Landscape Engineering Pte Ltd v Dot Safety Solutions Pte Ltd and another [2025] SGHC 214

Case Details

• Citation: [2025] SGHC 214
• Court: General Division of the High Court of the Republic of Singapore
• Decision Date: 30 October 2025
• Coram: Kwek Mean Luck J
• Case Number: Originating Application No 616 of 2025; Summons No 2122 of 2025
• Hearing Date(s): 15 October 2025
• Claimants / Plaintiffs: Landscape Engineering Pte Ltd
• Respondent / Defendant: Dot Safety Solutions Pte Ltd (First Respondent); Kumarandy Alaguraj (Second Respondent)
• Counsel for Claimants: Lim Muhammad Syafiq and Yap Wei Xuan Mendel (RHTLaw Asia LLP)
• Counsel for Respondent: The first and second respondents in person
• Practice Areas: Civil Procedure; Parties; Self-representation of company

Summary

The decision in [2025] SGHC 214 serves as a definitive clarification of the procedural requirements for a company to be represented by one of its officers under the Rules of Court 2021 ("ROC 2021"). The dispute originated from a landlord-tenant conflict where Landscape Engineering Pte Ltd ("Landscape") sought to restrain Dot Safety Solutions Pte Ltd ("Dot") and its director, Mr. Kumarandy Alaguraj ("Mr. Alaguraj"), from continuing what Landscape characterized as a series of unmeritorious and vexatious legal maneuvers. Central to the procedural skirmish was Summons No 2122 of 2025 ("SUM 2122"), an application by Mr. Alaguraj for permission to represent Dot in the proceedings, as companies are generally required to act through solicitors under the default rules of the Singapore courts.

The High Court was tasked with interpreting Order 4 Rule 3(3)(b) of the ROC 2021, a provision that replaced the older regime under the Rules of Court 2014. The primary doctrinal contribution of this judgment lies in the court’s determination that the requirements for an officer to represent a company are disjunctive. Specifically, the court must be satisfied that the officer either has sufficient executive or administrative capacity or is a proper person to represent the company. This distinction is critical because it prevents the conflation of an officer’s corporate role with their personal competence or conduct, ensuring that the "capacity" element remains a functional inquiry into the officer's position within the corporate structure.

Kwek Mean Luck J’s analysis emphasizes that while the ROC 2021 aims for efficiency and the "Ideals" of justice, these goals must be balanced against the fundamental right of access to justice. In this case, despite significant concerns regarding Mr. Alaguraj’s prior conduct—including the submission of AI-generated documents containing fictitious legal authorities—the court found that denying him the right to represent Dot would effectively stifle the company’s ability to defend itself, given its proven impecuniosity. The judgment thus reinforces the principle that the court’s discretion to allow self-representation is a vital safety valve for companies that cannot afford legal counsel, provided the representative meets the statutory threshold of capacity or propriety.

Ultimately, the court allowed the application for representation but notably restricted its scope. Rather than granting Mr. Alaguraj a blanket mandate to represent Dot in "all Court's Proceedings" as requested, the court confined the permission to the specific Originating Application (OA 616) at hand. This measured approach demonstrates the court's willingness to facilitate access to justice while maintaining strict control over the conduct of proceedings to prevent potential abuse of process by non-professional representatives.

Timeline of Events

1. 1 January 2022: Landscape Engineering Pte Ltd entered into a lease agreement with Dot Safety Solutions Pte Ltd for the lease of a property referred to as the "Premises." The lease term was scheduled to run from 2022 through 2023.
2. March 2023 – June 2023: A dispute arose regarding the payment of rent. Landscape alleged that Dot failed to pay rent for this period and subsequently failed to deliver up possession of the Premises upon the expiry of the lease.
3. 29 July 2024: Landscape obtained summary judgment against Dot in OC 1760. This judgment formed the basis for subsequent enforcement actions and the eventual filing of OA 616.
4. Post-July 2024: Dot filed an appeal against the summary judgment in OC 1760. The appeal was dismissed, leading Landscape to proceed with enforcement proceedings. During this period, Dot and Mr. Alaguraj filed multiple applications which Landscape characterized as unmeritorious.
5. 17 June 2025: Landscape filed Originating Application No 616 of 2025 (OA 616). The application sought to restrain Dot and Mr. Alaguraj from commencing further court actions or making applications related to OC 1760 without the court's permission, and to stay or discontinue ongoing proceedings.
6. 2025 (Specific date not recorded): Mr. Alaguraj filed Summons No 2122 of 2025 (SUM 2122) seeking permission to represent Dot in OA 616 and "in all Court's Proceedings."
7. 8 October 2025: Mr. Alaguraj filed a written submission in support of SUM 2122. This submission was later found to contain fictitious case citations generated by Artificial Intelligence.
8. 15 October 2025: The substantive hearing for SUM 2122 took place before Kwek Mean Luck J. During the hearing, the court addressed the interpretation of the ROC 2021 and the conduct of the parties.
9. 30 October 2025: The High Court delivered its judgment, allowing SUM 2122 in part, permitting Mr. Alaguraj to represent Dot specifically within the confines of OA 616.

