Case Details
- Title: RAHMAT BIN KARIMON v PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
- Citation: [2021] SGCA 74
- Court: Court of Appeal of the Republic of Singapore
- Date: 5 August 2021
- Case Number: Criminal Motion No 17 of 2021
- Judges: Steven Chong JCA
- Applicant: Rahmat bin Karimon
- Respondent: Public Prosecutor
- Procedural Posture: Application for leave under s 394H(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) to review a concluded Court of Appeal decision
- Legal Area: Criminal Procedure and Sentencing; Criminal Review
- Statutory Framework (Primary): Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed) (“MDA”); Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed) (“CPC”)
- Key Substantive Offence Context: Trafficking in diamorphine under s 5(1)(a) and punishable under s 33(1) of the MDA
- Prior Decisions Reviewed: Court of Appeal decision in Rahmat (CA) (CA/CCA 49/2017), reported in Zainal bin Hamad v Public Prosecutor and another appeal [2018] 2 SLR 1119 (“Rahmat (CA)”); High Court decision reported in Public Prosecutor v Rahmat bin Karimon and another [2018] 5 SLR 641 (“Rahmat (HC)”)
- Change of Law Relied Upon: Gobi a/l Avedian v Public Prosecutor [2021] 1 SLR 180 (“Gobi”) on the treatment of wilful blindness in relation to the s 18(2) MDA presumption of knowledge
- Related Leave Applications: Datchinamurthy a/l Kataiah v Public Prosecutor [2021] SGCA 30 (“Datchinamurthy”); Khartik Jasudass and another v Public Prosecutor [2021] SGCA 13 (“Khartik”)
- Judgment Length: 23 pages; 6,844 words
- Cases Cited (as provided): [2021] SGCA 13; [2021] SGCA 30; [2021] SGCA 74
Summary
Rahmat bin Karimon sought leave under s 394H(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code to commence a criminal review of a concluded Court of Appeal decision that had upheld his conviction and mandatory death sentence for trafficking in diamorphine. His central premise was that the Court of Appeal’s subsequent decision in Gobi a/l Avedian v Public Prosecutor changed the law on how “wilful blindness” should be treated in relation to the statutory presumption of knowledge under s 18(2) of the Misuse of Drugs Act. Rahmat argued that, because the Prosecution’s case at trial and on appeal was “in substance” based on wilful blindness rather than actual knowledge, the Prosecution should not have been permitted to rely on the s 18(2) presumption. He therefore contended that the trial judge’s and the Court of Appeal’s findings could not stand after Gobi.
The Court of Appeal (Steven Chong JCA) refused leave. The court emphasised that the review process is directed at the earlier appellate decision, and that the applicant must satisfy the “sufficiency” and “miscarriage of justice” requirements under s 394J of the CPC. In particular, the court clarified the respective roles of these requirements in determining whether a legitimate basis exists to exercise the power of review. Applying those principles, the court held that Rahmat’s attempt to recast the Prosecution’s case as one based on wilful blindness did not disclose the kind of error that would justify review. The court found that the relevant findings were not demonstrably wrong in the way required to show a miscarriage of justice.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
The underlying criminal matter arose from a coordinated illegal money-lending arrangement. Rahmat was employed as a “runner” for an individual known as “Kanna”, who was engaged in illegal money-lending. Rahmat had known Kanna for less than two months before his arrest, and his involvement was tied to instructions relayed through intermediaries.
On 27 May 2015, Rahmat entered Singapore from Malaysia via the Woodlands Checkpoint in a car with his wife and their three children. Acting on Kanna’s instructions, he drove to Rochor Road to meet a male subject known as “Bai”. Bai instructed Rahmat to meet Zainal bin Hamad (“Zainal”) at the IKEA store in Tampines. Rahmat was known to Zainal as “Abang”, while Zainal was known to Rahmat as “26”.
At IKEA, Rahmat met Zainal at the staircase on the second level. Around 8.35pm, Zainal passed S$8,000 to Rahmat. Rahmat then placed a green bag at the staircase landing in front of Zainal before leaving. After meeting his wife and children, Rahmat drove them back to Woodlands Checkpoint. At the checkpoint, both Rahmat and his wife were arrested by Central Narcotics Bureau officers. A search of Rahmat’s wife revealed the S$8,000 concealed in her brassiere. The evidence showed that Rahmat had passed the S$8,000 to his wife and told her to conceal it while they travelled to the checkpoint.
