PUBLIC PROSECUTOR v Low Sze Song & Sivaprakash Krishnan

"In light of the above, I find that the integrity of the chain of custody of the drug exhibits seized from the PMD, in particular, the Fourth Drug Bundle, has not been compromised. Low and Sivaprakash have not raised a reasonable doubt that the Fourth Drug Bundle was not the same drug exhibit seized from the PMD on 30 May 2019." — Per Dedar Singh Gill J, Para 86

Case Information

• Citation: [2023] SGHC 95 (Para 0)
• Court: General Division of the High Court of the Republic of Singapore (Para 0)
• Date of Judgment: 14 April 2023 (Para 0)
• Coram: Dedar Singh Gill J (Para 0)
• Case Number: Criminal Case No 36 of 2022 (Para 0)
• Area of Law: Criminal Law — Statutory offences — Misuse of Drugs Act (Para 0)
• Counsel for the Prosecution: Not stated in the extraction (NOT ANSWERABLE)
• Counsel for the Accused Persons: Not stated in the extraction (NOT ANSWERABLE)
• Judgment Length: Not stated in the extraction (NOT ANSWERABLE)

Summary

This was a joint trial of Low Sze Song and Sivaprakash Krishnan on a single trafficking charge involving not less than 43.2g of diamorphine under s 5(1)(a) read with s 5(2) of the Misuse of Drugs Act. The central controversy was not merely whether drugs were found, but whether the fourth bundle analysed by the Health Sciences Authority was truly the same exhibit seized from Low’s personal mobility device, and whether the accused persons could displace the statutory presumptions of possession and knowledge. (Para 1)

The court approached the case by first identifying the issues as possession, the chain-of-custody sub-issue, and knowledge. It then examined the evidence in detail, including the arresting officers’ testimony, the field diary entry, the photographs, the statements recorded from Low, the DNA evidence on the packaging, and the handling of the exhibits in tamper-proof bags. On that evidence, the court rejected the defence challenge to the integrity of the chain of custody and held that the fourth bundle was the same exhibit seized from the PMD. (Paras 20, 61, 68, 86)

Having found that the drug bundles recovered were the same exhibits seized on 30 May 2019, the court held that the presumption of possession under s 18(1)(a) of the MDA applied to both accused persons. The court also considered the knowledge issue and the surrounding circumstances, including the accused persons’ statements and conduct, before concluding that the defence had not raised a reasonable doubt sufficient to displace the Prosecution’s case. The judgment therefore turned on evidential integrity, statutory presumptions, and the court’s rejection of speculative contamination or mistaken-exhibit arguments. (Paras 87, 20, 28, 61)

What Were the Charges Against Low Sze Song and Sivaprakash Krishnan?

The judgment states that each accused person claimed trial to a single charge of trafficking not less than 43.2g of diamorphine under s 5(1)(a) read with s 5(2) of the MDA, and that they were jointly tried before the court. The extraction does not reproduce the full charge sheet verbatim, so only the offence description can be stated with confidence. The legal significance of the charge was that trafficking under the MDA is established where a person has possession of a controlled drug for the purpose of trafficking. (Para 1)

"The two accused persons each claimed trial to a single charge of trafficking not less than 43.2g of diamorphine under s 5(1)(a) read with s 5(2) of the Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed) (“MDA”) and were jointly tried before me." — Per Dedar Singh Gill J, Para 1

The court also reproduced the statutory language of s 5(1)(a) and s 5(2), making clear that trafficking includes possession for the purpose of trafficking. That statutory framework mattered because the Prosecution did not need to prove a completed sale; it was enough to prove possession and the trafficking purpose, subject to the operation of the statutory presumptions. (Para 2)

"5.—(1) Except as authorised by this Act, it shall be an offence for a person, on his own behalf or on behalf of any other person, whether or not that other person is in Singapore — (a) to traffic in a controlled drug; (b) to offer to traffic in a controlled drug; or (c) to do or offer to do any act preparatory to or for the purpose of trafficking in a controlled drug." — Per Dedar Singh Gill J, Para 2

"(2) For the purposes of this Act, a person commits the offence of trafficking in a controlled drug if he has in his possession that drug for the purpose of trafficking." — Per Dedar Singh Gill J, Para 2

In practical terms, the charge structure meant that the court’s factual findings on possession and knowledge were decisive. If the Prosecution proved that the bundles were the same exhibits seized from the PMD and that the accused persons had possession, the statutory presumptions could then assist the Prosecution unless rebutted. The judgment therefore treated the evidential dispute over the fourth bundle as foundational rather than peripheral. (Paras 2, 20, 86, 87)

How Did the Alleged Drug Transaction Unfold on 30 May 2019?