What Were the Facts of This Case?

The litigation history between Landscape Engineering Pte Ltd ("Landscape") and Dot Safety Solutions Pte Ltd ("Dot") is characterized by a protracted landlord-tenant dispute that escalated into complex procedural warfare. The relationship began on 1 January 2022, when Landscape leased a property to Dot. However, by early 2023, the relationship soured due to alleged non-payment of rent for the months of March through June 2023. Landscape further alleged that Dot remained in possession of the premises beyond the lease term without authorization. This led to the commencement of OC 1760, where Landscape successfully obtained summary judgment on 29 July 2024. Despite the dismissal of Dot’s appeal against this summary judgment, the conflict persisted through various enforcement and interlocutory stages.

Landscape’s primary grievance in the present Originating Application (OA 616) was that Dot, primarily through its director Mr. Kumarandy Alaguraj, had engaged in a pattern of "unmeritorious applications" designed to frustrate the enforcement of the summary judgment. Landscape contended that these applications were dismissed with costs, which remained unpaid by Dot. Consequently, Landscape sought a restrictive order to prevent Dot and Mr. Alaguraj from initiating further legal actions related to the subject matter of OC 1760 without prior judicial leave. This application was essentially an attempt to invoke the court's inherent jurisdiction or statutory powers to curb vexatious litigation conduct.

In response to OA 616, Mr. Alaguraj filed SUM 2122. Under the general procedural law of Singapore, a company must be represented by a solicitor unless the court grants permission for an officer of the company to act on its behalf. Mr. Alaguraj, as the director of Dot, sought this permission not only for the immediate OA 616 but for "all Court's Proceedings." He argued that Dot was impecunious and could not afford legal counsel, making his personal representation the only viable way for the company to participate in the legal process. He further asserted that he was the most appropriate person to represent the company given his intimate knowledge of the facts and his role as a director.

The factual matrix was further complicated by the quality of the submissions tendered by Mr. Alaguraj. In his written submission dated 8 October 2025, Mr. Alaguraj included several case citations that appeared to support his position. However, upon verification by the court and the opposing counsel, it was discovered that these citations were fictitious. Mr. Alaguraj admitted that he had used Artificial Intelligence (AI) to draft the submissions and had failed to verify the authenticity of the cases cited. This revelation became a significant factual point in the court's assessment of whether he was a "proper person" to represent the company under the ROC 2021.

Landscape vigorously opposed SUM 2122, arguing that Mr. Alaguraj’s conduct—specifically his history of filing unmeritorious applications and his recent use of fictitious AI-generated authorities—demonstrated that he was not a "proper person" to represent Dot. Landscape’s position was that the court should apply a stringent test that focused on the representative's competence and conduct, suggesting that the two limbs of the relevant rule should be read together to ensure that only capable and ethical individuals represent corporate entities. They highlighted the potential for further disruption to the judicial process if Mr. Alaguraj were allowed to continue representing Dot without professional legal oversight.

What Were the Key Legal Issues?

The resolution of SUM 2122 turned on the interpretation and application of the Rules of Court 2021, specifically regarding the representation of corporate entities. The court identified the following key legal issues:

