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Law Society of Singapore v Hanam, Andrew John [2023] SGHC 132

In Law Society of Singapore v Hanam, Andrew John, the High Court of the Republic of Singapore addressed issues of Legal Profession — Disciplinary proceedings, Legal Profession — Professional conduct.

Case Details

  • Citation: [2023] SGHC 132
  • Title: Law Society of Singapore v Hanam, Andrew John
  • Court: High Court of the Republic of Singapore (Court of Three Judges)
  • Originating Application: Originating Application No 5 of 2022 (“OA 5”)
  • Date of Judgment: 10 May 2023
  • Judgment Reserved: 25 January 2023
  • Judges: Tay Yong Kwang JCA, Belinda Ang Saw Ean JCA and Andrew Phang Boon Leong SJ
  • Delivering Judge: Belinda Ang Saw Ean JCA (delivering the judgment of the court)
  • Applicant/Plaintiff: Law Society of Singapore
  • Respondent/Defendant: Hanam, Andrew John (“Mr Hanam”)
  • Legal Area(s): Legal Profession — Disciplinary proceedings; Legal Profession — Professional conduct; Legal Profession — Show cause action
  • Statutes Referenced: Legal Profession Act 1966 (2020 Rev Ed) (“LPA”) (including ss 83 and 98); Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015 (“PCR”) (rr 17(2)(e) and 17(2)(f)); Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act (Cap 30B, 2006 Rev Ed) (“SOPA”)
  • Proceedings Below (as described): Disciplinary Tribunal (“DT”) convened following a complaint by Mr Krishnamoorthy Pugazendhi, sole director and shareholder of P&P Engineering & Construction Pte Ltd (“P&P”)
  • Length: 71 pages; 21,818 words

Summary

In Law Society of Singapore v Hanam, Andrew John [2023] SGHC 132, the High Court (in a court of three judges) considered an application by the Law Society of Singapore under the Legal Profession Act (“LPA”) seeking sanctions against an advocate and solicitor following disciplinary charges. The charges arose from Mr Hanam’s handling of a construction-related dispute on behalf of P&P, a company controlled by the complainant, Mr Krishnamoorthy Pugazendhi. The dispute concerned unpaid invoices under two subcontracts for work connected to the Marina Bay Mass Rapid Transit station.

The disciplinary tribunal (“DT”) found that two primary charges were made out: that Mr Hanam breached rr 17(2)(e) and 17(2)(f) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015 (“PCR”). Those provisions relate to improper conduct or practice and to failures in professional conduct that reflect inadequate competence, diligence, or judgment. The High Court ultimately agreed that, for the two primary charges, “due cause” had been shown for sanction under s 83(1) of the LPA. However, the court set aside certain findings of the DT on other charges, while leaving others undisturbed.

On sanction, the court imposed a suspension of 9 months. The decision is significant for practitioners because it emphasises the evidential and substantive expectations placed on advocates and solicitors when advising on litigation strategy, costs consequences, and alternative dispute resolution options—particularly where the advocate’s contemporaneous records (such as attendance notes) are absent.

What Were the Facts of This Case?

Mr Hanam was admitted to the Singapore Bar on 21 March 1998 and practised as an advocate and solicitor during the relevant period with Messrs Andrew LLC. On 25 November 2016, he was appointed by Mr Pugazendhi to represent P&P in its dispute with Kori Construction (S) Pte Ltd (“Kori”). The dispute concerned two subcontracts: a manpower subcontract and a steel fabrication subcontract. Under the subcontracts, Kori owed P&P a total sum of close to S$1.5 million.

As the litigation progressed, P&P’s claims and Kori’s counterclaims resulted in three sets of proceedings over nearly three years: (1) HC/S 1255/2016 (“Suit 1255”); (2) DC/DC 1043/2018 (“DC 1043”); and (3) HC/S 1167/2017 (“Suit 1167”). The High Court noted that, throughout the conduct of these proceedings, Mr Hanam did not keep attendance notes or timesheets of meetings and discussions with Mr Pugazendhi. This absence of contemporaneous records became relevant to the court’s assessment of whether Mr Hanam’s advice was reasonable and properly grounded in professional competence.

