Case Details
- Citation: [2011] SGCA 19
- Case Number: Civil Appeal No 137 of 2010
- Decision Date: 27 April 2011
- Court: Court of Appeal of the Republic of Singapore
- Coram: Chan Sek Keong CJ; Chao Hick Tin JA; Kan Ting Chiu J
- Title: PT Makindo (formerly known as PT Makindo TBK) v Aperchance Co Ltd and others
- Plaintiff/Applicant: PT Makindo (formerly known as PT Makindo TBK)
- Defendant/Respondent: Aperchance Co Ltd and others
- Parties’ Roles (as relevant): The 1st Respondent was the plaintiff in the earlier suit; the Appellant was the defendant in that earlier suit.
- Judges: Chan Sek Keong CJ; Chao Hick Tin JA; Kan Ting Chiu J
- Counsel for Appellant: Chandra Mohan s/o Rethnam, Mabelle Tay Jiahui and Gillian Hauw (Rajah & Tann LLP)
- Counsel for Respondents: Davinder Singh SC, Alecia Quah and Nabil Mustafiz (Drew & Napier LLC)
- Legal Area: Contempt of court (public misrepresentation of court orders; scandalising the court)
- Related High Court Decision: PT Makindo (formerly known as PT Makindo TBK) v Aperchance Co Ltd and others [2010] 4 SLR 954
- Prior Proceedings (high-level): Suit No 1149 of 2003; worldwide Mareva injunction obtained ex parte; set aside on 27 February 2004
- Judgment Length: 5 pages, 2,359 words (as provided)
- Cases Cited (as provided): [2011] SGCA 19 (self); Dunn v Bevan; Brodie v Bevan [1922] 1 Ch 276; R v Parke [1903] 2 KB 432; Re Bineet Kumar Singh AIR 2001 SC 2018; Tobacco Institute of Australia Limited v Australian Federation of Consumer Organisations Inc (No 2) (1993) 41 FCR 89
- Statutes Referenced (as provided): Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2006 Rev Ed) — O 52 r 2(2)
Summary
In PT Makindo (formerly known as PT Makindo TBK) v Aperchance Co Ltd and others, the Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal against the High Court’s refusal to cite the respondents for contempt of court. The contempt allegation arose from the respondents’ publication of advertisements in Indonesian newspapers that purported to show an “impeding and blockage” of the appellant’s assets “pursuant to” a Singapore High Court judgment and order. The appellant argued that the advertisements were misleading because the underlying worldwide Mareva injunction had been set aside on 27 February 2004, and that the respondents had also failed to comply with a court order requiring service of the setting-aside order on relevant parties.
The Court of Appeal accepted that the advertisements were false and misleading as at the time of publication. However, it held that the legal threshold for contempt was not met. The court’s central reasoning was that misrepresentation of a court order, without more, does not interfere with the administration of justice once the relevant proceedings have ended; rather, the appropriate contempt category would be limited to “scandalising the court” or attacks on the integrity of the judiciary. Since the advertisements did not impugn the conduct of the court or the integrity of the judiciary, they could not amount to contempt on that basis. The court therefore upheld the High Court’s dismissal.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
The appellant, PT Makindo (formerly known as PT Makindo TBK), is an Indonesian investment bank. The first respondent, Aperchance Co Ltd, is a company incorporated in Hong Kong. The second and third respondents were the only directors and shareholders of the first respondent, and they were based in Singapore. The dispute originated in earlier Singapore litigation concerning repayment of a large sum of money.
On 22 November 2003, the first respondent commenced Suit No 1149 of 2003 against the appellant and three other defendants for repayment of US$126 million. On 24 November 2003, the first respondent obtained an ex parte worldwide Mareva injunction against the defendants. This type of injunction is designed to restrain a defendant from dealing with assets to prevent frustration of a judgment. However, on 27 February 2004, the worldwide Mareva injunction was set aside by the High Court on jurisdictional grounds: the court held it had no jurisdiction over the appellant and the other defendants in Suit 1149/2003.