• The Interpretation of Order 4 Rule 3(3)(b) of the ROC 2021: Whether the two requirements set out in the rule—(i) "sufficient executive or administrative capacity" and (ii) "is a proper person to represent the company"—are conjunctive or disjunctive. This issue was central to determining whether an officer's role in the company could be overshadowed by their personal conduct or competence.
• The Definition of "Officer" in the Context of Representation: How the court should apply the definition of "officer" provided in O 4 r 3(6) and whether the "capacity" mentioned in r 3(3)(b) refers to the individual's corporate rank or their personal litigation skills.
• The Impact of the ROC 2021 "Ideals": How the five "Ideals" set out in Order 1 Rule 9—including fair access to justice, expeditious proceedings, and cost-effectiveness—should influence the court's discretion in allowing a non-lawyer to represent a company.
• The Relevance of Prior Conduct and AI Misuse: To what extent a representative's history of filing unmeritorious applications and the use of fictitious AI-generated citations should disqualify them from being a "proper person" under the second limb of the test.
• The Balance Between Access to Justice and Protection of the Opposing Party: Whether the impecuniosity of a company should override concerns about the potential for the representative to cause delay or incur unnecessary costs for the opposing party.

How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?

The court’s analysis began with a meticulous examination of the text of Order 4 Rule 3(3)(b) of the ROC 2021. The rule provides that the court may allow an officer to represent a company if it is satisfied that the officer "(i) has been duly authorised by the company to act on its behalf; and (ii) has sufficient executive or administrative capacity or is a proper person to represent the company in the matter." The court noted that the use of the word "or" between the capacity requirement and the propriety requirement strongly suggested a disjunctive interpretation. Kwek Mean Luck J held at [29]:

"There are two disjunctive elements in O 4 r 3(3)(b). The first is whether the officer has sufficient executive or administrative capacity. This refers to the officer’s role and position in the company. The second is whether the officer is a proper person to represent the company. This refers to the officer’s characteristics, such as his competence and conduct."

Landscape had argued for a more restrictive interpretation, suggesting that the focus should be on the characterisation and abilities of the officer, effectively merging the two limbs. They relied on Lin Yueh Hung v Andreas Vogel & Partner, Rechtsanwaelte AV & P Legal LLP [2024] 3 SLR 1020, where the court had observed that the focus of the new rule was on the "characterisation and abilities of the officer." However, Kwek Mean Luck J distinguished this, noting that the observations in Lin Yueh Hung were intended to highlight the shift away from the "appropriateness" test of the 2014 Rules, rather than to mandate a conjunctive reading of the two limbs in the 2021 Rules. The court emphasized that the first limb (capacity) is primarily a functional inquiry into the officer's standing within the company, while the second limb (propriety) is a broader inquiry into the individual's suitability for the task of litigation.

The court then turned to the definition of "officer" under O 4 r 3(6), which includes any director, secretary, or person employed in an executive capacity. The court reasoned that if an individual is a director (as Mr. Alaguraj is), they inherently possess "sufficient executive capacity" by virtue of their office. To read the rule otherwise would render the "capacity" limb redundant or would force the court to evaluate the "capacity" of a director based on their litigation skills, which is not what the plain language of the rule suggests. The court held that the "capacity" limb is satisfied if the person holds a sufficiently high-ranking position to speak for the company and bind it in the proceedings.

A significant portion of the analysis was dedicated to the "Ideals" of the ROC 2021. Order 1 Rule 9 mandates that the court must seek to achieve five ideals: fair access to justice, expeditious proceedings, cost-effective litigation, efficient use of court resources, and the fair and practical results. The court noted that these ideals must be balanced. While allowing a non-lawyer to represent a company might occasionally slow down proceedings (impacting the "expeditious" ideal), denying representation to an impecunious company would directly contravene the "fair access to justice" ideal. The court referred to Bulk Trading SA v Pevensey Pte Ltd [2015] 1 SLR 538, noting that while the doctrine of limited liability can disadvantage those litigating against companies, the court must ensure that companies are not effectively "driven from the judgment seat" simply because they cannot afford solicitors.

Regarding the "proper person" limb, the court addressed Landscape’s concerns about Mr. Alaguraj’s conduct. The court acknowledged that Mr. Alaguraj had a history of filing applications that were dismissed and, most recently, had submitted fictitious AI-generated authorities. However, the court found that these factors did not automatically disqualify him. The court noted that the "proper person" inquiry is not a search for a perfect representative but an assessment of whether the person can adequately perform the role without causing an abuse of process. The court observed that Mr. Alaguraj had been honest about his use of AI when confronted and had expressed a willingness to comply with court directions. The court also noted that the impecuniosity of Dot was a "heavy factor" in favor of allowing representation, as there was no evidence that Dot was deliberately withholding funds to avoid hiring a lawyer.

