PETROCHINA INTERNATIONAL (SINGAPORE) PTE. LTD. v Owner and/or Demise Charterer of the vessel OCEAN WINNER (IMO No. 9242479)

"For the reasons set out in this judgment, I am of the view that the filing of the Writs does not come within the meaning of ss 211B(8)(c) and 211B(8)(d) of the CA. As such, no leave of court was required to file the Writs. Consequently, there is no basis to set aside or strike out the Writs." — Per Ang Cheng Hock J, Para 94

Case Information

• Citation: [2021] SGHC 8 (Para 0)
• Court: General Division of the High Court of the Republic of Singapore (Para 0)
• Date of hearing: 12 October 2020; date of judgment: 15 January 2021 (Para 0)
• Coram: Ang Cheng Hock J (Para 0)
• Counsel for the plaintiff: Tan Poh Ling Wendy, Tang Yuan Jonathan, Kelley Wong Kar Ee (Morgan Lewis Stamford LLC) (Para 0)
• Counsel for the defendant: Lee Eng Beng SC, Ng Hui Ping Sheila, Ting Yong Hong, Ho Qi Rui Daniel (Rajah & Tann Singapore LLP) (Para 0)
• Case numbers: Admiralty in Rem No 86 of 2020 (Summons No 1912 of 2020); Admiralty in Rem No 87 of 2020 (Summons No 1913 of 2020); Admiralty in Rem No 88 of 2020 (Summons No 1914 of 2020); Admiralty in Rem No 89 of 2020 (Summons No 1915 of 2020) (Para 0)
• Area of law: Admiralty law; insolvency moratorium under scheme of arrangement; statutory interpretation (Paras 3, 20, 42)
• Judgment length: Not answerable from the extraction (not stated in the provided material) (Not answerable)

Summary

This decision concerned four admiralty in rem writs filed by PetroChina International (Singapore) Pte Ltd against vessels demise chartered by Ocean Tankers (Pte) Ltd, while Ocean Tankers was already within the automatic moratorium regime triggered by a scheme of arrangement application. The judicial managers of Ocean Tankers contended that the writs were filed in breach of the moratorium and should be set aside or struck out. The court rejected that contention and held that the filing of the writs did not fall within the statutory prohibitions in s 211B(8)(c) or s 211B(8)(d) of the Companies Act. (Paras 1, 6, 8, 11, 94)

The court’s reasoning turned on the nature of an admiralty in rem action. It held that the filing of such a writ merely creates a statutory lien and does not itself amount to the commencement of “proceedings” against the company, because the action is directed against the res, not the company. It also held that the filing of the writ is not “execution, distress or other legal process” against the company’s property, because those words connote enforcement steps, whereas filing the writ is only the first step in obtaining security. (Paras 65, 77, 94)

Accordingly, the summonses to set aside or strike out the writs were dismissed. The court reserved the issue of costs for separate hearing. The judgment is significant because it clarifies the interaction between scheme moratoria and admiralty practice, especially where maritime claimants seek to preserve their position by filing in rem writs before service or arrest. (Paras 94, 96, 3)

Why Did PetroChina File Admiralty In Rem Writs Against Vessels Demise Chartered by OTPL?

The dispute arose because PetroChina filed four admiralty in rem writs on 22 April 2020 against four vessels that had been demise chartered by Ocean Tankers (Pte) Ltd. The writs were filed after OTPL and another related company had already applied for moratorium relief under s 211B(1) of the Companies Act. The judicial managers later challenged the writs on the basis that they were filed during the automatic moratorium period and therefore required leave of court. (Paras 1, 6, 8, 11)

The court described the applications as raising “fundamental questions” about the interaction between insolvency law and admiralty law, particularly the extent to which scheme moratoria constrain maritime claimants’ ability to protect their interests. That framing is important because the case was not about service, arrest, or enforcement of the writs; it was about whether the mere filing of the writs was itself prohibited. (Para 3)

"These Summonses thus raise fundamental questions regarding the interaction between insolvency law and admiralty law, including, in particular, the extent to which the protections afforded by the statutory moratoria for schemes of arrangement conflict with the ability of maritime claimants to protect their interests." — Per Ang Cheng Hock J, Para 3

On the facts, the writs had not been served on the vessels when the applications were heard, and OTPL discovered them only after a cause book search. That factual setting mattered because the court’s analysis focused on what legal effect, if any, attached to filing alone. (Paras 14, 65, 77)

What Were the Key Facts and Procedural Steps Leading to the Summonses?