Subsequently, Zainal picked up the bag and placed it in a warehouse on the second floor of IKEA. Around 9.25pm, CNB officers entered the warehouse and arrested Zainal. The bag contained a red plastic bag containing three packets of granular/powdery substance weighing 1381.7g. The substance was found to contain not less than 53.64g of diamorphine, a controlled drug. Neither Rahmat nor Zainal was authorised under the Misuse of Drugs Act or its regulations to traffic in or possess a controlled drug.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The application raised two intertwined legal questions. First, what must an applicant show to obtain leave under s 394H(1) of the CPC to commence a criminal review of a concluded Court of Appeal decision? This required the court to apply the statutory requirements in s 394J, including the “sufficiency” requirement and the “miscarriage of justice” requirement. The court also needed to clarify the respective roles of these requirements in filtering out unmeritorious review applications.
Second, Rahmat’s substantive argument depended on the change of law in Gobi. The legal issue was whether, in Rahmat’s case, the Prosecution’s reliance on the s 18(2) MDA presumption of knowledge could properly be characterised as being based on wilful blindness such that, after Gobi, the presumption should not have been invoked. Put differently, the court had to determine whether Rahmat’s attempt to reframe the case as “in substance” wilful blindness—rather than actual knowledge—disclosed a legitimate basis for review and whether any alleged error was sufficiently connected to the earlier appellate decision to amount to a miscarriage of justice.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
The Court of Appeal began by situating the application within the statutory architecture of criminal review. It stressed that the review process is directed at the earlier decision of the appellate court—here, the Court of Appeal’s decision in Rahmat (CA)—not at the trial court’s reasoning in the abstract. Accordingly, the applicant must show that the appellate court’s decision is demonstrably wrong to establish a miscarriage of justice. This framing matters because it prevents review from becoming a general re-litigation of the entire case record; instead, it focuses on whether the appellate outcome is unsafe in light of the identified grounds.
Next, the court applied the settled approach from Kreetharan s/o Kathireson v Public Prosecutor and other matters [2020] 2 SLR 1175. Under that approach, leave under s 394H requires a “legitimate basis” for the exercise of the power of review. The court explained that this legitimacy is assessed through the requirements in s 394J. In particular, s 394J(2) requires (a) “sufficient material on which the appellate court may conclude” and (b) that there has been “a miscarriage of justice”. These became known as the “sufficiency” and “miscarriage of justice” requirements. The court indicated that the present case was an appropriate opportunity to examine and clarify how these requirements operate together.
On “sufficiency”, the court considered the statutory conditions that restrict what material can be relied on for leave. The judgment text provided indicates that the court would require that the material was not canvassed at any stage of the criminal matter before the filing of the application and that it could not have been canvassed earlier with reasonable diligence, among other conditions. While the excerpt is truncated, the court’s overall approach is clear: the review mechanism is not meant to allow applicants to repackage arguments already litigated or to rely on matters that could have been raised earlier.
Turning to the “miscarriage of justice” requirement, the court evaluated whether the alleged error—namely, that the Prosecution’s case was in substance based on wilful blindness and therefore could not rely on the s 18(2) presumption after Gobi—could demonstrate that the Court of Appeal’s earlier decision was unsafe. The court noted that this was not the first attempt to obtain leave on the basis of Gobi. In Datchinamurthy and Khartik, similar applications failed because the court found that the Prosecution’s cases and the court’s decisions were in fact based on actual knowledge rather than wilful blindness. This contextual point signalled that the court would scrutinise the record carefully to determine the true basis of the findings.
In Rahmat’s case, the court reviewed the procedural history. At trial, the Prosecution ran three arguments in closing submissions: (a) Rahmat could not rebut the s 18(2) presumption; alternatively (b) Rahmat was either wilfully blind or (c) had actual knowledge of the nature of the drugs. Rahmat’s defence was that he believed he was carrying medicine. The trial judge convicted Rahmat and imposed the mandatory death sentence, finding that Rahmat failed to rebut the s 18(2) presumption and that actual knowledge and wilful blindness were separately proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
On appeal, however, Rahmat chose to focus on a sole defence: that the s 18(2) presumption of knowledge had been rebutted. The Court of Appeal in Rahmat (CA) held that Rahmat failed to rebut the presumption. The court observed that there was no suggestion that the Court of Appeal’s grounds of decision inaccurately recorded the parties’ cases. This is significant because it undermines Rahmat’s attempt to argue that the appellate decision rested on a wilful blindness framework that would now be invalid after Gobi.
Rahmat’s application was filed after the decision in Gobi. The court noted subsequent events, including the grant of leave in Gobi and the Attorney-General’s Chambers’ letter to Rahmat’s counsel suggesting a review of the record in light of Gobi. Rahmat then filed the present motion. The court therefore accepted that Gobi represented a change in the legal landscape relevant to the s 18(2) presumption and wilful blindness.
