Case Details
- Citation: [2021] SGHC 212
- Title: Law Society of Singapore v CNH
- Court: High Court of the Republic of Singapore (Court of Three Judges)
- Decision Date: 15 September 2021
- Judges: Sundaresh Menon CJ; Andrew Phang Boon Leong JCA; Tay Yong Kwang JCA
- Case Number: Originating Summons No 3 of 2021 (Summons No 1 of 2021)
- Plaintiff/Applicant: Law Society of Singapore
- Defendant/Respondent: CNH
- Counsel for Applicant: Ramesh s/o Selvaraj and Afzal Ali (Allen & Gledhill LLP)
- Counsel for Respondent: Respondent absent
- Legal Areas: Legal Profession — Disciplinary procedures; Civil Procedure — Service
- Statutes Referenced: Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 2009 Rev Ed); Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 2007 Rev Ed)
- Key Provisions Referenced: LPA ss 83(1), 83(2)(h), 85(3), 98(2); SCJA s 16; Rules of Court (2014 Rev Ed) O 10 r 1(1); Legal Profession (Disciplinary Tribunal) Rules (2010 Rev Ed) r 6
- Related/Contextual Criminal Provision: Penal Code (Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed) s 509
- Judgment Length: 7 pages, 4,103 words
- Cases Cited: [2021] SGHC 212 (as per metadata); Consistel Pte Ltd and another v Farooq Nasir and another [2009] 3 SLR(R) 665; Iskandar bin Rahmat v Law Society of Singapore [2021] 1 SLR 874; Law Society of Singapore v Udeh Kumar s/o Sethuraju and another matter [2017] 4 SLR 1369; Law Society of Singapore v Ong Cheong Wei [2018] 3 SLR 937; Public Trustee and another v By Products Trade (citation truncated in extract)
Summary
In Law Society of Singapore v CNH [2021] SGHC 212, the High Court (Court of Three Judges) considered whether the Law Society could obtain an order for substituted service of disciplinary documents on a solicitor who had been convicted of sexual offences committed while he was a legal associate. The respondent, CNH, was absent from the proceedings and appeared to be outside Singapore at relevant times. The Law Society sought substituted service under s 98(2) of the Legal Profession Act (“LPA”) after repeated unsuccessful attempts at personal service at his last known residential address.
The court granted the application. While the general civil rule requires personal service of originating process and imposes a hierarchy of service steps, the court emphasised that disciplinary proceedings under the LPA operate within the High Court’s civil jurisdiction but are not “in personam” in the same way as private civil claims. The court held that substituted service was appropriate on the facts, given the Law Society’s diligent efforts, the respondent’s non-attendance, and the need to ensure that disciplinary processes are not stymied by a respondent’s absence.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
CNH was admitted to the roll of advocates and solicitors on 27 August 2016. At the material time, he was employed by a local law firm (“the Firm”) as a legal associate. On 8 June 2020, CNH pleaded guilty to, and was convicted of, two counts of sexual offences under s 509 of the Penal Code (Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed) for insulting the modesty of a female colleague. The conviction related to conduct occurring in 2017 while CNH was still a legal associate at the Firm. He was sentenced to four weeks’ imprisonment.
Following the conviction, the Law Society received information from the Attorney-General on 16 June 2020 pursuant to s 85(3) of the LPA, together with a request that the matter be referred to a disciplinary tribunal (“DT”). The Chief Justice appointed a DT on 3 September 2020 to investigate and hear the matter. The DT held a hearing on 23 November 2020. CNH was neither present nor represented. The DT proceeded in his absence after being satisfied that the documents relied on by the Law Society had been duly served and brought to CNH’s knowledge and attention, in accordance with r 6 of the Legal Profession (Disciplinary Tribunal) Rules (2010 Rev Ed).
On 8 February 2021, the DT found that CNH’s conduct established cause of sufficient gravity to refer the matter to the High Court for disciplinary action under s 83(2)(h) of the LPA. On 8 March 2021, the Law Society commenced the “Show Cause Proceedings” by filing an originating summons and supporting affidavit, requiring CNH to show cause why he should not be subjected to one or more punishments under s 83(1) of the LPA.
