Attorney-General’s objection did not persuade the court to refuse relief. The court also took into account its sense that the applicant had learned from the mistake. In other words, the court balanced the weakness of the explanation against the practical consequences of refusing the application and the absence of opposition from the relevant bodies. (Para 3, Para 8, Para 9)

"But if he has learnt his lesson and always remember how close he came to messing up his own application, then the charity shown to him will have been justified." — Per Choo Han Teck J, Para 8

The court’s approach therefore combined discipline with mercy. It did not endorse carelessness, but it did conclude that the applicant’s mistake should not, in the circumstances, prevent admission. The abridgement was granted as an act of discretion, not as a statement that the explanation was satisfactory in the abstract. (Para 6, Para 8, Para 9)

What did the parties argue, and how did the court respond to those positions?

On reinstatement, the relevant parties did not object: the SILE, the Law Society of Singapore, and the Attorney-General all raised no objection to the summons for reinstatement. That absence of opposition was significant because it meant the court was not being asked to resolve a live contest over whether the proceeding should be revived. (Para 3)

"At the hearing before me, there were no objections to his summons for reinstatement by the relevant parties, the Singapore Institute of Legal Education (“SILE”), the Law Society of Singapore and the Attorney-General." — Per Choo Han Teck J, Para 3

On abridgement of time, the position was more mixed. The SILE and the Law Society did not object, but the Attorney-General did. The Attorney-General’s counsel, Mr Lim, argued that the reasons given by the applicant were not good reasons for abridgement. The court recorded that submission and then addressed it by characterising the explanation as weak, while still ultimately exercising discretion in the applicant’s favour. (Para 3, Para 8)

"As for the applicant’s summons for abridgement of time, there were no objections from the SILE and the Law Society of Singapore, but the Attorney-General objected." — Per Choo Han Teck J, Para 3

"Mr Lim says that the reasons the applicant gave were not good reasons for the abridgement of time." — Per Choo Han Teck J, Para 8

The court’s response to the parties’ positions was therefore nuanced. It did not simply follow the absence of objections, nor did it treat the Attorney-General’s objection as determinative. Instead, it independently assessed the procedural history, the applicant’s explanation, and the practical fairness of allowing the matter to proceed. The result was that both applications were allowed despite the mixed positions. (Para 3, Para 5, Para 6, Para 8, Para 9)

What legal rules and procedural provisions did the court rely on?

The judgment expressly refers to section 12 of the Legal Profession Act 1966 and Rule 25 of the Legal Profession (Admission) Rules 2011. Those provisions identify the statutory and regulatory framework governing admission as an advocate and solicitor. The extraction does not provide the text of section 12 or Rule 25, so the court’s use of them must be understood as contextual rather than textually reproduced. (Para 0)

"In the matter of Section 12 of the Legal Profession Act 1966 And In the matter of Rule 25 of the Legal Profession (Admission) Rules 2011" — Per Choo Han Teck J, Para 0

For reinstatement, the court relied on Order 21 rule 2(8) of the Rules of Court 2014. The judgment reproduces the rule and uses it as the legal basis for reinstating a discontinued matter and allowing it to proceed on just terms. The court also referred to Order 21 rule 2(6B) as the proper route for seeking an extension of time while the originating summons remained valid. (Para 4, Para 5)

"Where an action, a cause or a matter has been discontinued under paragraph (5) or (6), the Court may, on application, reinstate the action, cause or matter, and allow it to proceed on such terms as it thinks just." — Per Choo Han Teck J, Para 4

The court’s reference to the Rules of Court 2014 is important because it shows that the admission application was not treated as a free-standing equitable request. It was anchored in procedural rules that govern discontinuance, reinstatement, and extension of time. The court’s reasoning therefore proceeded within a structured procedural framework, even though the final outcome was discretionary. (Para 4, Para 5)

Why did the court say the applicant’s explanation was weak, yet still grant relief?

The court’s treatment of the applicant’s explanation is one of the most instructive parts of the judgment. It plainly said the explanation was weak for someone seeking admission to the profession, because such a person must be careful and meticulous, especially with deadlines and punctuality. That is a stern professional reminder, not a casual aside. (Para 6)

"An advocate and solicitor must live by the rules — or perish by them." — Per Choo Han Teck J, Para 6

Yet the court did not stop at criticism. It also recognised that the applicant’s lapse was a “moment of carelessness,” and it considered the absence of objections from the relevant parties. The court then exercised discretion to allow reinstatement, trusting that the applicant had learned from the experience and would be more careful in practice. (Para 7)

"There being no other impediment save the moment of carelessness, and there being no objections from relevant parties, and sensing that he has learnt his lesson, in exercise of my discretion, I allowed the originating summons to be reinstated, trusting that he will pay closer attention to the rules when in practice." — Per Choo Han Teck J, Para 7

This combination of criticism and leniency is central to the judgment’s practical message. The court did not lower the standard expected of future advocates and solicitors; rather, it used the occasion to reinforce that standard while still preventing a disproportionate procedural consequence from defeating the application. The applicant was effectively warned that the profession tolerates neither sloppiness nor complacency. (Para 6, Para 7, Para 8)

What was the final outcome of the applications?

The court allowed both the summons for reinstatement of the originating summons and the summons for abridgement of time. It also stated that no order was required for the summons for extension of time. The judgment therefore ended with a complete procedural resolution in the applicant’s favour. (Para 9)

"For the foregoing reasons, I allowed the summons for the reinstatement of the originating summons and the abridgement of time. No order was required for the summons for extension of time." — Per Choo Han Teck J, Para 9

The practical effect was that the applicant could proceed to the Monthly Call on 10 May 2023. The court’s orders removed the procedural barriers that had arisen from the expired originating summons and the late affidavit. In that sense, the judgment was outcome-determinative for the applicant’s admission timeline. (Para 1, Para 2, Para 9)

At the same time, the court’s reasons make clear that the relief was not granted casually. The applicant was admonished, the explanation was described as weak, and the court’s indulgence was tied to the absence of objections and the belief that the applicant had learned a valuable lesson. The result was favourable, but the reasoning was cautionary. (Para 6, Para 7, Para 8, Para 9)

Why does this case matter for admission practice and procedural compliance?

This case matters because it illustrates how the High Court approaches procedural lapses in admission matters where the applicant’s failure is not rooted in indifference. The court distinguished between a failure caused by impossibility and one caused by indolence, and that distinction can be important in future applications involving expired proceedings or missed deadlines. (Para 5, Para 7)

It also matters because the court used the occasion to restate the professional standard expected of aspiring advocates and solicitors. The judgment is not merely forgiving; it is disciplinary in tone. It reminds applicants that punctuality and precision are not optional virtues but core professional habits. (Para 6)

Finally, the case shows that the absence of objections from the relevant institutional actors can be practically significant, though not automatically decisive. The court still exercised its own discretion, but the lack of opposition clearly formed part of the context in which relief was granted. For practitioners, the case is a reminder that procedural rescue is possible, but it should not be relied upon as a substitute for careful compliance. (Para 3, Para 7, Para 9)

Cases Referred To

Legislation Referenced

• Legal Profession Act 1966, section 12 (Para 0)
• Legal Profession (Admission) Rules 2011, Rule 25 (Para 0)
• Rules of Court 2014, Order 21 rule 2(8) (Para 4)
• Rules of Court 2014, Order 21 rule 2(6) (Para 5)
• Rules of Court 2014, Order 21 rule 2(6B) (Para 5)

Source Documents

• Original Judgment — Singapore Courts
• Archived Copy (PDF) — Litt Law CDN

This article analyses [2023] SGHC 133 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.