Case Details
- Citation: [2023] SGHC 52
- Title: Mah Kiat Seng v Attorney-General and others
- Court: High Court of the Republic of Singapore (General Division)
- Date of Decision: 3 March 2023
- Judgment Date (reserved/handed down): Judgment reserved after hearing on 27 February 2023; delivered 3 March 2023
- Judge: Philip Jeyaretnam J
- Case Type: Costs decision following earlier liability judgment
- Suit Number: Suit No 256 of 2020
- Plaintiff/Applicant: Mah Kiat Seng
- Defendants/Respondents: (1) Attorney-General; (2) and (3) Mohamed Rosli bin Mohamed; Tan Thiam Chin Lawrence
- Legal Area: Civil Procedure — Costs
- Key Procedural Context: Assessment of costs after partial success; litigant in person; apportionment among multiple defendants
- Statutes Referenced: Rules of Court (Cap 332, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed) (“ROC 2014”); Rules of Court 2021 (substantially carried forward provisions)
- Rules/Provisions Highlighted in Extract: O 59 r 18A; O 59 r 27(5); O 59 r 31(2); O 21 r 7 (ROC 2021 equivalent)
- Other Materials Referenced: Part IV of Appendix 2 to ROC 2014; Supreme Court Practice Directions 2013; Guidelines for Party-and-Party Costs in the Supreme Court of Singapore at Appendix G (“Costs Guidelines”); Costs Guidelines Section III (Simple Torts) and Torts category
- Cases Cited: [2023] SGHC 14; [2023] SGHC 52 (this decision); Campbell v Campbell [2016] EWHC 2237 (Ch) (English authority on litigant-in-person costs)
- Judgment Length: 11 pages; 2,657 words
Summary
This High Court decision concerns the assessment of costs following an earlier liability judgment in Mah Kiat Seng v Attorney-General and others [2023] SGHC 14. After the court determined liability on certain claims and dismissed others, it heard parties on costs. The present judgment addresses two recurring but under-explored questions in Singapore practice: first, how to determine the “incidence of costs” when a plaintiff succeeds against some defendants but fails against others; and second, how to quantify costs payable to and by a litigant in person, including the appropriate method for estimating time expended and fixing an hourly rate.
The court held that costs should be assessed separately in relation to each defendant for the purpose of identifying the “event” (i.e., the outcome) relevant to that defendant. It therefore awarded the plaintiff costs for his successful claim against Rosli, but required him to pay costs for his unsuccessful claim against Tan. As for the claims involving the SPF (through the Attorney-General), the court found that although the plaintiff achieved partial success (notably on the search of his person and bag), the SPF was overall successful and thus entitled to costs, with due allowance for the plaintiff’s limited success.
On quantum, the court applied the Singapore costs framework for litigants in person under O 59 r 18A of the ROC 2014 (substantially carried forward into the ROC 2021). It rejected the need for time sheets, used an objective estimate of reasonable time spent, and then fixed a compensatory hourly rate by reference to proportionality and the Magistrate’s Court costs scale. The court fixed costs payable to the plaintiff at $19,320. It also corrected the defendants’ approach to apportionment by emphasising that there is one total set of costs incurred by jointly represented defendants, which must be apportioned to avoid double counting. The court therefore reduced the defendants’ claimed amounts and recalibrated the overall costs assessment.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
The underlying dispute arose from events involving Mah Kiat Seng and the Singapore authorities and individuals sued in tort. Although the present decision is a costs judgment, it is anchored in the earlier liability findings in [2023] SGHC 14. In that earlier decision, the court determined that Mah succeeded on certain claims, including a claim against Rosli for unlawful apprehension, and claims against the SPF relating to the search conducted on Mah and his bag. However, Mah did not succeed on all claims. He also failed on an assault claim against Tan and on various other points concerning the SPF.
After liability was determined, the parties proceeded to a costs hearing. The Attorney-General (representing the state-related defendants, including the SPF) submitted that costs should follow the event. In doing so, the Attorney-General characterised the “event” as a mixture of successes and failures across different claims and defendants. Mah, who represented himself, argued for a broader approach: he urged the court to consider the “thesis” of his case, submitting that the core wrong was wrongful arrest and that because he succeeded on that central thesis, he should be treated as the successful party overall even if he failed on other claims.
The court rejected the “thesis” approach for the purpose of incidence of costs where the plaintiff’s successes and failures were distributed across different defendants. The court instead treated the incidence of costs as requiring a defendant-by-defendant analysis. This meant that even if Mah’s overall narrative was that his arrest and related events were wrongful, the court would still ask, for each defendant, whether Mah succeeded on the claims directed at that defendant.
