Case Details
- Citation: [2025] SGHC 20
- Title: Masoud Rahimi bin Mehrzad & 30 Ors v Attorney-General of Singapore
- Court: High Court (General Division)
- Originating Application: OA 972 of 2024
- Summons: SUM 2898 of 2024
- Judgment date (reserved): 20 January 2025
- Judgment date (delivered): 5 February 2025
- Judge: Hoo Sheau Peng J
- Applicants/Plaintiffs: Masoud Rahimi bin Mehrzad and 30 other prisoners (31 applicants in total)
- Respondent/Defendant: Attorney-General of Singapore
- Legal area(s): Civil Procedure (striking out); Constitutional Law (equality before the law; fundamental liberties—right to life and personal liberty)
- Statutory provisions challenged: Sections 60G(7)(d), 60G(8), 60H(6) and 60I(1) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969 (SCJA); and section 313(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code 2010 (CPC)
- Legislative context: Provisions introduced by the Post-appeal Applications in Capital Cases Act 2022 (PACC Act)
- Constitutional provisions relied on: Articles 9 and 12 of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (2020 Rev Ed)
- Procedural posture: Application by the Attorney-General to strike out the constitutional application in its entirety under O 9 r 16(1)(a) of the Rules of Court 2021
- Judgment length: 48 pages; 13,256 words
Summary
In Masoud Rahimi bin Mehrzad & 30 Ors v Attorney-General of Singapore ([2025] SGHC 20), the High Court considered a constitutional challenge brought by 31 prisoners awaiting capital punishment. The applicants sought declarations that certain provisions of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969 (SCJA) and the Criminal Procedure Code 2010 (CPC)—collectively, the “Impugned Provisions”—were void because they allegedly infringed the right to fair trial and access to justice under Article 9 of the Constitution, and also allegedly violated Article 12 (equality before the law).
The Attorney-General applied to strike out the originating application in its entirety on the basis that it disclosed no reasonable cause of action. The High Court (Hoo Sheau Peng J) allowed the Attorney-General’s application and struck out the constitutional application. The decision turned on two main issues: first, whether the applicants had the requisite standing to bring the constitutional challenge; and second, whether the application disclosed a viable constitutional claim that the Impugned Provisions were inconsistent with Articles 9 and 12.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
The applicants were prisoners awaiting capital punishment (“PACPs”). They brought an originating application (OA 972) seeking declarations that specific provisions introduced under the PACC Act were unconstitutional. The PACC Act created a structured “post-appeal applications in capital cases” regime (“PACC Act regime” or “PACCA regime”) within the SCJA. Under this regime, a PACP who wishes to make a post-appeal application (“PACC application”) must first obtain permission from the Court of Appeal.
Permission is not automatic. The Court of Appeal must consider multiple statutory factors when deciding whether to grant PACC permission, including whether the proposed application is based on material that could not, with reasonable diligence, have been adduced earlier; whether there was delay in filing; whether the applicant complies with filing requirements; and whether the PACC application has a reasonable prospect of success. The applicants’ constitutional challenge focused on particular elements of this permission and dismissal framework, as well as on the effect of PACC applications on the execution of death sentences.
Procedurally, the case had a significant predecessor. Prior to OA 972, 29 of the applicants (together with five other PACPs) filed an earlier originating application, OA 987, on 26 September 2023. OA 987 challenged, among other things, sections 60G(7)(d) and 60G(8) of the SCJA as inconsistent with Articles 9 and 12. The High Court struck out OA 987 on 5 December 2023. On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed the striking out, holding that the applicants in OA 987 lacked the requisite standing because, at the time of that application, they were not and would not be affected by the impugned provisions.
After the PACC Act regime came into force on 28 June 2024, the applicants filed OA 972 on 19 September 2024. OA 972 challenged a broader set of provisions than OA 987, including sections 60G(7)(d), 60G(8), 60H(6) and 60I(1) of the SCJA, and section 313(2) of the CPC. The Attorney-General then brought SUM 2898 to strike out OA 972 in its entirety under O 9 r 16(1)(a) of the Rules of Court 2021, arguing that the application disclosed no reasonable cause of action because the applicants lacked standing and because there was no realistic prospect of success on the constitutional merits.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The first key issue was whether the applicants met the threshold requirement of standing to commence OA 972. In constitutional litigation, standing is not merely procedural; it is a gatekeeping requirement that ensures the court adjudicates concrete disputes rather than hypothetical or abstract questions. The High Court had to determine the relevant point in time for assessing standing, and whether the applicants were actually affected by the impugned provisions in a manner that justified judicial review.
The second key issue was whether the application disclosed a viable constitutional claim that the Impugned Provisions were inconsistent with Articles 9 and 12 of the Constitution. The applicants argued that the statutory scheme imposed burdens and procedural constraints that undermined fair trial and access to justice, and that the scheme was also discriminatory or otherwise inconsistent with the constitutional guarantee of equality before the law.
Although the judgment extract provided is truncated, the structure of the High Court’s analysis indicates that the court treated standing as determinative, and then assessed whether the constitutional arguments were at least arguable. The court’s ultimate conclusion was that the application should be struck out in its entirety.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
Standing and the relevant point in time. The High Court approached standing by focusing on when the court must assess whether an applicant is “affected” by the impugned provisions. The applicants’ constitutional challenge depended on the premise that the impugned provisions would operate to their detriment in their own capital cases—particularly in relation to the permission stage for PACC applications and the consequences for execution of death sentences.
