"We consider that the key words in Section 34, for the purposes of a challenge under Art 34(2)(a)(iii) of the Model Law, are ‘claims’ and ‘reliefs’. Those phrases were intended to preclude either party from making new claims or seeking new relief which were outside the scope of the claims and counterclaims already submitted to arbitration in the BIT Arbitrations." — Per Quentin Loh JAD, Para 68
Case Information
- Citation: [2021] SGHC(I) 10 (Para 0)
- Court: Singapore International Commercial Court — Originating Summonses Nos 5 and 6 of 2020 (Para 0)
- Date: 15, 16 January 2021; 10 September 2021 (Para 0)
- Coram: Quentin Loh JAD, Vivian Ramsey IJ and Douglas Jones IJ (Para 0)
- Case Number: Originating Summons No 5 of 2020; Originating Summons No 6 of 2020 (Para 0)
- Area of Law: Arbitration — Award — Recourse against award — Setting aside (Para 0)
- Counsel for the plaintiffs: Not answerable from the supplied extraction (NOT ANSWERABLE)
- Counsel for the defendant: Not answerable from the supplied extraction (NOT ANSWERABLE)
- Judgment length: Not answerable from the supplied extraction (NOT ANSWERABLE)
What was this case about and why did the court say it mattered?
This case concerns applications by Lao Holdings N.V. and its wholly-owned subsidiary, Sanum Investments Limited, to set aside two arbitral awards made in investment treaty arbitrations against the Government of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic. The dispute arose out of claims of expropriation and related BIT claims connected with investments in Laos’ gaming and hospitality sector, and the court described the matter as one involving the interaction between the parties’ settlement arrangements and the later conduct of the revived arbitrations. (Para 1; Para 3; Para 16)
"This case concerns applications by the plaintiffs, Lao Holdings NV (“LH”) and its wholly-owned subsidiary, Sanum Investments Limited (“Sanum”), to set aside two arbitral awards made in arbitrations conducted under bilateral investment treaties (“BITs”) with the defendant, the Government of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (“GOL”)." — Per Quentin Loh JAD, Para 1
The central controversy was whether Section 34 of the Settlement Deed restricted the revived proceedings so tightly that the tribunals could not consider later allegations and evidence concerning bribery, corruption, fraud, illegality, and bad faith. The plaintiffs said the record was “frozen” as of 15 June 2014 and that the tribunals exceeded the scope of submission by admitting and relying on post-settlement material; GOL said Section 34 only barred new claims, counterclaims, and reliefs, not new allegations or evidence relevant to existing defences. (Para 54; Para 58; Para 63)
"Section 34 stipulates that the record shall be “frozen” as of 15 June 2014 and thereby restricts the scope of submission to arbitration in the Revived Proceedings to matters in the “frozen record”." — Per Quentin Loh JAD, Para 54
The court ultimately rejected the plaintiffs’ principal jurisdictional challenge under Art 34(2)(a)(iii) of the Model Law. It held that the key words in Section 34 were “claims” and “reliefs”, that those words did not capture the challenged allegations as new claims, and that the evidence complaint was procedural rather than jurisdictional. On that basis, the court dismissed the setting-aside application on the Section 34-based ground. (Para 68; Para 70; Para 78)
"Accordingly, for the reasons set out above we dismiss the plaintiffs’ application to set aside the BIT Awards on the basis of Art 34(2)(a)(iii) of the Model Law arising from issues relating to Section 34." — Per Quentin Loh JAD, Para 78
How did the dispute arise from the Laos gaming investments and the 2014 settlement?