Finally, the court addressed the scope of the representation. Mr. Alaguraj had requested permission to represent Dot in "all Court's Proceedings." The court rejected this broad request, noting that the court’s power under O 4 r 3 is to allow representation "in the matter." This implies a specific, case-by-case assessment. Given the concerns about Mr. Alaguraj’s prior conduct and the potential for future unmeritorious applications, the court decided to confine the permission to OA 616. This allows the court to monitor his conduct within a specific context and ensures that the permission is not used as a "blank cheque" for future litigation across different forums or matters.

What Was the Outcome?

The High Court allowed Summons No 2122 of 2025, but with significant limitations. The court granted permission for Mr. Kumarandy Alaguraj to represent Dot Safety Solutions Pte Ltd, but specifically confined this permission to the company’s proceedings within Originating Application No 616 of 2025. The court expressly denied the broader request for Mr. Alaguraj to represent the company in "all Court's Proceedings." The operative order was captured at [49]:

"I allowed SUM 2122, but confined, for Mr Alaguraj to represent Dot in the company’s proceedings in OA 616, and not “in all Court’s Proceedings” as prayed for."

In addition to the limited scope of representation, the court issued a stern warning to Mr. Alaguraj regarding his future conduct in the litigation. Specifically, the court addressed the misuse of Artificial Intelligence in legal submissions. Kwek Mean Luck J cautioned at [50] that as the application progresses, if Mr. Alaguraj continues to rely on AI to produce his submissions, he is under a strict obligation to verify the authenticity of the AI’s output. This was a direct response to the discovery of fictitious authorities in his earlier written submissions. The court emphasized that the privilege of self-representation carries with it the responsibility to maintain the integrity of the judicial process.

Regarding the costs of the summons, the court did not make a final award in the judgment, following the general practice of deferring or reserving costs in such interlocutory matters unless otherwise specified. The primary focus of the disposition was the procedural status of the parties in OA 616. By allowing the representation, the court ensured that Dot could participate in the hearing of Landscape’s application to restrain its litigation activities, thereby upholding the principle of audi alteram partem (hear the other side) even in the face of allegations of vexatious conduct.

The outcome reflects a pragmatic application of the ROC 2021 Ideals. By granting limited representation, the court achieved a "fair and practical result" (Ideal 5) that balanced "fair access to justice" (Ideal 1) for an impecunious company with the need for "efficient use of court resources" (Ideal 4) by preventing a broad, unmonitored mandate for a non-professional representative. The decision effectively placed Mr. Alaguraj on a "probationary" status within the confines of OA 616, where his conduct would be under the direct supervision of the presiding judge.

Why Does This Case Matter?

This case is of significant importance to practitioners and corporate litigants for several reasons, primarily due to its clarification of the ROC 2021 and its treatment of emerging technological challenges in litigation. First and foremost, the judgment provides a clear, authoritative interpretation of Order 4 Rule 3(3)(b). By establishing that the "capacity" and "propriety" limbs are disjunctive, the court has lowered the threshold for corporate officers to represent their companies. This is a vital development for small and medium enterprises (SMEs) or companies in financial distress that may find the cost of legal representation prohibitive. The ruling ensures that a director’s lack of legal training or past procedural errors does not automatically bar them from representing their company, provided they hold a sufficient executive position.

Secondly, the case situates the representation of companies firmly within the framework of the ROC 2021 "Ideals." Kwek Mean Luck J’s analysis demonstrates how the court will weigh the competing interests of efficiency and access to justice. The judgment signals that "fair access to justice" remains a paramount consideration, even when it may lead to some procedural friction. This provides a helpful precedent for future applications where an opposing party might seek to block corporate self-representation by pointing to the representative's lack of legal expertise or minor past misconduct. The court’s willingness to grant "confined" permission also offers a new procedural tool for judges to manage potentially problematic self-represented litigants without completely denying them a voice.

Thirdly, the judgment addresses the "AI in the courtroom" phenomenon with a clear-eyed and firm approach. The discovery of fictitious authorities generated by AI is a growing concern globally, and this case provides one of the first instances in Singapore where the High Court has directly addressed this in the context of a self-representation application. The court’s response—requiring verification of AI output rather than immediate disqualification—strikes a balance between acknowledging the utility of AI for laypersons and maintaining the sanctity of legal citations. It serves as a warning to all litigants, professional and otherwise, that the use of AI does not absolve them of the duty to ensure the accuracy of their submissions.