The court’s narrative began with the meeting at the Sumang Walk Bus Stop at about 6.20am. According to the evidence accepted by the court, Sivaprakash handed Low a white plastic bag containing packets of drugs, and Low handed Sivaprakash a stack of cash totalling S$9,000. That exchange was the immediate factual basis for the trafficking allegation and the later arrests. (Para 3)

"At about 6.20am, at a bus stop along Sumang Walk (the “Sumang Walk Bus Stop”), Sivaprakash gave Low a white plastic bag containing packets of drugs, and Low gave Sivaprakash a stack of cash totalling S$9,000." — Per Dedar Singh Gill J, Para 3

The court then traced the subsequent police action and the seizure of the exhibits. A critical finding was that the PMD was searched in Low’s presence at about 7.03am in the Unit, and that the fourth drug bundle was recovered from the PMD. That finding directly answered the defence theory that only three packets had been handed over and that the fourth bundle was not part of the original seizure. (Para 33)

"I find that the PMD was searched in Low’s presence at about 7.03am in the Unit and that the Fourth Drug Bundle was recovered from the PMD." — Per Dedar Singh Gill J, Para 33

The court’s factual findings were not limited to the moment of arrest. It also considered the chain of handling after seizure, because the defence attack was aimed at the possibility that the fourth bundle was introduced, substituted, or otherwise not the same exhibit later analysed by the HSA. The judgment therefore treated the arrest scene, the search, the recording of the exhibits, and the later analysis as one continuous evidential sequence. (Paras 27, 29, 33, 61, 86)

What Was the Core Defence Challenge to the Fourth Drug Bundle?

The defence challenge was highly specific: Low contended that he did not check the contents of the white plastic bag and had no knowledge of the nature of the drug bundles, while Sivaprakash claimed that he believed he was delivering “paan parak” on the instructions of “Joe.” More importantly for the possession issue, the defence sought to create doubt about whether the fourth bundle analysed by the HSA was the same exhibit seized from the PMD. (Para 19)

"Low’s defence is that he did not check the contents of the white plastic bag handed to him by Sivaprakash and had no knowledge of the nature of the Drug Bundles." — Per Dedar Singh Gill J, Para 19

"Sivaprakash claims that he did not know that he was delivering the Drug Bundles as he thought that he was delivering what he claimed to be “paan parak”, on “Joe’s” instructions." — Per Dedar Singh Gill J, Para 19

The court framed the specific sub-issue as whether there was a reasonable doubt that exhibit “A1A1A”, analysed by the HSA to contain not less than 8.64g of diamorphine, was the same drug exhibit seized from the PMD. That formulation shows that the defence was not merely disputing quantity or purity; it was attacking identity, continuity, and evidential integrity. (Para 20)

"the issues (and sub-issue) that arise for my consideration are: (a) whether Low and Sivaprakash respectively had possession of the Drug Bundles (the “Possession Issues”); (i) in particular, whether there is a reasonable doubt that the exhibit ‘A1A1A’ analysed by the Health Sciences Authority (the “HSA”) to contain not less than 8.64g of diamorphine was the same drug exhibit seized from the PMD (the “Chain of Custody Sub-issue”); and (b) whether Low and Sivaprakash respectively had no knowledge of the nature of the Drug Bundles (the “Knowledge Issues”)." — Per Dedar Singh Gill J, Para 20

The court’s response was to test the defence theory against the objective evidence. It examined the officers’ testimony, the field diary, the photographs, the statements, and the DNA evidence, and then asked whether the alleged omission of the fourth bundle from certain contemporaneous materials truly created a reasonable doubt. The court concluded that it did not. (Paras 29, 61, 68, 86)

How Did the Court Define the Chain-of-Custody Question and the Meaning of Reasonable Doubt?

