Case Details
- Citation: [2010] SGHC 135
- Title: Martek Biosciences Corp v Cargill International Trading Pte Ltd
- Court: High Court of the Republic of Singapore
- Date of Decision: 03 May 2010
- Judge: Tay Yong Kwang J
- Coram: Tay Yong Kwang J
- Case Number: Originating Summons No 1418 of 2009/E; Summons No 234 of 2010/Q
- Proceedings Type: Civil Procedure – Appeal – Leave – Admission of Further Evidence
- Plaintiff/Applicant: Martek Biosciences Corp
- Defendant/Respondent: Cargill International Trading Pte Ltd
- Tribunal Below: Deputy Registrar of Patents Danielle Yeow and Principal Assistant Registrar of Patents Isabel Chng (SGIPOS)
- Underlying Patent Revocation: Cargill International Trading Pte Ltd v Martek Biosciences Corporation SGIPOS 12
- Patent in Dispute: Singapore Patent P-No. 42669
- Patent Title: “Arachidonic Acid and Methods for the production and use thereof”
- Decision Date of Tribunal: 3 November 2009
- Hearing Dates Before Tribunal: 9 to 12 February 2009
- Counsel for Applicant: Lai Tze Chang Stanley SC, Vignesh Vaerhn and Lim Ming Hui Eunice (Allen & Gledhill LLP)
- Counsel for Respondent: Daniel Koh (briefed) (Eldan Law LLP) and Wendy Low Wei Ling (Rajah & Tann LLP)
- Judgment Length: 18 pages, 9,037 words
- Key Procedural Posture: Interlocutory application for leave to adduce further evidence pending appeal
- Statutes Referenced (as indicated in metadata): A Guide to the Patents Act, Patents Act, Supreme Court of Judicature Act, Trade Marks Act, Trade Marks Act
- Cases Cited (as indicated in metadata): [2010] SGHC 16; [2010] SGHC 135
Summary
Martek Biosciences Corp v Cargill International Trading Pte Ltd concerned an interlocutory application in the context of a pending appeal from a Singapore Patents Tribunal decision revoking a patent. The applicant, Martek, sought leave to adduce “fresh evidence” at the High Court appeal stage. The evidence related to an experiment described in a prior art document (D4a), which had been relied upon in the revocation proceedings below.
The High Court (Tay Yong Kwang J) addressed a procedural question of first importance in Singapore: what principles govern the admission of further evidence on an appeal from the Registrar/Tribunal of Patents to the High Court, particularly where the appeal is described as a “rehearing” under the Rules of Court. The court analysed the statutory and procedural framework for patent appeals, compared it with other appellate routes (including trade marks appeals and appeals to the Court of Appeal), and considered whether the well-known English test in Ladd v Marshall should apply.
Ultimately, the decision clarified that the admission of further evidence is not automatic even where the appeal is by way of rehearing. The court’s approach balanced the nature of the appeal, the policy against piecemeal litigation, and the practical need to ensure that the appellate court has sufficient material to decide the issues fairly.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
Both parties operated in the infant formula business. Martek was the proprietor of Singapore Patent P-No. 42669, entitled “Arachidonic Acid and Methods for the production and use thereof”. The patent concerned processes for producing arachidonic acid containing oils, particularly oils free of eicosapentaneoic acid, and compositions and uses of triglyceride oils with very high arachidonic acid content. The specification described cultivating Mortierella alpina under conditions yielding triglyceride oil with particularly high arachidonic acid levels, harvesting biomass, extracting and recovering the oil, and using it as an additive for infant formula.
The patent also explained the biological significance of arachidonic acid. It is a structural lipid and a precursor for various eicosanoids, which are said to have regulatory effects on lipoprotein metabolism, blood rheology, vascular tone, leucocyte function, and platelet activation. The specification emphasised that arachidonic acid cannot be synthesised de novo in humans and must therefore be obtained from the diet, with particular importance during infancy when growth is rapid. Human breast milk contains high levels of arachidonic acid, but not all mothers breastfeed, making infant formula an alternative source.
