PAKIRISAMY RAJOO & Anor v SHEILA DEVI D/O PAKIRISAMY RAJOO

"I found that no good reasons had been furnished for both Mr Singh’s and his clients’ absence. The plaintiffs had failed to show that they had an arguable case with a real prospect of success at trial. Accordingly, I saw no basis to set aside my decision to dismiss the claim in their absence." — Per See Kee Oon J, Para 55

Case Information

• Citation: [2022] SGHC 285 (Para 0)
• Court: General Division of the High Court of the Republic of Singapore (Para 0)
• Date of hearing: 27 October 2022; grounds issued on 9 November 2022 (Para 0)
• Coram: See Kee Oon J (Para 0)
• Case number: Suit No 327 of 2022 (Summons No 3754 of 2022) (Para 0)
• Area of law: Civil Procedure — Setting aside — Dismissal of claim — Absence of plaintiff at trial; Legal Profession — Professional conduct — Duties and responsibilities (Para 0)
• Counsel for the plaintiffs: Mohan Singh s/o Gurdial Singh (S K Kumar Law Practice LLP) and Tan Wei Chieh (Chen Weijie) (Prestige Legal LLP) (instructed) (Para 0)
• Counsel for the defendant: Andrew John Hanam (Andrew LLC) (Para 0)
• Judgment length: Not stated in the extraction (Para 0)

Summary

This was an application by two plaintiffs, husband and wife, to set aside a judgment entered after their claim was dismissed when neither they nor their counsel attended trial. The court recorded at the outset that the plaintiffs had sued their daughter and that the claim had been dismissed because of their absence at trial. The application was brought the same evening after the dismissal, but the court ultimately rejected it. (Para 1) (Para 3) (Para 13)

The central dispute concerned whether the plaintiffs’ absence was excusable because of illness and whether the medical documents they relied on were sufficient. The court found the explanations unconvincing, described the reasons advanced as contrived, and held that the medical certificates were of no assistance because they expressly stated they were not valid for absence from court proceedings. The court also scrutinised counsel’s conduct and found serious professional lapses in the way the non-attendance was handled. (Para 2) (Para 29) (Para 40) (Para 42)

On the merits, the court held that the plaintiffs had not shown an arguable case with a real prospect of success. It found the $60,000 component of the claim to be time-barred under s 6 of the Limitation Act and concluded that the plaintiffs had not produced objective evidence supporting the alleged promissory estoppel claim. The application was dismissed, and costs of $4,000 inclusive of disbursements were ordered against the plaintiffs. (Para 48) (Para 49) (Para 55)

Why did the court refuse to set aside the dismissal entered when the plaintiffs and their counsel failed to attend trial?

The court’s refusal turned first on the absence issue and then on the merits. The judge framed the governing inquiry as whether there were good reasons for the plaintiffs’ and Mr Singh’s absence at trial, whether the plaintiffs had an arguable case with a real prospect of success, and whether the application had been made promptly. The court accepted promptness, but that did not assist the plaintiffs because the explanations for non-attendance were rejected and the merits were found wanting. (Para 28) (Para 50)

"the reason for a party’s absence is the predominant consideration for the court in determining whether a judgment entered at trial in the absence of that party ought to be set aside." — Per See Kee Oon J, Para 26

Applying that principle, the judge found that no good reasons had been furnished for either the plaintiffs’ absence or counsel’s absence. The court considered the medical evidence, the timing of the events, and the surrounding circumstances, and concluded that the plaintiffs had not shown that their non-attendance was genuinely unavoidable. The judge went further and said the only inference was that the plaintiffs did not wish to be present for trial, which supported the conclusion that the absence was deliberate. (Para 29) (Para 53)

The court also treated the plaintiffs’ conduct as part of a broader pattern of abuse of process. The application to set aside was filed barely 12 hours after the dismissal, which the judge said undermined the claim that the plaintiffs were too ill to attend court. In the judge’s view, the speed of the filing was inconsistent with the narrative advanced to explain the absence, and the overall circumstances pointed away from any genuine inability to attend. (Para 51) (Para 53)

What were the plaintiffs’ claims, and what factual basis did they rely on?