In Suit 1255, P&P commenced proceedings on 25 November 2016 for unpaid invoices that had fallen due as of that date (the “November 2016 Invoices”). Although Mr Hanam was aware that additional invoices would fall due in December 2016 (the “December 2016 Invoices”), he informed Mr Pugazendhi that P&P would commence action for the November invoices first and file the December invoices later once they became due and payable. The December invoices were therefore pursued separately in December 2017 through Suit 1167. The court later treated this litigation structuring as part of the broader pattern of inadequate advice and failure to evaluate alternatives.

During Suit 1255, Kori brought interlocutory applications including HC/SUM 431/2017 (“SUM 431”) to compel disclosure of documents referred to in P&P’s pleadings. Mr Hanam enclosed a copy of SUM 431 to Mr Pugazendhi and advised that P&P would object on the basis of lack of relevance. P&P did not resist the application, resulting in an order that it pay costs. P&P then appealed (HC/RA 44/2017), but the appeal failed and further costs were ordered. The court treated these costs outcomes as demonstrative of failures in litigation management and advice.

Other procedural steps also generated costs and adverse consequences. For example, P&P filed HC/SUM 5237/2017 (“SUM 5237”) for third-party discovery against Taisei after unsuccessful voluntary production efforts. After Taisei filed an affidavit detailing production costs, Mr Hanam advised withdrawal of SUM 5237 and payment of costs. Similarly, P&P unsuccessfully applied for leave to call additional witnesses (HC/SUM 5616/2017 (“SUM 5616”)), again resulting in costs. The chronology also included garnishee-related show cause proceedings arising from Taisei’s costs and Mr Hanam’s agreement to pay costs incurred in obtaining a garnishee order.

In addition to these litigation events, the disciplinary case focused on specific alleged failures in advice and conduct. The High Court’s judgment (as reflected in its structured outline) addressed, among other matters, whether Mr Hanam failed to obtain instructions or consent from Mr Pugazendhi in relation to particular applications, whether he failed to advise on alternative dispute resolution options such as SOPA adjudication, and whether he failed to properly advise on documents and procedural choices across the three suits. The court also considered whether the DT erred in placing less weight on Mr Hanam’s evidence given in cross-examination, and whether certain findings should be disturbed.

The High Court had to determine, first, whether the second and third charges were made out and, if so, whether “due cause” existed for sanction under s 83 of the LPA. The “due cause” inquiry is central to disciplinary proceedings: it requires the court to assess whether the proven misconduct is of sufficient gravity to warrant disciplinary action, taking into account the nature of the breach, its impact on clients and the administration of justice, and the advocate’s professional standing.

Second, the court had to consider whether the charges were “irregular”. This issue concerns whether the disciplinary process and the framing of charges were procedurally or substantively defective such that the findings could not safely stand.

Third, the court addressed whether the DT erred in its evaluation of evidence—specifically, whether it placed less weight on Mr Hanam’s evidence given in cross-examination. This required the High Court to examine the evidential record and determine whether the DT’s approach to credibility and proof was legally sound.

Finally, the court considered what the appropriate sanction should be if due cause was established. Sanction in professional discipline is not purely punitive; it also serves deterrence, protection of the public, and maintenance of confidence in the legal profession.

How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?

The High Court approached the case by reviewing the DT’s findings and determining which findings should be set aside and which should remain. The judgment’s structure indicates that the court treated the “two primary charges” as the core of the due cause analysis. The court held that, in respect of those two primary charges, due cause had been shown for sanction under s 83(1) of the LPA. While the court set aside certain findings of the DT, it did not disturb the essential conclusion that Mr Hanam’s conduct breached the PCR in ways that warranted disciplinary action.

One of the court’s recurring themes was the evidential difficulty created by the absence of attendance notes and contemporaneous records. The court foreshadowed this difficulty explicitly: without attendance notes, it becomes harder for an advocate to demonstrate what advice was actually given, what options were discussed, and whether the advice reflected the minimum standard expected of an advocate and solicitor with substantial experience. In this case, Mr Hanam had been practising for 18 years at the material time, which raised the baseline expectation of competence and diligence.