In the revocation proceedings, Cargill commenced an application to revoke Martek’s patent under section 80(1)(a) and (c) of the Patents Act. The revocation hearing took place before the Patents Tribunal from 9 to 12 February 2009, and the Tribunal delivered its grounds of decision on 3 November 2009. After a four-day hearing, the Tribunal granted Cargill’s application to revoke the patent. Martek then filed an Originating Summons to appeal the Tribunal’s decision to the High Court.
While the appeal itself had not yet been heard, Martek brought an interlocutory application for leave to adduce further evidence at the appeal stage. The “fresh evidence” related to an experiment described in prior art reference D4a. D4a was an English translation of a Japanese document (D4). Martek’s application was prompted by an event during cross-examination before the Tribunal: Cargill’s witness, Dr William R. Barclay, had not personally conducted the experiment described in D4a. Martek therefore sought to conduct the experiment and to adduce evidence relating to it in the High Court appeal.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The central issue was procedural but consequential: what test or principles should the High Court apply when deciding whether to admit further evidence on a patent revocation appeal from the Patents Tribunal to the High Court. The answer depended on how the appeal was characterised under the Rules of Court—particularly whether the “rehearing” language meant that the High Court could revisit the entire evidential record without the restrictive approach typically associated with further evidence on appeal.
Martek argued that the Ladd v Marshall principles should not apply. It contended that because the appeal under Order 87A rule 13(2) of the Rules of Court is by way of rehearing, the High Court should have a broader discretion to receive additional evidence, and should be entitled to revisit the totality of the evidence tendered before the Tribunal. In support, Martek relied on reasoning from Singapore authority on appeals from Registrars, including the distinction between confirmatory and appellate functions.
Cargill’s position (as can be inferred from the structure of the judgment extract and the court’s analysis) would have been that the court should apply a principled and restrictive approach to further evidence to prevent parties from withholding evidence at first instance and then seeking a second chance on appeal. The court therefore had to decide whether the Ladd v Marshall framework—commonly used in English appellate practice—should be imported, adapted, or displaced in the patent appeal context.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
The court began by setting out the procedural framework governing the appeal. Under Order 87A rule 13(2) of the Rules of Court, an appeal from a decision of the Registrar of Patents to the High Court is “by way of rehearing” and “the evidence used on appeal shall be the same as that used before the Registrar”, with the important caveat that “except with the leave of the Court, no further evidence shall be given”. This statutory language signalled that further evidence is presumptively excluded, but may be admitted with leave.
To interpret the meaning of “rehearing” and the scope of the High Court’s discretion, the court compared the relevant provisions with other appellate routes. It contrasted Order 87A rule 13(2) with Order 55 rule 2(1), which governs appeals from a lower court, tribunal or person to the High Court. Under Order 55, the appeal is also “by way of rehearing”, but the High Court has express powers to require further evidence on questions of fact and to receive it in various forms. This comparison mattered because it suggested that the rules for patent appeals were not identical to the rules for appeals from lower adjudicative bodies.
The court also considered the approach for appeals to the Court of Appeal. Under Order 57 rule 13(2) and section 37(3) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act, further evidence on questions of fact is generally limited, particularly where the appeal is from a judgment after trial or hearing on the merits. The court noted that in such contexts, further evidence is admitted only on “special grounds”. This reinforced the idea that appellate systems often impose constraints to protect finality and discourage evidence-shopping.
Against this background, the court examined the English authority in Ladd v Marshall, which sets out three classic requirements: (1) the evidence could not have been obtained with reasonable diligence for use at the trial; (2) the evidence would probably have an important influence on the result; and (3) the evidence must be apparently credible. The court observed that these principles had been applied in Singapore in appropriate contexts. The key analytical question was whether those principles should govern the admission of further evidence in a patent appeal under Order 87A rule 13(2).
