Case Details
- Citation: [2025] SGCA 15
- Title: Muhammad Salleh bin Hamid v Public Prosecutor
- Court: Court of Appeal of the Republic of Singapore
- Date: 28 March 2025
- Case Type: Criminal Motion No 51 of 2024
- Proceedings: Application for permission to make a criminal review application
- Applicant/Defendant: Muhammad Salleh bin Hamid
- Respondent/Prosecutor: Public Prosecutor
- Judges: Steven Chong JCA
- Legal Area: Criminal Procedure and Sentencing — Criminal review
- Key Statutory Provision: Section 394H(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code 2010 (2020 Rev Ed) (“CPC”)
- Related Statutory Framework: Sections 394H(6A)(a) and 394J(2) CPC (threshold for “sufficient material” and “miscarriage of justice”)
- Statutes Referenced: Applications in Capital Cases Act 2022; Criminal Procedure Code (2010) (2020 Rev Ed); Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed); Supreme Court of Judicature Act; Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969
- Cases Cited (as provided): [2021] SGCA 118; [2021] SGHC 274; [2022] SGCA 4; [2023] SGCA 13; [2023] SGCA 33; [2024] SGCA 34; [2025] SGCA 15; [2025] SGCA 9; [2025] SGHC 20
- Length: 31 pages, 8,921 words
- Earlier Trial/Decision Mentioned: Public Prosecutor v Muhammad Abdul Hadi bin Haron and another [2020] 5 SLR 710 (“Salleh (HC)”) (as referenced in the extract)
Summary
In Muhammad Salleh bin Hamid v Public Prosecutor ([2025] SGCA 15), the Court of Appeal considered an application by a prisoner under s 394H(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code 2010 (2020 Rev Ed) (“CPC”) for permission to make a criminal review application. The applicant, who was awaiting capital punishment, had already had his appeal against conviction and sentence dismissed in 2020. Four years later, he sought a further review permission, despite having filed multiple post-appeal applications in the interim.
The Court of Appeal refused permission. Central to the decision was the statutory threshold in s 394H(6A)(a) read with s 394J(2) CPC: the applicant must show there is “sufficient material (being evidence or legal arguments)” to conclude that there has been a “miscarriage of justice” in the criminal matter in respect of which the earlier decision was made. The court found that the applicant’s submissions did not disclose any such sufficient material. The court also reiterated that complaints against defence counsel—particularly allegations of negligence or incompetence—must be supported by compelling evidence and must meet a strict threshold, given the importance of finality and the integrity of the criminal justice process.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
The underlying criminal matter concerned the applicant’s involvement in methamphetamine trafficking activities. On 22 July 2015, one Muhammad Abdul Hadi bin Haron (“Hadi”) travelled to Johor Bahru (“JB”). While in JB, Hadi collected two bundles from a person referred to as “Kakak”. It was undisputed that the applicant had instructed Hadi to make this collection from Kakak and had coordinated the collection.
After Hadi collected the bundles, he hid them in his motorcycle and returned to Singapore on the same day. Later that day, both Hadi and the applicant were arrested. The Central Narcotics Bureau (“CNB”) recovered the two bundles from Hadi’s motorcycle. The bundles contained not less than 325.81g of methamphetamine (the “Drugs”).
At trial in the High Court (HC/CC 12/2018, “CC 12”), the applicant claimed trial to a charge under s 5(1)(a) read with ss 5(2) and 12 of the Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed) (“MDA”). The prosecution’s case was that the applicant abetted Hadi by instigating him to be in possession of the Drugs for the purpose of trafficking. The applicant was represented at trial by Mr Ragbir Singh s/o Ram Singh Bajwa (“Mr Singh”) and Mr Wong Seow Pin (“Mr Wong”).
