Case Details
- Citation: [2025] SGCA 15
- Title: Muhammad Salleh bin Hamid v Public Prosecutor
- Court: Court of Appeal of the Republic of Singapore
- Court Type: Criminal Motion (criminal review / permission to review)
- Case Number: Court of Appeal / Criminal Motion No 51 of 2024
- Date of Decision: 28 March 2025
- Date of Hearing: 7 March 2025
- Judges: Steven Chong JCA
- Applicant: Muhammad Salleh bin Hamid (prisoner awaiting capital punishment)
- Respondent: Public Prosecutor
- Legal Area: Criminal Procedure and Sentencing — Criminal review
- Procedural Posture: Application for permission to make a review application under s 394H(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code (2010) (2020 Rev Ed) (“CPC”)
- Statutes Referenced: Applications in Capital Cases Act 2022; Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) 2010 (2020 Rev Ed); Misuse of Drugs Act (MDA) (Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed); Supreme Court of Judicature Act; Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969
- Key Provision: CPC s 394H(1), s 394H(6A)(a), s 394J(2)
- Underlying Conviction/Sentence (context): Conviction for abetting possession of methamphetamine for trafficking (mandatory death penalty at first instance; appeal dismissed in 2020)
- Length of Judgment: 31 pages, 8,921 words
- Cases Cited (as provided): [2021] SGCA 118; [2021] SGHC 274; [2022] SGCA 4; [2023] SGCA 13; [2023] SGCA 33; [2024] SGCA 34; [2025] SGCA 15; [2025] SGCA 9; [2025] SGHC 20
- Related Authorities Mentioned in Extract: Mohd Noor bin Ismail v Public Prosecutor [2023] SGCA 33; Arun Ramesh Kumar v Public Prosecutor [2022] 1 SLR 1152; Syed Suhail bin Syed Zin v Public Prosecutor [2021] 2 SLR 377; Murugesan a/l Arumugam v Public Prosecutor [2021] SGCA 118; Mohammad Farid bin Batra v Public Prosecutor and another appeal and other matters [2020] 1 SLR 907; Thennarasu s/o Karupiah v Public Prosecutor [2022] SGCA 4; Masri bin Hussain v Public Prosecutor [2025] SGCA 9; Public Prosecutor v Muhammad Abdul Hadi bin Haron and another [2020] 5 SLR 710 (“Salleh (HC)”)
Summary
In Muhammad Salleh bin Hamid v Public Prosecutor [2025] SGCA 15, the Court of Appeal dismissed an application for permission to make a criminal review application under s 394H(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code. The applicant, a prisoner awaiting capital punishment, sought to revisit a final appellate decision that had dismissed his appeal against conviction and sentence in 2020. Four years later, he attempted to trigger the statutory criminal review mechanism by arguing that there had been a “miscarriage of justice” in his case.
The Court held that the applicant failed to satisfy the threshold requirement in s 394H(6A)(a) read with s 394J(2) of the CPC: he did not provide “sufficient material (being evidence or legal arguments)” to conclude that a miscarriage of justice had occurred. The Court also reiterated a strict approach to allegations of incompetent or negligent counsel, emphasising that such grave accusations must be substantiated with compelling evidence and that unfounded allegations undermine the integrity and finality of the criminal justice process.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
The underlying criminal matter concerned the applicant’s involvement in methamphetamine trafficking activities. On 22 July 2015, one Mr Muhammad Abdul Hadi bin Haron (“Hadi”) travelled to Johor Bahru (“JB”). While in JB, Hadi collected two bundles from a person referred to as “Kakak”. It was undisputed that the applicant had instructed Hadi to make this collection from Kakak and had coordinated the collection.
After collecting the two bundles, Hadi hid them in his motorcycle and returned to Singapore on the same day. Later that day, both Hadi and the applicant were arrested. The Central Narcotics Bureau (“CNB”) recovered the two bundles from Hadi’s motorcycle. The bundles contained not less than 325.81g of methamphetamine (the “Drugs”).
