PUBLIC PROSECUTOR v Kishor Kumar A/L Raguan & Anor

"I found that the Prosecution had proved beyond a reasonable doubt the charges against Kishor and Pung respectively, and I convicted them on their respective charges." — Per Audrey Lim J, Para 3

Case Information

• Citation: [2022] SGHC 27 (Para 0)
• Court: In the General Division of the High Court of the Republic of Singapore (Para 0)
• Date: 4 February 2022 (Para 0)
• Coram: Audrey Lim J (Para 0)
• Case Number: Criminal Case No 2 of 2020 (Para 0)
• Area of Law: Criminal Law — Statutory offences — Misuse of Drugs Act; Criminal Procedure and Sentencing — Statements — Admissibility (Para 0)
• Counsel: Mr Allagarsamy for Kishor; Mr Wong was expressly named in the extract, but the provided text does not fully answer the counsel list for all parties (Para 0)
• Judgment Length: Not answerable from the extraction provided (Para 0)

Summary

This was a trial in the High Court arising from a drug delivery on 29 July 2016, when Kishor Kumar a/l Raguan delivered a grey plastic bag containing four black bundles to Pung near Pung’s home at Le Crescendo Condominium. The bundles were later found to contain not less than 36.05g of diamorphine, and the court treated the case as one involving trafficking by Kishor and possession for the purpose of trafficking by Pung. The court’s central task was to determine whether Pung’s recorded statements were admissible, whether Kishor knew the nature of the drugs, and whether the Prosecution had proved the statutory elements of both charges beyond reasonable doubt. (Para 1, Para 2, Para 3, Para 81)

The court admitted Pung’s 1st to 7th statements after rejecting his claim that CNB officers had induced him to use certain words and after finding that the statements were accurately recorded. The judge applied the two-stage voluntariness test and concluded that no threat, inducement or promise had been made in relation to the statements. The court also found that the evidence of the officers, the interpreter, and the surrounding circumstances supported the reliability of the recordings. (Para 26, Para 27, Para 44, Para 62)

On the merits, the court found that Kishor knew the black bundles contained heroin or diamorphine, or alternatively failed to rebut the presumption of knowledge under s 18(2) of the Misuse of Drugs Act. The judge rejected Kishor’s account that he thought the bundles contained “ice” or “stone”, and relied on the handphone records and the pattern of messages to infer drug-related dealings. Because Kishor was treated as a courier and no certificate of substantive assistance was issued to him, the mandatory death sentence followed; Pung, also treated as a courier, received life imprisonment because he was issued such a certificate. (Para 94, Para 97, Para 4)

What Were the Charges Against Kishor and Pung, and What Statutory Provisions Did the Court Apply?

The case concerned two distinct but related drug offences under the Misuse of Drugs Act. Kishor was charged with trafficking by delivering the drugs to Pung without authorisation, under s 5(1)(a) and punishable under s 33(1) of the MDA. Pung was charged with possession of the drugs for the purpose of trafficking, under s 5(1)(a) read with s 5(2) and punishable under s 33(1) of the MDA. The court also referred to the Second Schedule to the MDA, which fixed the prescribed punishment for the quantity involved. (Para 2, Para 4)

"Kishor was charged with trafficking by delivering to Pung the Drugs without authorisation, an offence under s 5(1)(a) and punishable under s 33(1) of the Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed) (“MDA”). Pung was charged with having possession of the Drugs for the purposes of trafficking and without authorisation, an offence under s 5(1)(a) read with s 5(2) and punishable under s 33(1) of the MDA." — Per Audrey Lim J, Para 2

The sentencing framework was equally important. The judge noted that under s 33(1) of the MDA, read with the Second Schedule, the prescribed punishment was death. The court further noted that s 33B(1)(a) gave the court a discretion not to impose the death penalty if the requirements in s 33B(2) were satisfied, including the issuance of a certificate of substantive assistance by the Prosecution under s 33B(2)(b). That framework ultimately determined the different sentences imposed on the two accused persons. (Para 4)