The chronology was central to the dispute. On 17 April 2020, OTPL and HLT filed applications for moratorium relief under s 211B(1) of the Companies Act. Four days later, on 22 April 2020, PetroChina filed the four admiralty in rem writs. On 8 May 2020, OTPL entered appearance in the four actions and filed the present summonses seeking to set aside or strike out the writs under the Rules of Court. (Paras 6, 8, 11)

The court also noted that none of the writs had been served on the vessels by the time the applications were brought. That fact supported the court’s later conclusion that the filing of the writs was not an enforcement step against property, but rather a procedural act that created a statutory lien. (Paras 14, 77)

"On 17 April 2020, OTPL and HLT (represented by the same law firm) filed Originating Summons No 406 of 2020 (“OS 406”) and Originating Summons No 405 of 2020 (“OS 405”) respectively for moratorium relief pursuant to s 211B(1) of the CA (“s 211B moratorium”)." — Per Ang Cheng Hock J, Para 6

"On 22 April 2020, PetroChina filed the Writs for ADM 86–89." — Per Ang Cheng Hock J, Para 8

"On 8 May 2020, OTPL entered an appearance in ADM 86–89 and filed the Summonses to set aside or strike out the Writs under O 12 r 7(1) and/or O 18 r 19(1) of the Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed) (“ROC”)." — Per Ang Cheng Hock J, Para 11

The court also recorded that OTPL discovered the writs only after a cause book search was conducted in respect of the vessels. That detail reinforced the point that the writs had not yet been served and that the issue before the court was the legal character of filing itself. (Para 14)

"None of the Writs has been served on the Vessels to date. OTPL discovered the Writs after a cause book search was conducted in respect of the Vessels." — Per Ang Cheng Hock J, Para 14

How Did the Parties Frame the Core Dispute Over the Moratorium?

OTPL’s position was that an admiralty in rem writ is procedurally an action against the vessel, but substantively the true defendant is the owner and/or demise charterer. On that basis, OTPL argued that the writs were “proceedings” commenced against OTPL within s 211B(8)(c), and therefore could not be filed without leave of court. OTPL also relied on the proposition that the writs were legal process against property of OTPL. (Para 17)

PetroChina’s response was that the filing of the writs was not caught by the automatic moratorium because an admiralty in rem action is against the res, not the company, and because filing a writ is not “execution, distress or other legal process” within s 211B(8)(d). PetroChina therefore maintained that no leave was required. (Para 18)

"OTPL submits that, while the in rem writ is procedurally an action against the res (i.e., the vessel), the true defendant of the action is the owner and/or the demise charterer of the vessel. Consequently, OTPL submits that the Writs are “proceedings” commenced against OTPL, who is the demise charterer, within the meaning of s 211B(8)(c) of the CA and as such the Writs could not be filed except with leave of court." — Per Ang Cheng Hock J, Para 17

"PetroChina submits that the filing of the Writs was not caught by the s 211B automatic moratorium because ss 211B(8)(c)–211B(8)(d) of the CA did not apply to bar the filing of the Writs without leave of court. Section 211B(8)(c) of the CA did not apply because an admiralty in rem writ is an action against the res, not the company." — Per Ang Cheng Hock J, Para 18

The court’s task was therefore to determine whether filing the writs fell within either of the two statutory limbs relied on by OTPL. It framed those as the two main issues for determination. (Para 20)

What Were the Two Main Statutory Questions the Court Had to Decide?

