Case Details
- Title: RAHMAT BIN KARIMON v PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
- Citation: [2021] SGCA 74
- Court: Court of Appeal of the Republic of Singapore
- Date: 5 August 2021
- Case Type: Criminal Motion (Leave for review)
- Criminal Motion No: 17 of 2021
- Applicant: Rahmat bin Karimon
- Respondent: Public Prosecutor
- Judge: Steven Chong JCA
- Judgment Reserved: 12 July 2021
- Prior Appellate Decision Being Reviewed: Rahmat (CA) — CA/CCA 49/2017 (reported in Zainal bin Hamad v Public Prosecutor and another appeal [2018] 2 SLR 1119)
- Related High Court Decision: Public Prosecutor v Rahmat bin Karimon and another [2018] 5 SLR 641 (“Rahmat (HC)”)
- Legal Area: Criminal Procedure and Sentencing; Criminal review; Misuse of Drugs Act offences
- Statutory Provision Central to the Application: s 394H(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed) (“CPC”)
- Key Substantive Provision: s 18(2) of the Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed) (“MDA”)
- Key Change of Law Relied Upon: Gobi a/l Avedian v Public Prosecutor [2021] 1 SLR 180 (“Gobi”)
- Cases Cited (as provided): [2021] SGCA 13; [2021] SGCA 30; [2021] SGCA 74
- Judgment Length: 23 pages; 6,844 words
Summary
In Rahmat bin Karimon v Public Prosecutor [2021] SGCA 74, the Court of Appeal considered an application for leave to commence a criminal review of a concluded Court of Appeal decision. The applicant, Rahmat, sought review under s 394H(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code (“CPC”) on the basis that the law had changed after his conviction and appeal, following the Court of Appeal’s decision in Gobi a/l Avedian v Public Prosecutor [2021] 1 SLR 180.
The central contention was that, because Gobi clarified that the statutory presumption in s 18(2) of the Misuse of Drugs Act (“MDA”) cannot be invoked to presume wilful blindness, the Prosecution’s case (and therefore the courts’ findings) must have been improperly premised on wilful blindness rather than actual knowledge. Rahmat argued that the trial judge and the Court of Appeal had relied on the s 18(2) presumption in a manner inconsistent with Gobi, and that this amounted to a miscarriage of justice.
The Court of Appeal refused leave. It held that the requirements for leave to commence a review application—particularly the “sufficiency” and “miscarriage of justice” requirements under s 394J—were not satisfied. Importantly, the Court emphasised that the review process is directed at the earlier appellate decision itself, and that the applicant must show, on sufficient material, that the earlier decision is demonstrably wrong such that a miscarriage of justice has occurred.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
Rahmat was employed as a “runner” for an illegal money-lending operation run by a person known as “Kanna”. Rahmat had known Kanna for less than two months before his arrest. On 27 May 2015, Rahmat entered Singapore from Malaysia via the Woodlands Checkpoint in a car with his wife and three children. He was acting on instructions from Kanna’s network.
After entering Singapore, Rahmat drove to Rochor Road and met a male subject known as “Bai”. Bai instructed Rahmat to meet Zainal bin Hamad (“Zainal”) at the IKEA store in Tampines. Rahmat and Zainal met at the staircase on the second level of IKEA. At about 8.35pm, Zainal passed S$8,000 to Rahmat. Rahmat then placed a green bag (“Bag”) at the staircase landing in front of Zainal before leaving IKEA.
Rahmat subsequently met up with his wife and children and drove back to Woodlands Checkpoint. At the checkpoint, Rahmat and his wife were arrested by officers of the Central Narcotics Bureau (“CNB”). CNB searched Rahmat’s wife and found S$8,000 concealed in her brassiere. Rahmat had passed the S$8,000 to his wife and instructed her to conceal it while they travelled to Woodlands Checkpoint.