"Under s 33(1) of the MDA, read with the Second Schedule to the MDA, the prescribed punishment is death. Pursuant to s 33B(1)(a) of the MDA, the court has a discretion not to impose the death penalty if the requirements set out in s 33B(2) are satisfied." — Per Audrey Lim J, Para 4

The court also dealt with the admissibility of statements recorded under the Criminal Procedure Code. The 1st Statement was a contemporaneous statement recorded under s 22 of the CPC on 29 July 2016, and the remaining statements were also recorded in the course of the investigation. The admissibility dispute was central because Pung’s account of what he had said, and what the officers had allegedly told him to say, went directly to the reliability of the prosecution evidence against him. (Para 5, Para 26, Para 37)

How Did the Court Approach the Admissibility of Pung’s Statements?

The court approached admissibility by applying the established two-stage voluntariness test. The judge identified the first question as whether objectively there was a threat, inducement or promise made to the accused having reference to the charge against him, and the second as whether subjectively the accused would reasonably think that by making the statement he would gain some advantage or avoid some adverse consequences in relation to the proceedings. This framework was drawn from Sulaiman bin Jumari v Public Prosecutor. (Para 26)

"whether objectively there was a TIP made to the accused, and having reference to the charge against him; and" — Per Audrey Lim J, Para 26(a)

"whether subjectively, the TIP was such that it would be reasonable for the accused to think that by making the statement he would gain some advantage or avoid some adverse consequences in relation to the proceedings against him." — Per Audrey Lim J, Para 26(b)

Applying that test, the judge was satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the 1st to 7th statements were voluntarily made. The court accepted the evidence of IO Yip and the interpreter Ee that no conversation of the kind alleged by Pung had taken place, and that no threat, inducement or promise was made during the recording of the statements. The judge therefore concluded that the statements were admissible. (Para 27, Para 44, Para 62)

"I was satisfied that the Prosecution had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the 1st to 7th Statements were voluntarily made." — Per Audrey Lim J, Para 27

"I accepted IO Yip’s evidence that no such conversation took place. Ee likewise testified that there was no such conversation, that he did not hear Pung complain to IO Yip, and that IO Yip did not make any TIP to Pung during the recording of any of the statements." — Per Audrey Lim J, Para 44

The judge then went further and addressed the accuracy of the recordings. The court found that the statements recorded what Pung had said, and that the alleged inaccuracies were not made out. This was important because even if a statement is voluntary, it must still accurately reflect what the accused actually said. The judge’s conclusion was that the Prosecution had proved both voluntariness and accuracy, and the statements were admitted. (Para 62)

"In the round, I was satisfied that the Prosecution had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the 1st to 7th Statements were voluntarily made and recorded what Pung had said." — Per Audrey Lim J, Para 62

"I thus allowed the 1st to 7th Statements to be admitted in the trial." — Per Audrey Lim J, Para 62

Why Did the Court Reject Pung’s Claim That He Was Induced to Use Certain Words in His Statements?

Pung’s case was that CNB officers had told him to cooperate and to say “bai fen” so that they could help his case, and that IO Yip had promised to help him if he used the words “bai fen” or “du pin”. He also claimed that because of this alleged inducement, parts of the statements were inaccurate and should not be relied upon. The court treated this as a factual dispute about what happened during the recording process. (Para 37, Para 26)

"Pung claimed that before recording the 1st Statement, Chin told him to co-operate with them by saying “bai fen” so that they could help his case (“Chin’s TIP”). Hence, “bai fen” was mentioned in that statement and he signed it although it was inaccurate." — Per Audrey Lim J, Para 37

The judge rejected that account because it was not supported by the evidence of the officers or the interpreter. The court accepted that no such conversation took place, that Pung did not complain to IO Yip, and that no inducement was made during the recording of any statement. The judge’s reasoning was therefore evidential rather than abstract: the court preferred the testimony of the officers and the interpreter to Pung’s version, and that preference resolved the admissibility issue against him. (Para 44, Para 62)

The court also found that Pung’s own account was internally inconsistent. The judge noted that Pung could not maintain a consistent story about how portions of the statements came to be, and that despite alleging that he had been told to say “bai fen” or “du pin”, he continued to say “dong xi” in the 2nd to 7th statements. That inconsistency undermined his claim that the statements were the product of improper inducement. (Para 62)

"Pung could not maintain a consistent story about how portions of the statements came to be. Despite claiming that IO Yip told him to say “bai fen” or “du pin”, Pung claimed that he continued to say “dong xi” in the 2nd to 7th Statements." — Per Audrey Lim J, Para 62

What Was the Court’s Treatment of the Evidence About Kishor’s Delivery of the Grey Bag and the Black Bundles?

