Case Details
- Citation: [2019] SGHC 66
- Title: Lee Hsien Loong v Leong Sze Hian
- Court: High Court of the Republic of Singapore
- Date of Decision: 12 March 2019
- Judge: Aedit Abdullah J
- Coram: Aedit Abdullah J
- Case Number: Suit No 1185 of 2018
- Applications: Summons No 148 of 2019; Summons No 428 of 2019
- Procedural Context: Appeal in Civil Appeal No 61 of 2019 dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 27 September 2019 (see [2019] SGCA 53)
- Plaintiff/Applicant: Lee Hsien Loong
- Defendant/Respondent: Leong Sze Hian
- Plaintiff’s Role in Suit: Plaintiff in the claim; defendant in the counterclaim
- Defendant’s Role in Suit: Defendant in the claim; plaintiff in the counterclaim
- Legal Area: Civil Procedure — Striking out
- Primary Substantive Context: Defamation claim; counterclaim premised on abuse of process
- Statutes Referenced: Human Rights Act
- Rules of Court Referenced: O 18 r 19(1)(a) of the Rules of Court (Cap 322, R5, 2014 Rev Ed) (“ROC”)
- Additional Procedural Provision Mentioned: O 14 of the ROC (summary judgment)
- Constitutional Provision Mentioned: Art 14(1)(a) of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1985 Rev Ed, 1999 Reprint)
- Counsel: Davinder Singh S/O Amar Singh SC, Lim Xianyang Timothy and Fong Cheng Yee, David (Drew & Napier LLC) for the plaintiff in the claim and the defendant in counterclaim; Lim Tean (Carson Law Chambers) for the defendant and the plaintiff in counterclaim
- Judgment Length: 14 pages, 6,350 words
Summary
Lee Hsien Loong v Leong Sze Hian concerned two applications arising from a defamation suit. The plaintiff, the Prime Minister of Singapore, sued the defendant for defamation after the defendant shared on Facebook an article alleging that the plaintiff was involved in “secret deals” and “unfair agreements” connected to Malaysia’s 1MDB scandal. The defendant did not add commentary to the Facebook post; the post displayed part of the article’s title and attracted engagement (likes, reactions, comments, and shares) before being removed after the defendant received a notice from the Info-communications Media Development Authority (IMDA).
The High Court (Aedit Abdullah J) allowed the plaintiff’s application to strike out the defendant’s counterclaim, which was premised on the tort of abuse of process. The court held that the counterclaim disclosed no reasonable cause of action because the Court of Appeal’s decision in Lee Tat Development Pte Ltd v Management Corporation Strata Title Plan No 301 had unequivocally rejected the tort of abuse of process as a recognised cause of action in Singapore. The court also dismissed the plaintiff’s application to strike out the defamation claim, finding that the pleadings raised triable issues suitable for trial.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
The dispute arose from a defamation claim linked to online content. The plaintiff, Lee Hsien Loong, was at the material time the Prime Minister of Singapore. The defendant, Leong Sze Hian, described himself as a human rights activist and government critic. His Facebook profile showed that he had a substantial online presence, with thousands of “friends” and a number of followers. The case therefore involved not only the content of the allegedly defamatory material, but also the manner in which it was disseminated through social media.
The allegedly defamatory article (“the Article”) was published on or around 7 November 2018 by “The Coverage”, a Malaysian-based social news network. The Article stated that ongoing Malaysian investigations concerning 1Malaysia Development Berhad (“1MDB”) were “trying to find the secret deals between the two corrupted Prime Ministers of Singapore and Malaysia”. The Article referred to the plaintiff and former Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak. It further referenced “several unfair agreements” said to have been entered into by Najib Razak with the plaintiff, including an agreement to build the Singapore-Malaysia High Speed Rail, and it included other details about alleged investigations.
On 7 November 2018 at about 6.16pm, the defendant shared a link to the Article on his Facebook Timeline (“the Post”). The Timeline functions as a record of a user’s Facebook activity, displaying posts in roughly reverse chronological order. Importantly, the defendant did not include any accompanying text with the Post. Instead, the Post displayed part of the Article’s title. As at 10.16pm on 7 November 2018, the Post had attracted multiple forms of engagement: 22 reactions, five comments, and 18 shares. The defendant removed the Post at about 7.30am on 10 November 2018, after reading a notice from IMDA sent around 11.00pm on 9 November 2018.