The plaintiffs were husband and wife, and they sued their daughter. The claim was for $300,000 and was pleaded on the basis of promissory estoppel. The court recorded that the plaintiffs alleged the defendant had represented that if they sold the Flat to her, she would pay them $300,000. The alleged sum was said to comprise a $240,000 “discount” component and a $60,000 repayment component for assistance in clearing past debts. (Para 1) (Para 5) (Para 6)

"The plaintiffs claimed the sum of $300,000 from the defendant on the basis of promissory estoppel." — Per See Kee Oon J, Para 5

The judge noted the specific breakdown of the alleged entitlement. According to the plaintiffs’ case, $240,000 represented the difference between the purported market price of $650,000 and the purchase price of $410,000, while $60,000 was said to be repayment for the plaintiffs’ assistance in helping the defendant clear her debts. That factual matrix mattered because it showed the claim was not a simple debt action but one dependent on alleged representations and reliance. (Para 6)

The court did not accept that the plaintiffs had established a viable factual foundation for relief. In the later merits analysis, the judge observed that there was no objective evidence supporting the promissory estoppel case, and the $60,000 component was in any event time-barred. The factual basis of the claim therefore failed both on evidential support and on limitation. (Para 48) (Para 49)

Why did the plaintiffs and their counsel fail to attend trial, and why did the court reject the illness explanation?

The plaintiffs’ explanation was that they were elderly and sick, had been hospitalised, and were on medical leave. Counsel also relied on a medical certificate said to have been given to him. The court, however, examined the documents and found that the medical certificates did not contain diagnoses and expressly stated that they were not valid for absence from court proceedings. The judge also noted that no medical certificate was produced for the second plaintiff, Mdm Devi. (Para 25) (Para 2) (Para 30) (Para 35)

"All the medical certificates did not contain any diagnosis and categorically stated that they were not valid for absence from court proceedings. No medical certificate was produced for the second plaintiff (“Mdm Devi”)." — Per See Kee Oon J, Para 2

The court found the explanations for Mr Rajoo’s absence “unconvincing and contrived.” It also found that Mdm Devi had no medical certificate to excuse her from attending court and did not file any affidavit to attest to her medical conditions. The judge further relied on the fact that the application was filed very quickly after the dismissal, which undermined the claim that the plaintiffs were too ill to attend the trial in the first place. (Para 29) (Para 35) (Para 51)

The judge’s reasoning was not limited to the existence of illness in the abstract. The court focused on whether the illness was properly documented and whether the documents complied with the relevant procedural requirements. Because the certificates expressly said they were not valid for absence from court and lacked diagnosis, they did not justify non-attendance. The court therefore treated the illness narrative as inadequate to explain the absence. (Para 40) (Para 41)

"the medical certificate(s) must contain a statement to the effect that the person in question is “unfit to attend Court”. The medical certificate must therefore expressly state that it is valid for absence from court proceedings. It must also contain a diagnosis of the person concerned" — Per See Kee Oon J, Para 40

How did the court assess counsel’s conduct and professional responsibilities?

The judgment contains a strong critique of Mr Singh’s conduct. The court recorded that he had not informed opposing counsel in advance that neither he nor his clients would attend court. The judge described this as a serious lapse and later said that Mr Singh’s conduct showed a “cavalier” disregard for the proceedings. The court also found that the medical certificates were of no assistance because of Mr Singh’s complete and utter disregard of the Practice Directions. (Para 10) (Para 4) (Para 40)

"It is with considerable regret that I feel compelled to write this grounds of decision, as it is necessary in my view to highlight Mr Singh’s cavalier conduct in these proceedings." — Per See Kee Oon J, Para 4

The judge went further and identified possible breaches of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct Rules) 2015. The court said Mr Singh could have been in breach of r 7 and r 13, and also noted prima facie breaches of r 9(2)(a) and r 9(2)(g). These observations were made in the context of the failure to communicate properly with the court and with opposing counsel, and the failure to ensure that the medical documentation met the required standards. (Para 42) (Para 43)

The court’s analysis shows that counsel’s obligations were not treated as peripheral. They were central to the court’s assessment of whether the non-attendance was excusable. Because the judge found that Mr Singh had not complied with the Practice Directions and had not given prior notice of the absence, the court treated the professional lapses as reinforcing the conclusion that the absence was not satisfactorily explained. (Para 11) (Para 40) (Para 42)

"Mr Singh’s complete and utter disregard of the Practice Directions meant that the medical certificates were of absolutely no assistance to him or his clients." — Per See Kee Oon J, Para 40

What legal test did the court apply to decide whether the dismissal should be set aside?