The present application arose because the Law Society could not effect personal service of the originating summons and supporting affidavit on CNH. The Law Society sought substituted service under s 98(2) of the LPA by posting the documents together with the substituted service order at CNH’s last known residential address (“the Premises”). The Premises were identified from CNH’s earlier filings, including applications for practising certificates made under s 25 of the LPA and a Notice of Charge of Particulars filed in 2017 indicating that he had ceased practice with the Firm with effect from 16 November 2017. When service was attempted, CNH was not at the Premises. Instead, an elderly couple (who informed the process server that they were CNH’s parents) said CNH was away from Singapore and that they did not know when he would return. They accepted the documents but refused to sign the acknowledgment.
Leading up to and even after the substituted service application was filed on 16 April 2021, the Law Society made multiple attempts at personal service at the Premises: on 10 March 2021 (around 8.45pm), 11 March 2021 (around 7.00pm), 15 March 2021 (around 10.50am and 11.20am), and again on 15 March 2021 (around 11.20am), and on 18 August 2021 (around 7.30pm and 8.30pm). On the first four occasions, the process server rang the doorbell several times without response. On the fifth occasion, the door was opened by an elderly man who abruptly shut the door after seeing the process server. The Law Society relied on photographs taken on a prior occasion to attest that this was the same elderly man who had answered the door on 2 October 2020 and identified himself as CNH’s father. The Law Society stated it had no further information about CNH’s whereabouts.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The central issue was whether substituted service should be granted under s 98(2) of the LPA despite indications that CNH had been out of jurisdiction at the time the Show Cause Proceedings were commenced. In other words, the court had to decide whether the procedural safeguards in the civil service regime (including the requirement for personal service and the hierarchy of service steps) should constrain the Law Society’s ability to serve disciplinary documents where the respondent was absent and hard to locate.
A related issue concerned the nature of disciplinary proceedings. The court needed to clarify how the general civil jurisdiction and service rules under the Supreme Court of Judicature Act (“SCJA”) and the Rules of Court interact with the LPA’s disciplinary framework. Specifically, the court had to determine whether the “touchstone” of civil jurisdiction—service of originating process for in personam actions—applies in the same way to disciplinary proceedings, which are not classic private disputes between parties over rights and liabilities inter se.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
The court began by setting out the general principles governing the High Court’s civil jurisdiction. Under s 16 of the SCJA, the General Division has jurisdiction to hear and try an action in personam where the defendant is duly served with a writ or other originating process, either in Singapore or outside Singapore in the manner authorised by the relevant rules, or where the defendant submits to jurisdiction. The court stressed that, generally, the touchstone for in personam civil jurisdiction is service. This is consistent with O 10 r 1(1) of the Rules of Court, which provides that a writ must generally be served personally on each defendant. The rationale is to ensure that the defendant has knowledge of the commencement of proceedings, enabling an informed decision about whether to contest service and whether to contest the proceedings.
The court also referred to the fairness concerns underlying service rules, including the observation in Consistel Pte Ltd and another v Farooq Nasir and another [2009] 3 SLR(R) 665 that it would be unfair to order judgment in default where the defendant did not even know that proceedings had been brought. The court noted that the Rules establish a hierarchy: where a defendant is out of jurisdiction at the time of issuance, the plaintiff must first seek leave to serve out of jurisdiction before resorting to substituted service. This hierarchy is designed to balance the need for procedural fairness with the practical realities of locating defendants.
However, the court then explained why disciplinary proceedings under the LPA are procedurally and conceptually different. The court observed that disciplinary jurisdiction does not concern in personam actions in the same way as private civil claims. It is not directed at determining private rights and obligations inter se between parties. Instead, disciplinary proceedings are concerned with the solicitor’s fitness to remain an officer of the court and the protection of the public and the integrity of the legal profession. The court relied on Iskandar bin Rahmat v Law Society of Singapore [2021] 1 SLR 874 to clarify that although applications in disciplinary matters must be served on other parties and form part of the civil jurisdiction under s 16(2) of the SCJA, disciplinary jurisdiction is not normatively distinct from civil jurisdiction; rather, it is a particular species of that jurisdiction grounded in “written law” (the LPA).