The factual core of the case was straightforward but serious. On 29 July 2016 at about 8.15pm, Kishor delivered a grey plastic bag containing four black bundles to Pung near Pung’s home at the condominium. The bundles were later analysed and found to contain not less than 36.05g of diamorphine. The court treated this delivery as the act of trafficking alleged against Kishor and as the source of the drugs later found in Pung’s possession. (Para 1, Para 2)

"On 29 July 2016 at about 8.15pm, the first accused (“Kishor”), a Malaysian, delivered a grey plastic bag (“Grey Bag”) containing four black bundles (“Black Bundles”) to the second accused (“Pung”) near Pung’s home at Le Crescendo Condominium (“the Condo”). The Black Bundles were found to contain not less than 903.50g of granular/powdery substance, analysed and found to contain not less than 36.05g of diamorphine (“the Drugs”)." — Per Audrey Lim J, Para 1

The court’s analysis did not stop at the physical delivery. It also considered the surrounding evidence, including the communications between Kishor and Pung and the later discovery of additional drugs in Pung’s home. The judge found that the records of Kishor’s handphone showed messages between them from 10 to 29 July 2016, which the court said must relate to drug transactions. That evidence was used to reject Kishor’s attempt to portray the delivery as innocent or unrelated to drugs. (Para 97(a))

"The records of Kishor’s handphone showed messages between them even from 10 to 29 July 2016, which must thus relate to drug transactions." — Per Audrey Lim J, Para 97(a)

The judge also found that Kishor continued to be involved in drug transactions thereafter, which reinforced the inference that the delivery on 29 July 2016 was part of a broader pattern of drug dealing rather than an isolated or misunderstood event. This broader context mattered because it bore directly on Kishor’s knowledge of the nature of the bundles and on the credibility of his defence. (Para 97)

"I disbelieved Kishor and found that he continued to be involved in drug transactions even thereafter." — Per Audrey Lim J, Para 97

How Did the Court Decide Whether Kishor Knew the Black Bundles Contained Heroin or Diamorphine?

Kishor’s defence was that he thought the black bundles contained “ice” or “stone”, not heroin or diamorphine. The court treated this as a direct challenge to the mens rea element of trafficking. The judge therefore had to decide whether the Prosecution had proved actual knowledge, or alternatively whether the presumption of knowledge under s 18(2) of the MDA applied and had not been rebutted. (Para 94)

"Kishor’s defence was that he thought the Black Bundles contained “ice” which he knew to be an illegal drug or contained “stone” which he thought were shiny crystals or decorative stones." — Per Audrey Lim J, Para 94

The court rejected that defence. The judge expressly found that Kishor knew the black bundles contained heroin or diamorphine, and alternatively that he had failed to rebut the presumption of knowledge under s 18(2). The reasoning was grounded in the surrounding evidence, including the handphone messages and the court’s disbelief of Kishor’s account. The judge’s conclusion was therefore not merely that the defence was improbable, but that the Prosecution had proved the necessary knowledge beyond reasonable doubt. (Para 94, Para 97)

"I found that Kishor knew the Black Bundles contained heroin or diamorphine; alternatively, he failed to rebut the presumption of knowledge under s 18(2) of the MDA." — Per Audrey Lim J, Para 94

The court’s treatment of the knowledge issue was also linked to the trafficking elements stated in the authorities. For trafficking under s 5(1)(a), the Prosecution had to prove the act of trafficking and knowledge of the nature of the controlled drug. The judge applied that framework to the facts and concluded that Kishor’s delivery of the bundles, together with the surrounding communications and his continuing involvement in drug transactions, satisfied the legal test. (Para 81, Para 97)

"For the offence of trafficking in a controlled drug under s 5(1)(a) of the MDA to be made out, the Prosecution must prove the act of trafficking in a controlled drug without any authorisation, and knowledge of the nature of the controlled drug" — Per Audrey Lim J, Para 81

How Did the Court Analyse Pung’s Possession of the Drugs for the Purpose of Trafficking?