The court identified two main issues. First, whether filing the admiralty in rem writs was the commencement of “proceedings” against OTPL under s 211B(8)(c). Second, whether filing the writs was “execution, distress or other legal process” against property of OTPL under s 211B(8)(d). The judgment also noted that there were possible alternative issues, including whether the writs were void ab initio and whether OTPL was a genuine bareboat charterer, but those were not decided. (Paras 20, 21)

"Two main issues arise for determination in this case. (a) First, was the filing of the admiralty in rem Writs the commencement of “proceedings” against “the company”, OTPL, under s 211B(8)(c) of the CA? (b) Second, was the filing of the admiralty in rem Writs an “execution, distress or other legal process” against “property” of OTPL under s 211B(8)(d) of the CA?" — Per Ang Cheng Hock J, Para 20

The court expressly observed that there were other possible issues, but it did not decide them because the two main statutory questions were sufficient to dispose of the summonses. That disciplined approach matters: the judgment is narrow and focused on the legal effect of filing, not on broader questions about the validity of the underlying maritime claims or the charter structure. (Para 21)

How Did the Court Interpret s 211B(8)(c): Was Filing the Writs the Commencement of “Proceedings” Against OTPL?

The court began with the statutory text and the nature of admiralty in rem proceedings. It accepted that an in rem action is procedurally directed at the vessel, but emphasized that the filing of the writ merely creates the statutory lien and security interest in the ship. Because the writ is filed to secure the claimant’s position against the res, the filing itself is not the commencement of proceedings against the company within the meaning of s 211B(8)(c). (Paras 41, 65, 77)

The court relied on the statutory interpretation framework from Tan Cheng Bock v Attorney-General, namely: ascertain possible interpretations in context, ascertain legislative purpose, and then prefer the interpretation that furthers that purpose. It also referred to the nature of admiralty jurisdiction and the proposition that such jurisdiction is invoked upon service or arrest, whichever is earlier. Those principles supported the conclusion that filing alone is not the commencement of proceedings against the company. (Paras 42, 43, 65)

"First, the court should ascertain the possible interpretations of the statutory provision, having regard not just to the text of the provision but also to the context of that provision within the written law as a whole. Second, the court should ascertain the legislative purpose of the statute. Third, the court should compare the possible interpretations of the provision against the purpose of the statute and prefer the interpretation which furthers the purpose of the written text." — Per Ang Cheng Hock J, Para 42

Applying that framework, the court reasoned that the filing of the writs did not amount to proceedings against OTPL because the writs were not yet served and had not been arrested. The court stressed that the filing step is designed to create the statutory lien, not to enforce a claim against the company. In that sense, the filing is antecedent to any actual proceeding against the company or the res. (Paras 65, 77)

"Viewed in this context, the mere filing of the Writs, which are meant to create the statutory liens on the Vessels, cannot be said to be the commencement of “proceedings” within the meaning of s 211B(8)(c) of the CA." — Per Ang Cheng Hock J, Para 65

The court also considered authorities on admiralty practice, including The Bolbina, The Fierbinti, The Trade Resolve, The Kusu Island, and The Dictator. Those cases were used to explain the nature of in rem proceedings, the creation of statutory liens, and the point at which admiralty jurisdiction is engaged. The court’s conclusion was that the filing of the writs did not trigger the moratorium limb in s 211B(8)(c). (Paras 52–65)

"The filing of the admiralty in rem writ merely creates the statutory lien and, thus, the security interest in the ship. There is no element of enforcement by such a step." — Per Ang Cheng Hock J, Para 77

Why Did the Court Reject the Argument That the Writs Were “Proceedings” Against the Demise Charterer?