The underlying dispute concerned claims of expropriation and other BIT-related claims in relation to the plaintiffs’ investments in the Laotian gaming and hospitality industry. The extraction identifies the investments as including Savan Vegas, Paksong Vegas, the Thanaleng Club, and the Paksan Club, and it records that the parties later entered a settlement arrangement intended to resolve the claims. (Para 3; Para 16)
"The underlying dispute concerns claims of expropriation and other BIT-related claims in relation to the plaintiffs’ investments in the Laotian gaming and hospitality industry." — Per Quentin Loh JAD, Para 3
On 15 June 2014, the parties concluded a Deed of Settlement together with a Side Letter dated 18 June 2014. The court noted that the settlement was intended to resolve the claims, but the later dispute turned on what Section 34 of that settlement meant for any revived proceedings if there was a material breach. The plaintiffs’ case was that the settlement froze the evidential and pleading landscape, while GOL’s case was that the clause only prevented new claims, counterclaims, and reliefs. (Para 16; Para 54; Para 58)
"On 15 June 2014, the parties concluded a Deed of Settlement (the “Settlement Deed”) together with a Side Letter dated 18 June 2014 (together, “the Settlement”), with the intention of resolving the claims." — Per Quentin Loh JAD, Para 16
The court’s analysis shows that the settlement was not treated as a complete bar to later arbitral activity. Instead, the key question was whether the revived proceedings remained within the scope of what the parties had already submitted to arbitration, or whether the tribunals had strayed into new territory by considering later evidence and allegations. That framing became the foundation for the court’s Art 34(2)(a)(iii) analysis. (Para 50; Para 51; Para 65)
"The issue is therefore whether Section 34, by its terms, limited the scope of the matters submitted to those tribunals so as to preclude them from considering the matters which the BIT Tribunals considered in the BIT Awards." — Per Quentin Loh JAD, Para 65
What were the BIT Tribunals asked to decide, and what evidence did they admit?
The extraction shows that GOL applied on 25 June 2018 to admit additional evidence in the revived proceedings. The proposed material fell into three categories: two awards from related SIAC arbitrations, documentary evidence and sworn testimony relevant to GOL’s defences, and a BDO accounting report commissioned after the settlement and said to be relevant to the quantification of GOL’s embezzlement counterclaim. (Para 25)
"On 25 June 2018, GOL filed its application (“GOL’s Application to Admit Additional Evidence”) which sought to introduce three categories of evidence consisting of: (a) two awards rendered in the ST SIAC Arbitration and the GOL SIAC Arbitration; (b) documentary evidence and sworn testimony relevant to GOL’s defences; and (c) an accounting report by BDO Financial Services Limited (the “BDO Report”) commissioned by GOL after the execution of the Settlement Deed, that was stated to be relevant to the quantification of GOL’s Embezzlement Counterclaim." — Per Quentin Loh JAD, Para 25
The BIT Tribunals admitted 35 of the proposed 40 new exhibits in the PCA and ICSID procedural orders, while refusing the Kurlantzick Report. The extraction also records that the tribunals considered the corruption issues to be of overriding importance and that the Kurlantzick Report was not admitted because it was irrelevant to whether the investments were obtained corruptly. (Para 31; Para 63)
"The BIT Tribunals admitted 35 of the proposed 40 new exhibits in PCA PO 12 and ICISD PO 14, which are identical in all material aspects. The Kurlantzick Report was not admitted." — Per Quentin Loh JAD, Para 31
The court’s treatment of this evidence dispute is important because it distinguished between the tribunal’s authority to decide what evidence to admit and the tribunal’s jurisdiction to hear the dispute at all. The court repeatedly emphasised that questions of evidence are procedural matters, not jurisdictional ones, and that the tribunal’s handling of the record therefore did not, without more, amount to an excess of jurisdiction under Art 34(2)(a)(iii). (Para 68; Para 46; Para 47)
"Questions of evidence are procedural matters and do not go to jurisdiction." — Per Quentin Loh JAD, Para 68
How did the court frame the issues for decision?