Furthermore, the case touches upon the intersection of corporate representation and the law on vexatious litigants. While the court did not find Mr. Alaguraj to be a vexatious litigant under s 73C(1) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969, the analysis of his conduct in the context of the "proper person" limb provides a roadmap for how such conduct will be evaluated. It suggests that "unmeritorious" applications, while relevant, must reach a high threshold of persistence and lack of merit before they will lead to a total bar on representation. This protects the right of litigants to pursue their cases, even if they are ultimately unsuccessful, while still allowing the court to intervene when the process is being abused.

Finally, the decision reinforces the importance of the definition of "officer" in the ROC 2021. By linking "executive capacity" to the individual's role in the company rather than their personal skills, the court has provided a predictable and objective standard for the first limb of the test. This reduces the need for extensive evidence regarding an officer's personal background in every representation application, thereby contributing to the "expeditious" and "cost-effective" ideals of the new rules. Practitioners can now advise corporate clients with greater certainty regarding who within the organization is likely to meet the "capacity" requirement for self-representation.

Practice Pointers

• Disjunctive Nature of O 4 r 3(3)(b): Practitioners should note that the requirements for a company officer to represent the company are disjunctive. An officer can satisfy the rule by either having "sufficient executive or administrative capacity" (role-based) or being a "proper person" (conduct/competence-based).
• Director Status as Capacity: Being a director of a company generally satisfies the "sufficient executive capacity" limb. The court is unlikely to require a director to prove their litigation skills to meet this specific limb of the test.
• AI Verification Duty: When parties (especially self-represented ones) use AI to generate submissions, there is a non-delegable duty to verify the authenticity of every case citation and legal proposition. Tendering fictitious authorities, even if unintentional, can severely damage a representative's standing under the "proper person" limb.
• Impecuniosity as a Heavy Factor: If a company is genuinely impecunious and cannot afford solicitors, this will be a significant factor in favor of allowing an officer to represent it, as the court is loath to deny access to justice.
• Confined Representation Orders: Courts may grant permission for representation that is limited to a specific application or matter rather than a general mandate. Practitioners should be prepared to argue for or against the scope of such orders based on the representative's past conduct.
• Ideals of ROC 2021: Any application under O 4 r 3 should be framed with reference to the five Ideals in O 1 r 9. Arguments should specifically address how allowing (or denying) representation serves the interests of justice, efficiency, and cost-effectiveness.
• Distinguishing Lin Yueh Hung: When citing Lin Yueh Hung, practitioners should be careful not to use its obiter remarks to argue for a conjunctive reading of O 4 r 3(3)(b), as [2025] SGHC 214 has clarified that the limbs remain separate.

Subsequent Treatment

As of the date of this judgment, [2025] SGHC 214 stands as a recent and authoritative interpretation of the ROC 2021. It clarifies the doctrinal shift from the 2014 Rules and provides a framework for balancing the "Ideals" of the new procedural regime. While it refers to earlier principles from Bulk Trading, it situates them within the specific language of the 2021 Rules. No subsequent cases have yet distinguished or overruled this decision, and it is expected to be the leading authority on corporate self-representation and the use of AI in lay submissions in the General Division of the High Court.

Legislation Referenced

• Rules of Court 2021: O 4 r 3(3)(b); O 4 r 3(6); O 1 r 9; O 3 r 1
• Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969: s 73C(1)

Cases Cited

• Considered: Lin Yueh Hung v Andreas Vogel & Partner, Rechtsanwaelte AV & P Legal LLP [2024] 3 SLR 1020
• Considered: Bulk Trading SA v Pevensey Pte Ltd [2015] 1 SLR 538
• Referred to: Tajudin bin Gulam Rasul v Suriaya bte Haja Mohideen [2025] SGHCR 33
• Referred to: Ghows LLC v Amber Compounding Pharmacy Pte Ltd [2023] SGMC 43
• Referred to: Elbow Holdings Pte Ltd v Marina Bay Sands Pte Ltd [2015] 5 SLR 289
• Referred to: Allergan, Inc v Ferlandz Nutra Pte Ltd [2015] 2 SLR 94
• Referred to: DB Trustees (Hong Kong) Ltd v Consult Asia [2010] 3 SLR 542
• Referred to: National University of Singapore v Ten Leu Jiun Jeanne-Marie [2024] 3 SLR 864

Source Documents

• Original Judgment PDF (2025_SGHC_214.pdf)
• eLitigation Case Record