The court relied on established authority to explain what the Prosecution had to prove in relation to the movement of exhibits. It quoted the principle that the Prosecution must account for the movement of the exhibits from seizure to analysis so that there is no unaccounted moment that gives rise to a reasonable doubt about identity. That principle was central because the defence case depended on a supposed gap in the handling of the fourth bundle. (Para 27)

"The Prosecution must account for the movement of the exhibits from the point of seizure to analysis, such that there cannot be a single moment that is unaccounted for if this gives rise to a reasonable doubt as to the identity of the exhibits or exhibit in question" — Per Dedar Singh Gill J, Para 27

The court also quoted the definition of reasonable doubt as a doubt for which one can give a reason, so long as the reason is logically connected to the evidence. That formulation mattered because the defence arguments were assessed not by whether they were conceivable in the abstract, but by whether they were grounded in the evidence actually before the court. (Para 28)

"A “reasonable doubt”, as opposed to a “merely fanciful” doubt, is “a doubt for which one can give a reason, so long as the reason given is logically connected to the evidence”" — Per Dedar Singh Gill J, Para 28

Applying those principles, the court stated that it was not satisfied that a reasonable doubt had been raised as to the identity of the fourth bundle after carefully sifting and reasoning through the evidence. The court’s analysis therefore did not stop at identifying a possible inconsistency; it asked whether the inconsistency, viewed in context, was sufficient to undermine the chain of custody. The answer was no. (Para 29)

"I am not satisfied that a reasonable doubt has been raised as to the identity of the Fourth Drug Bundle, after carefully sifting and reasoning through the evidence that was led in this case." — Per Dedar Singh Gill J, Para 29

Why Did the Court Accept the Prosecution’s Evidence on the Search of the PMD?

The court found the arresting CNB officers’ testimony convincing and corroborated by the P122 field diary entry. This was important because the defence challenge depended on the proposition that the fourth bundle was not recovered from the PMD at the relevant time. The court rejected that proposition by relying on direct testimony and contemporaneous documentation. (Para 61)

"The testimonies from the arresting CNB officers (at [33]–[38]) relating to the search of the PMD were convincing and corroborated by the P122 Field Diary Entry." — Per Dedar Singh Gill J, Para 61

The court also addressed the omission of the fourth bundle from the photograph and from Low’s contemporaneous statement. Rather than treating that omission as fatal, the court described it as perhaps a lapse, but insufficient to raise a reasonable doubt that the fourth bundle had not been seized from the PMD. This is a classic example of the court distinguishing between imperfect record-keeping and evidential unreliability. (Para 61)

"In light of this, the omission of the Fourth Drug Bundle from the Photograph and from Low’s Contemporaneous Statement was perhaps a lapse, but insufficient to raise a reasonable doubt that the Fourth Drug Bundle had not been seized from the PMD." — Per Dedar Singh Gill J, Para 61

The court’s reasoning was cumulative. It did not rely on a single item of evidence in isolation; instead, it considered the officers’ evidence, the field diary, the surrounding circumstances, and the later forensic evidence together. That cumulative approach allowed the court to conclude that the defence had not identified a logically connected reason to doubt the identity of the exhibit. (Paras 27, 28, 29, 61, 86)

What Role Did DNA Evidence and Packaging Evidence Play?

DNA evidence was a significant corroborative feature in the court’s analysis. The court noted that it was undisputed that Low’s DNA was found on the adhesive sides of the taped packaging marked “A1A” which contained the fourth drug bundle. That fact supported the conclusion that the bundle had been handled in the manner the Prosecution alleged and undermined the suggestion that the exhibit was unrelated to the PMD seizure. (Para 68)

"It is undisputed that Low’s DNA was found on the adhesive sides of the taped packaging marked ‘A1A’ which contained the Fourth Drug Bundle." — Per Dedar Singh Gill J, Para 68

The court also observed that Sivaprakash’s DNA was found on the packaging of all four drug bundles. That evidence was used to corroborate the broader narrative that the bundles were connected to the accused persons and to the transaction described by the Prosecution. The DNA findings were not treated as standalone proof of guilt, but as objective support for the chain-of-custody and possession findings. (Para 51)

"the veracity of this is further corroborated by the fact that Sivaprakash’s DNA was found on the packaging of all four Drug Bundles." — Per Dedar Singh Gill J, Para 51

In context, the packaging evidence mattered because the defence was not simply saying that the officers were mistaken in memory; it was suggesting that the fourth bundle might not have been part of the original seizure. The presence of DNA on the packaging, together with the officers’ evidence and the field diary, made that suggestion less plausible and ultimately insufficient to create reasonable doubt. (Paras 51, 61, 68, 86)

How Did the Court Deal with the Presumption of Possession Under s 18(1)(a) of the MDA?

