Case Details
- Citation: [2025] SGHC 20
- Title: Masoud Rahimi bin Mehrzad and others v Attorney-General
- Court: High Court of the Republic of Singapore (General Division)
- Date of Decision: 5 February 2025
- Judgment Reserved: 20 January 2025
- Judge(s): Hoo Sheau Peng J
- Originating Application No: OA 972 of 2024
- Summons No: SUM 2898 of 2024
- Applicants/Plaintiffs: Masoud Rahimi bin Mehrzad and 30 other prisoners awaiting capital punishment
- Respondent/Defendant: Attorney-General
- Legal Areas: Civil Procedure — Striking out; Constitutional Law — Equality before the law; Constitutional Law — Fundamental liberties
- Key Constitutional Provisions: Articles 9 and 12 of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (2020 Rev Ed)
- Key Statutes Challenged (Impugned Provisions): Sections 60G(7)(d), 60G(8), 60H(6) and 60I(1) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969; and section 313(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code 2010
- Statutory Context: The Post-appeal Applications in Capital Cases Act 2022 (“PACC Act”) introduced the PACC permission and post-appeal application regime
- Procedural Rule Invoked by AG: Order 9 r 16(1)(a) of the Rules of Court 2021
- Prior Related Decisions: Masoud Rahimi bin Mehrzad and others v Attorney-General [2024] SGHC 238; Masoud Rahimi bin Mehrzad and others v Attorney-General [2024] 1 SLR 414
- Judgment Length: 48 pages; 13,256 words
Summary
In Masoud Rahimi bin Mehrzad and others v Attorney-General [2025] SGHC 20, the High Court struck out a constitutional challenge brought by 31 prisoners awaiting capital punishment. The applicants sought declarations that specified provisions of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969 (“SCJA”) and the Criminal Procedure Code 2010 (“CPC”)—collectively referred to as the “Impugned Provisions”—were void for inconsistency with Articles 9 and 12 of the Constitution. The application was brought within the framework of the Post-appeal Applications in Capital Cases Act 2022 (“PACC Act”), which created a structured regime for “post-appeal applications in capital cases” (“PACC applications”).
The Attorney-General applied to strike out the originating application in its entirety under O 9 r 16(1)(a) of the Rules of Court 2021 on the basis that the application disclosed no reasonable cause of action. The High Court (Hoo Sheau Peng J) allowed the Attorney-General’s application and struck out OA 972. The decision turned on two principal grounds: first, the applicants lacked standing (including because of the relevant point in time for assessing standing); and second, the court found that there was no viable constitutional claim that the Impugned Provisions were inconsistent with Articles 9 and 12.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
The applicants were prisoners awaiting capital punishment (“PACPs”). They commenced OA 972 on 19 September 2024, seeking constitutional declarations that certain provisions of the SCJA and CPC were void. The constitutional challenge was directed at the PACC Act regime, which governs how PACPs may bring further post-appeal applications after their appeals have been concluded. The PACC Act was enacted to create a new procedure within the SCJA for such applications, and it introduced a permission-based mechanism requiring PACPs to obtain leave from the Court of Appeal before commencing a PACC application.
Under the PACC Act regime, a PACP seeking to make a PACC application must first apply to the Court of Appeal for “PACC permission” (SCJA s 60G(1)). In deciding whether to grant permission, the Court of Appeal must consider four factors set out in SCJA s 60G(7): (i) whether the proposed PACC application is based on material that could not, even with reasonable diligence, have been adduced before the relevant date; (ii) whether there was delay in filing after the material was obtained and the reasons for delay; (iii) whether the applicant complies with requirements to file written submissions and prescribed documents within prescribed periods; and (iv) whether the PACC application has a reasonable prospect of success (SCJA s 60G(7)(d)).
Further, the regime allows the Court of Appeal to summarily deal with applications for PACC permission without setting them down for hearing (SCJA ss 60G(8) and 60H(6)). The applicants’ constitutional complaint was that these summary dismissal powers and the “reasonable prospect of success” threshold operate at a stage where the applicant’s life is at stake, and therefore allegedly undermine fair trial and access to justice. In addition, the applicants challenged SCJA s 60I(1), which restricts successive PACC permission and PACC applications while a specified application is pending, and they challenged CPC s 313(2), which addresses the effect of PACC applications on the execution of death sentences.
Procedurally, the case was not the first constitutional attempt by these applicants. In 2023, a group of applicants filed OA 987 seeking declarations that SCJA ss 60G(7)(d) and 60G(8) violated Articles 9 and 12. The High Court struck out OA 987, and the Court of Appeal affirmed that decision on the ground that the applicants lacked standing because, at the time of the application, they were not and would not be affected by the impugned provisions. After the Impugned Provisions came into force on 28 June 2024, the applicants filed OA 972, challenging a broader set of provisions. The Attorney-General then applied to strike out OA 972 in its entirety.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The High Court identified two main issues. The first was whether the applicants met the threshold requirement of standing to bring the constitutional challenge. This issue was central because the Court of Appeal’s earlier decision in the related proceedings had already emphasised the standing requirement in the context of the PACC Act regime. The High Court therefore had to determine not only whether the applicants had standing, but also the relevant point in time for assessing standing.
The second issue was whether there was a viable claim that the Impugned Provisions were inconsistent with Articles 9 and 12 of the Constitution. Article 9 concerns fundamental liberties, including the right to fair trial and access to justice. Article 12 provides for equality before the law. The applicants contended that the Impugned Provisions imposed burdens and procedural constraints that were allegedly oppressive and inconsistent with these constitutional guarantees, particularly given the irreversible nature of the death penalty context.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
Issue 1: Standing and the relevant point in time
The High Court approached standing as a threshold question. The Attorney-General’s position was that the applicants lacked standing to commence OA 972 and that there was no realistic prospect of success in arguing that the Impugned Provisions were unconstitutional. The applicants disagreed, arguing that they had the requisite standing and that their constitutional challenge was at least arguable.