Following the setting aside, the High Court ordered the first respondent to pay the costs of the defendants and to serve the court order (the “27 February 2004 Court Order”) on all parties who had earlier been notified of the worldwide Mareva injunction. Importantly, the first respondent did not appeal the 27 February 2004 Court Order. It complied by informing relevant parties on 5 March 2004 that the worldwide Mareva injunction had been set aside, and by paying costs in September 2009.
Despite this, between 7 and 11 January 2010, the first respondent placed advertisements in five major Indonesian newspapers, including Bisnis Indonesia, Kompas and Kontan. The advertisements contained a translated statement headed “IMPEDING AND BLOCKAGE” and referred to the appellant and other individuals, stating that their assets/capital were impeded and blocked “all over the world pursuant to the judgment of the Singapore High Court” in the Suit 1149/2003 matter. The appellant later learned that the worldwide Mareva injunction had already been discharged on 27 February 2004, making the advertisements misleading at the time of publication.
The appellant, through solicitors, wrote to the respondents on 11 and 20 January 2010 protesting the publication and indicating it would seek “substantial damages and reliefs”. The appellant also requested confirmation whether the respondents had authorised the advertisements. The respondents ignored these requests. The appellant then applied ex parte for leave to commence committal proceedings for contempt of court, and leave was granted. The High Court subsequently dismissed the application, and the appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The Court of Appeal framed the appeal as turning on a single substantive issue: whether, in the circumstances, the respondents could be liable for contempt of court for publicly misrepresenting the nature or substance of the 27 February 2004 Court Order. While the appellant raised multiple arguments, the court treated this as the material question.
More specifically, the legal issue was whether misrepresenting a discharged or set-aside court order through public advertisements could constitute contempt. The appellant’s position was that the advertisements falsely suggested that the appellant’s assets were still frozen pursuant to a Singapore court order, thereby frustrating the effect of the setting-aside decision and harming the appellant’s commercial reputation. The appellant also argued that the respondents had effectively “resurrected” an order that had been set aside and that this should be treated as contempt.
In contrast, the respondents and the High Court had taken the view that contempt was not made out because the advertisements did not scandalise the court or interfere with the administration of justice. The Court of Appeal therefore had to determine the proper scope of contempt in the context of misrepresentation after the underlying proceedings had ended.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
The Court of Appeal began by addressing the appellant’s reliance on Dunn v Bevan; Brodie v Bevan [1922] 1 Ch 276. The appellant argued that Dunn v Bevan was concerned only with the risk of prejudicing ongoing proceedings and should not be read broadly to exclude contempt where administration of justice could be affected after proceedings ended. The appellant also emphasised that Dunn v Bevan involved an injunction to restrain circulars, rather than an application to cite for contempt.
The Court of Appeal rejected the appellant’s understanding of Dunn v Bevan. It treated Dunn v Bevan as establishing a principled limitation: misrepresentation of a court order cannot interfere with the administration of justice. The court relied on the reasoning of Wills J in R v Parke [1903] 2 KB 432, which used a metaphor of “poisoning the fountain of justice” before it flows, but not being able to poison it once the stream has ceased. In other words, where the relevant proceedings have ended, the administration of justice is not interfered with in the same way as during the pendency of proceedings.
The Court of Appeal then considered the appellant’s attempt to distinguish Dunn v Bevan on factual and legal grounds. The appellant argued that in Dunn v Bevan, the circulars misrepresented proceedings where no order of court was made, whereas in the present case there was an actual order that had been set aside. The appellant further contended that the advertisements misled the public into believing the appellant’s assets were frozen pursuant to a subsisting Singapore order, and that the respondents had fabricated or falsely represented the existence of such an order. The appellant also invoked comparative authority, including Re Bineet Kumar Singh AIR 2001 SC 2018, where the Indian Supreme Court held that using a fabricated court order could amount to contempt.