After Rahmat left IKEA, Zainal picked up the Bag and placed it in a warehouse on the second floor of IKEA. Around 9.25pm, CNB officers entered the warehouse and arrested Zainal. The Bag contained one red plastic bag holding three plastic packets of 1381.7g of granular/powdery substance. The substance was later found to contain not less than 53.64g of diamorphine, a controlled drug. Neither Rahmat nor Zainal was authorised under the MDA to traffic in or possess a controlled drug.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The principal legal issue was procedural and remedial: whether Rahmat’s application for leave to commence a criminal review under s 394H(1) of the CPC met the statutory threshold in s 394J. In particular, the Court had to consider whether there was “sufficient material” to conclude that the earlier appellate decision involved a “miscarriage of justice”.
Substantively, the issue was tied to the MDA presumption framework and the doctrine of wilful blindness. Rahmat relied on Gobi to argue that the Prosecution could not rely on the s 18(2) presumption to presume wilful blindness. He contended that, in substance, the Prosecution’s case at trial and on appeal was based on wilful blindness rather than actual knowledge, and that the courts’ conclusions that he could not rebut the s 18(2) presumption therefore could not stand after Gobi.
A further issue concerned the scope of review: the Court needed to clarify how the “sufficiency” and “miscarriage of justice” requirements operate, and what role the earlier appellate decision plays in the analysis. The Court also had to determine whether Rahmat’s attempt to re-characterise the Prosecution’s case as wilful blindness could, in the leave stage, satisfy the high threshold for review.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
The Court began by framing the review process. It stressed that the review is directed at the earlier decision of the appellate court—here, the Court of Appeal’s decision in Rahmat (CA). Accordingly, the focus of the leave application must be on showing that the earlier appellate decision is demonstrably wrong, leading to a miscarriage of justice. This is consistent with the structure of ss 394F, 394G and 394J(5) of the CPC, which position the appellate decision as the target of the review.
Next, the Court applied the settled approach to leave applications under s 394H. Citing the “seminal decision” in Kreetharan s/o Kathireson v Public Prosecutor [2020] 2 SLR 1175, the Court reiterated that an applicant must disclose a “legitimate basis” for the exercise of the power of review. That legitimate basis is assessed through the statutory requirements in s 394J, especially the “sufficiency” and “miscarriage of justice” requirements under s 394J(2). The Court explained that “sufficient material” must satisfy all requirements in s 394J(3)(a) to 394J(3)(c), including that the material was not canvassed at any stage of the criminal matter and could not have been canvassed earlier.
On the merits of Rahmat’s argument, the Court addressed the change of law brought by Gobi. In Gobi, the Court of Appeal held that the s 18(2) presumption cannot be invoked to presume wilful blindness. Rahmat therefore argued that, because the Prosecution’s case was “in substance” based on wilful blindness, the Prosecution should not have been able to rely on the s 18(2) presumption. He further argued that the trial judge and the Court of Appeal had treated the s 18(2) presumption as supporting a wilful blindness inference, and that this was now inconsistent with Gobi.
However, the Court’s analysis turned on how the Prosecution’s case and the courts’ findings were actually framed and decided. The Court noted that this was not the first leave application after Gobi raising similar arguments. In Datchinamurthy a/l Kataiah v Public Prosecutor [2021] SGCA 30 and Khartik Jasudass and another v Public Prosecutor [2021] SGCA 13, the applicants similarly contended that the Prosecution’s case had been based on wilful blindness rather than actual knowledge, and that therefore the s 18(2) presumption should not have been available. In both earlier cases, leave had failed because the Court found that the Prosecution’s case and the court’s decisions were in fact based on actual knowledge, not wilful blindness.
In Rahmat’s case, the Court examined the procedural history and the way the appeal was conducted. It observed that, although Rahmat challenged all three aspects of the trial judge’s findings in his written submissions, at the appeal hearing he chose to focus on a sole defence: that he had rebutted the s 18(2) presumption of knowledge. The Court of Appeal in Rahmat (CA) had explicitly noted this focus. On that basis, Rahmat (CA) held that Rahmat failed to rebut the s 18(2) presumption of knowledge.
The Court also considered the trial judge’s reasoning as described in the judgment extract. At trial, the Prosecution ran three arguments in closing submissions: first, that Rahmat could not rebut the s 18(2) presumption; second, alternatively, that Rahmat was either wilfully blind or had actual knowledge. The trial judge convicted Rahmat and found that Rahmat failed to rebut the s 18(2) presumption. The trial judge further found that actual knowledge and wilful blindness were separately proven beyond a reasonable doubt. This matters because it suggests that the case was not solely dependent on the presumption to reach wilful blindness; rather, the courts treated wilful blindness as separately established on the evidence.
