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Masoud Rahimi bin Mehrzad and others v Attorney-General [2025] SGHC 20

In Masoud Rahimi bin Mehrzad and others v Attorney-General, the High Court of the Republic of Singapore addressed issues of Civil Procedure — Striking out, Constitutional Law — Equality before the law.

Case Details

  • Citation: [2025] SGHC 20
  • Title: Masoud Rahimi bin Mehrzad and others v Attorney-General
  • Court: High Court of the Republic of Singapore (General Division)
  • Date of Decision: 5 February 2025
  • Judgment Reserved: 20 January 2025
  • Judge: Hoo Sheau Peng J
  • Originating Application No: 972 of 2024
  • Summons No: 2898 of 2024
  • Procedural Application: Summons under O 9 r 16(1)(a) of the Rules of Court 2021 to strike out the originating application
  • Applicants/Plaintiffs: Masoud Rahimi bin Mehrzad and 30 others (31 prisoners awaiting capital punishment)
  • Respondent/Defendant: Attorney-General
  • Legal Areas: Civil Procedure — Striking out; Constitutional Law — Equality before the law; Constitutional Law — Fundamental liberties (including right to life and personal liberty)
  • Constitutional Provisions Invoked: Articles 9 and 12 of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (2020 Rev Ed)
  • Statutory Provisions Challenged: Sections 60G(7)(d), 60G(8), 60H(6) and 60I(1) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969; and section 313(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code 2010
  • Legislation Referenced (contextual): Post-appeal Applications in Capital Cases Act 2022 (“PACC Act”); Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969 (“SCJA”); Criminal Procedure Code 2010 (“CPC”); Rules of Court 2021 (“ROC 2021”); Supreme Court of Judicature Act provisions on PACC permissions and procedures
  • Cases Cited: [2024] SGHC 238; [2025] SGHC 20 (this case)
  • Prior Related Decisions: Masoud Rahimi bin Mehrzad and others v Attorney-General [2024] 4 SLR 331 (“Masoud (HC)”); Masoud Rahimi bin Mehrzad and others v Attorney-General [2024] 1 SLR 414 (“Masoud (CA)”) (appeal dismissed on standing)
  • Judgment Length: 48 pages; 13,256 words

Summary

In Masoud Rahimi bin Mehrzad and others v Attorney-General [2025] SGHC 20, 31 prisoners awaiting capital punishment applied for constitutional declarations that certain provisions of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969 and the Criminal Procedure Code 2010 were void for inconsistency with Articles 9 and 12 of the Constitution. The challenged provisions were introduced by the Post-appeal Applications in Capital Cases Act 2022 (“PACC Act”) and form part of the “PACC Act regime”, which governs post-appeal applications (“PACC applications”) by prisoners under sentence of death.

The Attorney-General applied to strike out the originating application in its entirety under O 9 r 16(1)(a) of the Rules of Court 2021 on the basis that the applicants lacked standing and that the application disclosed no reasonable cause of action. The High Court (Hoo Sheau Peng J) allowed the striking-out application and held that the applicants had no standing to bring the constitutional challenge. As a result, the court did not grant the declarations sought and the originating application was struck out.

What Were the Facts of This Case?

The applicants were prisoners awaiting capital punishment (“PACPs”). They sought to challenge the constitutionality of specific procedural provisions that regulate how PACPs may bring post-appeal applications after their appeals have been concluded. The PACC Act was enacted to create a structured mechanism within the SCJA for PACPs to make PACC applications. Under this framework, a PACP must first obtain permission from the Court of Appeal before commencing a PACC application in the relevant capital case.

At the heart of the applicants’ complaint was the permission stage and the consequences for execution of the death sentence. The applicants targeted provisions in the SCJA that (i) require the Court of Appeal to consider whether the proposed PACC application has a “reasonable prospect of success” (including the applicants’ contention that this imposes an onerous predictive burden at the outset), and (ii) allow the Court of Appeal to summarily deal with and refuse permission without setting the matter down for a hearing. They also challenged provisions dealing with the effect of PACC applications on the carrying out of death sentences, including the circumstances in which a warrant of execution may nonetheless proceed.

Procedurally, this case followed earlier litigation. In 2023, a subset of the applicants (29 prisoners plus five others) filed HC/OA/987/2023 (“OA 987”) seeking declarations that certain SCJA provisions violated Articles 9 and 12. The High Court struck out OA 987, and the Court of Appeal affirmed the decision on the ground that the applicants lacked standing because, at the time of that application, they were not and would not be affected by the provisions they challenged. The appeal was dismissed. After the PACC Act regime came into force on 28 June 2024, the applicants filed the present originating application, HC/OA/972/2024 (“OA 972”), on 19 September 2024.

In OA 972, the applicants expanded the constitutional challenge to additional provisions: sections 60G(7)(d), 60G(8), 60H(6) and 60I(1) of the SCJA, and section 313(2) of the CPC. The Attorney-General responded by bringing a summons (SUM 2898) under O 9 r 16(1)(a) to strike out the originating application in its entirety. The High Court therefore had to determine, as a threshold matter, whether the applicants had standing to commence the constitutional challenge, and whether the application disclosed a viable claim.

The first key issue was whether the applicants met the threshold requirement of standing to bring OA 972. In constitutional litigation, standing is not merely a technical requirement; it is tied to whether the applicant is sufficiently affected by the impugned provisions so that the court can properly adjudicate the constitutional question. Here, the applicants had previously been found to lack standing in OA 987, and the Court of Appeal’s reasoning in Masoud (CA) was central to the High Court’s analysis.

