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Long Well Group Ltd and others v Commerzbank AG and others [2018] SGHC 164

In Long Well Group Ltd and others v Commerzbank AG and others, the High Court of the Republic of Singapore addressed issues of Civil procedure — Costs.

Case Details

  • Citation: [2018] SGHC 164
  • Title: Long Well Group Ltd and others v Commerzbank AG and others
  • Court: High Court of the Republic of Singapore
  • Decision Date: 23 July 2018
  • Judges: Choo Han Teck J
  • Coram: Choo Han Teck J
  • Case Number: Suit No 28 of 2012
  • Tribunal/Court: High Court
  • Judgment Reserved: Yes (judgment reserved; delivered on 23 July 2018)
  • Plaintiff/Applicant: Long Well Group Ltd and others
  • Defendant/Respondent: Commerzbank AG and others
  • Counsel for Plaintiffs: Tan Tee Jim SC, Christopher James De Souza, Amanda Lim Jia Yan, Basil Lee and Gayathri Sivasurian (Lee & Lee)
  • Counsel for Defendants: Andre Yeap SC, Lai Yew Fei and Khelvin Xu Cunhan (Rajah & Tann Singapore LLP)
  • Legal Area: Civil procedure — Costs
  • Statutes Referenced: Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 2007 Rev Ed), in particular s 28B; Supreme Court Practice Directions (para 82(1)(d))
  • Cases Cited: Thomson Plaza (Pte) Ltd v Liquidators of Yaohan Department Store Singapore Pte Ltd (in liquidation) [2001] 2 SLR(R) 246
  • Judgment Length: 2 pages, 1,053 words (as indicated in the provided metadata)
  • Earlier Substantive Judgment Date: 16 March 2018

Summary

Long Well Group Ltd and others v Commerzbank AG and others [2018] SGHC 164 concerns the High Court’s determination of costs after the court had already delivered its substantive judgment on 16 March 2018. The court initially ordered that costs would “follow the event” and be taxed if not agreed. After that, the defendants sought leave to make further arguments specifically on costs, contending that the plaintiffs had failed on “each and every one of the numerous issues raised”, save for a breach of contract claim.

On 23 July 2018, Choo Han Teck J dismissed the defendants’ application and affirmed the earlier costs order. The court held that the defendants’ procedural request was defective because it did not comply with para 82(1)(d) of the Supreme Court Practice Directions, which requires the request to state the law under which it is made. More importantly, the court found that the application had no substantive merit: it was not unreasonable for the plaintiffs to have pursued the unsuccessful issues, and the plaintiffs had substantially succeeded overall, obtaining more than 80% of the amount claimed. The court therefore maintained the “costs follow the event” approach and proceeded to fix costs in the manner agreed by the parties.

What Were the Facts of This Case?

The underlying dispute in Suit No 28 of 2012 involved multiple parties and claims arising from a commercial relationship in which the plaintiffs sued Commerzbank AG and related entities. The High Court had already determined the substantive merits of the case in a judgment delivered on 16 March 2018. That earlier judgment resolved the key issues in the plaintiffs’ favour to a significant extent, including a claim for breach of contract. The court’s substantive findings were followed by an order on costs: costs were to follow the event and be taxed if not agreed.

After the substantive judgment, the defendants did not accept the cost consequences. On 21 March 2018, counsel for the defendants requested leave to make further arguments before the judge on the issue of costs. The request was framed as an opportunity to revisit the costs order, with the defendants arguing that the plaintiffs’ litigation strategy had been overly expansive and that the plaintiffs had failed on numerous issues at trial. In the defendants’ view, the trial would have been shorter and the parties would have had fewer factual and legal issues to deal with if the plaintiffs had not raised so many issues.

The defendants’ position was also linked to the quantum of the plaintiffs’ claim. They argued that the amount claimed—$419,978.82—was excessive, and that this excessiveness should influence the costs outcome. In other words, the defendants sought a departure from the default principle that costs follow the event, by persuading the court that the plaintiffs’ conduct and the structure of the case justified a different costs allocation.

In response, the plaintiffs raised two procedural objections to the defendants’ request for further arguments. First, they argued that the request did not comply with para 82(1)(d) of the Supreme Court Practice Directions because it failed to state the law under which the request was made, allegedly prejudicing the plaintiffs. Second, they argued that s 28B of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act only permits further arguments “after any hearing other than a trial of an action”, and that there had been a trial of an action in this case. The plaintiffs therefore suggested that the defendants’ proper recourse was an appeal, not a further-arguments application.

The first legal issue was procedural: whether the defendants’ request for leave to make further arguments on costs was properly made under the relevant statutory and practice direction framework. This required the court to consider compliance with para 82(1)(d) of the Supreme Court Practice Directions and the scope of s 28B of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act, particularly the limitation that further arguments are only allowed after hearings other than a trial of an action.

The second legal issue was substantive: whether the court should depart from its earlier order that costs follow the event. The defendants contended that the plaintiffs had failed on numerous issues and that the plaintiffs’ overall approach made the trial more protracted than necessary. They also argued that the plaintiffs’ claimed quantum was excessive. The court had to decide whether these arguments justified a different costs outcome, notwithstanding the plaintiffs’ substantial success on the merits.

Finally, the court needed to determine the practical costs orders to be made once it affirmed the “costs follow the event” principle. This involved fixing costs payable by particular defendants to particular plaintiffs (and vice versa) and addressing costs relating to counterclaims, based on the relative success of the parties.

