Law Society of Singapore v Tan See Leh Jonathan [2020] SGHC 102

Case Details

• Citation: [2020] SGHC 102
• Title: Law Society of Singapore v Tan See Leh Jonathan
• Court: High Court of the Republic of Singapore
• Decision Date: 18 May 2020
• Case Number: Originating Summons No 13 of 2019
• Tribunal/Court: Court of Three Judges
• Coram: Sundaresh Menon CJ; Andrew Phang Boon Leong JA; Woo Bih Li J
• Judgment Type: Judgment of the court delivered ex tempore by Andrew Phang Boon Leong JA
• Plaintiff/Applicant: Law Society of Singapore
• Defendant/Respondent: Tan See Leh Jonathan
• Counsel for Applicant: Siraj Omar SC and Audie Wong Cheng Siew (Drew & Napier LLC)
• Counsel for Respondent: Respondent in person
• Legal Areas: Legal Profession – Duties; Legal Profession – Professional conduct; Legal Profession – Show cause action
• Statutes Referenced: Legal Profession Act (Cap 161) (“the Act”)
• Key Provisions Referenced: ss 32(2), 33, 35A, 36(1), 83(1), 83(2)(b), 83(2)(h), 94(1), 98(1)
• Regulations/Rules Referenced: Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules (2010 Rev Ed) (“PCR”), r 32 and r 39
• Judgment Length: 3 pages, 1,830 words
• Cases Cited (as provided): [2013] SGHC 5; [2020] SGHC 38; [2020] SGHC 102

Summary

In Law Society of Singapore v Tan See Leh Jonathan [2020] SGHC 102, the High Court (Court of Three Judges) considered a Law Society show cause action arising from an advocate and solicitor’s failure to supervise his paralegal and his improper fee-sharing arrangement with an unauthorised person. The respondent, Jonathan Tan See Leh, did not contest the underlying facts. The court therefore focused on whether “due cause” had been shown and, if not, what sanction should be imposed under the Legal Profession Act (Cap 161).

The court held that the respondent’s misconduct was sufficiently serious to warrant sanction under s 83(1) of the Act. It found that the respondent breached his duty of proper and constant supervision over his paralegal, who had been an unauthorised person because he had not renewed his practising certificate. The court also found a breach of the duty not to share fees with an unauthorised person for legal work performed. Given the blatant nature of the misconduct, the court imposed a three-month suspension from practice, commencing from the date of judgment.

What Were the Facts of This Case?

The respondent was admitted to the Roll of Advocates and Solicitors of the Supreme Court of Singapore on 21 March 1998. In January 2015, he engaged a person, Colin Craig Lowell Phan Siang Loong (“Colin Phan”), as his paralegal while the respondent was a consultant at Whitefield Law Corporation. The relationship was not merely informal: the paralegal was employed to assist in legal work under the respondent’s supervision.

Crucially, Colin Phan informed the respondent about a month before the engagement that he had been unable to renew his practising certificate and therefore could not practise as an advocate and solicitor. It was not disputed that, as a result, Colin Phan was an unauthorised person within the meaning of s 32(2) of the Legal Profession Act. Between January and February 2015, Colin Phan sent five emails to three individuals in which he represented himself as an advocate and solicitor. The respondent was copied in those emails, indicating at least awareness of Colin Phan’s public representation.

The Law Society charged the respondent under s 83(2)(b) and, in the alternative, s 83(2)(h) of the Act. The thrust of the charges was that the respondent failed to exercise adequate supervision over Colin Phan, who was an unauthorised person. The court accepted that the respondent’s duty to supervise paralegals is grounded in the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules, and that proper supervision is essential to protect the public and maintain confidence in the legal profession.

In addition to the supervision issue, the respondent and Colin Phan had an agreement to share approximately 50% of the respondent’s fees for legal work performed by Colin Phan. The precise percentage was determined case-by-case. The respondent had already paid Colin Phan a few hundred dollars pursuant to this arrangement. The Law Society charged the respondent for sharing legal fees with an unauthorised person, again under s 83(2)(b) and, in the alternative, s 83(2)(h) of the Act. The court treated the fee-sharing arrangement as facilitating the unauthorised person’s conduct and as undermining the integrity of the profession.

What Were the Key Legal Issues?