OTPL’s argument depended on the proposition that, although an admiralty in rem action is formally against the vessel, the true defendant is the owner or demise charterer. The court did not accept that this characterization altered the statutory analysis. It treated the statutory language as focusing on the legal nature of the step taken, not on the economic or practical identity of the party ultimately interested in the vessel. (Paras 17, 65)

The court’s reasoning was that the filing of the writ is not the commencement of proceedings against the company because the action remains one against the res until service or arrest. The fact that the demise charterer may be the party who ultimately appears or is affected does not transform the filing step into proceedings against the company for the purposes of the moratorium. (Paras 17, 18, 65)

"Section 211B(8)(c) of the CA – which has been repealed and re-enacted as s 64(8)(c) of IRDA (in largely similar terms) – provides:" — Per Ang Cheng Hock J, Para 41

In practical terms, the court drew a distinction between the existence of a claim and the commencement of proceedings. Filing the writ preserves the claimant’s position by creating a lien, but it does not yet amount to the kind of adversarial step against the company that the moratorium is designed to restrain. That distinction was decisive. (Paras 65, 77, 94)

How Did the Court Interpret s 211B(8)(d): Was Filing the Writs “Execution, Distress or Other Legal Process” Against OTPL’s Property?

The second issue concerned whether filing the writs was “execution, distress or other legal process” against property of OTPL. The court held that it was not. It reasoned that the phrase “other legal process” must be read in context with “execution” and “distress,” both of which are enforcement mechanisms. On that basis, the residual phrase covers processes of a similar enforcement character, not the mere filing of an admiralty writ. (Paras 72, 77, 79)

The court applied the ejusdem generis principle and explained that the crucial task is to identify the genus or common thread running through the listed items. Here, the common thread was enforcement against property. Filing a writ to create a statutory lien is not enforcement; it is a preliminary step that secures the claimant’s position. Therefore, it does not fall within the genus. (Paras 79, 77)

"The crucial part of the analysis in determining whether, and if so how, the ejusdem generis principle may be applied is the identification of the “genus” or common thread that runs through all the items in the list that includes the disputed term" — Per Ang Cheng Hock J, Para 79

The court concluded that the filing of the writs did not come within “other legal process” in s 211B(8)(d). It emphasized that there was no element of enforcement in the filing step itself. That conclusion aligned with the earlier finding under s 211B(8)(c), because both limbs were aimed at preventing coercive steps against the company or its property, not the mere preservation of maritime security. (Paras 77, 94)

"In my judgment, therefore, the filing of the Writs does not come within the meaning of “other legal process” in s 211B(8)(d) of the CA." — Per Ang Cheng Hock J, Para 77

What Role Did the Statutory Lien and Admiralty Jurisdiction Play in the Court’s Reasoning?

A central feature of the judgment was the court’s explanation that filing an admiralty in rem writ creates a statutory lien and security interest in the vessel. That is why the court treated filing as a protective step rather than an enforcement step. The lien concept was important because it showed that the claimant is not yet executing against property; it is merely securing a maritime claim in a way recognized by admiralty law. (Paras 65, 77)

The court also referred to the principle that admiralty jurisdiction is invoked upon service or arrest, whichever is earlier. That principle reinforced the distinction between filing and enforcement. If jurisdiction is not fully engaged until service or arrest, then filing alone cannot sensibly be equated with proceedings against the company or legal process against its property for the purposes of the moratorium. (Paras 52–65)

"The filing of the admiralty in rem writ merely creates the statutory lien and, thus, the security interest in the ship. There is no element of enforcement by such a step." — Per Ang Cheng Hock J, Para 77

This analysis also explains why the court was not persuaded by the moratorium argument. The statutory moratorium protects the company from coercive litigation and enforcement, but the filing of an in rem writ is a maritime mechanism for preserving rights against a vessel. The court treated those as conceptually distinct. (Paras 3, 65, 77, 94)

Which Authorities Did the Court Use to Support Its Admiralty Analysis?