In resolving standing, the court focused on the “relevant point in time” for assessing whether the applicants were affected by the impugned provisions. This is a doctrinally important aspect of constitutional litigation: even where legislation is facially suspect, a claimant must generally show that the impugned provisions have a real and direct impact on the claimant’s legal position. The High Court held that the applicants had no standing, applying the correct temporal framework for evaluating whether they were and would be affected by the challenged provisions at the time the application was brought.
Although the applicants were PACPs, the court’s reasoning reflected the logic of the earlier Court of Appeal decision: standing depends on whether the applicants are actually subject to the legal effects of the impugned provisions in a way that makes the constitutional challenge meaningful. Where the challenged provisions operate through a permission and procedural pathway that may not yet have been engaged in the applicants’ cases (or where the applicants were not positioned to be affected in the relevant sense), the constitutional claim may fail at the threshold.
Issue 2: Whether there was a viable constitutional claim
Having determined that the applicants lacked standing, the court also addressed whether the application disclosed a viable constitutional claim. The applicants’ constitutional arguments were directed at specific features of the PACC Act regime. First, they argued that SCJA s 60G(7)(d) imposes a “reasonable prospect of success” burden at the permission stage, which they characterised as requiring predictive assessment before the applicant can fully canvass the merits. They contended that this allegedly denies meaningful recourse to the courts and therefore violates Article 9 and is inconsistent with Article 12.
Second, they argued that SCJA s 60G(8) and SCJA s 60H(6) allow summary dismissal without setting down the application for hearing. The applicants’ complaint was that summary refusal prevents them from addressing the court or effectively canvassing their arguments at a stage where their lives are at stake. They framed this as an infringement of fair trial and access to justice under Article 9, and as discriminatory or unequal treatment under Article 12.
Third, the applicants challenged SCJA s 60I(1), which restricts successive PACC applications while a specified application is pending unless permission is obtained. Finally, they challenged CPC s 313(2), which provides that a warrant of execution may nonetheless be carried out in certain circumstances, even where there are applications for permission to apply for a stay of execution or for a stay of execution filed in the Court of Appeal and served on the Singapore Prison Service. The applicants’ argument was that these provisions, taken together, undermine the constitutional safeguards that should apply in capital cases.
The High Court’s analysis, as reflected in the structure of the judgment, applied constitutional principles governing challenges to legislation. While the applicants invoked Articles 9 and 12, the court’s reasoning indicates that the constitutional challenge did not clear the threshold of viability. In particular, the court considered the design and operation of the PACC Act regime as a whole, including the role of the Court of Appeal in assessing the statutory factors and the procedural safeguards embedded in the permission framework. The court also considered the nature of the summary procedure and the extent to which it is consistent with fair trial and access to justice in the context of permission-based gatekeeping.
Ultimately, the court concluded that there was no viable constitutional claim. This conclusion was consistent with the court’s approach to constitutional litigation in the context of capital procedures: while constitutional rights are engaged, the court will examine whether the statutory scheme provides sufficient procedural fairness and whether the applicants’ arguments can realistically establish constitutional inconsistency.
What Was the Outcome?
The High Court allowed the Attorney-General’s application under O 9 r 16(1)(a) of the Rules of Court 2021 and struck out OA 972 in its entirety. The practical effect was that the applicants’ constitutional challenge did not proceed to a full determination on the merits of whether the Impugned Provisions were unconstitutional.
Because the originating application was struck out, the applicants did not obtain the declarations they sought. The decision therefore reinforces the procedural gatekeeping role of standing requirements and the “no reasonable cause of action” standard in constitutional challenges brought through civil procedure.
Why Does This Case Matter?
This decision is significant for practitioners because it demonstrates how constitutional challenges to capital-case procedures may be terminated at an early stage. The court’s insistence on standing—particularly the identification of the relevant point in time for assessing whether applicants are affected—highlights that constitutional litigation is not merely about the abstract validity of legislation. Claimants must show a concrete legal impact on their own position within the procedural scheme.
Second, the case illustrates the court’s approach to constitutional arguments framed around fair trial and access to justice in permission-based regimes. The PACC Act introduces a structured permission process, including a “reasonable prospect of success” factor and summary disposal powers. While the applicants argued that these features are inherently oppressive in capital cases, the High Court’s conclusion that there was no viable constitutional claim indicates that the court will scrutinise whether the statutory design provides adequate procedural fairness rather than accepting broad assertions of unfairness.
Third, the decision has practical implications for how future litigants may structure constitutional challenges to the PACC Act regime. If standing is assessed strictly and temporally, applicants may need to ensure that their cases are positioned such that the impugned provisions have a direct and operative effect on them. Lawyers advising PACPs or other affected persons should therefore carefully map the procedural pathway and timing of statutory triggers before commencing constitutional proceedings.
Legislation Referenced
- Rules of Court 2021 (O 9 r 16(1)(a))
- Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (2020 Rev Ed), Articles 9 and 12
- Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969 (SCJA) — ss 60G(7)(d), 60G(8), 60H(6), 60I(1)
- Criminal Procedure Code 2010 (CPC) — s 313(2)
- Post-appeal Applications in Capital Cases Act 2022 (PACC Act) — ss 2(b) and 3 (as described in the judgment)
- Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969 (as part of the statutory framework for PACC permission)
Cases Cited
- [2024] SGHC 238
- [2025] SGHC 20
Source Documents
This article analyses [2025] SGHC 20 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.