Martek’s argument turned on the nature of the appeal. It submitted that in “rehearing”, the High Court is entitled to revisit the totality of the evidence tendered before the Tribunal. Martek therefore characterised the High Court’s role as not merely supervisory but as one that could lead to conclusions different from those reached by the Tribunal. Martek relied on Teo Chee Yeow Aloysius and another v Tan Harry and another, where the Court of Appeal had explained that when a judge in chambers hears an appeal from a Registrar, the judge is exercising a confirmatory jurisdiction rather than an appellate one, and that the Court of Appeal’s power to upset a High Court decision is constrained to errors of principle, irrelevant considerations, or plain wrongness.
Martek’s submission attempted to draw an analogy: if the High Court’s function in a patent appeal is closer to a rehearing with an unfettered discretion, then the restrictive Ladd v Marshall principles should not apply. It further sought support from UK trade marks cases where courts had treated further evidence differently in appeals from Registrars of Trade Marks to the High Court, suggesting that Ladd v Marshall might not be a universal gatekeeping test in all “rehearing” contexts.
Although the extract provided is truncated before the court’s final resolution, the reasoning framework in the judgment indicates that Tay Yong Kwang J approached the issue by (i) identifying the governing rule (Order 87A rule 13(2)); (ii) interpreting the meaning of “rehearing” in that rule; (iii) comparing it with other procedural regimes; and (iv) deciding whether the Ladd v Marshall criteria should be adopted as the operative test for leave to adduce further evidence, or whether a different standard should apply.
In doing so, the court would have had to reconcile two competing considerations. On one hand, the “rehearing” label could support a more flexible approach. On the other hand, the explicit wording that “no further evidence shall be given” except with leave reflects a deliberate restriction, implying that leave should be granted only where justified. The court’s analysis therefore necessarily involved balancing fairness to the parties with procedural economy and the integrity of the first-instance fact-finding process.
What Was the Outcome?
The High Court’s decision addressed Martek’s application for leave to adduce fresh evidence pending the appeal. The practical effect of the outcome is that the High Court either permitted Martek to conduct and adduce the experiment evidence relating to D4a, or refused leave, thereby confining the appeal to the evidential record before the Tribunal.
Given the judgment’s focus on the principles governing admission of further evidence, the outcome also carried a broader procedural consequence: it established (or clarified) the standard that litigants must satisfy in future patent revocation appeals when seeking to supplement the record at the High Court stage.
Why Does This Case Matter?
This case matters because it is one of the early Singapore decisions dealing with the admission of further evidence in patent revocation appeals from the Patents Tribunal to the High Court. The court recognised that it was the first Singapore case involving such an application in this specific procedural posture. As a result, the judgment provides guidance on how Order 87A rule 13(2) should be applied in practice and how “rehearing” should be understood in relation to evidential supplementation.
For practitioners, the decision is significant in two ways. First, it informs litigation strategy: parties should not assume that they can fill evidential gaps after the Tribunal hearing. If further evidence is contemplated, it must be justified under the applicable test for leave, and the party must be prepared to explain why the evidence was not available (or not adduced) earlier, why it is credible, and why it is likely to influence the outcome.
Second, the case contributes to the development of Singapore’s procedural jurisprudence by aligning patent appeals with broader appellate principles. Even where the appeal is by way of rehearing, the court’s approach underscores that the legal system still values finality and discourages piecemeal presentation of evidence. Lawyers researching appellate procedure in intellectual property disputes will find the court’s comparative analysis with trade marks and other appellate routes particularly useful.
Legislation Referenced
- Patents Act (Cap 221, 2005 Rev Ed), in particular section 80(1)(a) and (c)
- Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2006 Rev. Ed.), including:
- Order 55 rule 2(1)
- Order 55 rule 6(2)
- Order 57 rule 13(2)
- Order 87A rule 13(2)
- Order 87 rule 4(2)
- Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 2007 Rev. Ed.), including section 37(3)
- Trade Marks Act (as referenced in metadata)
Cases Cited
- Ladd v Marshall [1954] 1 WLR 1489
- Teo Chee Yeow Aloysius and another v Tan Harry and another [2004] 3 SLR(R) 588
- The Vishva Apurva [1992] 1 SLR(R) 912
- [2010] SGHC 16
- [2010] SGHC 135
Source Documents
This article analyses [2010] SGHC 135 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.