Case Details
- Title: Lam Hwa Engineering & Trading Pte Ltd v Yang Qiang
- Citation: [2013] SGHC 42
- Court: High Court of the Republic of Singapore
- Date: 20 February 2013
- Judges: Lai Siu Chiu J
- Case Number: Registrar's Appeal from Subordinate Courts No 32 of 2012
- Tribunal/Court: High Court
- Coram: Lai Siu Chiu J
- Counsel for Appellant: Niru Pillai (Global Law Alliance LLC)
- Counsel for Respondent: Belinder Kaur Nijar (Hoh Law Corporation)
- Plaintiff/Applicant: Lam Hwa Engineering & Trading Pte Ltd
- Defendant/Respondent: Yang Qiang
- Legal Area: Civil Procedure – Costs
- Statutes Referenced: Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2006 Rev Ed) (notably O 59 r 27(2), O 59 r 1(1), O 59 r 24(1)(c), O 35 r 1, O 38 r 22)
- Cases Cited: [2012] SGDC 31; [2013] SGHC 42
- Judgment Length: 10 pages, 5,896 words
- Lower Court Decision: Yang Qiang v Lam Hwa Engineering & Trading Pte Ltd [2012] SGDC 31
Summary
Lam Hwa Engineering & Trading Pte Ltd v Yang Qiang concerned a narrow but practically important issue in Singapore civil procedure: whether a successful litigant’s travel expenses to attend trial in Singapore can be claimed as “disbursements” (or more generally as “costs reasonably incurred”) on a standard bill of costs. The High Court, in a Registrar’s appeal from the Subordinate Courts, held that such travel expenses are not prohibited in principle and may be allowed where they are reasonably incurred under O 59 r 27(2) of the Rules of Court.
The dispute arose after the District Judge reversed the Deputy Registrar’s taxation decision. The Deputy Registrar had disallowed the Respondent’s claimed travel expenses, which included return air tickets from Shanghai to Singapore and related travel expenses within China. The High Court upheld the District Judge’s approach, rejecting the Appellant’s argument that the Rules distinguish between litigants and witnesses in a way that bars litigants from recovering their own attendance-related travel costs, and also rejecting the Appellant’s reliance on the Court of Appeal’s decision in Rajabali Jumabhoy and Others v Ameerali R Jumabhoy and Others.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
The Respondent, Yang Qiang, was a foreign Chinese worker who commenced a personal injury claim against the Appellant, Lam Hwa Engineering & Trading Pte Ltd. The claim was instituted in Singapore, and the matter proceeded to trial. However, on the first day of the trial, the parties settled. A final judgment dated 25 July 2011 was entered against the Appellant by consent.
Following the settlement and the consent judgment, the Respondent filed a bill of costs on 21 October 2011 for taxation by a Deputy Registrar of the Subordinate Courts. The bill was filed on a standard basis. On 18 November 2011, the Deputy Registrar certified that the bill had been taxed and that section 3 of the bill was disallowed. Section 3 contained the Respondent’s disbursement claims relating to travel expenses.
Specifically, the disallowed items included: (a) the Respondent’s return air tickets to Shanghai, totalling $1,113.00; and (b) the Respondent’s expenses incurred in China to travel to and from Pudong International Airport in Shanghai, totalling $95.00. In other words, the Respondent sought to recover costs associated with travelling to and from Singapore for the trial, as well as related travel costs within China.
Unhappy with the disallowance, the Respondent sought a review before the District Judge. Both parties were represented by counsel at the proceedings below. The District Judge reversed the Deputy Registrar’s decision and allowed the travel expenses. The Appellant then appealed to the High Court, where the sole issue was whether such travel expenses of a successful litigant are claimable as part of disbursements in a standard bill of costs.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The High Court framed the controversy as a single issue: whether a successful litigant’s travel expenses to attend trial in Singapore can be claimed as part of disbursements in a standard bill of costs. This required the court to interpret the relevant provisions of the Rules of Court governing standard costs and taxation, and to determine whether the Respondent’s claimed expenses fell within the category of “costs reasonably incurred” under O 59 r 27(2).
Two main arguments were advanced by the Appellant. First, the Appellant contended that the Rules should be read as allowing only witnesses (and not litigants) to recover travel expenses to attend court. This argument relied on O 38 r 22 (which provides for a witness not being compelled to attend unless a reasonable sum to cover expenses is extended) and O 35 r 1 (which addresses what happens when parties fail to appear at trial). Second, the Appellant argued that the Court of Appeal’s decision in Jumabhoy necessarily supported the same conclusion.
In response, the Respondent argued for a broader principle: that reasonable disbursements incurred by a successful party should be recoverable. The Respondent emphasised fairness and access to justice concerns, submitting that disallowing travel expenses would effectively prevent poor foreign plaintiffs from pursuing claims in Singapore, because they would be unable to afford the costs of travelling to attend trial.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
The High Court began by holding that the Respondent was not prohibited from claiming travel expenses as part of “costs reasonably incurred” under O 59 r 27(2) of the Rules. The court noted that the word “costs” in O 59 includes “disbursements” (referring to O 59 r 1(1)), and that disbursements must be set out in a bill of costs (under O 59 r 24(1)(c)). This framing was significant because it meant the court’s analysis could focus on whether the travel expenses were “reasonable” and “reasonably incurred,” rather than on whether the expenses were categorised as something other than disbursements.
