Case Details
- Citation: [2018] SGHC 164
- Title: Long Well Group Ltd and others v Commerzbank AG and others
- Court: High Court of the Republic of Singapore
- Date of Decision: 23 July 2018
- Judge: Choo Han Teck J
- Coram: Choo Han Teck J
- Case Number: Suit No 28 of 2012
- Tribunal/Court: High Court
- Decision Type: Costs decision following substantive judgment
- Plaintiff/Applicant: Long Well Group Ltd and others
- Defendant/Respondent: Commerzbank AG and others
- Counsel for Plaintiffs: Tan Tee Jim SC, Christopher James De Souza, Amanda Lim Jia Yan, Basil Lee and Gayathri Sivasurian (Lee & Lee)
- Counsel for Defendants: Andre Yeap SC, Lai Yew Fei and Khelvin Xu Cunhan (Rajah & Tann Singapore LLP)
- Legal Area: Civil procedure — Costs
- Statutes Referenced: Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 2007 Rev Ed), including s 28B
- Practice Directions Referenced: Supreme Court Practice Directions, paragraph 82(1)(d)
- Judgment Length: 2 pages, 1,053 words
- Related Procedural History: Substantive judgment delivered on 16 March 2018; costs ordered to follow the event and be taxed if not agreed; defendants sought leave to make further arguments on costs on 21 March 2018
- Parties (as listed in metadata): Long Well Group Limited; PT Citrabumi Sacna; Private Energy Pte Ltd; First Power International Limited; Commerzbank Aktiengesellschaft; Commerz Asset Management Asia Pacific Pte Ltd; Commerzbank Asset Management Asia Ltd; Commerz Asia Best SPC
Summary
Long Well Group Ltd and others v Commerzbank AG and others [2018] SGHC 164 concerns a post-judgment application focused solely on costs. After the High Court delivered its substantive decision on 16 March 2018, it ordered that costs would “follow the event”, to be taxed if not agreed. The defendants then sought leave to make further arguments on the issue of costs, contending that the plaintiffs should not recover costs because they “failed on each and every one of the numerous issues raised”, save for a breach of contract claim. They also argued that the quantum claimed was excessive.
Choo Han Teck J dismissed the defendants’ application and affirmed the costs order that costs follow the event. The court held that the defendants’ request for further arguments was procedurally defective because it did not comply with paragraph 82(1)(d) of the Supreme Court Practice Directions, which requires the request to state the law under which it is made. Substantively, the court found no reason to depart from the default costs principle: the plaintiffs had substantially succeeded, obtaining more than 80% of the amount claimed, and it was not unreasonable for them to have pursued the unsuccessful claims. The judge then fixed costs in a detailed allocation among the parties, including costs relating to the counterclaim.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
The underlying dispute in Suit No 28 of 2012 involved multiple parties and claims, culminating in a substantive judgment delivered by Choo Han Teck J on 16 March 2018. While the present decision is concerned with costs only, the procedural posture is important. The court’s substantive judgment resolved the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims and the defendants’ counterclaim(s), and it made an interim costs direction: costs were to follow the event, to be taxed if not agreed.
Following the substantive decision, the defendants took further steps. On 21 March 2018, counsel for the defendants requested leave to make further arguments before the court on the issue of costs. The request was made after the substantive judgment but before the costs position was finalised. This created a narrow but significant procedural question: whether the court could entertain further arguments on costs at that stage, and if so, whether the defendants had established grounds to depart from the “costs follow the event” principle.
The defendants’ position was that the plaintiffs had not achieved a sufficiently comprehensive success to justify costs. Their counsel emphasised that the plaintiffs had raised “numerous issues” at trial and, on the defendants’ approach, had failed on each of those issues except for the claim for breach of contract. They argued that the trial would have been shorter and the parties would have dealt with fewer factual and legal issues if the plaintiffs had not raised so many issues. In addition, they asserted that the quantum claimed by the plaintiffs—$419,978.82—was excessive.
In response, the plaintiffs challenged the application on two fronts. First, they argued that the request for further arguments was procedurally defective. Specifically, it did not comply with paragraph 82(1)(d) of the Supreme Court Practice Directions, which requires the request to state the law under which it is made, and the plaintiffs claimed prejudice from that omission. Second, the plaintiffs argued that s 28B of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act (SCJA) only permits further arguments “after any hearing other than a trial of an action”, and that the present case involved a trial. The plaintiffs therefore suggested that the appropriate recourse was an appeal, not further arguments at the High Court level.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The first legal issue was procedural: whether the defendants’ request for leave to make further arguments on costs was properly made and whether the court could entertain it. This required consideration of the interaction between (i) the Supreme Court Practice Directions (particularly paragraph 82(1)(d)) and (ii) the statutory framework in s 28B of the SCJA, as well as the court’s inherent jurisdiction to recall or revisit its decision in limited circumstances.
The second legal issue was substantive: whether the court should depart from the general principle that “costs follow the event”. The defendants argued that the plaintiffs’ partial success did not justify costs, because the plaintiffs failed on many issues and allegedly prolonged the trial. The plaintiffs countered that they had substantially succeeded—recovering more than 80% of the amount claimed—and that the unsuccessful issues were not unreasonable or unnecessary.
Finally, the court had to determine the appropriate costs orders once it decided to affirm the “costs follow the event” approach. This involved apportioning costs among multiple defendants and plaintiffs, and addressing costs relating to the counterclaim, including fixed sums rather than taxation.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
Choo Han Teck J began with the plaintiffs’ procedural objection. The judge agreed that the defendants’ request for further arguments did not comply with paragraph 82(1)(d) of the Supreme Court Practice Directions. That provision required the request to state the law under which it is made. The judge treated this non-compliance as significant because, where a clear rule applies, the court should not ignore it. Accordingly, the judge indicated that the application could be dismissed on this ground alone.
