Mu Qi & Anor v The Management Corporation Strata Plan No. 1849

"I find that the STB erred in not granting the orders sought by the appellants against the respondent for the removal of the fixed awnings and/or the restoration of the demolished external walls." — Per Ang Cheng Hock J, Para 77

Case Information

• Citation: [2021] SGHC 180 (Para 1)
• Court: In the General Division of the High Court of the Republic of Singapore (Para 1)
• Case Number: Tribunal Appeal No 18 of 2020 (Para 1)
• Coram: Ang Cheng Hock J (Para 1)
• Hearing Date: 24 March 2021 (Para 1)
• Judgment Date: 22 July 2021 (Para 1)
• Counsel for the appellants: Lee Xiancong (Taylor Vinters Via LLC) (Para 84)
• Counsel for the respondent: Lim Seng Siew and Lip Wei De Eric (OTP Law Corporation) (Para 84)
• Area of Law: Strata title / building maintenance / common property / MCST powers / appeals from the Strata Titles Board (Paras 1, 33, 53)
• Judgment length: Not stated in the extraction (NOT ANSWERABLE)

Summary

This appeal arose from a dispute at Bullion Park over fixed awnings installed at the balconies of 14th-floor units and the demolition of external walls to accommodate those awnings. The appellants were subsidiary proprietors of a 15th-floor unit and complained that the works were carried out on common property without valid approval. The High Court held that the external walls were common property, that the affected 14th-floor subsidiary proprietors did not need to be joined as parties, and that the resolutions relied on by the respondent did not validly authorise the permanent structures. (Paras 1, 5, 55, 77)

The court’s reasoning turned on the statutory scheme in the Building Maintenance and Strata Management Act, especially the definition of common property and the strict requirements for exclusive use or special privileges over common property. The judge rejected the respondent’s attempt to recharacterise the external walls as not being common property, and also rejected the contention that the November 2018 and November 2019 resolutions were sufficient to legitimise the awnings and wall demolition. The court emphasised that s 33 requires strict compliance and that the management corporation is ordinarily the proper party to sue and be sued in relation to common property. (Paras 33, 45, 53, 65, 66, 70)

In the result, the appeal succeeded. The matter was remitted to the Strata Titles Board so that, if valid 90% resolutions were not obtained within three months, the Board could make the necessary orders for removal of the fixed awnings and restoration of the demolished external walls. The court also noted that the STB’s nuisance-related orders under s 63 were stayed, with liberty to apply, and that costs would be dealt with separately. (Paras 77, 80, 84)

What dispute brought Mu Qi before the High Court?

The case concerned a dispute within Bullion Park, a condominium development at 170 Lentor Loop, where the appellants were subsidiary proprietors of a 15th-floor unit and objected to works carried out by their 14th-floor neighbours. The immediate complaint was that fixed awnings had been installed for the balconies at the front and rear of the 14th-floor unit, and that external walls had been demolished to facilitate those installations. The appellants treated those works as unauthorised encroachments on common property. (Paras 1, 5, 41)

The factual background matters because the court’s legal analysis was anchored in the nature of the works and the property affected. The judge noted that the appellants first noticed the installation in mid-December 2011, and that the dispute then developed through a series of resolutions and proceedings before the Strata Titles Board. The court later described the structures as unauthorised and as affixed to common property. (Paras 5, 68)

"In mid-December 2011, they noticed that their neighbour in the 14th floor unit below them was installing fixed awnings for the balconies at the front and rear of the 14th floor unit." — Per Ang Cheng Hock J, Para 5

The appeal was not about a private quarrel in the abstract; it was about whether the MCST could permit permanent structures on common property and, if not, whether the court should order their removal and the restoration of the walls. The High Court’s answer depended on the statutory characterisation of the external walls, the validity of the resolutions, and the procedural objection that the affected 14th-floor subsidiary proprietors had not been joined. (Paras 36, 40, 55, 65, 77)

How did the court frame the issues on appeal?