At trial in the High Court (HC/CC 12/2018, “CC 12”), the applicant faced one charge under s 5(1)(a) read with ss 5(2) and 12 of the Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed) (“MDA”). The prosecution’s case was that the applicant had abetted Hadi by instigating him to be in possession of the Drugs for the purpose of trafficking. The applicant was represented at trial by Mr Ragbir Singh s/o Ram Singh Bajwa (“Mr Singh”) and Mr Wong Seow Pin (“Mr Wong”).
The applicant’s defence at trial focused on his state of mind regarding the quantity of drugs he believed Hadi would collect. He claimed he did not intend to traffic in more than 250g of methamphetamine (in gross weight, ie, the weight of the bundles). He asserted that he had separately agreed with Kakak and Hadi not to deal in quantities beyond the capital punishment threshold. To support this, he relied on text messages which, according to him, showed confusion after Kakak told him that Hadi had collected multiple bundles, when the applicant expected only one bundle weighing not more than 250g. He also argued that earlier occasions on which Hadi had collected drugs from Kakak on the applicant’s instructions did not involve more than 250g.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The central legal issue in the Court of Appeal was procedural and threshold-based: whether the applicant had met the statutory requirement for permission to make a review application under s 394H(1) of the CPC. Specifically, under s 394H(6A)(a) read with s 394J(2), the applicant had to satisfy the Court that there was “sufficient material (being evidence or legal arguments)” to conclude that there had been a “miscarriage of justice” in respect of the earlier decision.
Within that threshold, the Court also had to consider the nature and legitimacy of the applicant’s proposed grounds. The applicant advanced multiple arguments, including (i) a claim of prejudice based on alleged counsel negligence/incompetence and alleged deviation from his instructions, (ii) reliance on “money evidence” as a basis for review, (iii) allegations against a named individual (Mr Singh) that the Court considered not made out, and (iv) other arguments said to disclose new material. The Court’s task was to determine whether these matters amounted to “sufficient material” capable of demonstrating a miscarriage of justice.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
The Court began by framing the statutory threshold. The applicant was seeking permission to review a decision that had already been dismissed by the Court of Appeal in 2020. The Court emphasised that the review mechanism is not a general second appeal. Instead, it is a tightly controlled process requiring “sufficient material” to show a miscarriage of justice. The Court found that, after considering the applicant’s submissions, there was “no material whatsoever, let alone ‘sufficient material’” to conclude that any miscarriage of justice had occurred.
A significant part of the Court’s analysis concerned the applicant’s allegations that his trial counsel (and also appellate counsel) were negligent or incompetent and acted contrary to his instructions. The Court observed what it described as a “disturbing, ongoing trend” of convicted persons blaming counsel for their conviction, often without proper basis and sometimes contrary to the convicted person’s original instructions. The Court reiterated that defence counsel perform an important public service in the administration of criminal justice, and therefore the threshold for raising complaints about counsel must be strict.
In particular, the Court reaffirmed that counsel’s conduct must fall so clearly below an objective standard that it could fairly be described as “flagrant or egregious incompetence or indifference”, and there must be a real possibility that the inadequate assistance caused a miscarriage of justice. The Court relied on its earlier jurisprudence, including Mohammad Farid bin Batra v Public Prosecutor [2020] 1 SLR 907, and reiterated remarks from Thennarasu s/o Karupiah v Public Prosecutor [2022] SGCA 4 that grave allegations against former counsel should not be lightly made. The Court characterised unfounded allegations as reprehensible and unjust to counsel who have tried their best to assist clients in difficult situations, often without much material or other reward.
The Court further warned that appellate courts will not hesitate to make adverse costs orders against those who persist in making unsustainable and unfounded allegations against former counsel. It noted that, over a short period, it had already heard multiple similar applications premised on allegations of negligence and incompetence against former counsel. This context supported the Court’s insistence on compelling evidence before such allegations can be entertained as grounds for review.