Nevertheless, the court’s refusal of leave indicates that the record did not support Rahmat’s characterisation of the case as being “in substance” based on wilful blindness. The court’s reasoning, consistent with its approach in Datchinamurthy and Khartik, suggests that where the appellate decision (and the underlying findings) were grounded in actual knowledge or in a manner not dependent on invoking the s 18(2) presumption to presume wilful blindness, the Gobi change does not create a miscarriage of justice. In other words, even if wilful blindness was discussed as an alternative, the applicant must show that the appellate outcome depended on the now-prohibited use of the presumption in relation to wilful blindness.
Finally, the court clarified the contours of the leave requirements by emphasising the distinct functions of sufficiency and miscarriage of justice. Sufficiency ensures that the applicant brings forward material that is procedurally and substantively eligible for review. Miscarriage of justice ensures that the identified material, when applied to the appellate decision, reveals a real risk that the earlier outcome is unsafe. The court’s approach reflects a balancing exercise: it preserves finality of concluded appeals while still allowing review where a genuine legal shift or evidential gap undermines the safety of the appellate decision.
What Was the Outcome?
The Court of Appeal dismissed Rahmat’s application for leave to commence a criminal review. As a result, the concluded Court of Appeal decision in Rahmat (CA) remained undisturbed, and the conviction and sentence stood.
Practically, the refusal of leave meant that Rahmat could not proceed to a full criminal review hearing. The court’s decision thus reinforced that Gobi, while changing the legal treatment of wilful blindness in relation to the s 18(2) presumption, does not automatically reopen every concluded case where wilful blindness was mentioned at trial; the applicant must demonstrate that the appellate decision was demonstrably wrong in a way that satisfies the statutory threshold.
Why Does This Case Matter?
Rahmat bin Karimon v Public Prosecutor is important for two reasons. First, it provides guidance on how the Court of Appeal will apply the leave-to-review framework under ss 394H and 394J of the CPC. The court’s emphasis on the “legitimate basis” requirement, and on the distinct roles of sufficiency and miscarriage of justice, helps practitioners understand that leave is not granted merely because there has been a change in law. Instead, the applicant must connect the change to the earlier appellate decision in a way that meets the statutory threshold.
Second, the case illustrates the limits of relying on Gobi in concluded MDA cases. Even where wilful blindness is part of the factual matrix, the court will examine whether the Prosecution’s case and the appellate findings were actually dependent on invoking the s 18(2) presumption to presume wilful blindness. Where the record supports actual knowledge or where the appellate decision did not rest on the prohibited reasoning, the Gobi change will not justify review.
For defence counsel and law students, the case underscores the importance of appellate focus and litigation strategy. Rahmat’s decision to focus solely on rebutting the s 18(2) presumption on appeal, and the Court of Appeal’s recorded holding that he failed to rebut it, made it harder to later argue that the appellate outcome was fundamentally premised on wilful blindness. More broadly, the case demonstrates that review applications will be scrutinised for whether they are, in substance, attempts to relitigate issues already canvassed or to reframe the record without satisfying the statutory requirements.
Legislation Referenced
- Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed) (“CPC”), in particular:
- Section 394H(1) (leave to commence a review application)
- Section 394J (requirements for leave, including sufficiency and miscarriage of justice)
- Section 394J(2) (sufficiency and miscarriage of justice requirements)
- Section 394F(1), 394G(1), 394J(5) (direction of review to appellate decisions)
- Section 394H(6)(a) (single Judge hearing)
- Sections 313(f), 313(g), 313(h) (execution and respite processes)
- Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed) (“MDA”), in particular:
- Section 18(2) (presumption of knowledge)
- Section 5(1)(a) and Section 5(2) (trafficking provisions in the relevant context)
- Section 33(1) (punishment)
- Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1985 Rev Ed, 1999 Reprint), Article 22P(1) (respite of execution)
Cases Cited
- Rahmat bin Karimon v Public Prosecutor [2021] SGCA 74
- Gobi a/l Avedian v Public Prosecutor [2021] 1 SLR 180
- Datchinamurthy a/l Kataiah v Public Prosecutor [2021] SGCA 30
- Khartik Jasudass and another v Public Prosecutor [2021] SGCA 13
- Kreetharan s/o Kathireson v Public Prosecutor and other matters [2020] 2 SLR 1175
- Zainal bin Hamad v Public Prosecutor and another appeal [2018] 2 SLR 1119 (“Rahmat (CA)”)
- Public Prosecutor v Rahmat bin Karimon and another [2018] 5 SLR 641 (“Rahmat (HC)”)
Source Documents
This article analyses [2021] SGCA 74 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.