The court identified the central point of law as whether the STB erred in refusing to grant the appellants’ requested orders despite finding that there was no 90% approval for the works and no “killer litter” problem. The judge also framed the question whether the affected subsidiary proprietors of the 14th-floor units ought to have been heard, and whether the respondent’s later resolutions could validly authorise the works. These were the issues that structured the judgment. (Paras 36, 40)

"The first point of law is whether the STB erred in not granting the orders sought by the appellants in relation to the removal of the awnings and the restoration of the external walls despite its findings that (a) there was no 90% approval for the SPs of the relevant 14th floor units to carry out such works on the common property of the development, and (b) there was no “killer litter” problem in the development." — Per Ang Cheng Hock J, Para 36

The respondent’s position at the hearing before the High Court was that the external walls were not common property, and therefore no approval under s 33 was needed. In the alternative, it argued that the November 2018 and November 2019 resolutions supplied the necessary approval. The court treated those contentions as the key legal answers to the appellants’ claim for removal and restoration. (Para 37)

The judge also had to address a procedural objection raised by the STB: whether relief could be granted against the respondent MCST when the affected 14th-floor subsidiary proprietors had not been named as respondents. That issue was important because the STB had declined to order removal on the basis that doing so would be tantamount to ordering those proprietors to demolish their awnings without hearing them. (Paras 27, 41, 45)

Why did the court say the affected 14th-floor subsidiary proprietors did not need to be joined?

The court rejected the STB’s procedural concern and held that the management corporation, rather than the individual subsidiary proprietors, was the proper party in a dispute concerning common property. The judge relied on the statutory and doctrinal position that the MCST is the entity charged with managing common property and is ordinarily the party to sue and be sued in relation to it. That meant the appellants were not required to name the 14th-floor owners as respondents before seeking relief. (Paras 45, 46)

"it is consistent with the purpose and objective of the Act that, in regard to common property in general, it is the management corporation, rather than the subsidiary proprietors, which should normally be the party to sue and to be sued." — Per Ang Cheng Hock J, Para 45

The court’s reasoning was not merely procedural convenience. It reflected the structure of strata title law, under which the MCST acts for the development in relation to common property. The judge therefore treated the STB’s refusal to grant relief on the ground that the affected owners were absent as an error of law. The proper defendant was the MCST, and the MCST could not avoid relief by pointing to the absence of the individual owners whose works were in issue. (Paras 45, 77)

This conclusion was reinforced by the court’s view that the respondent had itself been the party before the STB and had the opportunity to defend the legality of the works and the resolutions. The judgment therefore did not accept that the absence of the 14th-floor owners prevented the tribunal or the court from making orders directed at the MCST concerning common property. (Paras 41, 45, 77)

Why did the court hold that the external walls were common property?

The respondent attempted to argue, contrary to its stance before the STB, that the external walls were not common property and that no approval under s 33 was therefore required. The court rejected that submission. The judge examined the statutory definition of common property and the physical character of the walls, and concluded that the external walls formed part of the common property of the development. (Paras 37, 53, 55)

"I therefore find it quite indisputable that the external walls form part of the common property of the development." — Per Ang Cheng Hock J, Para 55

The court’s reasoning was grounded in the statutory definition in s 2(1) of the BMSMA and in the photographs in evidence. The judge observed that the external walls contributed to the appearance of the building and were capable of being enjoyed by some or all subsidiary proprietors. That supported the conclusion that they were common property rather than part of any individual lot. (Paras 53, 55)

"Based on the photographs that were produced in evidence, it is clear to me that the external walls to which the awnings were affixed contributed to the appearance of the building, and were hence capable of being enjoyed by some or even all subsidiary proprietors of the development" — Per Ang Cheng Hock J, Para 55

The judge also noted that the respondent’s attempt to rely on Wu Chiu Lin was unpersuasive. The court referred to that case as one in which another judge had held external walls to be common property, and the present judgment treated later statutory amendments as reinforcing the same conclusion. The court also referred to an earlier STB decision, Mark Wheeler, as consistent with that view. (Paras 52, 58)

"Counsel for the respondent suggested that I should not follow the decision of Chan Seng Onn J in Wu Chiu Lin v Management Corporation Strata Title Plan No 2874 [2018] 4 SLR 966 (“Wu Chiu Lin”), where he held that the external walls of the strata development in that case were common property" — Per Ang Cheng Hock J, Para 52

How did the court deal with the respondent’s reliance on the November 2018 and November 2019 resolutions?