The judgment referred to several admiralty authorities to explain the nature of in rem proceedings and the effect of filing. The court cited The Bolbina for the proposition that issuance of an admiralty writ creates a statutory lien and that in rem actions are against the res. It also referred to The Fierbinti for the rule that admiralty jurisdiction is invoked upon service or arrest, whichever is earlier. These authorities were used to anchor the court’s understanding of the procedural and substantive character of the writs. (Paras 52, 53, 77)

The court also referred to The Trade Resolve, The Kusu Island, and The Dictator in discussing admiralty jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in rem and mixed actions. Those cases helped the court situate the present dispute within the established admiralty framework, rather than treating the writ as an ordinary civil process against a company. (Paras 54–58)

"The filing of the admiralty in rem writ merely creates the statutory lien and, thus, the security interest in the ship. There is no element of enforcement by such a step." — Per Ang Cheng Hock J, Para 77

In addition, the court referred to The Hull 308 in the context of winding up and leave requirements, and contrasted that setting with the present scheme moratorium. That comparison mattered because OTPL relied on winding-up authorities to argue that leave was required. The court ultimately treated the scheme moratorium as materially different from the winding-up regime. (Paras 29, 30, 31)

Why Did the Court Distinguish Winding-Up Authorities Such as The Hull 308?

OTPL relied on winding-up authorities, including The Hull 308, to support the proposition that leave is required before an admiralty writ can be filed against a company in insolvency-related circumstances. The court acknowledged those authorities but distinguished them on the basis that they arose in the context of winding up, where the statutory regime and policy considerations differ from those governing a scheme of arrangement moratorium. (Paras 29, 30, 31)

The court noted that in The Hull 308, the Court of Appeal upheld the setting aside of an admiralty in rem writ filed after winding up because the writ had been filed without leave to commence the action under s 262(3) of the Companies Act. That was a different statutory context from the present case, where the question was whether filing alone was prohibited by s 211B(8)(c) or s 211B(8)(d). (Para 29)

"In The Hull 308, the Court of Appeal upheld the High Court’s decision to set aside an admiralty in rem writ filed after the winding up of the company because the writ was filed without obtaining leave to commence the action under s 262(3) of the Companies Act (Cap 50, 1988 Rev Ed)." — Per Ang Cheng Hock J, Para 29

The court also referred to Neo Corp Pte Ltd (under judicial management) v Neocorp Innovations Pte Ltd and another application, and to Re IM Skaugen SE and other matters, to explain the statutory and policy differences between judicial management, schemes of arrangement, and winding up. Those authorities helped the court interpret the moratorium provisions in their proper legislative setting. (Paras 31, 32, 33)

How Did the Court Use the Statutory Interpretation Framework to Reach Its Conclusion?

The court expressly adopted the three-step framework from Tan Cheng Bock v Attorney-General. It first considered the possible interpretations of the statutory provisions in context, then the legislative purpose, and finally which interpretation best furthered that purpose. This method was central to the judgment because the dispute turned on the meaning of “proceedings” and “other legal process” in a moratorium provision. (Para 42)

In applying that framework, the court considered the text of s 211B(8)(c) and (d), the surrounding provisions in the Companies Act and the corresponding IRDA provisions, and the nature of admiralty in rem proceedings. It then concluded that the filing of the writs did not fall within either limb. The court’s reasoning was therefore textually grounded, context-sensitive, and purposive. (Paras 41, 42, 65, 77, 94)

"First, the court should ascertain the possible interpretations of the statutory provision, having regard not just to the text of the provision but also to the context of that provision within the written law as a whole. Second, the court should ascertain the legislative purpose of the statute. Third, the court should compare the possible interpretations of the provision against the purpose of the statute and prefer the interpretation which furthers the purpose of the written text." — Per Ang Cheng Hock J, Para 42

The court also used ejusdem generis to confine “other legal process” to processes similar to execution and distress. That interpretive move was decisive in rejecting the broader reading urged by OTPL. (Paras 79, 77)

What Did the Court Decide About the Alternative Issues Raised by the Parties?