The court said the central issue was the scope of Section 34 of the Settlement Deed, whether the BIT Tribunals failed to abide by the parties’ agreement, and what the consequences of any such failure would be. That framing is significant because it shows the court treated the contractual settlement clause as the lens through which the arbitral jurisdiction challenge had to be assessed. (Para 50)
"Based on the issues proposed by the parties, it is clear that the central issue in this case is the scope of Section 34 of the Settlement Deed, whether the BIT Tribunals failed to abide by the parties’ agreement, and what the consequences of such a failure, if any, would be." — Per Quentin Loh JAD, Para 50
The court then divided the case into four broad issue groups: first, the scope of Section 34 and whether the tribunals exceeded the scope of submission by allowing further evidence; second, whether the ICSID Tribunal’s findings relating to certain projects exceeded the scope of submission; third, whether there was a material breach of agreed arbitral procedures warranting intervention; and fourth, whether the plaintiffs were given a reasonable opportunity to be heard. (Para 51)
"We thus deal with the issues in this Judgment as follows: (a) the scope of Section 34 and whether the BIT Tribunals had exceeded the scope of submission to arbitration in allowing further evidence to be admitted into the record; (b) whether the ICSID Tribunal’s findings relating to certain projects exceeded the scope of the submission to arbitration; (c) whether there was a material breach of agreed arbitral procedures warranting the intervention of this court; and (d) whether the plaintiffs were given the reasonable opportunity to be heard." — Per Quentin Loh JAD, Para 51
That structure matters because it shows the court did not treat every complaint as a jurisdictional one. Instead, it separated scope, procedure, and hearing fairness, and then tested each complaint against the proper standard of curial review. The result was a disciplined analysis that preserved the distinction between jurisdictional excess and procedural disagreement. (Para 51; Para 46; Para 47)
What did each side argue about Section 34 of the Settlement Deed?
The plaintiffs’ position was that Section 34 froze the record as of 15 June 2014 and thereby restricted the revived proceedings to matters in that frozen record. On that reading, the tribunals could not admit or rely on later evidence or allegations because doing so would expand the scope of submission beyond what the parties had agreed. (Para 54)
"Section 34 stipulates that the record shall be “frozen” as of 15 June 2014 and thereby restricts the scope of submission to arbitration in the Revived Proceedings to matters in the “frozen record”." — Per Quentin Loh JAD, Para 54
GOL’s response was that Section 34, properly construed, did not prohibit new allegations. It said only new claims, counterclaims, and reliefs were barred, and that the clause did not prevent the parties from advancing further factual material in support of existing claims or defences. GOL also argued that the tribunals were obliged, as a matter of public international law, to ensure that treaties intended to promote and protect legitimate investments were not abused by corrupt investors. (Para 58; Para 63)
"GOL first contends that on proper construction of the Settlement Deed, new allegations were not precluded from being raised in the Revived Proceedings. Only the bringing of new claims, counterclaims and reliefs was prohibited." — Per Quentin Loh JAD, Para 58
"GOL argues that the BIT Tribunals were performing their duty and function under public international law to ensure that treaties intended to promote and protect legitimate investments are not abused by corrupt investors." — Per Quentin Loh JAD, Para 63
The court accepted the defendant’s core construction. It held that the key words in Section 34 were “claims” and “reliefs”, and that those phrases were intended to preclude new claims or new relief outside the scope of the claims and counterclaims already submitted to arbitration. The court therefore rejected the plaintiffs’ attempt to convert the clause into a broader evidential freeze that would disable the tribunals from considering later material relevant to existing issues. (Para 68; Para 70; Para 71)
"We consider that the key words in Section 34, for the purposes of a challenge under Art 34(2)(a)(iii) of the Model Law, are ‘claims’ and ‘reliefs’. Those phrases were intended to preclude either party from making new claims or seeking new relief which were outside the scope of the claims and counterclaims already submitted to arbitration in the BIT Arbitrations." — Per Quentin Loh JAD, Para 68
Why did the court say the evidence complaint was procedural rather than jurisdictional?
