Case Details
- Citation: [2019] SGHC 66
- Title: Lee Hsien Loong v Leong Sze Hian
- Court: High Court of the Republic of Singapore
- Date of Decision: 12 March 2019
- Judge: Aedit Abdullah J
- Coram: Aedit Abdullah J
- Case Number: Suit No 1185 of 2018 (Summonses Nos 148 and 428 of 2019)
- Tribunal/Court: High Court
- Plaintiff/Applicant: Lee Hsien Loong
- Defendant/Respondent: Leong Sze Hian
- Procedural Posture: Applications to strike out pleadings in a defamation action (SUM 148/2019; SUM 428/2019)
- Legal Area: Civil Procedure — Striking out
- Primary Substantive Context: Defamation; counterclaim premised on abuse of process
- Statutes Referenced: Human Rights Act (as referenced in the judgment extract)
- Rules of Court Referenced: O 18 r 19(1)(a) of the Rules of Court (Cap 322, R5, 2014 Rev Ed) (“ROC”)
- Appeal Note: Appeal in Civil Appeal No 61 of 2019 dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 27 September 2019 (see [2019] SGCA 53)
- Counsel (Plaintiff in claim / Defendant in counterclaim): Davinder Singh S/O Amar Singh SC, Lim Xianyang Timothy and Fong Cheng Yee, David (Drew & Napier LLC)
- Counsel (Defendant in claim / Plaintiff in counterclaim): Lim Tean (Carson Law Chambers)
- Judgment Length: 14 pages, 6,350 words
Summary
Lee Hsien Loong v Leong Sze Hian concerned interlocutory applications in a defamation suit arising from a Facebook post that shared an online article alleging wrongdoing connected to the 1MDB scandal. The plaintiff, the Prime Minister of Singapore, sued for defamation after the defendant shared a link to an article published by a Malaysian social news network. The defendant did not add commentary to the post; the post displayed part of the article’s title and attracted “likes”, “reactions”, and “shares” for a short period before being removed.
In SUM 148/2019, the plaintiff sought to strike out the defendant’s counterclaim premised on the tort of abuse of process. The High Court (Aedit Abdullah J) allowed this application because the tort of abuse of process was not recognised in Singapore law, following binding Court of Appeal authority in Lee Tat Development Pte Ltd v Management Corporation Strata Title Plan No 301. The court held that the counterclaim disclosed no reasonable cause of action.
In SUM 428/2019, the defendant sought to strike out the plaintiff’s defamation claim. The High Court dismissed that application, holding that the claim disclosed triable issues and should proceed to trial. The decision therefore reflects a procedural discipline: where binding precedent forecloses a pleaded cause of action, striking out is appropriate; where factual and legal issues remain arguable, the matter should proceed to trial.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
The plaintiff, Lee Hsien Loong, was the current Prime Minister of Singapore at the material time. The defendant, Leong Sze Hian, described himself as a human rights activist and government critic. His Facebook profile page bore his name, and he had a substantial social media presence, with thousands of “friends” and a smaller number of “followers”. The dispute arose from the defendant’s use of Facebook to share an external article.
On or around 7 November 2018, an article entitled “Breaking News: Singapore Lee Hsien Loong Becomes 1MDB’s Key Investigation Target – Najib Signed Several Unfair Agreements with Hsien Loong In Exchange For Money Laundering” was published on “The Coverage”, a Malaysian-based social news network. The article suggested that Malaysian investigations into 1MDB were attempting to uncover “secret deals” between the plaintiff and former Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak. It referenced “several unfair agreements” allegedly entered into by Najib with the plaintiff, including an agreement to build the Singapore–Malaysia High Speed Rail, and it included other details about alleged investigations.
On 7 November 2018 at about 6.16pm, the defendant shared a link to the article on his Facebook Timeline. Importantly, the defendant did not include any accompanying text. The Facebook Timeline functions as a record of a user’s posts, and the post displayed part of the article’s title. As at 10.16pm on 7 November 2018, the post had attracted 22 “reactions”, five “comments”, and 18 “shares”. The defendant removed the post at about 7.30am on 10 November 2018 after receiving a notice from the Info-communications Media Development Authority (IMDA) sent at around 11.00pm on 9 November 2018.