The judgment noted that there were possible alternative issues, including whether the writs were void ab initio and whether OTPL was a genuine bareboat charterer. However, the court did not decide those issues because the two main statutory questions were sufficient to dispose of the summonses. The judgment therefore remains focused on the moratorium question and does not extend to those alternative matters. (Para 21)

That restraint is important for practitioners. The court did not purport to decide the substantive merits of PetroChina’s maritime claims, the validity of the charter arrangements, or whether the writs could be challenged on some other basis. Its holding is narrower: filing the writs was not prohibited by the scheme moratorium provisions invoked by OTPL. (Paras 21, 94)

"For the reasons set out in this judgment, I am of the view that the filing of the Writs does not come within the meaning of ss 211B(8)(c) and 211B(8)(d) of the CA. As such, no leave of court was required to file the Writs. Consequently, there is no basis to set aside or strike out the Writs." — Per Ang Cheng Hock J, Para 94

Because the court resolved the matter on the statutory interpretation of the moratorium provisions, it did not need to reach the alternative grounds. That makes the decision a focused authority on the filing of admiralty writs during a scheme moratorium. (Paras 20, 21, 94)

What Was the Final Order and What Happened to Costs?

The court dismissed the summonses. It held that no leave of court was required to file the writs and that there was therefore no basis to set them aside or strike them out. The court also indicated that it would hear the parties separately on costs. (Paras 94, 96)

"As such, no leave of court was required to file the Writs. Consequently, there is no basis to set aside or strike out the Writs. This is sufficient for me to dismiss the Summonses" — Per Ang Cheng Hock J, Para 94

"I will hear the parties separately on the issue of costs of the applications." — Per Ang Cheng Hock J, Para 96

The result was therefore a complete defeat for OTPL on the summonses, but without a final costs determination in the judgment itself. The court’s order left costs to be addressed separately. (Paras 94, 96)

Why Does This Case Matter for Admiralty Claimants and Insolvency Practitioners?

This case matters because it clarifies that the filing of an admiralty in rem writ during the automatic moratorium period for a scheme of arrangement is not, without more, the commencement of proceedings against the company or legal process against its property. That means maritime claimants may be able to file writs to preserve their position even while a debtor company is under a scheme moratorium, provided they do not cross the line into prohibited enforcement or continuation steps. (Paras 3, 65, 77, 94)

For insolvency practitioners, the decision is equally important because it narrows the reach of the moratorium in the maritime context. The court’s analysis shows that the moratorium is not a blanket prohibition on all procedural steps that may affect the company indirectly. Instead, the statutory language must be read according to the nature of the step taken. Filing a writ to create a statutory lien is not the same as enforcing against property. (Paras 42, 65, 77)

The case also illustrates the importance of understanding the interaction between admiralty law and restructuring law. The court’s reasoning suggests that the protective logic of maritime liens and the protective logic of scheme moratoria can coexist, but only if the statutory language is carefully applied. That makes the decision a useful guide for future disputes involving vessels, demise charterers, and restructuring moratoria. (Paras 3, 41, 42, 94)

Cases Referred To

Legislation Referenced

• Companies Act (Cap 50, 2006 Rev Ed): ss 211B(1), 211B(4)(a), 211B(8)(c), 211B(8)(d), 211B(8)(e), 211B(13), 210(10), 227AA, 227C, 227D, 258, 260, 262(3) (Paras 6, 20, 29, 41, 72)
• Insolvency, Restructuring and Dissolution Act 2018: ss 63–72, 64(8)(c), 64(8)(d), 64(8)(e), 88(1), 95, 96, 129, 130(2), 133(1)(a), 526(1)(b) (Paras 41, 72)
• Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed): O 12 r 7(1), O 18 r 19(1), O 18 r 19(1)(b), O 18 r 19(1)(d), O 46 r 1 (Paras 11, 27, 28)
• High Court (Admiralty Jurisdiction) Act: ss 3, 4(2), 4(3), 4(4) (Paras 52–56)
• Supreme Court of Judicature Act: s 13 (Para 52)
• Distress Act: s 7 (Para 72)

Source Documents

• Original Judgment — Singapore Courts
• Archived Copy (PDF) — Litt Law CDN

This article analyses [2021] SGHC 8 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.