Following publication of the Article and the defendant’s sharing of it, media outlets reported on the Article over 8 and 9 November 2018. The Straits Times reported responses by Singapore’s Law and Home Affairs Minister and the High Commission of Singapore in Malaysia, which refuted the Article and its contents. On 9 November 2018, the Straits Times also reported that the Monetary Authority of Singapore had filed a police report regarding a similar article published on the Straits Times Review website, and that IMDA had issued a statement describing the STR article as “baseless and defamatory”. These events formed part of the broader factual backdrop against which the defamation suit was brought.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The first key issue concerned the defendant’s counterclaim. The plaintiff applied to strike out the counterclaim under O 18 r 19(1)(a) of the ROC on the basis that it disclosed no reasonable cause of action. The counterclaim was premised on the tort of abuse of process. The central legal question was whether abuse of process was a recognised tort in Singapore law and, if so, whether the defendant’s pleaded case could possibly succeed.
The second key issue concerned the plaintiff’s application to strike out the defamation claim. The plaintiff argued that the claim should not proceed because it allegedly lacked sufficient basis. The court had to determine whether the defamation pleadings disclosed triable issues. In defamation litigation, this typically involves assessing whether the pleaded meanings, imputations, and publication-related allegations are sufficiently arguable to warrant a full trial rather than summary disposal.
Although the defamation claim itself was not struck out, the counterclaim application required the court to engage with the defendant’s attempt to distinguish binding Court of Appeal authority. The defendant argued that the tort of abuse of process should be reconsidered or limited in light of constitutional freedom of expression under Art 14(1)(a). The legal issue therefore also included whether constitutional arguments could displace or carve out from the binding precedent in Lee Tat.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
For the counterclaim striking-out application (SUM 148/2019), the court began by restating the applicable test under O 18 r 19(1)(a). A “reasonable cause of action” is one that has “some chance of success when only the allegations in the pleading are considered”. The court also noted that claims based on causes of action not recognised at law should be struck out for disclosing no reasonable cause of action. This framework ensured that the court did not conduct a mini-trial but instead assessed whether the legal foundation of the counterclaim existed and whether the pleadings could possibly meet the threshold for a recognised claim.
The court then addressed the binding authority issue. The defendant’s counterclaim relied on the tort of abuse of process. However, the Court of Appeal in Lee Tat Development Pte Ltd v Management Corporation Strata Title Plan No 301 had “unequivocally rejected” the tort of abuse of process as a recognised cause of action in Singapore. The High Court emphasised that stare decisis applied and that it was satisfied Lee Tat was binding. In particular, the court highlighted the Court of Appeal’s emphatic statement that the tort of abuse of process was not recognised in Singapore law, and that there were ample procedural mechanisms within civil procedure to address abuses without recognising a new tort.
The High Court also addressed the defendant’s attempt to persuade it to reconsider Lee Tat. The defendant argued that Lee Tat should be revisited because the present case involved constitutional freedom of expression. The defendant contended that the tort of abuse of process should exist in limited circumstances to restrain abuse of public function, drawing an analogy to malicious prosecution. The defendant further argued that Lee Tat did not address exceptions involving abuse of public function and that the constitutional dimension required a different approach.
In response, the High Court held that it did not see any room in Lee Tat for the tort of abuse of process to be recognised or extended through the constitutional arguments advanced. The court treated the Court of Appeal’s rejection as definitive, and it refused to carve out an exception based on the defendant’s characterisation of the dispute as involving freedom of expression. The reasoning reflects a strict adherence to hierarchical precedent: where the Court of Appeal has clearly rejected a cause of action, a High Court is not at liberty to create an exception or effectively overrule that position by recharacterising the legal context.
Having concluded that the counterclaim was legally untenable, the court allowed SUM 148/2019 and struck out the counterclaim. The court further dealt with costs. The plaintiff sought indemnity costs, arguing that the defendant knowingly pursued a hopeless claim despite knowledge of Lee Tat. The court referenced the principle that knowingly pursuing a hopeless claim can justify indemnity costs, and it also noted that wholly unmeritorious conduct may similarly support such an award. While the extract provided does not reproduce the final costs order in full, the court’s approach indicates that the counterclaim’s legal basis was not merely weak but foreclosed by binding authority.