Following publication of the article and the defendant’s sharing of it, media outlets reported on the article and its contents. The Straits Times reported governmental and diplomatic responses that refuted the article. It also reported that the Monetary Authority of Singapore had filed a police report regarding a similar article published on another site, and that IMDA had issued a statement describing the article on that site as “baseless and defamatory”. These events formed part of the broader context in which the plaintiff decided to sue.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The first key issue concerned SUM 148/2019: whether the defendant’s counterclaim disclosed a reasonable cause of action and should therefore be struck out under O 18 r 19(1)(a) of the Rules of Court. The counterclaim was premised on the tort of abuse of process. The plaintiff’s position was that this tort was not recognised in Singapore law and, in any event, the counterclaim could not succeed.
The second key issue concerned SUM 428/2019: whether the plaintiff’s defamation claim should be struck out on the basis that it disclosed no reasonable cause of action. The defendant’s application required the court to assess whether the pleaded defamation case raised triable issues or whether it was hopeless at the pleading stage.
Although the case arose in a defamation context, the striking-out dispute turned primarily on civil procedure and the binding effect of precedent on the availability of a pleaded tort. The defendant attempted to argue that the tort of abuse of process should be reconsidered or recognised in limited circumstances, including where constitutional freedom of expression was implicated.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
For SUM 148/2019, the court began by restating the applicable striking-out standard. Under O 18 r 19(1)(a) ROC, a pleading may be struck out if it discloses no reasonable cause of action. The court referred to the formulation that a “reasonable cause of action” is one that has “some chance of success when only the allegations in the pleading are considered”. The court also noted that a claim based on a cause of action not recognised at law will be struck out.
The defendant’s counterclaim relied on the tort of abuse of process. However, the court treated the Court of Appeal’s decision in Lee Tat Development Pte Ltd v Management Corporation Strata Title Plan No 301 as binding. In Lee Tat, the Court of Appeal had unequivocally rejected the tort of abuse of process as a recognised cause of action in Singapore. The High Court emphasised that the Court of Appeal’s reasoning in Lee Tat was not tentative: it was emphatic and grounded in policy considerations such as undermining finality, encouraging satellite litigation, opening the floodgates of litigation, and creating a chilling effect on regular litigation.
In the present case, the defendant sought to persuade the High Court to depart from Lee Tat. The defendant argued that the Court of Appeal should reconsider whether the tort exists, and attempted to distinguish Lee Tat on the basis that the present case involved constitutional freedom of expression under Article 14(1)(a) of the Constitution. The defendant also argued that Lee Tat did not address whether the tort should apply in exceptions where there is an abuse of a public function, drawing an analogy to malicious prosecution. The defendant suggested that, because malicious prosecution is a tool for constraining arbitrary exercise of public prosecuting powers, abuse of process should similarly be available in limited circumstances to restrain abuse of public functions affecting freedom of expression in the private sphere.
The High Court rejected these submissions. The court held that it was satisfied that Lee Tat was binding and that the doctrine of stare decisis applied. It therefore concluded that Lee Tat precluded the counterclaim from succeeding. The court relied on the Court of Appeal’s statement that it did not recognise the tort of abuse of process in Singapore and that there were ample legal mechanisms within existing civil procedure rules to afford adequate remedies for abuses of process. The High Court treated this as dispositive: if the legal basis for the pleaded cause of action does not exist, the claim cannot “take off” and must be struck out.
In addition, the High Court noted that civil procedure mechanisms already provide remedies for procedural abuse. It referenced the availability of summary judgment under O 14 ROC as an example of procedural tools that can address unmeritorious or abusive claims. The court also observed that subsequent authority had applied Lee Tat, reinforcing that the position was settled.
For SUM 428/2019, the court took a different approach. Unlike the counterclaim, the plaintiff’s defamation claim was not foreclosed by binding authority. The court held that the plaintiff’s claim disclosed sufficient basis to proceed to trial. While the extract does not reproduce the full reasoning on defamation elements, the court’s conclusion indicates that the pleadings raised triable issues—issues that should not be resolved summarily at the interlocutory stage. The court therefore dismissed the application to strike out the claim.
