Case Details
- Citation: [2026] SGCA 15
- Court: Court of Appeal of the Republic of Singapore
- Date: 24 March 2026
- Case Title: Mustaqim Bin Abdul Kadir v PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
- Proceedings: Court of Appeal / Criminal Appeal No 7 of 2023; Court of Appeal / Criminal Motion No 11 of 2025
- Related Trial Case: Criminal Case No 44 of 2022
- Appellant/Defendant: Mustaqim bin Abdul Kadir
- Respondent/Prosecution: Public Prosecutor
- Judges: Tay Yong Kwang JCA, Steven Chong JCA and Judith Prakash SJ
- Legal Areas: Criminal law; statutory offences; criminal procedure; evidence; sentencing/appeal principles
- Statutes Referenced: Evidence Act 1893
- Key Statutory Instrument: Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed) (“MDA”)
- Charge: Single capital charge of possession of not less than 56.8g of diamorphine for the purpose of trafficking under s 5(1)(a) read with s 5(2), punishable under s 33(1) of the MDA
- Judgment Length: 25 pages, 6,821 words
- Core Themes in Grounds of Decision: (i) application to adduce further evidence on appeal; (ii) admissibility of CNB statements; (iii) alleged inducement/promises; (iv) abuse of process concerns relating to inconsistent positions and collateral purpose
Summary
In Mustaqim bin Abdul Kadir v Public Prosecutor ([2026] SGCA 15), the Court of Appeal dealt with both (1) an appeal against conviction and sentence for a capital Misuse of Drugs Act charge, and (2) a criminal motion seeking to adduce further psychiatric and medical evidence on appeal. The appellant, Mustaqim, was convicted of possession of not less than 56.8g of diamorphine for the purpose of trafficking. His primary defence at trial was that a substantial portion of the drugs—about 42.62g—were “unwanted drugs” he had mistakenly received from a person known as “Zack”, and that he had intended to return them.
The appellant also challenged the admissibility of seven statements recorded by the Central Narcotics Bureau (“CNB”), alleging that the statements were obtained through inducements or promises, including a representation that if he cooperated and was found to be a courier, he could receive life imprisonment rather than the death penalty. In the appeal, he further sought to introduce “fresh” psychiatric evidence to support a “state of mind” argument: that his disorientation, confusion, and irrelevant speech around the time of his arrest and the recording of his statements should have led the court to exclude those statements.
The Court of Appeal rejected the motion to adduce further evidence. Applying the principles in Ladd v Marshall (as adapted for criminal appeals), the court held that the evidence was not sufficiently non-available and was not material in the required sense. The court’s reasoning emphasised that the underlying clinical information was already available at trial, and that the defence had consciously chosen not to pursue expert evidence on drug-withdrawal symptoms during the trial process. The appeal against conviction and sentence was therefore dealt with on the basis of the trial record, with the court ultimately affirming the conviction and sentence.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
The appellant faced a single capital charge under the Misuse of Drugs Act (“MDA”) for possession of not less than 56.8g of diamorphine for the purpose of trafficking. The prosecution’s case relied heavily on the appellant’s possession of the drugs and the evidential weight of his statements to CNB during investigations. At trial, the appellant did not deny that the drugs were found in his possession; instead, he advanced a narrative that he had mistakenly received two bundles of drugs from “Zack” and that he intended to return the “unwanted drugs” to Zack. This defence was directed at undermining the inference of trafficking intent.
In addition to the “unwanted drugs” explanation, the appellant challenged the admissibility of seven CNB statements. These statements included two contemporaneous statements recorded on 26 January 2018 by SSgt Fardlie and ASP Aliff, a cautioned statement recorded on 27 January 2018 by ASP Yang, and four long statements recorded between 30 January and 2 February 2018 by ASP Yang with an interpreter, Mr Faiz. The appellant’s admissibility challenge was not merely technical; it was grounded in a substantive claim that the statements were obtained through inducements or promises that affected voluntariness.