Pung was charged not merely with possession, but with possession for the purpose of trafficking. The court therefore had to determine whether he had possession of the drugs, whether he knew their nature, and whether his possession was for trafficking and not authorised. The judge expressly adopted the formulation from Ramesh a/l Perumal v Public Prosecutor and another appeal. (Para 81)

"For the offence of possession of a controlled drug for the purpose of trafficking under s 5(1)(a) read with s 5(2) of the MDA, the Prosecution must prove possession of the controlled drug, knowledge of the nature of the drug, and that possession of the drug was for the purpose of trafficking which was not authorised" — Per Audrey Lim J, Para 81

The court found that Pung’s account of temporary safekeeping was false. The extraction states that the court found Pung’s account of temporary safekeeping to be false, and the judge’s acceptance of the officers’ evidence and the statements supported that conclusion. Once the statements were admitted, they formed part of the evidential matrix showing that Pung had possession of the drugs and that the possession was connected to trafficking rather than innocent custody. (Para 1, Para 62)

The judge’s conclusion on Pung’s role was also reflected in the sentencing analysis. The court found that both accused persons’ roles were limited to that of couriers. That finding did not exonerate Pung; rather, it placed him within the statutory framework for trafficking offences while also making him eligible for the alternative sentencing regime because the Prosecution issued him a certificate of substantive assistance. (Para 4)

"I found that Kishor’s and Pung’s roles were limited to that of a courier." — Per Audrey Lim J, Para 4

What Legal Tests Did the Court Apply, and How Were the Authorities Used?

The judgment expressly relied on three authorities for the governing legal tests. Sulaiman bin Jumari v Public Prosecutor supplied the two-stage voluntariness test for statements. Saravanan Chandaram v Public Prosecutor and another matter supplied the elements of trafficking under s 5(1)(a). Ramesh a/l Perumal v Public Prosecutor and another appeal supplied the elements of possession for the purpose of trafficking under s 5(1)(a) read with s 5(2). The court used these authorities not as background references but as the legal structure for deciding the issues before it. (Para 26, Para 81)

"In Sulaiman bin Jumari v Public Prosecutor [2021] 1 SLR 557 at [39], the Court of Appeal reaffirmed the two-stage test for determining the voluntariness of a statement" — Per Audrey Lim J, Para 26

For trafficking, the judge stated that the Prosecution had to prove the act of trafficking in a controlled drug without authorisation and knowledge of the nature of the controlled drug. That formulation was then applied to Kishor’s delivery of the grey bag and the black bundles, the handphone messages, and the court’s rejection of his explanation that he thought the bundles contained stones or ice. The authority therefore functioned as the legal bridge between the facts and the conviction. (Para 81, Para 94, Para 97)

For possession for trafficking, the judge stated that the Prosecution had to prove possession, knowledge, and purpose of trafficking. That formulation was applied to Pung after the court admitted his statements and rejected his inducement argument. The authority mattered because it clarified that possession alone was not enough; the court had to be satisfied that the possession was for trafficking and that the accused knew the nature of the drug. (Para 81, Para 62)

Why Did the Court Accept the Testimony of the CNB Officers and the Interpreter Over Pung’s Account?