How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?

Choo Han Teck J began with the plaintiffs’ procedural objection. The court agreed that the defendants’ request for further arguments did not comply with para 82(1)(d) of the Supreme Court Practice Directions. That provision requires a request to state the law under which it is made. The judge emphasised that where a clear rule applies, the court should not ignore non-compliance. Although the defendants, in their reply submissions, later asserted reliance on the court’s inherent jurisdiction, the judge treated the procedural defect as sufficient to dismiss the application.

Importantly, the judge did not stop at procedure. For completeness, he also addressed why the application lacked merit on the substance. The court’s starting point was the earlier costs order: costs to follow the event. The defendants’ attempt to displace that principle relied on a “counting issues” approach—arguing that because the plaintiffs failed on more issues than they succeeded, costs should not follow the event. The judge rejected this as an over-simplification of the costs analysis.

In assessing whether it was unreasonable for the plaintiffs to have raised unsuccessful issues, the court considered the significance of the issue on which the plaintiffs succeeded. Even if, numerically, the plaintiffs failed on more issues than they succeeded, the judge noted that the plaintiffs’ success was not trivial. The plaintiffs succeeded on a key issue—breach of contract—and obtained more than 80% of the amount claimed. That level of success supported the conclusion that the plaintiffs had substantially prevailed, and therefore the default costs principle should apply.

The court also addressed the plaintiffs’ argument about the scope of s 28B of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act. The judge observed that while the power to hear further arguments under s 28B may be limited to hearings other than a trial of an action, that limitation did not necessarily apply to the court’s inherent jurisdiction. Both parties had referred to Thomson Plaza (Pte) Ltd v Liquidators of Yaohan Department Store Singapore Pte Ltd (in liquidation) [2001] 2 SLR(R) 246, where it was said that even in respect of a final order, a judge has an inherent jurisdiction to recall his decision and hear further arguments, provided the order is not yet perfected.

However, the judge found that the plaintiffs’ reliance on the filing of a notice of appeal was not relevant to the inherent jurisdiction point. The notice of appeal was filed after the defendants had sought leave to make further arguments, and the questions of further arguments and costs had to await the judge’s decision. In other words, the procedural chronology meant that the inherent jurisdiction analysis was not displaced by the mere filing of an appeal notice at that stage. This reasoning reinforced the court’s view that, even if inherent jurisdiction existed, the defendants’ application still failed because it was procedurally defective and substantively unpersuasive.

Having affirmed the “costs follow the event” approach, the judge then proceeded to determine the appropriate costs orders. The earlier order had provided for taxation if not agreed, but counsel agreed to make submissions on costs in lieu of taxation or agreement. The court therefore fixed costs amounts rather than directing taxation. This reflects a common practical approach in Singapore civil procedure: where parties can agree on submissions, the court may fix costs to avoid further procedural steps.

What Was the Outcome?

Choo Han Teck J affirmed the earlier costs order that costs follow the event. The court ordered that costs be paid by the 3rd defendant to the plaintiffs fixed at $200,000. This reflected the plaintiffs’ substantial success, including their recovery of more than 80% of the claimed amount, and the court’s view that the key successful issue was significant.

Because the plaintiffs did not succeed against the other defendants, the court also ordered costs to be paid by the plaintiffs to the 1st and 4th defendants fixed at $40,000 for each defendant. The judge took into account that the 1st and 4th defendants were minor parties and were represented by the same counsel. As for counterclaim costs, the court ordered that costs be paid by the 3rd and 4th defendants to the 1st, 2nd and 3rd plaintiffs fixed at $10,000 each plaintiff, reflecting that the counterclaim taken out by the 3rd and 4th defendants failed.

Why Does This Case Matter?

This decision is a useful authority on costs in Singapore civil litigation, particularly on how courts apply the “costs follow the event” principle where there are multiple issues and partial success. The court’s reasoning demonstrates that costs analysis is not a mechanical exercise of counting the number of issues won or lost. Instead, the court focuses on the overall outcome and the significance of the issues on which a party succeeded, including the proportion of the claim recovered.

For practitioners, the case also highlights the importance of procedural compliance when seeking further arguments. The court treated non-compliance with para 82(1)(d) of the Supreme Court Practice Directions as a sufficient basis to dismiss the application. Even where a party attempts to recharacterise the basis of its request (for example, by invoking inherent jurisdiction), the court may still insist on strict adherence to the procedural framework where a clear rule exists.

Finally, the case is relevant for understanding the relationship between statutory powers to hear further arguments and the court’s inherent jurisdiction. By referencing Thomson Plaza and clarifying that the limitation in s 28B may not apply to inherent jurisdiction, the decision provides a structured approach to how courts may consider their power to revisit decisions. However, it also underscores that even if the court has power, it will not necessarily exercise it where the application is procedurally defective and substantively weak.

Legislation Referenced

  • Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 2007 Rev Ed), s 28B
  • Supreme Court Practice Directions, para 82(1)(d)

Cases Cited

  • Thomson Plaza (Pte) Ltd v Liquidators of Yaohan Department Store Singapore Pte Ltd (in liquidation) [2001] 2 SLR(R) 246

Source Documents

This article analyses [2018] SGHC 164 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.

Written by Sushant Shukla

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