The appellant’s “Inducement Defence” comprised three main allegations. First, he alleged that SSgt Fardlie told him that because the drugs were above the capital limit, if he cooperated and was found to be a courier, he could get life imprisonment (the “Alleged MDP Notice Representation”). Second, he alleged that during the recording of the first contemporaneous statement, SSgt Fardlie instructed him to “just say that this stuff is to be sent to Zack’s customer” (the “Alleged Contemporaneous Statement Representation”). Third, he alleged that before the first long statement, he referred back to the alleged MDP notice representation and that ASP Yang responded in English that he knew the appellant had cooperated, but that ASP Yang needed to take the statement on 30 January 2018 to determine whether the appellant was truly a courier and whether he would provide information (the “ASP Yang’s Alleged Representation”).
After conviction and sentence, the appellant brought Criminal Motion No 11 of 2025 (“CM 11”) to adduce further evidence. He sought to introduce psychiatric and clinical material to support a “State of Mind Defence”. The motion relied on an A&E discharge summary from Changi General Hospital dated 6 February 2018, Singapore Prison Service clinical notes, and a psychiatric report by Dr Jacob Rajesh dated 8 April 2018. The appellant’s position was that his disorientation, confusion, and irrelevant speech after discharge from hospital—and around the time the four long statements were recorded—should have raised a reasonable doubt about his state of mind when he made the CNB statements, thereby supporting exclusion.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The first key issue was whether the Court of Appeal should admit the further evidence on appeal. This required the court to apply the established framework for adducing fresh evidence, derived from Ladd v Marshall, while recognising that the criminal context may justify a more flexible approach. The appellant had to satisfy conditions relating to non-availability (that the evidence could not have been obtained with reasonable diligence at trial), materiality (that it would probably have an important influence on the result), and reliability (that it was apparently credible).
The second key issue concerned the admissibility of the CNB statements. Although the provided extract focuses primarily on the motion to adduce further evidence, the broader appeal included arguments that the statements should have been excluded due to inducements or promises, and that the appellant’s mental state at the time of recording undermined voluntariness or reliability. The court therefore had to consider how the trial judge assessed the alleged inducements and how the trial record addressed the appellant’s mental state.
A further, procedural issue was whether the appellant’s attempt to introduce psychiatric evidence on appeal amounted to an abuse of process. The grounds of decision flagged concerns about inconsistent positions—particularly that the appellant sought to adduce evidence that he had elected not to adduce at trial—and about collateral purpose, ie, using a “fresh evidence” application as a disguised attempt to obtain a retrial.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
The Court of Appeal began with CM 11, treating the further evidence application as a threshold matter. It set out the governing principles for adducing further evidence on appeal. The court referred to the three conditions in Ladd v Marshall: (a) non-availability with reasonable diligence; (b) materiality; and (c) reliability. However, the court also emphasised that in criminal proceedings, these conditions are not applied with their full rigour. Instead, the appellate court generally admits additional evidence favourable to the accused, provided it meets relevance and reliability requirements. The court cited the approach in Anan Group (Singapore) Pte Ltd v VTB Bank (Public Joint Stock Co) and subsequent authorities, including Soh Meiyun v Public Prosecutor and Azuin bin Mohd Tap v Public Prosecutor.
Crucially, the court held that the appellant’s further evidence failed at least the non-availability and materiality requirements. On non-availability, the appellant argued that he could not reasonably have anticipated that the evidence would have a bearing on the case. He pointed out that the A&E discharge summary had already been admitted at trial and marked as “P329”, and he suggested that the significance of his state of mind only became apparent later, particularly after references to “drug induced psychosis” appeared in the prison clinical notes and Dr Rajesh’s report. The appellant’s argument was essentially that the defence could not have known at trial that expert psychiatric evidence would be necessary to challenge voluntariness or admissibility.
The Court of Appeal disagreed. It reasoned that the central point the appellant sought to make—abnormal disorientation, confusion, and irrelevant speech after discharge from hospital and at the time the four long statements were recorded—could have been raised, or at least expert opinion could have been sought, based on information available at trial. The court highlighted that the A&E discharge summary contained clinical observations relevant to the appellant’s mental state, including that he was talking to himself and the walls, had been aggressive, was not oriented to time/place/person in prison, claimed he was in Hougang, and said he was in a dream. These are precisely the kinds of observations that would alert counsel to the possibility of a mental state issue affecting statement-taking.