The respondent argued that even if the external walls were common property, the November 2018 and November 2019 resolutions had authorised the works. The court rejected that argument. It held that the November 2019 by-law was not legally effective insofar as it purported to authorise the fixed awnings or the demolition of the external walls, because it was an invalid attempt to comply with s 33. (Paras 37, 66, 70)

"In my view, this is undoubtedly an invalid resolution, insofar as it is one that is passed purportedly to comply with s 33 of the BMSMA." — Per Ang Cheng Hock J, Para 66

The judge explained that s 33 is designed to preserve a balance between the rights of the individual subsidiary proprietor and the collective rights of the development. Because of that balance, the statutory requirements must be strictly complied with whenever exclusive use of, or special privileges over, common property are contemplated. The court therefore treated the resolution requirements as substantive safeguards, not as formalities that could be loosely satisfied. (Paras 65, 66)

"To preserve this balancing of rights, the requirements of s 33 must be strictly complied with whenever exclusive use of, or special privileges over, common property in a development is contemplated." — Per Ang Cheng Hock J, Para 65

The court also held that the November 2018 resolution did not validly authorise the permanent structures. The judgment noted that the respondent’s own case before the STB had accepted that there was no 90% approval for the relevant works, and the court did not accept that the later resolutions cured that defect. The result was that the awnings and wall demolition remained unauthorised. (Paras 36, 68, 70)

"I find that November 2019 by-law is not legally effective insofar as it purports to authorise the fixed awnings installed by the 14th floor SPs, or the demolition of the external walls of the development." — Per Ang Cheng Hock J, Para 70

What statutory provisions did the court rely on, and how were they used?

The judgment referred to several provisions of the BMSMA. Section 98(1) governed the appeal route and limited appeals to points of law. Section 2(1) supplied the definition of “common property.” Section 24 concerned the constitution and powers of the MCST, while s 29 addressed duties in respect of common property. Section 32(4) dealt with the effectiveness of by-laws, s 33 with exclusive use by-laws, s 37(4) with improvements in lots, and s 63 with nuisance. (Paras 1, 33, 53, 64, 74)

"No appeal shall lie to the General Division of the High Court against an order made by a Board under this Part or the Land Titles (Strata) Act (Cap. 158) except on a point of law." — Per Ang Cheng Hock J, Para 33

The court used s 98(1) to explain the appellate standard and relied on Ng Eng Ghee to show that “points of law” include ex facie errors of law such as misinterpretation of a statute or taking irrelevant considerations into account. That framing mattered because the appellants were challenging the STB’s legal approach, not merely its factual findings. (Paras 33, 34)

"Errors of law include misinterpretation of a statute or any other legal document or a rule of common law; asking oneself and answering the wrong question, taking irrelevant considerations into account or failing to take relevant considerations into account" — Per Ang Cheng Hock J, Para 34

Section 33 was central to the merits because it governs the grant of exclusive use or special privileges over common property. The court also referred to s 37(4), which concerns improvements “in or upon” a lot, and used that provision to reject the respondent’s attempt to characterise the awnings and wall demolition as merely internal improvements. The statutory scheme therefore supported the conclusion that the works required proper approval and could not be justified by loose or incomplete resolutions. (Paras 64, 74)

"Under s 37(4) of the BMSMA, the respondent may authorise the SP to effect improvements “in or upon his lot”" — Per Ang Cheng Hock J, Para 74

What evidence did the court consider about the awnings and their effects?