In the quantum phase, the factual matrix relevant to costs was not about the underlying torts but about the plaintiff’s conduct of the litigation as a litigant in person. Mah asserted that he had spent approximately 1,000 hours on the proceedings, supported by his account of trial preparation, cross-examination preparation, review of video recordings, and legal research. The Attorney-General did not provide a competing time estimate but argued that Mah’s claimed time was not substantiated. The court therefore had to estimate reasonable time spent and then quantify a compensatory hourly rate consistent with the costs rules and proportionality.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The first key issue was the “incidence of costs”: on what principles should costs be awarded when the plaintiff succeeds against some defendants but fails against others? The court had to decide whether it should treat the “event” as the plaintiff’s overall thesis of the case or whether it should identify the event separately for each defendant. This issue is particularly important in multi-defendant tort litigation where the plaintiff’s claims may be partially successful and where different defendants may be vicariously liable for different acts.
The second key issue concerned the quantification of costs payable to a litigant in person. Under O 59 r 18A of the ROC 2014, a litigant in person may be allowed costs that would reasonably compensate for time expended and expenses reasonably incurred. The court had to determine (i) whether the litigant must provide time sheets or other detailed proof of time, (ii) how to estimate reasonable time objectively, and (iii) how to fix an hourly rate that is consistent with proportionality to the amount at stake and the policy rationale of access to justice.
The third issue related to the quantification of costs payable by the plaintiff to the defendants. The Attorney-General sought substantial sums for the successful defence of Tan and for the SPF’s partial success. The court had to address whether the defendants’ costs claims should be treated as independent and cumulative, or whether, because the defendants were jointly represented and incurred one overall set of costs, the costs must be apportioned to avoid double counting. This required the court to apply the logic of joint representation to the costs assessment.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
On incidence of costs, the court began from the general principle that costs follow the event. However, the critical question was how to define the “event” in a case with multiple defendants and partial success. Mah argued that the court should consider the “thesis” of his case—wrongful arrest—and treat him as the successful party because he succeeded on that central theme. The court accepted that a thesis-based approach may be appropriate where the plaintiff succeeds on some but not all claims against a single defendant. But it held that this approach was not appropriate where the plaintiff’s successes and failures were directed at different defendants. In such circumstances, the event relevant to each defendant must be considered separately.
Applying this defendant-by-defendant approach, the court held that Mah was entitled to costs for his successful claim against Rosli (unlawful apprehension). Conversely, because Mah failed on the assault claim against Tan, he had to pay costs for that unsuccessful claim. This analysis underscores that “success” for costs purposes is not merely about the narrative coherence of the plaintiff’s case; it is about the legal outcome of the claims against each defendant.
For the SPF-related claims, the court found that although Mah succeeded on the search of his bag and person, he failed on various other points that were either general in nature or not directed at specific actions by Rosli or Tan for which the SPF would be vicariously liable. The court therefore concluded that overall the SPF was successful in its defence and entitled to costs. Importantly, the court signalled that Mah’s partial success would be relevant when quantifying those costs, meaning that the award would not be “all or nothing” but would reflect the degree of success.
On quantum for costs payable to Mah, the court applied O 59 r 18A of the ROC 2014. It noted that unlike England, Singapore’s rules do not set an hourly rate for litigants in person. Mah relied on Campbell v Campbell [2016] EWHC 2237 (Ch), but the court distinguished the English framework because Singapore’s rules and policy considerations differ. It also observed that the English approach includes a cap tied to the idea that lawyers mark up underlying costs; Singapore’s rules do not adopt the same explicit cap, but the underlying policy logic of preventing a litigant in person from “profiting” from costs remains relevant to proportionality.
The Attorney-General argued that Mah should have brought the proceedings in the Magistrate’s Court because the damages awarded were below the Magistrate’s jurisdictional limit. The court accepted that O 59 r 27(5) of the ROC 2014 limits costs in such circumstances, but it emphasised that the court retains discretion under O 59 r 31(2) to order otherwise. Given that the case was not straightforward despite its low monetary value, the court exercised discretion to consider that Mah may have spent more time than a typical Magistrate’s Court case. Nevertheless, when fixing the hourly rate, the court treated the Magistrate’s Court scale as a helpful reference point for proportionality.
In estimating time, the court held that there was no need for time sheets. The court could use its own experience to estimate reasonable time spent. It rejected Mah’s claimed 1,000 hours as potentially reflecting personal importance rather than objective reasonableness. Instead, it calculated a reasonable total of 460 hours, excluding matters for which separate interlocutory costs orders had already been made: 60 hours for trial days, 300 hours for pre-trial preparation, and 100 hours for post-trial work. It then apportioned that time to the claims on which Mah succeeded. Using a broad-brush approach, the court found that unlawful apprehension was by far the most work-intensive issue, and allocated 70% of the time to that successful claim, resulting in 322 hours.
