Case Details
- Citation: [2019] SGCA 53
- Title: Leong Sze Hian v Lee Hsien Loong
- Court: Court of Appeal of the Republic of Singapore
- Date: 27 September 2019
- Case Number: Civil Appeal No 61 of 2019
- Judges: Sundaresh Menon CJ, Andrew Phang Boon Leong JA, Judith Prakash JA
- Appellant: Leong Sze Hian
- Respondent: Lee Hsien Loong
- Procedural Posture: Appeal against an order striking out the appellant’s counterclaim
- Legal Area(s): Civil Procedure; Striking out; Defamation (context); Abuse of process (tort pleaded)
- Statutes Referenced: Not specified in the provided extract
- Cases Cited: Lee Tat Development Pte Ltd v Management Corporation Strata Title Plan No 301 [2018] 2 SLR 866 (“Lee Tat Development”)
- Judgment Type: Ex tempore judgment
- Judgment Length: 6 pages; 1,386 words
Summary
In Leong Sze Hian v Lee Hsien Loong ([2019] SGCA 53), the Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal against a decision striking out the appellant’s counterclaim framed in terms of “abuse of process”. The underlying dispute arose from a defamation action brought by the respondent, Lee Hsien Loong, against the appellant, Leong Sze Hian, after the appellant posted a link to an article on a Malaysian website alleging, among other things, “secret deals” between Singapore and Malaysia involving the respondent and other political figures.
The appellant did not concede the falsity of the publication and intended to defend the defamation claim. However, he also sought to sue the respondent by way of a counterclaim in the tort of abuse of process, contending that the defamation action itself was an abuse of process. The Court of Appeal held that this counterclaim was foreclosed by its earlier decision in Lee Tat Development, where it was held that the tort of abuse of process is not recognised under Singapore law. The Court further rejected the appellant’s attempt to carve out an exception, including on the basis that the respondent was a public figure and allegedly used “machinery of the state” to silence critics.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
The facts, as recited by the Court of Appeal, began with the appellant’s online posting. The appellant shared a link to an article that appeared to have been published on a Malaysian website. The article suggested that ongoing Malaysian investigations concerning 1Malaysia Development Berhad extended to alleged “secret deals” between “corrupted Prime Ministers” of Singapore and Malaysia. The article referenced, among other matters, allegedly “unfair agreements” entered into by Mr Najib Razak with the respondent, including an agreement to build the Singapore–Malaysia High-Speed Rail.
Following the publication, the respondent commenced a defamation action against the appellant. The appellant intended to defend the claim. Importantly, the appellant’s defence strategy included not conceding the falsity of the article. Even if the article were shown at trial to be false, the appellant argued that he would still be entitled to raise an abuse-of-process argument, treating the respondent’s commencement of the defamation action as itself abusive.
Procedurally, the dispute became more complex because the appellant did not confine his abuse-of-process argument to a defence. Instead, he framed a counterclaim premised on the tort of abuse of process. In effect, he sought to rely on the alleged abuse not only to resist liability in the defamation action, but also to obtain damages through a separate cause of action pleaded as a counterclaim.
In the court below, the respondent applied to strike out the appellant’s counterclaim. The appellant, in turn, applied to strike out the respondent’s defamation claim on various grounds, including that it was an abuse of process. The judge struck out the appellant’s counterclaim and dismissed the appellant’s application to strike out the defamation claim. The appellant then appealed only the striking out of his counterclaim.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The central legal issue was whether the appellant could maintain a counterclaim based on the tort of abuse of process in Singapore law. Put differently, the Court of Appeal had to determine whether such a tort exists and is actionable, such that a defendant in a defamation suit could sue the plaintiff for damages on the basis that the plaintiff’s proceedings were an abuse of process.
A second issue concerned the appellant’s attempt to distinguish or limit the effect of the Court of Appeal’s earlier decision in Lee Tat Development. The appellant accepted that Lee Tat Development stated that the tort of abuse of process is not recognised in Singapore, but he urged the Court of Appeal in the present case to “carve out” an exception. The appellant’s argument was that the respondent, being the Prime Minister, was acting in a public capacity and allegedly using the “machinery of the state” to silence critics.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeal’s task was not merely to apply Lee Tat Development mechanically, but to assess whether any principled basis existed to depart from that precedent in the circumstances of a defamation claim involving a public figure and alleged state influence.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
The Court of Appeal began by clarifying the narrow scope of the appeal. The Court expressly stated that it would say nothing about the appellant’s defences to the defamation claim, because those defences were not before the Court. The only question was the appellant’s contention that, aside from raising defences, he was entitled to sue the respondent by mounting a cause of action in abuse of process.