The court’s overall analysis thus reflects two complementary procedural principles. First, where a pleaded cause of action is legally unavailable because binding precedent rejects it, striking out is appropriate. Second, where the claim is not legally foreclosed and raises arguable issues, the court should allow the matter to proceed to trial rather than decide contested questions of fact or law on a striking-out application.
What Was the Outcome?
The High Court allowed SUM 148/2019 and struck out the defendant’s counterclaim. The practical effect was that the abuse of process counterclaim could not proceed, removing an additional cause of action from the defamation suit and narrowing the issues for trial.
The High Court dismissed SUM 428/2019. The plaintiff’s defamation claim therefore remained alive and was permitted to proceed to trial. The case would thus focus on the pleaded defamation allegations, including how the shared post and the article’s content were understood in their natural and ordinary meaning, and whether the plaintiff could establish the elements of defamation and the falsity/baselessness asserted in the pleadings.
Why Does This Case Matter?
This decision is significant primarily for its reaffirmation of the binding authority in Lee Tat on the non-recognition of the tort of abuse of process in Singapore. Practitioners should treat Lee Tat as firmly settled: attempts to repackage procedural grievances as an “abuse of process” tort are likely to be struck out at an early stage. The High Court’s approach demonstrates that, even where a defendant invokes constitutional arguments such as freedom of expression, the court will not depart from binding precedent unless the legal basis is genuinely open for reconsideration.
From a civil procedure perspective, the case illustrates the operation of O 18 r 19(1)(a) ROC and the “reasonable cause of action” threshold. The court’s reasoning shows that striking out is not merely about whether the claim seems weak; it is about whether the pleading discloses a legally recognised cause of action with some prospect of success. Where the cause of action is not recognised at law, the court will not permit the matter to proceed to trial.
For defamation litigators, the decision also underscores that striking-out applications against defamation claims will not succeed where triable issues exist. Even in a case involving social media sharing without additional commentary, the court was not prepared to summarily dispose of the plaintiff’s claim. This has practical implications for defendants seeking early dismissal: they must show not only that the claim is factually contested, but that it is legally untenable or otherwise lacks a reasonable cause of action.
Legislation Referenced
- Rules of Court (Cap 322, R5, 2014 Rev Ed): O 18 r 19(1)(a)
- Rules of Court (Cap 322, R5, 2014 Rev Ed): O 14 (summary judgment referenced as an example of procedural remedy)
- Human Rights Act (as referenced in the judgment extract)
- Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1985 Rev Ed, 1999 Reprint): Article 14(1)(a) (freedom of expression) (invoked by the defendant)
Cases Cited
- Gabriel Peter & Partners (suing as a firm) v Wee Chong Jin and others [1997] 3 SLR(R) 649
- TMT Asia Ltd v BHP Billiton Marketing AG (Singapore Branch) and another [2015] 2 SLR 540
- Lee Tat Development Pte Ltd v Management Corporation Strata Title Plan No 301 [2018] 2 SLR 866
- Sunbreeze Group Investments Ltd and others v Sim Chye Hock Ron [2018] 2 SLR 1242
- Tan Chin Yew Joseph v Saxo Capital Markets Pte Ltd [2013] SGHC 274
- Three Rivers District Council v The Governor and Co of the Bank of England (No 6) [2006] EWHC 816 (Comm)
- Anne Joseph Aaron (m w) and Others v Cheong Yip Seng and Others [1995] SGHC 131
- Crawford Adjusters (Cayman) Ltd v Sagicor General Insurance (Cayman) Ltd [2014] AC 366
- Lee Hsien Loong v Leong Sze Hian [2019] SGCA 53 (appeal dismissed; referenced in LawNet editorial note)
- [1995] SGHC 131
- [2013] SGHC 274
- [2019] SGCA 53
- [2019] SGHC 36
Source Documents
This article analyses [2019] SGHC 66 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.