On the substantive misconduct, the High Court examined how Mr Hanam handled litigation strategy and advice. The court’s outline shows that it considered multiple strands: (1) failures relating to authority and consent in filing or issuing documents on P&P’s behalf; (2) failures to advise on ADR options, including SOPA adjudication; (3) failures to advise on procedural steps such as discovery and calling additional witnesses; and (4) failures to properly advise on specific applications and commencement decisions across the suits. Even where some findings were not disturbed, the court’s overall assessment supported the conclusion that the misconduct was sufficiently serious.

In particular, the court treated the failure to advise on alternative dispute resolution options as a professional conduct issue with real consequences. The construction context matters: SOPA adjudication is designed to provide a faster mechanism for payment disputes. The court’s reasoning indicates that an experienced advocate should have at least discussed the availability and suitability of such mechanisms, and that failure to do so could amount to a breach of the PCR. The court also considered whether Mr Hanam’s advice reflected a proper evaluation of litigation timing and costs, including whether it was sensible to commence separate actions for different invoice tranches rather than adopting a more efficient approach.

Another aspect of the analysis concerned the court’s treatment of costs orders. The judgment references “demonstrable failures” reflected in costs outcomes made against P&P in the course of the proceedings. While costs orders do not automatically establish misconduct, they can provide objective indicators that procedural steps were taken (or not taken) in a way that fell below professional standards. The court’s analysis suggests that repeated costs consequences, coupled with failures in advice and authority, supported the disciplinary conclusion.

On the evidential question—whether the DT erred in placing less weight on Mr Hanam’s cross-examination evidence—the High Court’s approach appears to have been cautious. The court did not treat cross-examination evidence as decisive in isolation; rather, it weighed the absence of contemporaneous records against the credibility and plausibility of the advocate’s account. This is consistent with disciplinary jurisprudence: where an advocate claims that certain advice was given, the court may expect corroboration through records, file notes, or other contemporaneous documentation.

Finally, the High Court addressed sanction. It considered the gravity of the proven breaches, the need for deterrence, and the protection of the public. The court’s imposition of a 9-month suspension reflects a balance: the misconduct was serious enough to warrant removal from practice for a period, but the court also set aside some DT findings, indicating that not all allegations were upheld. The sanction therefore corresponded to the misconduct that remained established and the court’s assessment of its overall seriousness.

What Was the Outcome?

The High Court held that, for the two primary charges, due cause had been shown for sanction under s 83(1) of the LPA. The court ordered that Mr Hanam be suspended for 9 months. This suspension is the practical disciplinary consequence: during the suspension period, Mr Hanam would be prohibited from practising as an advocate and solicitor in Singapore.

In addition, the court set aside certain findings of the DT (as reflected in the judgment outline), while leaving other findings undisturbed. The net effect is that the sanction was grounded in the misconduct that the High Court accepted as proven and sufficiently grave, rather than on every allegation originally advanced.

Why Does This Case Matter?

This decision matters because it clarifies how disciplinary tribunals and the High Court will evaluate an advocate’s professional conduct in litigation management and client advice. The case underscores that professional competence is not limited to courtroom advocacy; it includes advising on strategy, procedural choices, and alternative mechanisms for resolving disputes—especially in specialised commercial contexts such as construction payment disputes.

For practitioners, the case is also a strong reminder of the evidential importance of contemporaneous records. The High Court highlighted the difficulty arising from the absence of attendance notes and other records. In disciplinary proceedings, where the advocate’s account of what was discussed is contested, the lack of documentation can significantly impair the advocate’s ability to demonstrate that advice met the required standard.

From a precedent perspective, Law Society of Singapore v Hanam reinforces the disciplinary expectation that experienced advocates should proactively consider and discuss relevant ADR options, including SOPA adjudication where appropriate. It also illustrates how costs consequences and repeated procedural missteps can support findings of breach, particularly when they align with failures in advice and authority.

Legislation Referenced

  • Legal Profession Act 1966 (2020 Rev Ed) (Cap 161) — including ss 83 and 98
  • Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015 — rr 17(2)(e) and 17(2)(f)
  • Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act (Cap 30B, 2006 Rev Ed) — including the adjudication regime (SOPA adjudication)

Cases Cited

  • [2013] SGHC 5
  • [2022] SGHC 185
  • [2022] SGDT 12
  • [2023] SGHC 132

Source Documents

This article analyses [2023] SGHC 132 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.

Written by Sushant Shukla

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