The court’s credibility findings were decisive. The judge accepted IO Yip’s evidence that no conversation took place in which Pung was told to say “bai fen” or “du pin”, and accepted Ee’s evidence that he did not hear Pung complain to IO Yip and that IO Yip did not make any TIP during the recording of any statement. Those findings directly undermined Pung’s claim that the statements were tainted by inducement. (Para 44)

"I accepted IO Yip’s evidence that no such conversation took place. Ee likewise testified that there was no such conversation, that he did not hear Pung complain to IO Yip, and that IO Yip did not make any TIP to Pung during the recording of any of the statements." — Per Audrey Lim J, Para 44

The judge’s reasoning was not limited to a bare preference for prosecution witnesses. The court also considered the internal coherence of Pung’s own evidence and found that he could not maintain a consistent story about how the statements were produced. That inconsistency made his allegation of inducement less credible, especially when set against the contemporaneous recording process and the testimony of the officers and interpreter. (Para 62)

As a result, the court concluded that the statements were both voluntary and accurately recorded. This dual finding mattered because it allowed the court to rely on the statements as substantive evidence of Pung’s knowledge and possession, rather than treating them as unreliable or inadmissible material. (Para 62)

"In the round, I was satisfied that the Prosecution had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the 1st to 7th Statements were voluntarily made and recorded what Pung had said." — Per Audrey Lim J, Para 62

How Did the Court Resolve the Sentencing Consequences Under s 33B of the MDA?

Sentencing turned on the statutory courier regime. The judge found that Kishor’s and Pung’s roles were limited to that of a courier. However, the consequences diverged because the Prosecution did not issue Kishor with a certificate of substantive assistance under s 33B(2)(b), whereas it did issue such a certificate to Pung. The court therefore had no discretion to avoid the mandatory death sentence for Kishor, but could impose life imprisonment on Pung. (Para 4)

"As the Prosecution did not issue Kishor with a certificate of substantive assistance under s 33B(2)(b) of the MDA, I passed the mandatory death sentence on him. I imposed the alternative sentence of life imprisonment on Pung as the Prosecution had issued Pung with a certificate of substantive assistance." — Per Audrey Lim J, Para 4

The judge’s sentencing analysis was therefore entirely statutory. It did not depend on mitigation in the ordinary sense, but on whether the statutory preconditions for avoiding the death penalty were met. The court’s finding that both accused were couriers was necessary but not sufficient for leniency; the certificate of substantive assistance was the decisive factor. (Para 4)

This aspect of the judgment illustrates the operation of s 33B in practice. Even where the court accepts that an accused played only a courier role, the availability of the alternative sentence depends on the Prosecution’s certificate. The case thus demonstrates the limited but crucial role of judicial discretion in capital drug cases under the MDA. (Para 4)

Why Does This Case Matter?

This case matters because it shows how a court in a capital drug prosecution evaluates both statement admissibility and drug-knowledge evidence in a single trial. The judgment demonstrates that a challenge to recorded statements will fail where the court accepts the officers’ and interpreter’s evidence and finds the accused’s account inconsistent. It also shows how handphone records and the surrounding pattern of communications can be used to infer drug-related dealings and rebut an innocent explanation. (Para 44, Para 62, Para 97)

The case is also significant for sentencing under the MDA. It illustrates the practical operation of the courier exception and the certificate of substantive assistance regime under s 33B. Even where the court finds that an accused was only a courier, the absence or presence of a certificate can determine whether the sentence is death or life imprisonment. That makes the case important for practitioners advising clients in capital drug matters. (Para 4)

Finally, the judgment is a useful example of how the High Court applies established appellate authority to concrete facts. The court expressly used the voluntariness test from Sulaiman, the trafficking elements from Saravanan Chandaram, and the possession-for-trafficking elements from Ramesh. The case therefore serves as a compact but important illustration of doctrinal application in a serious criminal trial. (Para 26, Para 81)

Cases Referred To

Legislation Referenced

• Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed): s 5(1)(a) (Para 2, Para 81)
• Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed): s 5(2) (Para 2, Para 81)
• Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed): s 17(c) (Para 6)
• Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed): s 18(2) (Para 94)
• Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed): s 33(1) (Para 2, Para 4)
• Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed): s 33B(1)(a) (Para 4)
• Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed): s 33B(2)(b) (Para 4)
• Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed): Second Schedule (Para 4)
• Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed): s 22 (Para 5)
• Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed): s 23 (Para 6)

Source Documents

• Original Judgment — Singapore Courts
• Archived Copy (PDF) — Litt Law CDN

This article analyses [2022] SGHC 27 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.