The court identified the relevant framework by reference to the reason for absence, the merits of the claim, and promptness in bringing the application. The judge expressly framed the issues as whether there were good reasons for the plaintiffs’ and Mr Singh’s absence, whether the plaintiffs had an arguable case with a real prospect of success, and whether they had applied promptly to set aside the judgment. That structure governed the entire analysis. (Para 28)

"(a) whether there were good reasons for the plaintiffs’ and Mr Singh’s absence at trial; (b) whether the plaintiffs had an arguable case with a real prospect of success; and (c) whether the plaintiffs had applied promptly to set aside the judgment dismissing their claim." — Per See Kee Oon J, Para 28

On the first limb, the court applied the principle that the reason for absence is the predominant consideration. The judge cited authority for the proposition that absence due to personal reasons or difficulties does not necessarily prevent a finding that the absence was deliberate. This meant that even if the plaintiffs were unwell or facing difficulties, the court still had to ask whether the absence was genuinely unavoidable or whether it was a deliberate choice. (Para 26) (Para 41)

On the second limb, the court required the plaintiffs to show an arguable case with a real prospect of success. The judge found they had not done so, because the claim lacked objective support and one component was time-barred. On the third limb, the court accepted that the application was prompt, but promptness alone could not cure the absence of good reasons or the lack of merit. (Para 49) (Para 50)

Why did the court conclude that the plaintiffs had no arguable case with a real prospect of success?

The merits analysis was decisive. The court found that the plaintiffs had not addressed anything on affidavit or in written submissions to show that there were merits to their claim. The judge then examined the substance of the pleaded case and concluded that the $60,000 claim was plainly time-barred under s 6 of the Limitation Act after 2015. That alone undermined a substantial part of the claim. (Para 27) (Para 48)

"It is manifestly clear that this claim is time-barred under s 6 of the Limitation Act after 2015." — Per See Kee Oon J, Para 48

The court also found that there was no objective evidence supporting the promissory estoppel claim. The judge therefore concluded that the plaintiffs did not have a good arguable case with a real prospect of success. This finding was not a mere procedural observation; it was a substantive determination that the underlying claim was weak enough that setting aside the dismissal would serve no useful purpose. (Para 49)

The judge’s conclusion on merits was tied to the broader assessment of the plaintiffs’ conduct. The court considered the rapid filing of the setting-aside application, the absence of proper medical evidence, and the lack of supporting material for the claim itself. Taken together, these factors led the court to reject the application even though it had been filed promptly. (Para 50) (Para 51) (Para 55)

How did the court treat the timing of the application to set aside the dismissal?

The court accepted that the application was made promptly. The judge expressly stated that there was no question that the plaintiffs had applied promptly to set aside the dismissal of their claim. That finding meant the application did not fail on delay alone. However, promptness was only one part of the analysis and could not overcome the other defects identified by the court. (Para 50)

"There was no question that the plaintiffs had applied promptly to set aside the dismissal of their claim." — Per See Kee Oon J, Para 50

Even though the application was prompt, the judge considered the speed of the filing to be inconsistent with the plaintiffs’ explanation for their absence. The application was filed barely 12 hours after the dismissal, and the court said this greatly undermined the claim that the plaintiffs were so ill that they could not even be present in court for the trial. The timing therefore cut against the credibility of the illness narrative. (Para 13) (Para 51)

The court’s treatment of promptness is important because it shows that procedural diligence is not enough where the substantive explanation is rejected. The plaintiffs moved quickly, but the court found that the speed of the application actually reinforced the suspicion that the absence had not been genuinely compelled by illness. (Para 50) (Para 51)

What did the court say about deliberate absence and abuse of process?

The judge made a clear finding that the plaintiffs’ absence was deliberate. After reviewing the evidence, the court said the only inference it could draw was that the plaintiffs, for reasons best known to themselves, did not wish to be present for the trial. That finding was central to the refusal to set aside the dismissal. (Para 53)

"The only inference I could draw was that the plaintiffs, for reasons best known to themselves, did not wish to be present for the trial." — Per See Kee Oon J, Para 53

The court also characterised the conduct as a flagrant abuse of the court’s process. This was not a casual remark; it reflected the judge’s view that the non-attendance, the inadequate medical documentation, and the immediate post-dismissal application together pointed to a misuse of procedure rather than a genuine inability to attend. The court therefore treated the matter as one involving more than a simple procedural default. (Para 53)

"This was a flagrant abuse of the court’s process." — Per See Kee Oon J, Para 53

That conclusion was reinforced by the court’s earlier findings on counsel’s conduct and the medical evidence. The judge had already found that the medical certificates were not valid for absence from court and that Mr Singh had disregarded the Practice Directions. In that context, the finding of deliberate absence was the culmination of a chain of reasoning rather than a standalone assertion. (Para 40) (Para 42) (Para 53)

What role did the medical certificates and other documents play in the court’s reasoning?