The court considered photographs, the parties’ affidavits, and the STB’s findings. The evidence showed that the awnings were fixed structures attached to the external walls and that they affected the appearance of the building. The judge also referred to evidence that the awnings reflected heat, caused glare to the unit upstairs, created dirt, and caused noise disturbance during rain. (Paras 31, 55)

"the awnings reflected heat and caused glare which affected the unit upstairs, that the awnings were a source of dirt, and that the awnings caused “noise disturbance” during the rain." — Per Ang Cheng Hock J, Para 31

The court also noted the evidence of one affected 14th-floor owner, who said the awnings should not be removed because of the risk of “killer litter” and because they prevented water ingress during torrential rain. That evidence was relevant to the respondent’s attempt to justify the structures on safety grounds, but the court did not accept that it displaced the statutory requirements for valid approval. (Paras 51, 24, 65)

"His evidence was to the effect that the fixed awnings which covered his balcony should not be removed because of the risk of “killer litter”, and because it prevented the ingress of water into his unit during torrential rain." — Per Ang Cheng Hock J, Para 51

The judge also referred to STB cases recognising awnings as “safety devices” in killer litter situations, but that did not alter the outcome. The court treated that line of authority as an exception rather than a general licence to install permanent structures on common property without proper approval. The evidence therefore supported the factual context, but not the respondent’s legal position. (Para 24)

How did the court treat the STB’s earlier findings and orders?

The STB had found that there was no 90% resolution authorising the works, but it declined to order removal because it considered that doing so would be tantamount to ordering the 14th-floor owners to demolish their awnings without hearing them. The STB also found that the November 2012 by-law had no force or effect because it was not acknowledged by the BCA or lodged with the Commissioner as required by s 32(4). (Paras 27, 29)

"the STB decided against granting the orders against the respondent to take the necessary action to remove the unauthorised structures, because that “would be tantamount to [the STB] ordering the [14th floor units’ SPs] to demolish their awnings without affording them an opportunity to be heard”." — Per Ang Cheng Hock J, Para 27

The High Court disagreed with the STB’s refusal to grant relief on that procedural basis. It held that the MCST was the proper party and that the absence of the individual owners did not prevent the tribunal from making orders against the respondent. The court therefore corrected what it saw as an error in the STB’s approach to the identity of the proper respondent and the legal consequences of the unauthorised works. (Paras 45, 77)

The STB had also made nuisance-related orders under s 63, but the High Court’s extracted text indicates that those orders were stayed, with liberty to apply. The judgment did not finally determine costs in the extracted material and expressly reserved that issue. (Paras 32, 84)

Why did the court say the November 2019 by-law was ineffective under s 33?

The court treated the November 2019 by-law as an attempt to regularise permanent encroachments on common property without satisfying the statutory conditions. Because s 33 requires strict compliance where exclusive use or special privileges over common property are involved, a by-law that does not properly identify and authorise the relevant privilege cannot validate the works. The judge therefore held that the by-law was not legally effective for the awnings or the wall demolition. (Paras 65, 70)

"Exclusive use by-laws 33.—(1) Without prejudice to section 32, with the written consent of the subsidiary proprietor of the lot concerned, a management corporation may make a by-law —" — Per Ang Cheng Hock J, Para 64

The court’s analysis shows that the statutory mechanism is not satisfied merely because some form of resolution is passed. The resolution must be the right kind of resolution, supported by the required level of approval, and directed to the correct subject matter. The judge found that the respondent’s resolution did not meet that standard and could not retrospectively legalise the permanent structures. (Paras 65, 66, 70)

That conclusion also explains why the court rejected the respondent’s attempt to rely on the November 2018 and November 2019 resolutions as a complete answer. The legal defect was not cured by later paperwork, because the underlying works remained unauthorised structures affixed to common property. (Paras 68, 70)

What did the court decide about the respondent’s attempt to characterise the works as improvements in a lot?