As a preliminary point, the Court noted that the appellant’s counsel had not cited any case—either in Singapore or in other jurisdictions—that recognised a claim of this kind. While the absence of authority was not determinative, the Court found it “improbable” that a person could publish potentially defamatory material and then sue the recipient for attempting to protect his interests. This observation framed the Court’s scepticism about the conceptual coherence of the proposed counterclaim.
The Court then addressed the appellant’s submission that the respondent’s motivation was to silence a critic of the government. The Court considered the appellant’s characterisation of the respondent’s conduct and the alleged use of state machinery. However, the Court emphasised that the defamation action was brought by the respondent “evidently in his own capacity and using his own solicitors”. On the face of the proceedings, the only organ of state involved was the judiciary. The Court also noted that the appellant, when pressed, clarified that he was not referring to the courts themselves, but rather to statements by the Infocomm Media Development Authority (IMDA) and other agencies. The Court observed that whatever actions those agencies might have taken were not connected to the suit before it.
Having placed the facts in their proper setting, the Court turned to the decisive obstacle: Lee Tat Development. The Court described Lee Tat Development as a “recent decision” of the Court of Appeal, fully and carefully reasoned, reflecting unanimous views of a five-judge panel. In that case, the Court held that the tort of abuse of process is not a recognised tort under Singapore law. The appellant accepted that this was the law, but asked the Court to carve out an exception for the type of claim he wished to pursue.
The Court rejected the proposed carve-out. It reasoned that Lee Tat Development was grounded in policy considerations that remained persuasive. The Court explained that every defendant in litigation faces the prospect that, even if he prevails, the vindication of victory may not fully address the inconvenience, stress, pain, and other suffering endured during the proceedings. Historically, the common law addressed this through costs awards. A successful party could recover costs, and the court has wide discretion in fashioning an appropriate costs order.
In Lee Tat Development, the Court of Appeal had been invited to go beyond costs and allow a party to bring an action seeking damages where the party could show that the claim faced was an abuse of process. The Court declined. It held in clear terms that the tort of abuse of process is not part of Singapore law. The Court in Leong Sze Hian reiterated the reasons given in Lee Tat Development, namely: (1) recognising the tort would undermine finality and encourage satellite litigation, prolonging disputes; (2) it would open the floodgates to a variety of claims, including for abusive commencement of civil proceedings; (3) it could deter genuine litigants with potentially valid claims from pursuing remedies for fear of being sued; and (4) existing civil procedure rules already provide adequate means to deal with abuses of process.
Crucially, the Court of Appeal in the present case concluded that these reasons “remain valid” and that it was satisfied there was “no reason or basis for departing from Lee Tat Development”. The Court therefore treated Lee Tat Development as binding and determinative, leaving no room for the appellant’s policy-based exception argument, even when the plaintiff was a public figure and the appellant alleged political motivation.
What Was the Outcome?
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. As a result, the striking out of the appellant’s counterclaim in abuse of process remained in place. The practical effect was that the appellant could not pursue damages through a counterclaim premised on a tort that Singapore law does not recognise.
The Court ordered that the appellant pay the respondent costs fixed at $20,000 inclusive of disbursements, and made the usual order for payment out of security. This reinforced that the litigation would proceed without the additional layer of an abuse-of-process counterclaim.
Why Does This Case Matter?
Leong Sze Hian v Lee Hsien Loong is significant primarily because it confirms and applies the Court of Appeal’s earlier holding in Lee Tat Development that the tort of abuse of process is not recognised in Singapore. For practitioners, the case underscores that attempts to plead abuse of process as a standalone cause of action—whether as a counterclaim in defamation proceedings or in other civil contexts—will face a high risk of being struck out at an early stage.
The decision also illustrates the Court’s approach to arguments seeking to carve out exceptions from established precedent. Even where a defendant alleges improper motivation, including political or public-capacity considerations, the Court will not readily create new tortious pathways that would undermine the policy reasons for refusing recognition. In this sense, the case is a reminder that policy considerations embedded in precedent are not easily displaced by contextual facts.
From a litigation strategy perspective, the case clarifies that defendants who believe proceedings are abusive should rely on the procedural mechanisms already available within the civil justice system—such as striking out, abuse-of-process doctrines, and costs consequences—rather than attempting to convert those complaints into a damages claim through an unrecognised tort. This has implications for how pleadings are drafted, how counterclaims are structured, and how parties assess the cost-benefit of pursuing satellite litigation.
Legislation Referenced
- Not specified in the provided judgment extract.
Cases Cited
- Lee Tat Development Pte Ltd v Management Corporation Strata Title Plan No 301 [2018] 2 SLR 866
Source Documents
This article analyses [2019] SGCA 53 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.