However, the High Court’s reasoning was shaped by the Court of Appeal’s earlier decision in Masoud (CA), which had affirmed the striking out of OA 987 on standing grounds. In that earlier appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the applicants in OA 987 lacked standing because, at the time of that application, they were not and would not be affected by the challenged provisions. The High Court in OA 972 treated this as highly relevant to the standing analysis, and it examined whether the applicants in OA 972 could be distinguished, or whether the same underlying standing defect persisted.
Applicants’ constitutional arguments under Article 9. The applicants’ Article 9 case centred on the fairness and accessibility of the PACC permission process. They argued, in substance, that section 60G(7)(d) imposed an onerous burden at the outset by requiring the applicant to show a “reasonable prospect of success” in order to obtain permission. The applicants contended that this requirement forced a predictive assessment before the applicant could fully access the court processes needed to develop the challenge, thereby undermining fair trial and access to justice.
They further argued that sections 60G(8) and 60H(6) allowed the Court of Appeal to dismiss PACC permission or the PACC application summarily without setting the matter down for a hearing. The applicants maintained that this prevented them from addressing the court or effectively canvassing their arguments in a process where their lives were at stake. In their view, summary dismissal mechanisms—especially in capital contexts—were constitutionally problematic because they reduced procedural safeguards and limited meaningful participation.
Applicants’ Article 12 arguments (equality before the law). The applicants also invoked Article 12, alleging that the statutory scheme created unequal treatment. While the extract does not reproduce the full equality argument, the typical constitutional approach in such cases is to identify the relevant comparator group and explain why the differential treatment is not justified. The High Court would have assessed whether the applicants’ equality arguments were sufficiently grounded in the operation of the impugned provisions, and whether they raised a real constitutional question rather than a disagreement with legislative policy.
The Attorney-General’s response and the striking-out framework. The Attorney-General’s position was that the application should be struck out because it disclosed no reasonable cause of action. This included two limbs: (1) the applicants lacked standing; and (2) there was no chance of success in arguing that the Impugned Provisions were unconstitutional. Under O 9 r 16(1)(a) of the Rules of Court 2021, the court considers whether the pleadings disclose a reasonable cause of action; if not, the claim should not proceed to full adjudication.
In applying this framework, the High Court treated the standing defect as central. If the applicants were not properly before the court—because they were not affected by the impugned provisions in the constitutionally relevant sense—then the court would not proceed to determine the merits. Even if the court were to consider the constitutional arguments, the court would still assess whether the arguments were viable in light of existing appellate guidance and the statutory design of the PACC regime.
Conclusion on both issues. The High Court ultimately held that the applicants had no standing. This conclusion disposed of the case. The court also found that the application did not disclose a viable constitutional claim. The combined effect was that OA 972 was struck out in its entirety.
What Was the Outcome?
The High Court allowed the Attorney-General’s application (SUM 2898) and struck out OA 972 in its entirety. Practically, this meant that the applicants’ constitutional challenge to the Impugned Provisions did not proceed to a full hearing on the merits.
Because the striking out was based on both standing and the absence of a viable constitutional claim, the decision reinforces that constitutional litigation—particularly in the capital context—must satisfy threshold requirements before the court will engage in substantive constitutional adjudication.
Why Does This Case Matter?
This case is significant for practitioners because it clarifies the strictness of standing requirements in Singapore constitutional litigation. The High Court’s reliance on the Court of Appeal’s earlier standing analysis in Masoud (CA) underscores that applicants must demonstrate that they are actually affected by the impugned provisions at the relevant time. For lawyers advising PACPs or other applicants challenging statutory schemes, the decision highlights the importance of carefully mapping the statutory operation to the applicant’s procedural status and timing.
Second, the case illustrates how the court uses the striking-out mechanism to prevent constitutional claims from proceeding where threshold defects exist. Even where the subject matter is grave—death sentences and the fairness of post-appeal processes—the court will still apply procedural doctrines rigorously. This has implications for how constitutional pleadings should be framed: applicants must not only allege constitutional inconsistency, but also ensure that the court can properly adjudicate the dispute.
Third, the decision contributes to the developing jurisprudence on the PACC Act regime. While the judgment extract does not detail all substantive constitutional reasoning, the court’s approach indicates that challenges to the structure of permission and summary dismissal mechanisms will face significant hurdles, including standing and the requirement to show a viable constitutional basis. Practitioners should therefore consider whether constitutional arguments can be advanced in a manner that satisfies standing and avoids premature or abstract challenges.
Legislation Referenced
- Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969 (SCJA), ss 60G(7)(d), 60G(8), 60H(6), 60I(1)
- Criminal Procedure Code 2010 (CPC), s 313(2)
- Post-appeal Applications in Capital Cases Act 2022 (PACC Act)
- Rules of Court 2021 (ROC 2021), O 9 r 16(1)(a)
- Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (2020 Rev Ed), Arts 9 and 12
Cases Cited
- Masoud Rahimi bin Mehrzad and others v Attorney-General [2024] 4 SLR 331 (“Masoud (HC)”)
- Masoud Rahimi bin Mehrzad and others v Attorney-General [2024] 1 SLR 414 (“Masoud (CA)”)
Source Documents
This article analyses [2025] SGHC 20 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.