Turning to SUM 428/2019 (the plaintiff’s application to strike out the defamation claim), the court dismissed it. The court found that there was a sufficient basis for the matter to proceed to trial. This indicates that, unlike the counterclaim, the defamation claim was not legally barred at the pleading stage. The court’s reasoning suggests that the pleadings raised triable issues concerning the meaning of the Article and the Post, publication, and whether the imputations were defamatory and actionable. The court therefore applied the procedural principle that striking out is an exceptional remedy and should not be used to deprive parties of a trial where factual and legal issues require adjudication.
What Was the Outcome?
The High Court allowed SUM 148/2019 and struck out the defendant’s counterclaim for abuse of process. The practical effect was that the litigation would proceed on the plaintiff’s defamation claim without the counterclaim being part of the trial agenda. This also removed the defendant’s attempt to transform the dispute into a procedural or constitutional counter-attack through an unrecognised tort.
The court dismissed SUM 428/2019, meaning the plaintiff’s defamation claim was not struck out and would proceed to trial. The case therefore continued on the core defamation allegations, with the court holding that the pleadings disclosed triable issues rather than a claim that was doomed at the outset.
Why Does This Case Matter?
This case is significant for civil procedure and for defamation practitioners because it illustrates how Singapore courts police the boundaries of recognised causes of action at the pleading stage. The striking-out of the abuse of process counterclaim reinforces the binding effect of Court of Appeal authority and demonstrates that litigants cannot circumvent precedent by reframing the dispute as constitutional or policy-driven. For lawyers, the decision is a reminder that the doctrine of stare decisis is not merely formal; it has concrete consequences for whether pleadings survive.
More broadly, the case highlights the court’s approach to the “reasonable cause of action” test under O 18 r 19(1)(a). Where a pleaded cause of action is not recognised in law, the court will strike it out without needing to assess the merits. This is particularly relevant in complex litigation where parties sometimes attempt to add novel torts or procedural claims to gain leverage or delay. The court’s reasoning also shows that constitutional arguments, while potentially important in the right context, do not automatically justify creating new private law causes of action contrary to binding authority.
For defamation litigation, the dismissal of the strike-out application underscores that defamation claims often involve issues best resolved at trial. Even where the defendant’s conduct appears limited (sharing a link without commentary) and the post was later removed, the court still found that the claim raised triable issues. Practitioners should therefore expect that courts will be cautious about striking out defamation claims unless the pleadings are clearly defective or legally barred.
Legislation Referenced
- Rules of Court (Cap 322, R5, 2014 Rev Ed): O 18 r 19(1)(a)
- Rules of Court (Cap 322, R5, 2014 Rev Ed): O 14 (mentioned as a procedural remedy)
- Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1985 Rev Ed, 1999 Reprint): Art 14(1)(a)
- Human Rights Act (as referenced in the case metadata)
Cases Cited
- Gabriel Peter & Partners (suing as a firm) v Wee Chong Jin and others [1997] 3 SLR(R) 649
- TMT Asia Ltd v BHP Billiton Marketing AG (Singapore Branch) and another [2015] 2 SLR 540
- Lee Tat Development Pte Ltd v Management Corporation Strata Title Plan No 301 [2018] 2 SLR 866
- Sunbreeze Group Investments Ltd and others v Sim Chye Hock Ron [2018] 2 SLR 1242
- Tan Chin Yew Joseph v Saxo Capital Markets Pte Ltd [2013] SGHC 274
- Three Rivers District Council v The Governor and Co of the Bank of England (No 6) [2006] EWHC 816 (Comm)
- Anne Joseph Aaron (m w) and Others v Cheong Yip Seng and Others [1995] SGHC 131
- Crawford Adjusters (Cayman) Ltd v Sagicor General Insurance (Cayman) Ltd [2014] AC 366
- Lee Tat Development Pte Ltd v Management Corporation Strata Title Plan No 301 [2018] 2 SLR 866 (also referenced for key paragraphs)
- Lee Hsien Loong v Leong Sze Hian [2019] SGCA 53 (appeal dismissed; referenced in editorial note)
- [1995] SGHC 131
- [2013] SGHC 274
- [2019] SGCA 53
- [2019] SGHC 36
Source Documents
This article analyses [2019] SGHC 66 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.