Despite these arguments, the Court of Appeal held that the appellant’s submissions demonstrated a misunderstanding of the law. The court’s key point was that the misrepresentation of a court order, even if false, does not fall within contempt as interference with the administration of justice. The court acknowledged that public confidence can be undermined at any time by baseless attacks on the integrity or impartiality of courts and judges. However, that is a different species of contempt—namely, scandalising the court or attacking the judiciary as an institution.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeal treated “scandalising the court” as the relevant contempt category. It reasoned that the advertisements would only amount to contempt if they amounted to scandalising the court. The court concluded they could not possibly do so because they carried no suggestion about the conduct of the court. In other words, the advertisements did not attack the judiciary’s integrity, impartiality, or independence; they merely misrepresented the status of an injunction or order. That distinction mattered: contempt is not a general remedy for misleading statements about litigation outcomes, particularly where the statements do not impugn the court itself.
The Court of Appeal also addressed the appellant’s reliance on Australian authority, including Tobacco Institute of Australia Limited v Australian Federation of Consumer Organisations Inc (No 2) (1993) 41 FCR 89, where the court emphasised that the public should not be misled by statements attributed to the court and used out of context. The Court of Appeal did not accept that this supported a broader contempt jurisdiction in Singapore in the circumstances of the case. It maintained that the misrepresentation alleged here did not interfere with the administration of justice and therefore could not ground contempt.
While the judgment text provided is truncated after the discussion of scandalising the court, the overall structure of the Court of Appeal’s reasoning is clear: (1) contempt for misrepresentation is constrained by the principle that once proceedings have ended, misstatements do not interfere with the administration of justice; (2) the only remaining contempt pathway would be scandalising the court, which requires an attack on the court’s integrity or conduct; and (3) the advertisements did not meet that threshold.
What Was the Outcome?
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and upheld the High Court’s decision to dismiss the appellant’s application to cite the respondents for contempt of court. The practical effect was that the appellant could not pursue committal proceedings for contempt based on the advertisements.
The court also ordered costs against the appellant, consistent with its earlier dismissal of the appeal at the conclusion of the hearing. The decision leaves open that the appellant may pursue ordinary civil remedies (such as defamation or other claims) if the advertisements caused reputational or commercial harm, but contempt was not the appropriate procedural vehicle on these facts.
Why Does This Case Matter?
This case is significant for practitioners because it clarifies the boundaries of contempt of court in Singapore where the alleged wrongdoing consists of public misrepresentation of court orders. The Court of Appeal’s reasoning underscores that contempt is not a catch-all response to misleading statements about litigation. Instead, contempt for misrepresentation is tightly linked to interference with the administration of justice or to scandalising the court.
For lawyers advising clients who publish information about litigation—whether in media statements, advertisements, or other public communications—PT Makindo highlights the importance of distinguishing between (a) misleading or false statements that may give rise to ordinary causes of action and (b) statements that attack the judiciary or interfere with the administration of justice. Even where the underlying order has been set aside and the public is misled, the contempt jurisdiction may not be engaged unless the statements impugn the court itself or otherwise fall within the recognised categories of contempt.
From a strategic perspective, the decision also signals that courts will scrutinise applications for contempt carefully, particularly where the underlying proceedings are long concluded. The court’s reliance on Dunn v Bevan and the “fountain/stream” metaphor suggests that timing and the status of the underlying proceedings are relevant to whether the administration of justice is capable of being interfered with. Practitioners should therefore consider alternative remedies—such as defamation, injunctive relief, or claims for misrepresentation—when the alleged harm is reputational or commercial rather than institutional.
Legislation Referenced
- Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2006 Rev Ed) — O 52 r 2(2)
Cases Cited
- [2011] SGCA 19 (PT Makindo (formerly known as PT Makindo TBK) v Aperchance Co Ltd and others)
- PT Makindo (formerly known as PT Makindo TBK) v Aperchance Co Ltd and others [2010] 4 SLR 954
- Dunn v Bevan; Brodie v Bevan [1922] 1 Ch 276
- R v Parke [1903] 2 KB 432
- Re Bineet Kumar Singh AIR 2001 SC 2018
- Tobacco Institute of Australia Limited v Australian Federation of Consumer Organisations Inc (No 2) (1993) 41 FCR 89
Source Documents
This article analyses [2011] SGCA 19 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.