Statute Details
- Title: Protection from Scams Act 2025
- Act Code: PSA2025
- Type: Act of Parliament
- Number: No. 1 of 2025
- Commencement Date: 1 July 2025 (date appointed by Minister by notification in the Gazette)
- Status: Current version as at 27 Mar 2026
- Long Title (substance): Empowers specified officers to issue restriction orders to banks in Singapore prohibiting certain bank transactions and the grant and use of credit facilities temporarily
- Structure: Part 1 (Preliminary), Part 2 (Restriction Orders), Part 3 (Appeals), Part 4 (Miscellaneous), plus a Schedule
- Key Provisions (from metadata): ss. 1–11; Schedule (scam offences)
What Is This Legislation About?
The Protection from Scams Act 2025 (“PSA 2025”) is a targeted, time-sensitive legislative response to the operational reality of scams: victims are often manipulated into transferring money or obtaining credit quickly, sometimes within minutes or hours. The Act’s core policy is to interrupt that flow of funds and credit by empowering enforcement officers to impose immediate restrictions on banks.
In plain terms, the PSA 2025 creates a legal mechanism for “restriction orders” directed at banks. These orders can prohibit certain transactions and can also restrict the grant and use of credit facilities for a period. The aim is to protect a “scam victim” by preventing further financial harm while investigations and enforcement actions proceed.
The Act is designed to be practical for both enforcement and banking operations. It defines key terms (including “bank account” in the context of a scam victim, “credit facility”, and “remote communication”), identifies who may act (“specified officers”), and provides procedural safeguards through an appeals framework and immunity provisions for compliance.
What Are the Key Provisions?
1) Definitions and interpretive framework (Part 1: ss. 1–2)
The Act begins with a short title and commencement provision (s. 1). Section 2 then supplies the interpretive backbone for the restriction-order regime. Several definitions are particularly important for practitioners:
- “Bank” is tied to the Banking Act 1970, ensuring the PSA 2025 applies to banks in Singapore as legally defined.
- “Bank account” is defined broadly for scam contexts: it includes accounts held in the scam victim’s name, and also accounts held jointly where at least one account holder is the scam victim. This matters because scams frequently involve joint accounts, nominees, or accounts used to receive proceeds.
- “Credit facility” is defined to include advances, loans, and other facilities granted by a bank to an individual that provide access to funds or financial guarantees, as well as other liabilities incurred by a bank on behalf of an individual. This definition is crucial because the Act is not limited to debit transfers; it can also affect credit-based harm.
- “Remote communication” is defined expansively to cover Internet, telephone/other communication devices, television/radio, and other electronic or technological means. The definition also allows the Minister to exclude specific systems or methods by order in the Gazette, giving regulatory flexibility.
- “Scam offence” is not left open-ended: it is defined as any offence specified in the Schedule. This is a legislative “gate” that limits the Act’s reach to enumerated scam-related offences.
- “Scammer” is defined in a way that focuses on the officer’s belief and the scammer’s interaction with the victim via remote communication. It covers persons who have committed, participated in, facilitated, or taken preparatory steps in furtherance of a scam offence, whether in Singapore or elsewhere, and who have interacted with the scam victim via remote communication for those purposes.
- “Specified officer” includes a police officer under the Police Force Act 2004 and a Commercial Affairs Officer appointed under that Act. This matters for validity and internal governance: only these officers can trigger the restriction-order process.
2) Restriction orders: meaning, scope, and issuance (Part 2: ss. 3–4)
Part 2 establishes the operational tool. Section 3 explains the meaning and scope of “restriction orders”. While the extract provided does not reproduce the full text of ss. 3–6, the long title and the Act’s structure indicate that restriction orders are directed to banks and can prohibit:
- Certain bank transactions (i.e., preventing movement of funds that would otherwise enable scam proceeds to be withdrawn, transferred, or otherwise dissipated); and
- The grant and use of credit facilities (i.e., preventing the victim from obtaining or drawing down credit that would exacerbate losses).
Section 4 then addresses issue of restriction orders. Practically, this provision is the legal “trigger” that allows specified officers to act when they have grounds to believe a scam offence is being committed or intended. For counsel, the key legal questions typically include: what evidential threshold applies, what information must be stated in the order, and how the order identifies the relevant bank(s) and account(s). Even without the full text in the extract, the Act’s definitions and policy design signal that the order will be tied to the scam victim’s bank account(s) and the relevant scam offence category in the Schedule.
3) Duration, cancellation, variation, and extension (s. 5)
Section 5 governs the lifecycle of restriction orders. This is a critical safeguard and a practical banking issue: banks need certainty about when restrictions start and end, and victims need clarity about when normal banking activity can resume.
In typical restriction-order regimes, the law will provide for an initial duration, and then allow cancellation (e.g., if the basis no longer exists), variation (e.g., narrowing the scope), or extension (e.g., where investigations require continued protection). For practitioners, the key is to treat s. 5 as both a procedural protection and a litigation/compliance roadmap: it determines how long the bank must hold the line and what steps may be taken to adjust or terminate restrictions.