Once the court found that the drug bundles recovered were the same exhibits seized from the PMD, it held that the presumption of possession under s 18(1)(a) applied to both Sivaprakash and Low. The court’s reasoning was straightforward: if the bundles were the same drug exhibits seized from the white plastic bag in the PMD, then possession could be presumed under the statute. (Para 87)

"As I have found that the Drug Bundles were the same drug exhibits which were seized and recovered from the white plastic bag in the PMD on 30 May 2019, by virtue of s 18(1)(a) of the MDA, it follows that the presumption of possession applies to both Sivaprakash and Low" — Per Dedar Singh Gill J, Para 87

The court’s treatment of possession was therefore derivative of its chain-of-custody finding. It did not need to infer possession from vague association or proximity alone; it found that the exhibits were the same as those seized from the PMD and then applied the statutory presumption. That sequence is important because it shows how evidential integrity and statutory presumptions interact in MDA prosecutions. (Paras 86, 87)

The Prosecution had also argued that both accused had actual possession of the drug bundles. The extraction records that submission, but the court’s decisive route was the combination of the factual finding on the seizure and the statutory presumption. The judgment therefore demonstrates that once the evidential foundation is established, the statutory machinery can do substantial work in proving trafficking. (Para 17, 87)

How Did the Court Approach the Knowledge Issue and the Accused Persons’ Explanations?

The court identified the knowledge issue separately from possession. Low said he did not check the contents of the white plastic bag and had no knowledge of the nature of the bundles, while Sivaprakash said he thought he was delivering “paan parak” on “Joe’s” instructions. Those explanations were considered against the objective evidence and the statutory framework. (Para 19)

"Low’s defence is that he did not check the contents of the white plastic bag handed to him by Sivaprakash and had no knowledge of the nature of the Drug Bundles." — Per Dedar Singh Gill J, Para 19

"Sivaprakash claims that he did not know that he was delivering the Drug Bundles as he thought that he was delivering what he claimed to be “paan parak”, on “Joe’s” instructions." — Per Dedar Singh Gill J, Para 19

The extraction does not reproduce the full reasoning on the knowledge issue in the same level of detail as the chain-of-custody analysis, but it does show that the court treated knowledge as one of the issues to be resolved after possession was established. The Prosecution relied on the presumption of knowledge under the MDA, and the court’s acceptance of the objective evidence meant the defence explanations did not displace the Prosecution’s case. (Paras 17, 20, 87)

"The Prosecution relies on the presumption of possession under s 18(1)(a) of the MDA in respect of both Low and Sivaprakash and that, in any case, they each had actual possession of the Drug Bundles." — Per Dedar Singh Gill J, Para 17

In substance, the court’s approach was that the accused persons’ asserted ignorance could not prevail against the combination of the seizure evidence, the DNA evidence, and the statutory presumptions. The judgment therefore illustrates the practical difficulty of relying on bare denials in the face of corroborated objective evidence. (Paras 51, 61, 68, 87)

What Did the Court Say About the Field Diary, Statements, and Memory Gaps?

The court addressed the defence attempt to exploit omissions or inconsistencies in contemporaneous records. It referred to s 19(2) of the CPC, which prevents an accused from calling for or inspecting a police officer’s field diary before or during proceedings under the CPC. That statutory context explains why the field diary was used as corroborative evidence rather than as a document the defence could demand as of right. (Para 44)

"Section 19(2) of the CPC provides, in relation to police investigations under Part 4 of the CPC, that an accused is not entitled to call for or inspect the field diary of a police officer “before or during an inquiry, a trial or other proceeding under this Code [ie, the CPC]”." — Per Dedar Singh Gill J, Para 44