In addition, the court relied on Dr Koh’s testimony. Dr Koh, an Institute of Mental Health psychiatrist who examined the appellant, testified that between 6 and 11 February 2018 the appellant appeared disoriented and confused, and that he improved over time until he was lucid by 12 February 2018. The Court of Appeal treated this as essentially the same clinical information that underpinned Dr Rajesh’s later opinion. Therefore, the court concluded that the appellant’s attempt to introduce further psychiatric evidence did not satisfy the non-availability condition because the underlying clinical facts were already on the record.
On materiality, the court further held that the evidence was not likely to have an important influence on the result. The court noted that evidence concerning the appellant’s alleged drug withdrawal symptoms could have been obtained during the trial. It was significant that the defence had expressly considered whether to adduce such evidence in relation to the admissibility or weight of the four long statements, but ultimately did not do so. The court referred to trial counsel’s account that consultations with a psychiatrist and psychologist had occurred regarding withdrawal and inducement/threat/promise issues, and that counsel had then decided not to complete instructions specifically on the long statements. This supported the court’s view that the appellant was not genuinely unable to obtain the evidence earlier; rather, he had chosen a litigation strategy that did not include the expert evidence later sought.
Although the extract does not reproduce the full discussion of the admissibility arguments on inducement and mental state, the court’s approach to the motion indicates how it would treat the “state of mind” narrative: the appellate court was unwilling to allow a belated attempt to reframe the case using evidence that was either already available or could have been obtained with reasonable diligence. The court’s analysis also implicitly addressed abuse of process concerns: allowing such evidence would risk turning the appeal into a retrial, contrary to the finality of criminal adjudication.
What Was the Outcome?
The Court of Appeal dismissed Criminal Motion No 11 of 2025 (CM 11) to adduce further evidence. The court held that the further evidence did not satisfy the non-availability and materiality conditions under the Ladd v Marshall framework as adapted for criminal appeals. As a result, the appellate court declined to consider the psychiatric and clinical materials as fresh evidence capable of undermining the trial judge’s conclusions on admissibility and voluntariness.
With the further evidence application rejected, the appeal against conviction and sentence proceeded on the basis of the trial record. The Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction and sentence for the capital MDA charge, maintaining the trial court’s findings as to the admissibility and evidential weight of the CNB statements and the appellant’s defences.
Why Does This Case Matter?
This decision is significant for practitioners because it clarifies the practical application of the Ladd v Marshall conditions in Singapore criminal appeals. While the court recognises that the non-availability requirement is not applied with full rigour in criminal proceedings, it remains a meaningful constraint. The Court of Appeal’s reasoning shows that where the underlying clinical observations are already in the trial record, an appellant cannot later characterise the evidence as “fresh” merely because a more detailed expert interpretation is obtained after conviction.
For defence counsel, the case underscores the importance of making timely decisions about whether to adduce expert evidence at trial, particularly where statement admissibility and voluntariness are contested. The court’s emphasis that the defence had considered withdrawal-related evidence but did not pursue it suggests that strategic omissions at trial may be fatal to later attempts to reopen the evidential foundation on appeal.
For prosecutors, the case supports the finality of criminal proceedings and provides a framework to resist collateral attempts to obtain a de facto retrial through “fresh evidence” motions. It also reinforces the court’s willingness to scrutinise the purpose and timing of such applications, especially where the evidence could have been obtained earlier with reasonable diligence.
Legislation Referenced
- Evidence Act 1893
- Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed) (noted in the grounds as s 5(1)(a), s 5(2), and s 33(1)) [CDN] [SSO]
Cases Cited
- [2025] SGCA 9
- [2026] SGCA 15
- Ladd v Marshall [1954] 1 WLR 1489
- Azuin bin Mohd Tap v Public Prosecutor [2025] 1 SLR 259
- Anan Group (Singapore) Pte Ltd v VTB Bank (Public Joint Stock Co) [2019] 2 SLR 341
- Soh Meiyun v Public Prosecutor [2014] 3 SLR 299
- Miya Manik v Public Prosecutor [2021] 2 SLR 1169
Source Documents
This article analyses [2026] SGCA 15 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.