Against this background, the Court of Appeal in the present leave application concluded that Rahmat had not shown that the earlier appellate decision was demonstrably wrong in the way required to establish a miscarriage of justice. In other words, even accepting Gobi as a change in law, Rahmat’s attempt to re-characterise the Prosecution’s case as “in substance” wilful blindness did not overcome the leave threshold. The Court’s approach reflects a practical concern: review is not a mechanism for re-litigating the factual characterisation of the Prosecution’s case unless the statutory threshold is met.
Finally, the Court clarified the respective roles of the “sufficiency” and “miscarriage of justice” requirements. While “sufficiency” concerns whether the applicant has brought forward material that meets the statutory conditions, “miscarriage of justice” concerns whether, on that material, the appellate court can conclude that the earlier decision resulted in a miscarriage. The Court’s reasoning indicates that the applicant must do more than point to a later doctrinal development; he must connect that development to a demonstrable error in the earlier appellate decision.
What Was the Outcome?
The Court of Appeal dismissed Rahmat’s application for leave to commence a criminal review. The Court held that the statutory requirements under s 394J were not satisfied, and therefore there was no legitimate basis to exercise the power of review.
Practically, this meant that Rahmat’s concluded conviction and the Court of Appeal’s earlier decision in Rahmat (CA) remained undisturbed. The refusal of leave also meant that the Court would not proceed to a full criminal review of the earlier appellate decision.
Why Does This Case Matter?
Rahmat bin Karimon v Public Prosecutor is significant for practitioners because it illustrates how the Court of Appeal manages post-Gobi review applications that attempt to leverage the clarified treatment of wilful blindness under s 18(2) of the MDA. While Gobi changed the doctrinal landscape, Rahmat demonstrates that not every applicant can convert that change into a successful review. The leave stage remains a rigorous filter.
Substantively, the case reinforces that the review inquiry is anchored to the earlier appellate decision and to the statutory threshold in s 394J. Applicants must show, with sufficient material, that the earlier appellate decision is demonstrably wrong and that a miscarriage of justice has occurred. This is not satisfied merely by asserting that the Prosecution’s case was “in substance” based on wilful blindness; the applicant must connect the argument to what the appellate court actually decided and why that decision is now inconsistent with the clarified law.
For defence counsel, the case also highlights the importance of how appeals are framed and argued. Rahmat’s decision at the appeal hearing to focus on rebutting the s 18(2) presumption of knowledge, rather than pursuing a broader wilful blindness-centric argument, was noted by the Court. This suggests that the appellate record and the scope of the issues actually litigated will be highly relevant when later review applications are assessed.
Legislation Referenced
- Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed): ss 394F(1), 394G(1), 394H(1), 394J(2), 394J(3)(a)-(c), 394J(5), 313(f), 313(g), 313(h)
- Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed): s 18(2)
- Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed): ss 5(1)(a), 5(1)(a) read with s 33(1) (as described in the trial charges); s 5(1)(a) read with s 5(2) and punishable under s 33(1) (as described for Zainal) [CDN] [SSO]
- Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1985 Rev Ed, 1999 Reprint): Art 22P(1)
Cases Cited
- Kreetharan s/o Kathireson v Public Prosecutor [2020] 2 SLR 1175
- Gobi a/l Avedian v Public Prosecutor [2021] 1 SLR 180
- Datchinamurthy a/l Kataiah v Public Prosecutor [2021] SGCA 30
- Khartik Jasudass and another v Public Prosecutor [2021] SGCA 13
- Zainal bin Hamad v Public Prosecutor and another appeal [2018] 2 SLR 1119 (Rahmat (CA))
- Public Prosecutor v Rahmat bin Karimon and another [2018] 5 SLR 641 (Rahmat (HC))
- Rahmat bin Karimon v Public Prosecutor [2021] SGCA 74
Source Documents
This article analyses [2021] SGCA 74 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.