Although the defendants, in reply submissions, asserted that their request was made in reliance on the court’s inherent jurisdiction, the judge held that the presence of a clear rule meant there was no basis for the court to disregard the procedural defect. This reasoning reflects a disciplined approach to procedural compliance: even if a party invokes an alternative jurisdictional basis, the court expects the request to be properly framed in accordance with the applicable procedural requirements.
Turning to the merits, the judge found no reason to change the costs order. The court did not accept the defendants’ attempt to reframe the costs outcome by counting the number of issues on which the plaintiffs failed. While the defendants’ approach might show that the plaintiffs lost on more issues than they won, the judge emphasised that the issue on which the plaintiffs succeeded was not insignificant. The plaintiffs had succeeded in more than 80% of the amount claimed, which is a strong indicator of substantial success and supports the default costs principle.
The court also addressed the defendants’ argument that the trial would have been shorter if the plaintiffs had confined their case to the successful claim. The judge rejected the premise that the unsuccessful claims were unreasonable or unnecessary. In particular, the judge accepted that it was not unreasonable for the plaintiffs to have raised the claims that ultimately failed. The judge further noted the plaintiffs’ submission that the same facts raised at trial would have been raised even if the plaintiffs had confined their claim to the breach of contract claim that succeeded. This reasoning is important for costs analysis because it links the “unnecessary issues” argument to whether the issues were genuinely avoidable and whether they materially increased the trial burden.
On the question of jurisdiction to hear further arguments, the judge discussed s 28B of the SCJA and the court’s inherent jurisdiction. The plaintiffs had argued that s 28B was inapplicable because the case involved a trial of an action. The judge agreed that the power under s 28B may be limited to hearings other than a trial. However, the judge held that this limitation did not apply to the court’s inherent jurisdiction. The judge relied on Thomson Plaza (Pte) Ltd v Liquidators of Yaohan Department Store Singapore Pte Ltd (in liquidation) [2001] 2 SLR(R) 246, where it was said to be “settled law” that even in respect of a final order, the judge has an inherent jurisdiction to recall the decision and hear further arguments, as long as the order is not yet perfected.
The judge also addressed a further argument by the plaintiffs: that the filing of a notice of appeal by the 3rd defendant meant the court no longer had inherent jurisdiction. The judge rejected that contention as irrelevant to the costs application. The notice of appeal was filed after the defendants sought leave to make further arguments, and the questions of further arguments and costs had to await the judge’s decision. Thus, the procedural timeline meant that the inherent jurisdiction analysis was not displaced by the notice of appeal in the way the plaintiffs suggested.
Having affirmed the costs principle, the judge then proceeded to fix costs. The judge ordered that costs be paid by the 3rd defendant to the plaintiffs fixed at $200,000. The judge also made a nuanced allocation: because the plaintiffs did not succeed against the other defendants, costs were ordered to be paid by the plaintiffs to the 1st and 4th defendants fixed at $40,000 each. The judge took into account that the 1st and 4th defendants were minor parties and were represented by the same counsel, which justified a lower fixed sum than might otherwise be awarded.
Finally, the judge dealt with costs relating to the counterclaim. Since the counterclaim taken out by the 3rd and 4th defendants against the 1st, 2nd and 3rd plaintiffs failed, the judge ordered costs to be paid by the 3rd and 4th defendants to the 1st, 2nd and 3rd plaintiffs fixed at $10,000 each plaintiff. This demonstrates that the court’s “event” analysis was applied not only to the main claims but also to the counterclaim, with costs consequences tailored to the specific outcomes for each party.
What Was the Outcome?
The High Court dismissed the defendants’ application for leave to make further arguments on costs and affirmed the original order that costs follow the event. The court therefore did not disturb the substantive costs direction made on 16 March 2018.
In practical terms, the judge fixed costs in specified sums: $200,000 payable by the 3rd defendant to the plaintiffs; $40,000 each payable by the plaintiffs to the 1st and 4th defendants; and $10,000 each payable by the 3rd and 4th defendants to each of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd plaintiffs in respect of the failed counterclaim.
Why Does This Case Matter?
This decision is a useful authority on two recurring themes in Singapore civil litigation: (i) procedural discipline in applications for further arguments after judgment, and (ii) the practical application of the “costs follow the event” principle where a party succeeds substantially but not on every issue.
On procedure, the case underscores that non-compliance with the Supreme Court Practice Directions—here, paragraph 82(1)(d)—can be fatal even where a party seeks to rely on an alternative basis such as inherent jurisdiction. For practitioners, the decision is a reminder to ensure that applications are properly grounded in the relevant procedural framework and that the request clearly states the law relied upon, to avoid dismissal on technical grounds.
On costs, the case clarifies that courts will not necessarily depart from the default rule merely because a party lost on many issues. The judge’s focus on substantial success (more than 80% of the amount claimed) and on whether the unsuccessful issues were unreasonable or unnecessary provides a structured approach for litigants assessing litigation risk and settlement strategy. The decision also illustrates how courts may apportion costs among multiple parties and address counterclaim costs separately, using fixed sums where appropriate.
Legislation Referenced
- Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 2007 Rev Ed), s 28B
- Supreme Court Practice Directions, paragraph 82(1)(d)
Cases Cited
- Thomson Plaza (Pte) Ltd v Liquidators of Yaohan Department Store Singapore Pte Ltd (in liquidation) [2001] 2 SLR(R) 246
Source Documents
This article analyses [2018] SGHC 164 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.