The court’s reasoning was explicit: questions of evidence are procedural matters and do not go to jurisdiction. That proposition was central to the dismissal of the Art 34(2)(a)(iii) challenge because the plaintiffs’ complaint about post-settlement evidence could not, without more, establish that the tribunals had exceeded the scope of submission. (Para 68)
"Questions of evidence are procedural matters and do not go to jurisdiction." — Per Quentin Loh JAD, Para 68
In reaching that conclusion, the court treated the evidence issue as distinct from the question whether the tribunals were deciding new claims. The court reasoned that the challenged matters—such as the Thanaleng, Witness, and MaxGaming allegations—were not new causes of action but part of GOL’s existing defence of corruption, bribery, illegality, and/or bad faith. Because they were part of the existing defence, they did not amount to new claims or reliefs within the meaning of Section 34. (Para 70)
"These are not “new claims” because they form part of GOL’s existing defence of corruption, bribery, illegality and/or bad faith. They are not new causes of action." — Per Quentin Loh JAD, Para 70
The court then stated that it rejected the plaintiffs’ case to set aside the BIT Awards based on Art 34(2)(a)(iii) of the Model Law. That conclusion followed from the court’s construction of Section 34 and its view that the tribunals had not strayed beyond the matters already submitted to arbitration. (Para 71)
"We reject the plaintiffs’ case to set aside the BIT Awards based on based on Art 34(2)(a)(iii) of the Model Law." — Per Quentin Loh JAD, Para 71
How did the court approach the general standard of curial intervention in arbitration?
The court began from the familiar principle that courts strive to uphold arbitration awards and do not approach them with a meticulous legal eye seeking to pick holes, inconsistencies, and faults. This was not merely rhetorical; it set the tone for the court’s treatment of the plaintiffs’ attempt to recast procedural disagreements as jurisdictional excess. (Para 41)
"As a matter of general approach, the courts strive to uphold arbitration awards. They do not approach them with a meticulous legal eye endeavouring to pick holes, inconsistencies and faults in awards and with the objective of upsetting or frustrating the process of arbitration." — Per Quentin Loh JAD, Para 41
The court also stated that it should accord a margin of deference to the tribunal in the exercise of procedural discretion. That deference was especially relevant where the tribunal had to manage the admission of evidence and the conduct of the proceedings, matters that are ordinarily within the tribunal’s procedural domain rather than the court’s supervisory jurisdiction. (Para 46)
"the court should accord a margin of deference to the tribunal in its exercise of procedural discretion." — Per Quentin Loh JAD, Para 46
The court further noted that intervention requires a real basis for alleging that the tribunal conducted the arbitral process either irrationally or capriciously. This threshold is important because it prevents a disappointed party from turning every procedural disagreement into a setting-aside application. The court’s approach therefore preserved the autonomy of the arbitral process while still leaving room for intervention in truly exceptional cases. (Para 47)
"it must be shown that there is a real basis for alleging that the tribunal has conducted the arbitral process “either irrationally or capriciously”" — Per Quentin Loh JAD, Para 47
How did the court deal with the plaintiffs’ argument that the tribunals considered matters outside the ICSID arbitration?
The extraction shows that the court identified as a separate issue whether the ICSID Tribunal’s findings relating to certain projects exceeded the scope of the submission to arbitration. Although the supplied text does not reproduce the full detailed reasoning on that sub-issue, it does show that the court treated it as part of the same overall inquiry into Section 34 and the scope of submission. (Para 51; Para 65)
What is answerable from the extraction is that the court’s core answer remained the same: the challenged matters were not new claims but part of GOL’s existing corruption and bad faith defence. On that basis, the court held that the tribunals had not exceeded their mandate merely by considering later evidence or by making findings connected to the disputed projects. (Para 68; Para 70; Para 71)
"These are not “new claims” because they form part of GOL’s existing defence of corruption, bribery, illegality and/or bad faith. They are not new causes of action." — Per Quentin Loh JAD, Para 70
Because the extraction does not provide the full paragraph-by-paragraph reasoning on the project-specific findings, it would be unsafe to invent further detail. What can be said with confidence is that the court did not accept the plaintiffs’ attempt to isolate those findings as jurisdictionally fatal, and it dismissed the Art 34(2)(a)(iii) challenge arising from Section 34. (Para 71; Para 78)
What role did the Model Law and the IAA play in the setting-aside applications?