For the hourly rate, the court treated costs as a costs jurisdiction grounded in access to justice rather than a damages claim requiring proof of opportunity cost. It nonetheless required proportionality to the amount at stake. It reasoned that typical cases with damages of $20,000 might take one or two days for trial and three to four days for pre- and post-trial work, suggesting about 50 hours of lawyer time. Using the Magistrate’s Court costs scale (Appendix 2, Part IV), it treated $5,000 as a representative figure within the $3,000 to $6,000 range, yielding $100 per hour. It then discounted by one-third to eliminate the profit margin that lawyers might earn but litigants in person do not, arriving at a net hourly rate of $66.66, rounded down to $60. Multiplying $60 by 322 hours produced $19,320 as the costs payable to Mah.
On quantum for costs payable by Mah, the court addressed the defendants’ approach to the costs claims for Tan and the SPF. The Attorney-General relied on the Supreme Court Costs Guidelines and categorised the case as “Simple Torts,” arriving at a range of $66,000 to $132,000 for pre-trial work, trial, and post-trial work. The Attorney-General then sought $35,000 for Tan and $50,000 for the SPF, treating these as independent and cumulative. The court rejected this as potentially leading to double counting because there was one total set of costs incurred by jointly represented defendants. It illustrated the point by noting that the same lawyers were in court for the trial for all defendants, and that disbursements were only claimed at 50%—yet the costs claims assumed a much higher share.
The court therefore recalibrated the analysis by looking at the complexity of the case as a whole and then considering the proportion of the case taken up by the claims on which Tan and the SPF succeeded. It also corrected the defendants’ categorisation: the court considered the case should not be treated as “Simple Torts” but as “Torts” overall. Applying the “Torts” category produced a higher range (midpoint $143,500) than the “Simple Torts” midpoint (about $99,000). This meant the court’s starting point was higher than the defendants’ own. The court then proceeded to apportion the overall costs to reflect the respective degrees of success, consistent with the principle that jointly incurred costs must be allocated fairly rather than multiplied.
What Was the Outcome?
The court awarded Mah costs for his successful claim against Rosli for unlawful apprehension, but required him to pay costs for his unsuccessful claim against Tan. For the SPF-related claims, the court held that the SPF was overall successful and entitled to costs, while taking into account Mah’s limited and partial success on the search of his person and bag when quantifying those costs.
On quantum, the court fixed costs payable to Mah as $19,320, applying O 59 r 18A and using an objective estimate of reasonable time spent and a proportional hourly rate derived by reference to the Magistrate’s Court costs scale. It also reduced and recalibrated the defendants’ costs claims by emphasising that there is one total set of costs incurred by jointly represented defendants and that the costs must be apportioned to avoid double counting. The practical effect is that both sides received costs only to the extent justified by their respective degrees of success and by a principled, proportionate assessment of time and complexity.
Why Does This Case Matter?
This decision is significant for practitioners because it provides a structured and practical approach to costs where (i) the plaintiff is a litigant in person, (ii) there is partial success across multiple defendants, and (iii) defendants are jointly represented. While Singapore courts have long applied the principle that costs follow the event, this case clarifies that the “event” must be identified separately for each defendant when outcomes differ across defendants. This is particularly relevant in tort litigation involving multiple actors and vicarious liability.
On litigant-in-person costs, the judgment offers useful guidance on quantification. It confirms that time sheets are not strictly necessary and that the court can estimate reasonable time using its own experience. It also demonstrates how proportionality to the amount at stake can inform the hourly rate, even though Singapore does not prescribe an hourly rate for litigants in person. The method—estimate reasonable hours, apportion to successful issues, then fix an hourly rate by reference to the Magistrate’s Court scale and discount for the absence of lawyer profit—provides a workable template for future submissions.
Finally, the judgment is a reminder that costs claims by multiple defendants must be approached carefully where there is joint representation. The court’s anti–double counting reasoning is likely to influence how parties draft and quantify costs submissions, especially when relying on costs guidelines that may be expressed in ranges for categories of cases. For law students and litigators, the case is therefore a valuable study in both the legal principles and the mechanics of costs assessment in Singapore civil procedure.
Legislation Referenced
- Rules of Court (Cap 332, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed) (“ROC 2014”), O 59 r 18A
- ROC 2014, O 59 r 27(5)
- ROC 2014, O 59 r 31(2)
- Rules of Court 2021, O 21 r 7 (substantially carried forward from O 59 r 18A)
- ROC 2014, Appendix 2 (Part IV) (Magistrate’s Court costs scale reference)
- Supreme Court Practice Directions 2013, Appendix G (Guidelines for Party-and-Party Costs in the Supreme Court of Singapore)
Cases Cited
- Mah Kiat Seng v Attorney-General and others [2023] SGHC 14
- Mah Kiat Seng v Attorney-General and others [2023] SGHC 52
- Campbell v Campbell [2016] EWHC 2237 (Ch)
Source Documents
This article analyses [2023] SGHC 52 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.