On the Appellant’s first ground, the court rejected the proposition that O 35 r 1 makes it mandatory for a litigant to travel to court in person. The High Court observed that a litigant may appear by counsel. The court relied on the general procedural position reflected in Singapore Civil Procedure 2013, noting that only if both the party and counsel are absent may default judgment be entered or the action dismissed. Thus, the premise that O 35 r 1 obliges the Respondent to travel personally was not accepted. Even if a litigant-in-person were required to attend in some circumstances, the court reasoned that it does not logically follow that travel expenses are therefore non-recoverable.
On the Appellant’s second ground, the court addressed O 38 r 22. The High Court agreed with the Respondent that O 38 r 22 is a provision stipulating the rights of a witness vis-à-vis the litigant who subpoenas the witness. It is part of Order 38, which deals with how evidence is led in court. The court therefore held that O 38 r 22 does not govern whether a litigant who incurs travel expenses to attend trial is entitled to recover those expenses in a standard bill of costs. The obligation to compensate a witness for attendance does not answer the separate question of whether a litigant’s own travel expenses are recoverable as part of costs on taxation.
The court then turned to the Appellant’s reliance on Jumabhoy. The District Judge had treated Jumabhoy as addressing only “costs for attendance” and not the distinct issue of disbursements for travel expenses. The High Court agreed with the District Judge’s approach. In Jumabhoy, the Court of Appeal held that a party who was not represented by counsel could not claim costs for attendance before the appellate court. The High Court explained that this outcome could be understood by the general rule that only solicitors are entitled to claim professional costs for time spent attending court proceedings. Importantly, Jumabhoy was not confronted with the issue of disbursements, let alone whether a litigant’s travel expenses could be claimed as disbursements.
Further, the High Court was not persuaded by the Appellant’s attempt to equate “costs for attendance” with “travel expenses.” The court emphasised that “attendance” costs for solicitors are not the same as disbursements. The court also referenced the High Court’s earlier clarification in Ong Jane Rebecca v Lim Lie Hoa and others that disbursements refer to expenses actually incurred and paid out. This distinction supported the view that travel expenses, being actual expenses incurred and paid, could fall within the concept of disbursements and therefore within O 59’s taxation framework.
Having rejected the Appellant’s interpretive arguments, the High Court endorsed the District Judge’s reasoning on the substantive “reasonableness” of the expenses. The District Judge had treated the Appellant as a tortfeasor who must take the consequences flowing naturally from its negligence. One such consequence was that the Respondent had to mount an action in Singapore and therefore had to travel to and from Singapore. The District Judge also considered the Respondent’s practical circumstances: as a foreign worker injured in the incident, he could not continue working and thus could not have remained in Singapore even if he had wanted to. On that basis, the travel expenses were “reasonably incurred” under O 59 r 27(2).
Although the High Court’s extract is truncated, its core reasoning is clear: the Rules do not impose a categorical bar against litigants recovering travel expenses; the relevant provisions are concerned with reasonable costs reasonably incurred; and Jumabhoy does not extend to disbursements for travel expenses. The court’s analysis thus combined a careful reading of the procedural rules with a principled distinction between professional attendance costs and actual disbursements.
What Was the Outcome?
The High Court dismissed the Appellant’s appeal and upheld the District Judge’s decision allowing the Respondent’s travel expenses. The District Judge had allowed the claim in the sum of $1,208, reflecting the travel-related disbursements that had been disallowed by the Deputy Registrar.
Practically, the decision confirmed that, on taxation on a standard basis, a successful litigant may recover reasonable travel expenses incurred to attend trial in Singapore, provided they are properly pleaded as disbursements and satisfy the “reasonable amount” and “reasonably incurred” requirements under O 59 r 27(2).
Why Does This Case Matter?
Lam Hwa Engineering & Trading Pte Ltd v Yang Qiang is significant because it clarifies the approach to taxation of costs where the successful party is a litigant (not a witness) and where the costs claimed are travel expenses incurred to attend trial. While the court acknowledged that there was no direct authority on the precise point, it provided a structured interpretation of the Rules of Court and rejected an overly rigid reading that would have treated litigants’ travel expenses as categorically non-recoverable.
For practitioners, the case is useful in two ways. First, it offers a framework for arguing recoverability: focus on O 59 r 27(2) and the requirement that the expenses be “reasonably incurred,” and ensure that the expenses are properly set out as disbursements in the bill of costs. Second, it cautions against relying on Jumabhoy as if it created a general bar on litigants’ attendance-related costs. The decision underscores that Jumabhoy dealt with “costs for attendance” in a different context and does not automatically govern disbursements for travel.
From an access-to-justice perspective, the decision also supports the policy rationale that successful foreign litigants should not be deterred by the inability to recover necessary travel expenses. Although the court’s reasoning is grounded in the Rules and taxation principles, the fairness concern articulated by the Respondent provides context for why a categorical prohibition would be problematic.
Legislation Referenced
- Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2006 Rev Ed)
- Order 59 r 27(2) (standard basis; reasonable amount in respect of all costs reasonably incurred)
- Order 59 r 1(1) (definition of “costs” including disbursements)
- Order 59 r 24(1)(c) (disbursements to be set out in a bill of costs)
- Order 35 r 1 (failure to appear by both parties or one of them)
- Order 38 r 22 (tender of expenses for witnesses)
Cases Cited
- Yang Qiang v Lam Hwa Engineering & Trading Pte Ltd [2012] SGDC 31
- Rajabali Jumabhoy and Others v Ameerali R Jumabhoy and Others [1998] 2 SLR(R) 576
- Ong Jane Rebecca v Lim Lie Hoa and others [2008] 3 SLR(R) 189
- The London Scottish Benefit Society v Chorley, Crawford and Chester (1884) 13 QBD 872
Source Documents
This article analyses [2013] SGHC 42 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.