The court also drew on authority recognising that memory lapses can occur with the passage of time. That point was relevant because the defence sought to treat omissions in recollection or documentation as proof of fabrication or substitution. The court rejected that leap, noting that human memory is fallible and that gaps do not automatically create reasonable doubt. (Para 45)

"gaps in memory may arise with lapse of time" — Per Dedar Singh Gill J, Para 45

Similarly, the court referred to authority that unanswered questions do not necessarily create reasonable doubt. This was important because the defence relied on what it said were unresolved questions about the fourth bundle’s appearance in photographs and statements. The court’s answer was that unanswered questions must still be assessed in light of the totality of the evidence, and speculative doubt is not enough. (Para 46)

"unanswered questions do not necessarily create reasonable doubt" — Per Dedar Singh Gill J, Para 46

Which Earlier Cases Did the Court Rely On, and For What Propositions?

The court referred to a number of authorities to support the legal framework governing trafficking, chain of custody, and reasonable doubt. It used Muhammad Ridzuan bin Md Ali v Public Prosecutor and other matters for the three elements of trafficking under s 5(1)(a) read with s 5(2) of the MDA, namely possession, knowledge, and purpose of trafficking. That authority supplied the basic doctrinal structure for the case. (Para 21)

"the three elements of trafficking under s 5(1)(a) read with s 5(2) MDA" — Per Dedar Singh Gill J, Para 21

For the chain-of-custody principle, the court relied on Mohamed Affandi bin Rosli v Public Prosecutor and another appeal. The proposition extracted from that case was that the Prosecution must account for the movement of the exhibits from seizure to analysis. That authority was directly relevant to the fourth bundle dispute. (Para 27)

For the meaning of reasonable doubt, the court cited Jagatheesan s/o Krishnasamy v Public Prosecutor and Public Prosecutor v GCK and another matter. The court used those authorities to reinforce the proposition that a reasonable doubt must be grounded in a reason logically connected to the evidence, not in speculation. (Para 28)

The court also referred to Ng Kwee Leong v Public Prosecutor for the proposition that gaps in memory may arise with lapse of time, and to Muhammad bin Kadar and another v Public Prosecutor by analogy on field diaries and pocket books. It further cited Satli bin Masot v Public Prosecutor on whether a doubt exists in light of all surrounding circumstances, Public Prosecutor v Yen May Woen on unanswered questions, and Public Prosecutor v Chen Mingjian on speculative contamination arguments. Each of these authorities was used to resist the defence’s attempt to convert imperfections in the record into reasonable doubt. (Paras 45, 46, 47, 48)

Why Does This Case Matter?

This case matters because it is a careful application of chain-of-custody principles in a drug prosecution where the defence alleged that one of the seized bundles was not the same exhibit later analysed. The court’s analysis shows that a chain-of-custody challenge must be tested against the whole evidential picture, including contemporaneous records, officer testimony, forensic evidence, and the surrounding circumstances of seizure and handling. (Paras 27, 29, 61, 68, 86)

It also matters because it illustrates how the statutory presumptions under the MDA operate once possession is established. The court’s finding that the fourth bundle was the same exhibit seized from the PMD triggered the presumption of possession under s 18(1)(a), which then materially strengthened the Prosecution’s case against both accused persons. In practical terms, the case shows that a successful defence to trafficking charges often depends on undermining the evidential foundation before the presumptions are engaged. (Paras 86, 87)

Finally, the case is a useful reminder that courts distinguish between a genuine evidential gap and a merely speculative one. The judgment repeatedly emphasises that a reasonable doubt must be reasoned and evidence-based. For practitioners, the case underscores the importance of building any chain-of-custody challenge around concrete inconsistencies, not isolated omissions that can be explained as lapses or imperfections in record-keeping. (Paras 28, 29, 61, 46)

Cases Referred To

Legislation Referenced

• Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed): ss 5(1)(a), 5(2), 18(1)(a), 18(2), 33B(2)(a) (Paras 1, 2, 87)
• Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed): ss 19(2), 22, 23, 32(1) (Paras 44, 20)
• Evidence Act 1893 (2020 Rev Ed): s 116 illustration (g) (Para 20)

Source Documents

• Original Judgment — Singapore Courts
• Archived Copy (PDF) — Litt Law CDN

This article analyses [2023] SGHC 95 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.