The first key issue was whether the respondent had shown “due cause” such that no sanction should be imposed. This required the court to assess whether the respondent’s conduct fell within the statutory grounds for disciplinary action and whether the misconduct was sufficiently serious to warrant sanction under s 83(1) of the Act. The court also had to consider the respondent’s position that the misconduct was not serious because Colin Phan was, in substance, “a lawyer” despite the practising certificate renewal failure.

The second issue concerned the appropriate sanction. Even where misconduct is established, the court must determine the level of disciplinary response that is proportionate and consistent with the objectives of punishment and deterrence. The court therefore had to weigh aggravating factors—such as the respondent’s knowledge and the blatant disregard of professional standards—against mitigating factors, including admission of facts, absence of antecedents, and voluntary cessation of practice.

How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?

The court began by noting that the respondent did not contest the underlying facts of the charges. In particular, he did not dispute the Law Society’s Statement of Case dated 26 March 2019. The court therefore treated the factual matrix as established and proceeded to evaluate whether the misconduct met the threshold for sanction under s 83(1) of the Act. It referred to the principle that due cause must be shown and that the seriousness of misconduct is assessed in light of the public interest in regulating the legal profession.

On the supervision duty, the court emphasised that the respondent had a duty to exercise proper and constant supervision over Colin Phan as his paralegal. The court linked this duty to r 32 of the PCR. It further observed that it is a criminal offence for an unauthorised person to represent himself to be an advocate and solicitor, referencing s 33 of the Act. The court reasoned that proper supervision is vital because it ensures that clients receive legal advice only from those duly qualified and authorised to carry on legal work. This, in turn, preserves public confidence in the legal profession, which the court described as an indispensable element in the justice system.

The court found that the respondent’s failure to supervise undermined public confidence. The court’s reasoning was not limited to the fact that Colin Phan was unauthorised; it also considered the respondent’s knowledge and the practical reality that Colin Phan was actively representing himself to third parties as an advocate and solicitor. The respondent being copied in emails where Colin Phan made such representations reinforced the conclusion that the respondent did not take adequate steps to prevent or correct the unauthorised conduct.

On the fee-sharing issue, the court held that the respondent had a duty not to share his fees with an unauthorised person for legal work performed, grounded in r 39 of the PCR. The court explained that an unauthorised person is not entitled to, and cannot recover, fees for legal work performed. It referenced the statutory framework that makes such conduct an offence and prevents recovery of fees in relation to the unauthorised work (including ss 33(1), 35A and 36(1) of the Act). The court treated the fee arrangement as facilitating the commission of the offence by creating a financial incentive and a structural mechanism through which the unauthorised person could effectively operate as if authorised.

The respondent’s principal defence was addressed at length. He argued that due cause had not been shown because Colin Phan was not an advocate and solicitor only due to a “mere technicality” (failure to renew his practising certificate). The respondent contended that, for all intents and purposes, Colin Phan was a lawyer, and therefore the misconduct should be viewed as less serious. The court rejected this argument as a non sequitur. It held that the law does not distinguish between different types of unauthorised persons under s 32(2) of the Act, and therefore the breach was not merely technical.

The court also stressed that prejudice is inherent in allowing an unauthorised person to hold himself out as an advocate and solicitor, even if he had once been a lawyer. One specific concern was professional indemnity insurance: an unauthorised person operating without a practising certificate exposes clients to possible loss because the necessary professional indemnity insurance cover would not be in place. The court further reasoned that the public interest requires that clients receive legal advice only from those duly qualified and authorised. It concluded that a reasonable member of the public, knowing that Colin Phan was an unauthorised person and would therefore be guilty of an offence under s 33 of the Act, would have unhesitatingly considered the respondent’s failure to supervise and fee-sharing arrangement to be serious misconduct.

Having determined that the respondent’s conduct fell within ss 83(2)(b) and 83(2)(h) and that the misconduct was sufficiently serious, the court turned to sanction. It observed that grossly improper conduct without dishonesty or deceit generally attracts a monetary penalty, but that the appropriate sanction depends on the overall circumstances. Aggravating factors may justify more severe sanctions such as suspension or striking off. The court relied on recent disciplinary decisions to illustrate the spectrum of sanctions.