The medical certificates were central to the plaintiffs’ explanation, but they failed on their own terms. The court noted that the certificates did not contain any diagnosis and categorically stated that they were not valid for absence from court proceedings. The judge also observed that no medical certificate was produced for Mdm Devi. These deficiencies meant the documents could not justify the plaintiffs’ absence. (Para 2) (Para 30) (Para 35)

"The two medical certificates Mr Rajoo tendered both stated unequivocally that they were not valid for absence from court attendance." — Per See Kee Oon J, Para 30

The court also considered an unsigned note dated 10 October 2022 purportedly issued by one “Kok Kuan TEO” from Woodlands Polyclinic. The judge treated this document as part of the evidential picture but did not accept it as curing the defects in the medical evidence. The absence of a proper diagnosis, the lack of a valid certificate for Mdm Devi, and the non-compliance with the Practice Directions all meant the documents were insufficient. (Para 36) (Para 40)

In addition, the court noted that the medical certificates were of no assistance because they did not satisfy the procedural requirements for excusing attendance at court. The judge specifically stated that the certificate must say the person is unfit to attend court, must expressly state that it is valid for absence from court proceedings, and must contain a diagnosis. The plaintiffs’ documents did not meet that standard. (Para 40)

How did the court deal with the underlying $60,000 claim and the limitation issue?

The court addressed the $60,000 component separately and concluded that it was time-barred. The judge stated that it was manifestly clear that the claim was time-barred under s 6 of the Limitation Act after 2015. This finding was fatal to that part of the claim and materially weakened the plaintiffs’ overall position on the merits. (Para 48)

"It is manifestly clear that this claim is time-barred under s 6 of the Limitation Act after 2015." — Per See Kee Oon J, Para 48

The limitation point mattered because the plaintiffs’ claim was not treated as a single undifferentiated sum. The court recognised that the alleged $300,000 comprised two distinct components, and the $60,000 repayment claim was independently vulnerable to limitation. Once the court concluded that this component was time-barred, the plaintiffs’ case lost a significant part of its asserted monetary basis. (Para 6) (Para 48)

The judge then combined that limitation finding with the absence of objective evidence supporting the promissory estoppel case. The result was a firm conclusion that the plaintiffs had not shown a good arguable case with a real prospect of success. The merits analysis therefore supported dismissal of the setting-aside application even apart from the absence issue. (Para 49)

Why is this case important for civil procedure and professional conduct?

This case is important because it shows that a party who fails to attend trial cannot expect relief merely by producing some medical paperwork after the event. The court insisted on proper medical evidence, compliance with procedural requirements, and a credible explanation for non-attendance. The decision also demonstrates that promptness in seeking relief will not save an application where the underlying explanation is rejected and the claim itself lacks merit. (Para 40) (Para 50) (Para 55)

"Mr Singh’s complete and utter disregard of the Practice Directions meant that the medical certificates were of absolutely no assistance to him or his clients." — Per See Kee Oon J, Para 40

The case is equally significant for professional conduct. The judge expressly criticised counsel’s “cavalier” conduct and identified possible breaches of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct Rules) 2015. The decision therefore serves as a reminder that counsel must communicate promptly and candidly with the court and with opposing counsel, especially when a trial attendance issue arises. (Para 4) (Para 42) (Para 43)

Finally, the case illustrates the court’s willingness to infer deliberate absence where the surrounding circumstances point that way. The judge did not treat illness as a talismanic excuse; instead, the court examined the documents, the timing, the communications, and the merits, and concluded that the application was an abuse of process. That approach has practical significance for litigants and lawyers alike. (Para 41) (Para 51) (Para 53)

Cases Referred To

Legislation Referenced

• Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed), O 35 r 1 (Para 12)
• Limitation Act 1959 (2020 Rev Ed), s 6 (Para 48)
• Legal Profession (Professional Conduct Rules) 2015, r 7 (Para 42)
• Legal Profession (Professional Conduct Rules) 2015, r 13 (Para 42)
• Legal Profession (Professional Conduct Rules) 2015, r 9(2)(a) (Para 43)
• Legal Profession (Professional Conduct Rules) 2015, r 9(2)(g) (Para 43)
• Supreme Court Practice Directions 2021 (Para 40)
• Practice Direction No 89 (Para 40)

Source Documents

• Original Judgment — Singapore Courts
• Archived Copy (PDF) — Litt Law CDN
• View in judgment: "After hearing submissions, I dismissed SUM..."
• View in judgment: "The trial was scheduled to be..."
• View in judgment: "After hearing submissions, I dismissed SUM..."
• View in judgment: "pursuant to O 35 r 1..."
• View in judgment: "he could have been in breach..."

This article analyses [2022] SGHC 285 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.