The applications were brought under s 24 of the International Arbitration Act and/or Art 34(2) of the UNCITRAL Model Law, which has force of law in Singapore through s 3(1) of the IAA. The court therefore approached the case as a statutory setting-aside challenge governed by Singapore’s arbitration framework, not as a merits appeal from the BIT awards. (Para 39)
"The Applications to set aside the BIT Awards are brought under s 24 of the IAA and/or Art 34(2) of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (“Model Law”) which is given force of law in Singapore by s 3(1) of the IAA." — Per Quentin Loh JAD, Para 39
The extraction also reproduces the text of s 24 of the IAA, which permits the High Court to set aside an award if the making of the award was induced or affected by fraud or corruption, or if there was a breach of the rules of natural justice that prejudiced a party’s rights. Although the court’s final dismissal on the Section 34 issue did not require it to decide every possible statutory ground in the same depth, the statutory framework is important because it shows the plaintiffs were invoking both the Model Law and the IAA. (Para 39)
"Court may set aside award 24. Notwithstanding Article 34(1) of the Model Law, the High Court may, in addition to the grounds set out in Article 34(2) of the Model Law, set aside the award of the arbitral tribunal if — (a) the making of the award was induced or affected by fraud or corruption; or (b) a breach of the rules of natural justice occurred in connection with the making of the award by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced." — Per Quentin Loh JAD, Para 39
The court also referred to Article 16 of the Model Law, which concerns the competence of the arbitral tribunal to rule on its jurisdiction. The appearance of Article 16 in the extraction underscores that the dispute involved the classic arbitral question of who decides the scope of the tribunal’s authority and how far a court should go in reviewing that decision. (Para 75)
"Article 16. Competence of arbitral tribunal to rule on its jurisdiction" — Per Quentin Loh JAD, Para 75
What did the court say about contractual interpretation of Section 34?
The court’s reasoning on Section 34 was rooted in contractual interpretation. The extraction shows that the court relied on the text of the clause and treated “claims” and “reliefs” as the operative words for determining whether the tribunals had exceeded the scope of submission. That approach is consistent with the court’s insistence that the clause could not be expanded beyond its language to create a broader evidential prohibition. (Para 68)
Although the extraction does not reproduce the full interpretive chain in every paragraph, it does show that the court considered the clause in context and rejected the plaintiffs’ reading that would have frozen the entire record. The court instead held that the clause was intended to prevent new claims or new relief outside the claims and counterclaims already submitted to arbitration. (Para 68)
"Those phrases were intended to preclude either party from making new claims or seeking new relief which were outside the scope of the claims and counterclaims already submitted to arbitration in the BIT Arbitrations." — Per Quentin Loh JAD, Para 68
That conclusion is important because it demonstrates that the court did not treat Section 34 as a procedural straitjacket. Rather, it read the clause as preserving the existing arbitral dispute while preventing parties from expanding the dispute into entirely new causes of action or remedies. The practical effect was to allow the tribunals to consider later evidence insofar as it related to the existing claims and defences. (Para 68; Para 70)
Why did the court reject the setting-aside application under Art 34(2)(a)(iii)?
Article 34(2)(a)(iii) permits setting aside where the award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission. The court’s answer was that the challenged allegations and evidence did not fall outside the submission because they were part of the existing corruption, bribery, illegality, and bad faith defence. (Para 39; Para 68; Para 70)
The court’s reasoning proceeded in two steps. First, it identified the operative contractual language in Section 34 as referring to claims and reliefs, not to a blanket exclusion of all later evidence. Second, it classified the challenged matters as part of the existing defence rather than as new claims. Once those steps were taken, the jurisdictional challenge failed because the tribunals had not decided a dispute outside the submission. (Para 68; Para 70)
"We reject the plaintiffs’ case to set aside the BIT Awards based on based on Art 34(2)(a)(iii) of the Model Law." — Per Quentin Loh JAD, Para 71
The court then concluded by dismissing the plaintiffs’ application on the Section 34-based Art 34(2)(a)(iii) ground. The extraction does not provide the full final orders on every pleaded basis, so the article confines itself to the dismissal expressly stated in the supplied text. (Para 78)
"Accordingly, for the reasons set out above we dismiss the plaintiffs’ application to set aside the BIT Awards on the basis of Art 34(2)(a)(iii) of the Model Law arising from issues relating to Section 34." — Per Quentin Loh JAD, Para 78
Why does this case matter for investment arbitration and Singapore arbitration law?