Turning to the substantive trial evidence and the applicant’s asserted grounds, the Court addressed the applicant’s reliance on “money evidence” as not a legitimate basis to review. The Court also rejected the applicant’s allegations against Mr Singh as not made out. In addition, the Court found that the applicant’s other arguments did not disclose any new material. In effect, the Court treated the applicant’s grounds as either (i) re-litigating matters already considered, (ii) unsupported assertions, or (iii) arguments that did not meet the statutory requirement of “sufficient material” capable of demonstrating a miscarriage of justice.
Although the extract does not reproduce the full reasoning on each ground, the Court’s approach is consistent with the earlier factual findings at trial. At trial, the High Court had found that the applicant’s defence—that he did not intend to traffic beyond 250g—was not credible. The High Court reasoned that the applicant had expressed no confusion or surprise when told that Hadi had collected two bundles totalling 500g; that the applicant’s claim of confronting Kakak did not cohere with his text messages; that his contemporaneous and cautioned statements contradicted the defence; and that his text messages suggested prior dealings beyond 250g. The High Court also found the applicant’s role went beyond that of a courier, affecting sentencing considerations, and the applicant’s appeal was dismissed in 2020.
What Was the Outcome?
The Court of Appeal dismissed the application for permission to make a review application. Practically, this meant the applicant could not proceed to a full review of the earlier appellate decision under the CPC’s criminal review framework.
The Court’s dismissal also signals that, for capital cases, the review permission stage remains a robust gatekeeping mechanism. Without “sufficient material” demonstrating a miscarriage of justice, the Court will not permit review proceedings to be launched, even where the applicant is awaiting capital punishment.
Why Does This Case Matter?
This decision is important for practitioners because it clarifies and reinforces the strict threshold at the permission stage for criminal review applications under the CPC. The Court’s insistence on “sufficient material” serves as a reminder that criminal review is not an avenue to revisit arguments already rejected, nor a substitute for appeal. Lawyers advising convicted persons—especially in capital matters—must carefully assess whether the proposed grounds are supported by evidence or legal arguments that can realistically demonstrate a miscarriage of justice.
Second, the judgment is notable for its strong commentary on allegations of counsel incompetence. The Court’s discussion is not merely rhetorical; it provides a doctrinal framework for evaluating such complaints: counsel’s conduct must be egregiously deficient and there must be a real possibility of causation of a miscarriage of justice. The Court’s emphasis on substantiation and its willingness to consider adverse costs orders underscore that unmeritorious counsel-blame narratives may be counterproductive and may expose applicants to financial consequences.
Third, the case demonstrates how the Court treats “new material” claims. Even where applicants frame their submissions as novel, the Court will scrutinise whether the material is genuinely new and whether it has the capacity to alter the miscarriage-of-justice analysis. For law students and practitioners, this is a useful illustration of how courts operationalise statutory language like “sufficient material” and how they prevent review proceedings from becoming a de facto second appeal.
Legislation Referenced
- Applications in Capital Cases Act 2022
- Criminal Procedure Code 2010 (2020 Rev Ed), in particular:
- Section 394H(1)
- Section 394H(6A)(a)
- Section 394J(2)
- Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed), in particular:
- Section 5(1)(a)
- Section 5(2)
- Section 12
- Supreme Court of Judicature Act
- Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969
Cases Cited
- Mohd Noor bin Ismail v Public Prosecutor [2023] SGCA 33
- Arun Ramesh Kumar v Public Prosecutor [2022] 1 SLR 1152
- Syed Suhail bin Syed Zin v Public Prosecutor [2021] 2 SLR 377
- Murugesan a/l Arumugam v Public Prosecutor [2021] SGCA 118
- Mohammad Farid bin Batra v Public Prosecutor and another appeal and other matters [2020] 1 SLR 907
- Thennarasu s/o Karupiah v Public Prosecutor [2022] SGCA 4
- Masri bin Hussain v Public Prosecutor [2025] SGCA 9
- Public Prosecutor v Muhammad Abdul Hadi bin Haron and another [2020] 5 SLR 710 (“Salleh (HC)”)
- [2021] SGHC 274
- [2022] SGCA 4
- [2023] SGCA 13
- [2023] SGCA 33
- [2024] SGCA 34
- [2025] SGHC 20
Source Documents
This article analyses [2025] SGCA 15 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.