Case Details
- Citation: [2019] SGCA 53
- Case Number: Civil Appeal No 61 of 2019
- Court: Court of Appeal of the Republic of Singapore
- Date of Decision: 27 September 2019
- Judges: Sundaresh Menon CJ; Andrew Phang Boon Leong JA; Judith Prakash JA
- Parties: Leong Sze Hian (Appellant) v Lee Hsien Loong (Respondent)
- Procedural Posture: Appeal against the High Court’s order striking out the appellant’s counterclaim
- Legal Area: Civil Procedure — Striking out
- Primary Issue: Whether a tort of abuse of process is recognised in Singapore such that it can found a counterclaim (not merely a defence)
- Appellant’s Counsel: Lim Tean (Carson Law Chambers)
- Respondent’s Counsel: Davinder Singh s/o Amar Singh SC, Lin Xianyang Timothy, Fong Cheng Yee David, Darveenia Rajula Rajah and Shannon Valencia Peh (Davinder Singh Chambers LLC)
- High Court Decision Appealed From: [2019] SGHC 66
- Judgment Length: 2 pages; 1,254 words
Summary
In Leong Sze Hian v Lee Hsien Loong [2019] SGCA 53, the Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal against a High Court order striking out the appellant’s counterclaim framed in terms of “abuse of process”. The counterclaim was brought alongside the appellant’s intention to defend a defamation action brought by the respondent, Lee Hsien Loong, who was the Prime Minister.
The appellant had posted a link to an article on a Malaysian website alleging, among other things, that investigations into the 1Malaysia Development Berhad fund extended to “secret deals” between “corrupted Prime Ministers” of Singapore and Malaysia. The respondent sued the appellant for defamation. Instead of limiting his response to defences to the defamation claim, the appellant sought to sue back by counterclaiming in the tort of abuse of process, contending that the defamation action itself was an abuse intended to silence a critic.
The Court of Appeal held that the appellant’s counterclaim was foreclosed by the earlier Court of Appeal decision in Lee Tat Development Pte Ltd v Management Corporation Strata Title Plan No 301 [2018] 2 SLR 866 (“Lee Tat Development”), which held that the tort of abuse of process is not recognised under Singapore law. The Court declined to carve out any exception, emphasising policy reasons including finality of litigation, avoidance of satellite proceedings, and the adequacy of existing procedural safeguards and costs mechanisms.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
The dispute arose from an online publication. The appellant, Leong Sze Hian, posted a link to an article that appeared to have been published on a Malaysian website. The article suggested that ongoing Malaysian investigations concerning the 1Malaysia Development Berhad fund were extending to allegedly “secret deals” between the “two corrupted Prime Ministers” of Singapore and Malaysia. The article referenced, among other things, “several unfair agreements” that Mr Najib Razak had entered into with the respondent, including an agreement to build the Singapore–Malaysia High-Speed Rail.
Following this publication, the respondent, Lee Hsien Loong, commenced a defamation action against the appellant. The appellant indicated that he intended to defend the defamation claim. Importantly, the appellant did not concede the falsity of the article. He also advanced a broader position: even if the article were shown at trial to be false, he contended that he would still be entitled to raise “abuse of process” as a defence to the defamation action.
However, the appellant went further in the court below. In addition to raising defences, he filed a counterclaim premised on the tort of abuse of process. In substance, the appellant sought to rely on the alleged abuse of process not only defensively (as a response to the defamation claim) but also offensively, as a standalone cause of action to obtain relief against the respondent.
The respondent applied to strike out the appellant’s counterclaim. Separately, the appellant applied to strike out the respondent’s defamation claim on various grounds, including that the defamation action was itself an abuse of process. The High Court struck out the appellant’s counterclaim, while dismissing the appellant’s application to strike out the defamation claim. The present appeal concerned only the striking out of the counterclaim; the Court of Appeal expressly noted that it was not dealing with the appellant’s defences to the defamation claim because they were not before it.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The central legal issue was narrow but significant: whether the appellant could maintain a counterclaim based on the tort of abuse of process in Singapore. Put differently, the question was whether Singapore law recognises a cause of action in abuse of process that can be pleaded as a claim (here, as a counterclaim), rather than merely raised as a procedural defence or as a basis for seeking costs or other remedies within the existing litigation framework.
A related issue concerned the appellant’s attempt to distinguish or limit the binding effect of Lee Tat Development. The appellant accepted that Lee Tat Development stated that the tort of abuse of process is not a recognised tort under Singapore law. Nevertheless, he urged the Court of Appeal to “carve out an exception” to allow his proposed claim to proceed, particularly on the basis that the respondent was acting in a public capacity and allegedly using the “machinery of the state” to silence critics.