In this case, the court considered the misconduct “blatant”. It highlighted that the respondent knew a month before hiring Colin Phan that his practising certificate had not been renewed and that he was unauthorised. Despite this knowledge, the respondent proceeded to hire him as a paralegal and entered into an arrangement to clear some of Colin Phan’s files. The arrangement involved sharing legal fees. The court also found that the respondent knew or ought to have known that Colin Phan represented himself to third parties as an advocate and solicitor, yet the respondent did nothing. The court characterised the respondent’s conduct as more than negligence: it was a disregard of professional and ethical standards designed to preserve the dignity of the profession and protect the public.

Mitigation was considered, but the court found it insufficient to justify a fine. Three mitigating factors were identified. First, the respondent admitted without qualification to all facts in the Statement of Case, avoiding unnecessary wastage of time and resources. Second, he had no similar antecedents. Third, he had voluntarily ceased to practise from 1 April 2019, which the court treated as a weighty indicator of remorse and guilt. The court also noted the absence of aggravating factors in the form of harm caused to clients.

Ultimately, the court imposed a three-month suspension. It reasoned that a fine was not appropriate because the misconduct was not inadvertent: the respondent knew Colin Phan lacked a practising certificate, yet entered into a fee-sharing agreement and failed to supervise. The court emphasised that the sanction must be both punitive and deterrent, and that suspension would register strong disapproval and protect the public against similar misconduct by like-minded solicitors.

What Was the Outcome?

The court imposed a three-month suspension from the date of the judgment. The respondent had conceded the position before the court that a three-month suspension was appropriate, and the court accepted that concession as well-founded. The suspension therefore operated as the disciplinary consequence for both the failure to supervise and the improper fee-sharing arrangement.

The court also indicated that it would hear the parties on costs, meaning that while the substantive disciplinary sanction was determined, ancillary financial orders relating to costs were left for further submissions.

Why Does This Case Matter?

This decision is significant for practitioners because it clarifies that supervision duties and fee-sharing restrictions are not formalities; they are core safeguards protecting the public and maintaining the integrity of the legal profession. The court’s reasoning shows that where an advocate and solicitor knows (or ought to know) that a person is unauthorised, the professional response must be immediate and robust. Continuing to engage the unauthorised person and structuring arrangements that effectively enable unauthorised practice will attract serious disciplinary consequences.

The case also addresses a common defence strategy in disciplinary matters: minimising the seriousness of misconduct by characterising the unauthorised status as a “technicality”. The court rejected that approach emphatically. It held that the statutory scheme does not treat different unauthorised persons differently, and that the risks to clients—such as lack of professional indemnity insurance—are real regardless of why the practising certificate was not renewed.

For law firms and supervising solicitors, the practical implications are clear. First, hiring and supervision processes must include verification of practising status where relevant and must ensure that paralegal arrangements do not drift into unauthorised representation. Second, fee-sharing arrangements must comply strictly with the PCR and the Act; any arrangement that shares fees with an unauthorised person for legal work is likely to be treated as facilitating offences and as undermining professional integrity. Finally, the case demonstrates that even where there is no evidence of direct client harm, suspension may still be warranted where the misconduct is blatant and deterrence is required.

Legislation Referenced

• Legal Profession Act (Cap 161), including ss 32(2), 33, 35A, 36(1), 83(1), 83(2)(b), 83(2)(h), 94(1), 98(1)
• Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules (2010 Rev Ed), including r 32 and r 39

Cases Cited

• Law Society of Singapore v Udeh Kumar s/o Sethuraju [2017] 4 SLR 1369
• Law Society of Singapore v Tan Chwee Wan Allan [2007] 4 SLR(R) 699
• Law Society of Singapore v Seah Li Ming Edwin and another [2007] 3 SLR(R) 401
• Law Society of Singapore v Mahadevan Lukshumayeh and others [2008] 4 SLR(R) 116
• Law Society of Singapore v Lee Cheong Hoh [2001] 1 LR(R) 197
• Jeffrey Pinsler SC, Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015: A Commentary (Academy Publishing 2016)
• Law Society of Singapore v Ezekiel Peter Latimer [2020] SGHC 38
• Law Society of Singapore v Chiong Chin May Selena [2013] SGHC 5
• Law Society of Singapore v Ravindra Samuel [1999] 1 SLR(R) 266
• Law Society of Singapore v Chan Chun Hwee Allan [2018] 4 SLR 859
• Allan Tan (as cited in the judgment at [51])

Source Documents

• Original Judgment (PDF) — Singapore Law Watch
• Archived Copy (PDF) — Litt Law CDN

This article analyses [2020] SGHC 102 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.