The second issue was whether there was a viable constitutional claim that the impugned provisions were inconsistent with Articles 9 and 12 of the Constitution. Article 9 concerns fundamental liberties, including the right to life and personal liberty and, in constitutional practice, is often invoked in relation to fairness in criminal process and access to justice. Article 12 provides for equality before the law and equal protection under the law. The applicants argued that the PACC permission and summary refusal mechanisms, and the effect of PACC applications on execution, undermined fair trial and access to justice and created unconstitutional inequality.

How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?

The High Court approached the case through the lens of the striking-out application. Under O 9 r 16(1)(a) of the ROC 2021, the court may strike out a pleading if it discloses no reasonable cause of action. In constitutional cases, this requires the court to assess whether the application is legally and factually viable at the outset, including whether the applicant has standing and whether the constitutional challenge is arguable.

On standing, the court focused on the “relevant point in time” for assessing whether the applicants were affected by the impugned provisions. The judgment indicates that the applicants’ earlier lack of standing in OA 987 had been affirmed by the Court of Appeal on the basis that the applicants were not and would not be affected by the challenged provisions at the time they commenced that earlier application. The High Court therefore examined whether the applicants in OA 972 could be said to be affected by the impugned provisions at the relevant time when OA 972 was filed, and whether the applicants’ circumstances had changed in a way that would satisfy the standing threshold.

Applying the standing principles, the court concluded that the applicants had no standing. The reasoning, as reflected in the judgment’s structure, turned on the timing and the nature of the effect of the impugned provisions on the applicants’ legal position. The court treated the standing requirement as a threshold barrier: if the applicants were not sufficiently affected by the impugned provisions at the relevant time, the constitutional question could not be properly entertained. The court therefore struck out OA 972 without proceeding to a full merits determination of the constitutional arguments.

Because the court allowed the striking-out application on standing, it did not grant the declarations sought. Nonetheless, the judgment’s structure shows that the court also addressed the second issue—whether there was a viable constitutional claim under Articles 9 and 12. The applicants’ arguments were that the “reasonable prospect of success” requirement at the permission stage was a predictive exercise that imposed an oppressive burden and denied meaningful access to court. They also argued that summary dismissal mechanisms without a hearing prevented them from addressing the court on matters “upon which his life hinges”, thereby undermining fair trial and access to justice. In relation to Article 12, they contended that the regime created unequal treatment in a manner inconsistent with equality before the law.

However, the court’s ultimate conclusion rested on the absence of standing. In constitutional litigation, this is significant: even where a constitutional argument may appear serious on its face, the court will not decide it unless the applicant is properly positioned to bring the challenge. The High Court’s approach reflects a disciplined procedural gatekeeping function, ensuring that constitutional adjudication is undertaken only in cases where the applicant is directly and sufficiently affected by the impugned law.

What Was the Outcome?

The High Court allowed the Attorney-General’s summons under O 9 r 16(1)(a) and struck out OA 972 in its entirety. The practical effect is that the applicants did not obtain the declarations that the impugned provisions were void for inconsistency with Articles 9 and 12.

As a result, the constitutional challenge did not proceed to a substantive determination of whether the PACC Act regime’s permission and summary refusal mechanisms, and the execution-related provisions in the CPC, were constitutionally valid. The decision therefore leaves the PACC Act regime intact for the time being, at least as far as this particular constitutional challenge is concerned.

Why Does This Case Matter?

This case matters primarily for its reaffirmation of standing as a threshold requirement in constitutional litigation in Singapore. The applicants had already been unsuccessful in OA 987, and the Court of Appeal’s standing analysis in Masoud (CA) was effectively carried forward. The High Court’s decision in Masoud (2025) underscores that litigants cannot circumvent a standing defect by reframing the challenge or adding additional provisions unless they can demonstrate that they are sufficiently affected by the impugned provisions at the relevant time.

For practitioners, the decision is a reminder that constitutional challenges—especially those seeking declarations of invalidity—are highly sensitive to procedural posture and timing. In capital-related litigation, where urgency and life-and-death consequences heighten the stakes, courts still require compliance with standing doctrine. Lawyers advising PACPs or other affected groups must therefore carefully assess whether the impugned provisions have a direct and present impact on the client’s legal position at the time the constitutional application is filed.

Second, the case highlights the interaction between constitutional rights arguments and the structural design of the PACC Act regime. Even though the applicants’ arguments focused on fair trial, access to justice, and equality, the court’s decision demonstrates that constitutional merits may never be reached if the applicant fails to clear the standing hurdle. This has implications for how future constitutional challenges should be framed: they must be anchored in a demonstrable, legally relevant effect on the applicant rather than a general or hypothetical concern about how the regime might operate.

Legislation Referenced

  • Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969 (SCJA), including ss 60G(7)(d), 60G(8), 60H(6), 60I(1)
  • Criminal Procedure Code 2010 (CPC), including s 313(2)
  • Post-appeal Applications in Capital Cases Act 2022 (PACC Act)
  • Rules of Court 2021 (ROC 2021), including O 9 r 16(1)(a)
  • Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969 (contextual references including s 394H and related provisions)
  • Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (2020 Rev Ed), including Articles 9 and 12

Cases Cited

  • [2024] SGHC 238
  • Masoud Rahimi bin Mehrzad and others v Attorney-General [2024] 4 SLR 331 (“Masoud (HC)”) (referred to in the judgment’s procedural history)
  • Masoud Rahimi bin Mehrzad and others v Attorney-General [2024] 1 SLR 414 (“Masoud (CA)”) (referred to in the judgment’s procedural history)
  • [2025] SGHC 20 (this case)

Source Documents

This article analyses [2025] SGHC 20 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.

Written by Sushant Shukla

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