Case Details
- Citation: [2018] SGHC 99
- Title: PCCW Media Limited v M1 Limited & 4 Ors
- Court: High Court of the Republic of Singapore
- Date of Decision: 24 April 2018
- Originating Summons: Originating Summons No 537 of 2017
- Summons: Summons No 3534 of 2017
- Judge: Lee Seiu Kin J
- Hearing Date: 3 August 2017
- Plaintiff/Applicant: PCCW Media Limited
- Defendants/Respondents: M1 Limited & 4 Ors (including My Republic Limited, Singapore Telecommunications Limited, Starhub Ltd, ViewQwest Private Limited, and additional subsidiaries added as parties)
- Legal Area(s): Copyright; Network Service Provider liability and remedies; Injunction/site blocking; Locus standi; Assignment of rights to sue
- Statutes Referenced: Copyright Act (Cap 63) (including ss 193A, 193DDA)
- Cases Cited: [2007] SGDC 248; [2018] SGHC 99
- Judgment Length: 21 pages, 5,418 words
Summary
PCCW Media Limited v M1 Limited & 4 Ors concerned the scope of standing required to apply for a “site blocking” order against network service providers under s 193DDA of the Copyright Act (Cap 63). The plaintiff, PCCW, operated a streaming service (VIU) in Singapore and held non-exclusive licences from Korean broadcasters for certain drama and variety shows. It alleged that multiple online locations were flagrantly infringing by streaming unauthorised copies of those shows.
Although the plaintiff obtained assignment agreements from the Korean broadcasters purporting to transfer to PCCW the right to sue for infringement in Singapore, the High Court held that PCCW did not have locus standi to apply under s 193DDA. The court’s central reasoning was that s 193DDA(1) restricts applications to the “owner or exclusive licensee of copyright in a material”. PCCW was a non-exclusive licensee, and the assignments did not elevate it into the category of “owner” or “exclusive licensee” for the purposes of the statutory remedy.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
The plaintiff, PCCW Media Limited, is a Hong Kong company that operates a content service known as “VIU” in various jurisdictions, including Singapore. VIU provides on-demand streaming of episodes of drama and variety shows. In Singapore, PCCW was licensed (on a non-exclusive basis) to distribute and make available certain drama and variety shows produced by four Korean broadcasters: Seoul Broadcasting System, CJ E&M Corporation, Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation, and Korean Broadcasting System (collectively, “the Korean Broadcasters”).
The defendants were network service providers within the meaning of the Copyright Act. The plaintiff initially commenced proceedings against M1 Limited, My Republic Limited, Singapore Telecommunications Limited, Starhub Ltd, and ViewQwest Private Limited. It later sought leave to add further subsidiaries—M1 Net Ltd, Singnet Pte Ltd, Singtel Mobile Singapore Pte Ltd, Starhub Internet Pte Ltd, and Starhub Online Pte Ltd—because the plaintiff could not initially determine which subsidiaries fell within the statutory definition of network service providers. The court granted leave to add the new defendants, and counsel for the original defendants confirmed representation of the subsidiaries.
PCCW alleged that five “flagrantly infringing online locations” (FIOLs) were using fully qualified domain names to enable users to stream unauthorised copies of episodes of the relevant drama and variety shows. The alleged FIOLs were DramaNice, DramaCool, MyAsianTV, KShowOnline, and KissAsian. The plaintiff obtained confirmation from the Korean Broadcasters that they had never issued copyright licences for those shows to the owners or operators of the alleged FIOLs.
Evidence was adduced suggesting that the FIOLs attracted substantial traffic from Singapore users, with each site receiving between hundreds of thousands and millions of visits in May 2016. Between 17 April 2017 and 19 April 2017, PCCW issued take-down notices to the owners and/or operators of each FIOL. It did not receive responses. PCCW then notified the owners and/or operators that it intended to apply for an order under s 193DDA requiring network service providers to take reasonable steps to disable access to the FIOLs, and commenced the proceedings on 17 May 2017.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The sole question before the High Court was whether PCCW had locus standi to apply for an order under s 193DDA. Section 193DDA(1) empowers the High Court to order a network service provider to take reasonable steps to disable access to a flagrantly infringing online location, but only “on an application made by the owner or exclusive licensee of copyright in a material”. The plaintiff was not an owner of copyright and, on the face of its licensing arrangements, was a non-exclusive licensee.
Accordingly, the legal issue turned on the effect of the assignment agreements PCCW entered into with the Korean Broadcasters. Between 19 August 2016 and 29 September 2016, PCCW entered into four separate assignment agreements with each Korean broadcaster. The assignments purported to transfer to PCCW the right to sue for copyright infringement in Singapore, but limited to the purpose of obtaining the relief under s 193DDA. PCCW argued that this assignment of the right to sue effectively made it the “owner” for the purposes of the enforcement action.