4) Offence for contravention and composition (s. 6)
Section 6 creates an offence of contravening a restriction order and provides for composition of the offence. This indicates that the Act expects strict compliance by those subject to restriction orders—most notably banks, but potentially also other persons who may be involved in circumventing restrictions.
For legal advisers, this provision is important in two ways. First, it underscores that restriction orders are not merely administrative directions; they carry penal consequences. Second, the inclusion of “composition” suggests a mechanism for resolving certain contraventions without full prosecution, which can be relevant for compliance failures, operational mistakes, or disputes about scope.
5) Appeals and designation of appropriate officers (Part 3: ss. 7–8)
Part 3 provides a structured route to challenge restriction orders. Section 7 addresses appeals against restriction orders, while s. 8 provides for designation of appropriate officers to hear appeals. This is a key procedural fairness element: even where immediate action is necessary to prevent harm, the law must allow affected parties to contest the basis, scope, or continuation of restrictions.
In practice, appeals may be brought by persons whose accounts or credit facilities are restricted, and/or by banks depending on how the order is framed and who is considered “affected”. Counsel should focus on: (i) appeal timelines, (ii) the standard of review, (iii) whether the restriction order remains in force pending appeal, and (iv) what evidence can be adduced. These details will determine strategy—particularly where a victim needs urgent access to funds for legitimate purposes.
6) Immunity for complying with restriction orders (s. 9)
Section 9 provides immunity for complying with restriction orders. This is designed to protect banks and officers from liability when they act in good faith to comply with a lawful restriction order. For banks, this is essential: compliance often requires freezing or blocking transactions, and without immunity, banks could face civil or regulatory exposure for acting defensively.
For practitioners, immunity provisions are often the hinge between enforcement effectiveness and risk management. The scope of immunity (e.g., whether it covers negligence, what “good faith” means, and whether it excludes wilful misconduct) will be central when advising banks on compliance protocols and when responding to claims by affected customers.
7) Amendment of Schedule and regulations (ss. 10–11)
Section 10 allows amendment of the Schedule, which lists “scam offences”. This is important because scam typologies evolve. The ability to amend the Schedule enables the law to keep pace with new offence categories without waiting for a full legislative overhaul.
Section 11 empowers the making of regulations. Regulations typically cover operational details: procedural requirements, forms, service methods, and banking implementation rules. For lawyers, regulations are often where the “how” is found—so practitioners should monitor subsidiary legislation once the Act is in force.
8) The Schedule: “Scam offences”
The Schedule identifies the specific offences that qualify as “scam offences” for PSA 2025 purposes. This is a limiting device: the restriction-order power is tied to enumerated offences, not to a general concept of “scam” alone. Practically, this means that the legal basis for a restriction order will depend on how the underlying conduct is characterised under the relevant criminal provisions listed in the Schedule.
How Is This Legislation Structured?
The PSA 2025 is organised into four Parts plus a Schedule:
- Part 1 (ss. 1–2): Preliminary provisions—short title, commencement, and definitions.
- Part 2 (ss. 3–6): Restriction orders—meaning/scope, issuance, duration and lifecycle, and offences for contravention (including composition).
- Part 3 (ss. 7–8): Appeals—how appeals are made and who hears them.
- Part 4 (ss. 9–11): Miscellaneous—immunity for compliance, amendment of the Schedule, and regulations.
- Schedule: Enumerates “scam offences” that activate the Act’s restriction-order framework.
Who Does This Legislation Apply To?
The PSA 2025 is principally aimed at protecting scam victims—individuals against whom a scam offence is committed or intended. The Act also necessarily affects banks in Singapore, because restriction orders are directed to banks and require them to prohibit certain transactions and restrict credit facilities.
Operationally, the Act applies through the actions of specified officers (police officers and Commercial Affairs Officers). It also contemplates participation by parties who may be affected by restriction orders through the appeals process. While the extract does not specify every procedural participant, the structure indicates that both victims and banks may have roles in compliance and challenge.
Why Is This Legislation Important?
The PSA 2025 is significant because it shifts anti-scam enforcement from a purely post-incident model to a real-time financial disruption model. Scams often succeed because funds can be moved instantly. By enabling restriction orders, the Act creates a legal basis for banks to act quickly to prevent further loss.
For practitioners, the Act’s value lies in its combination of (i) broad, operationally relevant definitions (especially around “bank account”, “credit facility”, and “remote communication”), (ii) a structured restriction-order lifecycle (including variation and extension), and (iii) procedural safeguards (appeals) and risk controls (immunity for compliance). Together, these features aim to balance victim protection with legal accountability.
From an enforcement and compliance perspective, the offence provision for contravention and the immunity for compliance are both critical. They create strong incentives for banks to implement restriction orders faithfully, while also shielding them from liability when acting within the legal framework. For counsel advising banks, victims, or investigators, the PSA 2025 will likely require close coordination with internal banking controls, escalation procedures, and evidence management for any subsequent appeal.
Related Legislation
- Banking Act 1970
- Police Force Act 2004
- Scams Act 2025
Source Documents
This article provides an overview of the Protection from Scams Act 2025 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the official text for authoritative provisions.