The trial judge convicted both the applicant and Hadi and imposed the mandatory death penalty on the applicant. The trial judge’s reasoning, as summarised in the Court of Appeal’s extract, turned largely on the applicant’s state of mind regarding the quantity of drugs that Hadi was to collect at the time the applicant instigated Hadi. The applicant’s defence was that he did not intend to traffic in more than 250g of methamphetamine (in gross weight, ie, the weight of the bundles). He claimed he had separately agreed with Kakak and Hadi not to deal beyond the capital punishment threshold.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The immediate legal issue before the Court of Appeal was not whether the applicant was guilty, but whether he had met the statutory precondition for permission to pursue a criminal review. Under s 394H(1) CPC, permission is required before a criminal review application can proceed. The court had to determine whether the applicant satisfied the threshold in s 394H(6A)(a) read with s 394J(2) CPC—namely, whether there was “sufficient material (being evidence or legal arguments)” to conclude that there had been a “miscarriage of justice” in the earlier decision.
A second, related issue concerned the applicant’s attempt to ground his review application in allegations about his counsel’s performance. The applicant argued that his trial counsel (and also his appeal counsel) was negligent and/or incompetent, and that counsel acted contrary to his instructions. The Court of Appeal had to consider whether such allegations, as advanced, could amount to “sufficient material” for the purpose of demonstrating a miscarriage of justice, bearing in mind the court’s established approach to counsel-related complaints.
Third, the Court of Appeal had to assess whether the applicant’s other arguments—such as reliance on “money evidence” and allegations against a named individual (Mr Singh, as referenced in the extract)—were properly made out and whether they introduced genuinely new material or merely re-packaged points already considered.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
The Court of Appeal began by framing the statutory threshold. Under s 394H(6A)(a) read with s 394J(2) CPC, the applicant must satisfy the court that there is “sufficient material (being evidence or legal arguments)” to conclude that there has been a “miscarriage of justice” in the criminal matter in respect of which the earlier decision was made. This is a gatekeeping function: permission is not granted for speculative or repetitive arguments, and the applicant must identify material that could realistically affect the integrity of the earlier outcome.
Applying this framework, the court concluded that there was “no material whatsoever, let alone ‘sufficient material’” to conclude that any miscarriage of justice had occurred. The court’s analysis proceeded through the applicant’s grounds for review permission. In doing so, it emphasised that the applicant’s submissions did not cross the statutory threshold and did not provide evidence or legal arguments capable of undermining the earlier decision.
On the counsel complaint, the Court of Appeal reiterated a “disturbing, ongoing trend” of convicted persons blaming counsel for their conviction, often without proper basis and sometimes contrary to the convicted person’s original instructions. The court stressed that defence counsel provide an important public service in the administration of criminal justice. Consequently, the threshold for raising complaints about counsel is “understandably strict”. The court referred to prior authority emphasising that the conduct must fall so clearly below an objective standard that it could be fairly described as “flagrant or egregious incompetence or indifference”, and there must be a real possibility that the inadequate assistance caused a miscarriage of justice.
The Court of Appeal also relied on its earlier remarks in Thennarasu s/o Karupiah v Public Prosecutor ([2022] SGCA 4) that grave allegations against former counsel—attacking counsel’s reputation and the finality and integrity of the judicial process—should not be lightly made. Unfounded allegations were described as reprehensible and unjust to counsel who have tried their best to assist clients, often without much material or other reward. The court further warned that appellate courts would not hesitate to make adverse costs orders against applicants who persist in making unsustainable and unfounded allegations against former counsel.
In the present case, the court observed that the applicant’s allegations against counsel were not substantiated with compelling evidence. The court’s approach suggests that, for counsel-related grounds to qualify as “sufficient material”, an applicant must do more than assert negligence or incompetence; the applicant must demonstrate, with concrete support, how counsel’s conduct fell below the strict objective standard and how that conduct could have affected the outcome.