This case matters because it clarifies how a settlement clause limiting “claims” and “reliefs” should be understood when a dispute is revived and the tribunal is asked to consider later-discovered allegations of corruption and bad faith. The court’s approach prevents parties from using a settlement deed to sterilise the tribunal’s ability to assess whether the investment was tainted by illegality, while still respecting the parties’ agreement not to introduce wholly new claims. (Para 68; Para 70; Para 63)
"GOL argues that the BIT Tribunals were performing their duty and function under public international law to ensure that treaties intended to promote and protect legitimate investments are not abused by corrupt investors." — Per Quentin Loh JAD, Para 63
The case also reinforces Singapore’s strong pro-arbitration stance. The court repeated that awards should be upheld, that courts should not search for faults with a meticulous legal eye, and that tribunals are entitled to procedural deference. Those principles are especially important in setting-aside proceedings, where the court’s role is supervisory rather than appellate. (Para 41; Para 46; Para 47)
"As a matter of general approach, the courts strive to uphold arbitration awards." — Per Quentin Loh JAD, Para 41
Finally, the decision is practically significant because it draws a line between jurisdiction and procedure. Parties often attempt to characterise evidential disputes as scope-of-submission objections; this judgment makes clear that such an argument will not succeed merely because the evidence is later in time or inconvenient to one side. If the material relates to an existing defence and the tribunal is acting within its procedural discretion, the court is unlikely to intervene. (Para 68; Para 70; Para 47)
Cases Referred To
| Case Name | Citation | How Used | Key Proposition |
|---|---|---|---|
| Government of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic v Sanum Investments Ltd | [2015] 2 SLR 322 | Background and procedural history | Prior Singapore High Court decision on jurisdiction under the Laos-PRC BIT (Para 1; Para 3) |
| Sanum Investments Ltd v Government of Lao People’s Democratic Republic | [2016] 5 SLR 536 | Background and procedural history | Court of Appeal reversal restoring PCA jurisdiction (Para 1; Para 3) |
| Sanum Investments Limited v ST Group Co, Ltd and others | [2020] 3 SLR 225 | Background/context | Related litigation involving Laotian entities (Para 1) |
| ST Group Co Ltd and others v Sanum Investments Ltd and another appeal | [2020] 1 SLR 1 | Background/context | Related litigation involving Laotian entities (Para 1) |
| Soh Beng Tee & Co Pte Ltd v Fairmount Development Pte Ltd | [2007] 3 SLR(R) 86 | Minimal curial intervention | Courts strive to uphold awards and intervene minimally (Para 41) |
| Zermalt Holdings SA v Nu-Life Upholstery Repairs Ltd | [1985] 2 EGLR 14 | General approach to reading awards | Courts should not pick holes in awards (Para 41) |
| BLC and others v BLB and another | [2014] 4 SLR 79 | Minimal intervention | Generous reading of awards; no hypercritical approach (Para 41) |
| AKN and another v ALC and others and other appeals | [2015] 3 SLR 488 | Minimal intervention and party autonomy | Limited recourse after choosing arbitration (Para 41) |
| Tjong Very Sumito and others v Antig Investments Pte Ltd | [2009] 4 SLR(R) 732 | Support for arbitral process | Courts support, not displace, arbitral process (Para 41) |