The respondent sought to invoke s 37(4), which concerns improvements “in or upon” a lot, but the court did not accept that the awnings and wall demolition fell within that provision. The judge’s reasoning was that the works were done to common property, not merely within the lot, and therefore required the more demanding statutory treatment applicable to common property. (Paras 74, 55)

"Under s 37(4) of the BMSMA, the respondent may authorise the SP to effect improvements “in or upon his lot”" — Per Ang Cheng Hock J, Para 74

The distinction mattered because the respondent’s argument depended on treating the external walls and awnings as if they were part of the individual lot or as if the MCST could authorise them under a more permissive regime. The court rejected that premise after finding that the external walls were common property. Once that finding was made, the respondent’s reliance on s 37(4) could not stand. (Paras 55, 74)

The judgment therefore preserved the boundary between lot improvements and common property alterations. The court’s approach ensures that owners cannot, by re-labelling a structure as an “improvement,” avoid the statutory controls that protect the shared fabric of a strata development. (Paras 65, 74)

What was the final outcome and what orders did the court make?

The appeal succeeded. The court held that the STB erred in refusing to grant the appellants’ requested orders for removal of the fixed awnings and restoration of the demolished external walls. The matter was remitted to the STB so that, if the necessary 90% resolutions for each affected 14th-floor unit were not obtained within three months, the STB could make the necessary removal and restoration orders. (Paras 77, 80)

"I remit this matter to the STB for it to make the necessary orders for the respondent to remove the fixed awnings and restore the demolished external walls if, within a period of three months from the date of this judgment, the necessary 90% resolutions for the installation of the awnings and the demolition of the external walls for each of the affected 14th floor units have not been obtained." — Per Ang Cheng Hock J, Para 80

The court also indicated that a three-month period was sufficient for the respondent to take the necessary steps before removal and restoration would follow. That gave the respondent a final opportunity to regularise the position through valid resolutions, but only in the manner required by the statute. (Para 80)

As to costs, the judge stated that the issue would be dealt with separately. The extracted material also records that the STB had considered it inequitable to penalise the appellants with costs because their case was not without merit and the respondent was not without fault. (Paras 32, 84)

Why does this case matter for strata title disputes in Singapore?

This case is important because it clarifies that disputes over common property are ordinarily to be litigated through the MCST, not by joining every affected subsidiary proprietor. That practical rule matters in strata disputes where the number of affected owners may be large and where the MCST is the statutory body responsible for the common property. The judgment therefore provides procedural clarity as well as substantive guidance. (Paras 45, 77)

"it is the management corporation, rather than the subsidiary proprietors, which should normally be the party to sue and to be sued." — Per Ang Cheng Hock J, Para 45

The case is also significant because it confirms that external walls can be common property and that permanent structures attached to them cannot be legitimised by informal or incomplete resolutions. The court’s insistence on strict compliance with s 33 protects the collective interests of all subsidiary proprietors and prevents piecemeal encroachment on shared building fabric. (Paras 55, 65, 70)

"To preserve this balancing of rights, the requirements of s 33 must be strictly complied with whenever exclusive use of, or special privileges over, common property in a development is contemplated." — Per Ang Cheng Hock J, Para 65

Finally, the judgment is a practical warning against attempts to regularise unauthorised works after the fact through loosely drafted by-laws or resolutions. The court made clear that the statutory route must be followed from the outset, and that a later resolution will not necessarily cure a defect where the works are on common property and the required approval has not been obtained. (Paras 66, 68, 70, 80)

Cases Referred To

Legislation Referenced

• Building Maintenance and Strata Management Act (Cap 30C, 2008 Rev Ed): ss 2(1), 24, 29, 32(4), 33, 37(4), 63, 98(1), 98(2) (Paras 1, 33, 53, 64, 74)
• Land Titles (Strata) Act (Cap. 158) (Paras 33, 65)
• Building Maintenance (Strata Management) Regulations 2005 (Para 29)

Source Documents

• Original Judgment — Singapore Courts
• Archived Copy (PDF) — Litt Law CDN
• View in judgment: "“common property”, subject to subsection (9),..."
• View in judgment: "I will deal separately with the..."
• View in judgment: "Ang Cheng Hock Judge of the..."
• View in judgment: "Section 2(1) of the BMSMA defines..."

This article analyses [2021] SGHC 180 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.