Thus, the court had to decide whether (i) the assignment agreements were of any effect for the statutory standing requirement, and (ii) whether being assigned the right to sue for infringement could convert a non-exclusive licensee into an “owner of copyright” (or otherwise satisfy the “owner or exclusive licensee” threshold) for s 193DDA purposes.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
The court began by framing the statutory architecture. Section 193DDA is part of a legislative scheme that provides a targeted remedy against network service providers where there is “flagrant” online infringement. However, Parliament imposed a standing gatekeeping requirement: the application must be made by the “owner or exclusive licensee of copyright in a material”. This requirement is not merely procedural; it defines who may invoke the extraordinary remedy of network-level disabling measures.
On the facts, PCCW’s position was that it was a licensee of copyright in the relevant drama and variety shows, but the licences were non-exclusive. The court therefore treated PCCW as falling outside the express statutory category of “exclusive licensee”. The plaintiff’s attempt to bridge this gap relied on the assignment agreements. The court examined the nature of what was assigned: the Korean Broadcasters purported to assign to PCCW the right to sue for infringement in Singapore, limited to obtaining orders under s 193DDA in relation to specified websites.
The court’s analysis focused on whether such an assignment could alter PCCW’s legal status for standing purposes. PCCW argued that the assignment of a right to sue for infringement could be valid and that, by virtue of the assignment, PCCW should be treated as effectively the owner for the purposes of the s 193DDA application. The plaintiff relied on commentary and foreign authorities addressing the validity of assignments of bare rights of action, including the “Trendtex exception” concept, which recognises that an assignment of a bare right of action may be valid where the assignee has a genuine commercial interest in the litigation.
However, the High Court’s reasoning did not accept that the standing requirement in s 193DDA could be satisfied by contractual drafting that assigns only the right to sue for the limited purpose of obtaining site-blocking orders. The court treated the statutory wording as controlling: the remedy is available only to the “owner or exclusive licensee of copyright in a material”. An assignee of a limited right to sue, particularly where the underlying licence remains non-exclusive, does not automatically become an “owner” or an “exclusive licensee” within the meaning of the statute. In other words, the court did not treat the assignment of enforcement rights as equivalent to a transfer of ownership or exclusivity in the copyright itself.
In reaching this conclusion, the court effectively distinguished between (a) the ability to contractually arrange who brings proceedings and (b) the specific statutory categories Parliament chose for access to the s 193DDA remedy. Even if the assignment agreements were capable of transferring certain enforcement rights, the court held that PCCW still did not meet the statutory threshold. The standing requirement is designed to ensure that only those with the requisite proprietary or exclusive entitlement can seek network-level disabling orders, which carry significant implications for freedom of access and for network service providers.
Accordingly, the court held that PCCW had no locus standi. The court’s decision turned on statutory interpretation of s 193DDA(1) and the legal effect of the assignments in relation to the standing categories. The court therefore did not grant the site-blocking remedy sought, because the plaintiff was not within the class of applicants authorised by the Act.
What Was the Outcome?
The High Court dismissed PCCW’s application. The practical effect of the decision was that PCCW could not obtain an order under s 193DDA requiring the network service providers to take reasonable steps to disable access to the alleged flagrantly infringing online locations.
More broadly, the decision clarified that contractual assignments of the right to sue—especially when limited to the purpose of obtaining s 193DDA relief—do not necessarily satisfy the statutory standing requirement for applicants. Unless the applicant is an “owner” or an “exclusive licensee” of copyright in the relevant “material”, the court will not entertain an application for the network-service-provider remedy.
Why Does This Case Matter?
This case is significant for practitioners because it addresses a recurring strategy in copyright enforcement: using assignment agreements to obtain standing to seek injunctive relief. The High Court’s decision underscores that s 193DDA(1) is a strict statutory gatekeeping provision. Rights to sue, even if contractually assigned, must still align with the statutory categories of “owner” or “exclusive licensee”.
For rights holders and content platforms, the case highlights the importance of structuring licensing and enforcement arrangements carefully. If a party is only a non-exclusive licensee, it should not assume that an assignment of enforcement rights will automatically confer standing for s 193DDA applications. Instead, parties may need to consider whether they can obtain exclusive licensing arrangements or otherwise ensure they fall within the statutory standing requirements.
For network service providers and defendants, the decision provides a potential threshold defence. Where an applicant’s standing is challenged, the court may focus on the statutory text rather than the commercial rationale behind assignments. This can affect litigation strategy, including early motion practice and the framing of evidence about the nature of the applicant’s copyright entitlement.
Legislation Referenced
- Copyright Act (Cap 63) (2006 Rev Ed), including:Section 193A(1) (definition of “network service provider”)
- Section 193DDA(1) (standing requirement for applications for disabling access orders)
Cases Cited
- [2007] SGDC 248
- [2018] SGHC 99
Source Documents
This article analyses [2018] SGHC 99 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.