In addition, the court emphasised the statutory character of the LPA’s disciplinary framework. Advocates and solicitors are officers of the Supreme Court under s 82(1) of the LPA. Being an officer of the court “presupposes and connotes” obligations and responsibilities to uphold the legal framework. The court cited earlier decisions (including Law Society of Singapore v Udeh Kumar s/o Sethuraju and another matter [2017] 4 SLR 1369 and Law Society of Singapore v Ong Cheong Wei [2018] 3 SLR 937) to reinforce that the disciplinary regime is anchored in the solicitor’s professional status and duties, not in a private dispute.
Against this doctrinal backdrop, the court returned to the practical question: whether substituted service was justified on the facts. The court accepted that the Law Society had made repeated attempts at personal service at CNH’s last known residential address over an extended period, including multiple evening and daytime visits. The process server was unable to obtain personal service because there was no response at the Premises on several occasions, and on another occasion the door was opened but the respondent did not engage with the process. The Law Society also had evidence from earlier service attempts that CNH was away from Singapore and that his parents did not know when he would return. The Law Society further had no additional information about CNH’s whereabouts.
In granting substituted service, the court effectively recognised that the fairness rationale for personal service—ensuring knowledge—must be applied in a manner consistent with the disciplinary context. Where the Law Society has taken reasonable steps to locate and serve the respondent, and where the respondent’s absence appears to be persistent and not merely temporary, substituted service can be an appropriate mechanism to prevent the disciplinary process from being frustrated. The court’s approach reflects a balancing exercise: it is not enough for a respondent to evade service; the disciplinary system must be able to proceed to determine whether cause exists for disciplinary punishment, especially where a DT has already found sufficient gravity to refer the matter to the High Court.
What Was the Outcome?
The High Court allowed the Law Society’s application for substituted service under s 98(2) of the LPA. The practical effect of the order was that the Law Society could proceed with the Show Cause Proceedings by serving the originating summons and supporting affidavit by posting them (together with the substituted service order) to CNH’s last known residential address.
Given that CNH was absent and had not engaged with the DT proceedings, the substituted service order ensured that the High Court disciplinary process could continue despite the respondent’s apparent absence from Singapore and the Law Society’s inability to effect personal service.
Why Does This Case Matter?
This decision is significant for practitioners because it clarifies how service principles operate in the disciplinary context. While civil service rules are rooted in fairness and the need for defendants to know of proceedings, disciplinary proceedings under the LPA are directed at professional accountability and the protection of the public. The court’s reasoning underscores that the disciplinary framework is not simply a private civil action dressed in statutory form; it is a regulatory mechanism with its own logic and objectives.
For law firms and the Law Society, the case provides practical guidance on what constitutes sufficient diligence when seeking substituted service. The court was persuaded by the Law Society’s repeated attempts at personal service at the last known address, the evidence that the respondent was away from Singapore, and the absence of further information about his whereabouts. This is particularly relevant where a respondent may have relocated abroad after conviction or after ceasing practice, and where service may be difficult without updated contact details.
For law students and litigators, the case also serves as a useful illustration of the interaction between the SCJA’s civil jurisdiction provisions and the LPA’s disciplinary scheme. By drawing on Iskandar, the court reinforced that disciplinary jurisdiction, though part of the High Court’s civil jurisdiction, is conceptually distinct from in personam private disputes. That distinction matters when courts consider procedural questions such as service, because the underlying purpose of the proceedings influences how service rules are applied.
Legislation Referenced
- Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 2009 Rev Ed), including ss 82(1), 83(1), 83(2)(h), 85(3), 98(2)
- Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 2007 Rev Ed), s 16
- Rules of Court (2014 Rev Ed), O 10 r 1(1)
- Legal Profession (Disciplinary Tribunal) Rules (2010 Rev Ed), r 6
- Penal Code (Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed), s 509
Cases Cited
- Consistel Pte Ltd and another v Farooq Nasir and another [2009] 3 SLR(R) 665
- Iskandar bin Rahmat v Law Society of Singapore [2021] 1 SLR 874
- Law Society of Singapore v Udeh Kumar s/o Sethuraju and another matter [2017] 4 SLR 1369
- Law Society of Singapore v Ong Cheong Wei [2018] 3 SLR 937
- Public Trustee and another v By Products Trade (citation not fully shown in extract)
Source Documents
This article analyses [2021] SGHC 212 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.