Finally, the Court of Appeal had to consider whether the factual framing—namely that the respondent was the Prime Minister and the litigation allegedly had a silencing motive—could justify departing from the established position that the tort is not recognised. The Court’s analysis therefore involved both doctrinal and policy considerations, anchored in the precedent of Lee Tat Development.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
The Court of Appeal began by clarifying the scope of the appeal. It emphasised that it was not addressing the appellant’s defences to the defamation claim, as those were not before the Court. The focus was solely on whether the counterclaim should have been struck out. This framing mattered because the appellant’s arguments were partly directed at the merits of the defamation dispute, whereas the counterclaim’s viability depended on whether the tort of abuse of process exists as a recognised cause of action in Singapore.
As a preliminary observation, the Court noted that the appellant’s counsel had not cited any case—either in Singapore or in other jurisdictions—that recognised a scenario where a person could make a potentially defamatory publication and then mount a viable claim against the person at the receiving end for attempting to protect his interests. While this point was not determinative, it underscored the Court’s scepticism about the conceptual coherence of the appellant’s proposed counterclaim.
The appellant’s primary submission was that the respondent’s motivation was to silence a critic of the government, and that the respondent was using state machinery to do so. The Court unpacked this submission carefully. It observed that the action was brought by the respondent “evidently in his own capacity and using his own solicitors”. On the face of the proceedings, the only organ of state involved was the judiciary. The Court also recorded that counsel clarified he was not referring to the courts, but rather to statements by IMDA and other agencies. The Court responded that whatever those agencies might have done, they had nothing to do with the suit before it. This analysis narrowed the factual relevance of the appellant’s “state machinery” argument to the litigation context.
Ultimately, the Court identified the “biggest and, in our judgment, insuperable obstacle” as the binding precedent in Lee Tat Development. The Court explained that in a fully reasoned unanimous decision of a five-judge panel, it had been held that the tort of abuse of process is not part of Singapore law. The appellant accepted this as the law but asked the Court to carve out an exception. The Court rejected the request, holding that no carve-out was warranted.
The Court then reinforced the policy rationale in Lee Tat Development. It summarised the reasoning that recognising a tort of abuse of process would undermine the principle of finality and encourage unnecessary satellite litigation. It would also open the floodgates to a variety of claims, including claims for allegedly abusive commencement of civil proceedings. Further, it could deter genuine litigants with potentially valid claims from pursuing their remedies, for fear of being sued in turn. Finally, the Court noted that existing rules of civil procedure already provide adequate means for dealing with abuses of process, including through procedural mechanisms and costs awards.
In the present case, the Court of Appeal concluded that these reasons remained valid and that there was no basis to depart from Lee Tat Development. The Court did not treat the respondent’s status as Prime Minister as a legal differentiator capable of changing the doctrinal position. Instead, it treated the issue as one of legal recognition of a tort, which is governed by precedent and policy considerations rather than by the alleged motive behind the litigation.
What Was the Outcome?
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. Consequently, the High Court’s order striking out the appellant’s counterclaim in abuse of process remained in place. The practical effect was that the appellant could not pursue the counterclaim as a separate cause of action, even if he maintained that the defamation proceedings were abusive.
On costs, the Court ordered the appellant to pay the respondent costs fixed at $20,000 inclusive of disbursements. It also made the usual order for payment out of security, reflecting standard practice where security for costs had been ordered or was in place.
Why Does This Case Matter?
Leong Sze Hian v Lee Hsien Loong is important primarily for its reaffirmation of the doctrinal position established in Lee Tat Development: the tort of abuse of process is not recognised in Singapore. While the case arose in a defamation context, the Court’s reasoning is not confined to defamation. It is a procedural and substantive reminder that litigants cannot circumvent the absence of a recognised tort by reframing an alleged abuse of litigation as a counterclaim seeking damages.
For practitioners, the case highlights the limits of “abuse of process” arguments in Singapore civil litigation. Even where a party believes that proceedings are motivated by improper purposes, the remedy lies within the existing procedural framework—such as striking out, summary judgment, case management powers, and costs—rather than by founding a standalone tort claim. This is consistent with the policy concerns articulated in Lee Tat Development about finality, satellite litigation, and deterrence of legitimate claims.
The case also illustrates how courts will treat attempts to distinguish precedent based on the alleged status or motive of the opposing party. The appellant’s argument that the respondent was acting in a public capacity and using state machinery did not provide a legal basis to carve out an exception. Instead, the Court focused on the legal recognition of the tort and the adequacy of existing remedies. As such, the decision serves as a caution to litigants who seek to expand causes of action beyond what Singapore law currently recognises.
Legislation Referenced
- No specific statutes were expressly referenced in the provided judgment extract.
Cases Cited
- Lee Tat Development Pte Ltd v Management Corporation Strata Title Plan No 301 [2018] 2 SLR 866
- Leong Sze Hian v Lee Hsien Loong [2019] SGHC 66
Source Documents
This article analyses [2019] SGCA 53 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.