| ASG v ASH | [2016] 5 SLR 54 | Party autonomy and limited recourse | Parties accept consequences of arbitration (Para 41) |
| TMM Division Maritima SA de CV v Pacific Richfield Marine Pte Ltd | [2013] 4 SLR 972 | Generous reading of awards | No hypercritical analysis (Para 41) |
| Atkins Limited v The Secretary of State for Transport | [2013] EWHC 139 (TCC) | Generous reading of awards | Avoid hypercritical analysis (Para 41) |
| Webber v Seltzer | 2005 Can LII 3209 | Approach to arbitral awards | Courts should not second-guess arbitrators if process is basically fair (Para 41) |
| China Machine New Energy Corp v Jaguar Energy Guatemala LLC and another | [2020] 1 SLR 695 | Procedural discretion | Substantial deference to tribunal procedural decisions (Para 46) |
| On Call Internet Services Ltd v Telus Communications Co | [2013] BCAA 366 | Within China Machine quotation | Substantial deference to procedural decisions (Para 46) |
| ABB AG v Hochtief Airport GmbH | [2006] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 1 | Threshold for intervention | Intervention only if conduct irrational or capricious (Para 47) |
| CRW Joint Operation v PT Perusahaan Gas Negara (Persero) TBK | [2011] 4 SLR 305 | Two-stage inquiry under Art 34(2)(a)(iii) | Identify scope, then determine whether award exceeded it (Para 68) |
| PT Asuransi Jasa Indonesia (Persero) v Dexia Bank SA | [2007] 1 SLR(R) 597 | Cited in CRW | Same two-stage inquiry (Para 68) |
| GD Midea Air Conditioning Equipment Co Ltd v Tornado Consumer Goods Ltd and another matter | [2018] 4 SLR 271 | Agreed procedure and jurisdiction | Agreed procedure can define scope, but not all procedural agreements do (Para 68) |
| EFT Holdings, Inc and another v Marinteknik Shipbuilders (S) Pte Ltd and another | [2014] 1 SLR 860 | Applicable law point | Singapore law applies if no contrary foreign law shown (Para 68) |
| Zurich Insurance (Singapore) Pte Ltd v B-Gold Interior Design & Construction Pte Ltd | [2008] 3 SLR(R) 1029 | Contractual interpretation | Interpret text in context objectively (Para 68) |
| Sembcorp Marine Ltd v PPL Holdings Pte Ltd and another and another appeal | [2013] 4 SLR 193 | Contractual interpretation | Contextual interpretation (Para 68) |
| Oxley Consortium Pte Ltd v Geetex Enterprises Singapore (Pte) Ltd | [2020] SGHC 235 | Contractual interpretation | Context cannot rewrite text (Para 68) |
| Y.E.S. F&B Group Pte Ltd v Soup Restaurant Singapore Pte Ltd | [2015] 5 SLR 1187 | Contractual interpretation | Contextual interpretation (Para 68) |
| MS First Capital Insurance Ltd v Smart Automobile Pte Ltd | [2020] SGHC 256 | Contractual interpretation | Contextual interpretation (Para 68) |
| Tuitiongenius Pte Ltd v Toh Yew Keat and another | [2021] 1 SLR 231 | Contractual interpretation | Contextual interpretation (Para 68) |
| Sui Southern Gas Co Ltd v Habibullah Coastal Power Co (Pte) Ltd | [2010] 3 SLR 1 | Public policy/corruption argument | Egregious corruption, bribery, and fraud may violate public policy (Para 63) |
Legislation Referenced
- International Arbitration Act (Cap 143A, 2002 Rev Ed): s 24; s 19B; s 3(1); s 10; s 10(3) (Para 39) [CDN] [SSO]
- UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration: Art 34(2)(a)(ii); Art 34(2)(a)(iii); Art 34(2)(a)(iv); Art 34(2)(b)(ii); Art 16(1); Art 16(2); Art 16(3) (Para 39; Para 75)
- Settlement Deed: Sections 32, 33, 34, 42 (Para 16; Para 50; Para 54; Para 65)
Source Documents
This article analyses [2021] SGHCI 10 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.