Turning to the applicant’s other grounds, the Court of Appeal rejected them as well. The extract indicates four principal grounds: (1) the applicant’s claim of prejudice was not “sufficient material” capable of demonstrating a miscarriage of justice; (2) reliance on “money evidence” was not a legitimate basis to review the earlier decision; (3) allegations against Mr Singh were not made out; and (4) other arguments did not disclose any new material. While the extract is truncated and does not reproduce the full reasoning for each ground, the court’s overall conclusion is clear: none of the grounds provided the evidential or legal basis required under the CPC for permission to proceed.
Importantly, the court treated the application as part of a broader pattern of post-appeal litigation. The applicant had filed no less than six applications after his appeal was dismissed in 2020. The Court of Appeal’s insistence on “sufficient material” and its admonition against unfounded counsel allegations reflect a concern for finality and the proper use of review mechanisms, particularly in capital cases where the process is already subject to rigorous safeguards.
What Was the Outcome?
The Court of Appeal dismissed the application for permission under s 394H(1) CPC. The practical effect is that the applicant was not allowed to proceed with a criminal review application based on the grounds advanced. In other words, the court held that the applicant had not met the statutory gatekeeping threshold for demonstrating a miscarriage of justice.
The decision also signals that the court will scrutinise applications that rely on unsupported claims—especially allegations of counsel incompetence—and will reject arguments that do not introduce genuinely new evidence or credible legal arguments capable of affecting the integrity of the earlier conviction and sentence.
Why Does This Case Matter?
This case matters for practitioners because it clarifies, in a capital-case context, the strictness of the permission stage under s 394H CPC. The Court of Appeal’s emphasis on “sufficient material” and its insistence that there must be a basis to conclude a “miscarriage of justice” reinforces that permission is not a formality. Defence counsel and litigants must be prepared to identify specific evidence or legal arguments that could realistically undermine the earlier decision.
Second, the judgment is a strong reaffirmation of the court’s approach to complaints against counsel. The court’s discussion—grounded in prior authorities such as Mohammad Farid bin Batra v Public Prosecutor and Thennarasu—highlights that allegations of negligence or incompetence must be substantiated with compelling evidence and must meet a high threshold of objective egregiousness. This has direct implications for how future applicants should frame and evidence counsel-related grounds, and for how counsel should advise clients about the risks of making unsupported allegations.
Third, the decision underscores the court’s intolerance for repetitive or non-legitimate bases for review, such as reliance on evidence that is not properly connected to the statutory miscarriage-of-justice inquiry. For law students and researchers, the case provides a useful illustration of how Singapore’s criminal review framework operates as a structured filter, balancing the need to correct miscarriages of justice against the need for finality in criminal adjudication.
Legislation Referenced
- Applications in Capital Cases Act 2022
- Criminal Procedure Code 2010 (2020 Rev Ed), including ss 394H, 394J
- Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed), including ss 5(1)(a), 5(2), 12
- Supreme Court of Judicature Act
- Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969
Cases Cited
- [2021] SGCA 118
- [2021] SGHC 274
- [2022] SGCA 4
- [2023] SGCA 13
- [2023] SGCA 33
- [2024] SGCA 34
- [2025] SGCA 15
- [2025] SGCA 9
- [2025] SGHC 20
- Mohd Noor bin Ismail v Public Prosecutor [2023] SGCA 33
- Arun Ramesh Kumar v Public Prosecutor [2022] 1 SLR 1152
- Syed Suhail bin Syed Zin v Public Prosecutor [2021] 2 SLR 377
- Murugesan a/l Arumugam v Public Prosecutor [2021] SGCA 118
- Mohammad Farid bin Batra v Public Prosecutor and another appeal and other matters [2020] 1 SLR 907
- Thennarasu s/o Karupiah v Public Prosecutor [2022] SGCA 4
- Masri bin Hussain v Public Prosecutor [2025] SGCA 9
- Public Prosecutor v Muhammad Abdul Hadi bin Haron and another [2020] 5 SLR 710 (“Salleh (HC)”)
Source Documents
This article analyses [2025] SGCA 15 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.