Case Details
- Citation: [2022] SGHC 264
- Title: Janesh s/o Rajkumar v Unknown Person (“CHEFPIERRE”) [2022] SGHC 264
- Court: High Court of the Republic of Singapore (General Division)
- Date of Decision: 21 October 2022
- Originating Application: Originating Claim No 41 of 2022
- Summons: Summons No 1800 of 2022
- Judge: Lee Seiu Kin J
- Plaintiff/Applicant: Janesh s/o Rajkumar
- Defendant/Respondent: Unknown Person (“CHEFPIERRE”)
- Legal Areas: Civil Procedure — Injunctions; Civil Procedure — Service
- Procedural Posture: Application for (i) a proprietary injunction and (ii) substituted service out of jurisdiction against an unknown defendant
- Core Substantive Theme: Whether an NFT can be the subject of a proprietary injunction; whether the court can extend common law principles to digital assets
- Statutes Referenced: Bankruptcy Act; First Schedule of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act; First Schedule of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969
- Cases Cited (as provided): [2005] SGHC 150; [2016] SGHCR 7; [2022] SGHC 264; [2022] SGHC 46
- Judgment Length: 45 pages, 12,712 words
Summary
In Janesh s/o Rajkumar v Unknown Person (“CHEFPIERRE”) [2022] SGHC 264, the High Court considered whether a claimant could obtain a proprietary injunction over a specific non-fungible token (“NFT”)—the Bored Ape Yacht Club (“BAYC”) NFT ID #2162—where the claimant alleged that the NFT had been taken or dealt with in breach of the claimant’s proprietary interests. The application also raised a procedural question: whether the court had jurisdiction to grant relief against an unknown defendant and whether substituted service out of jurisdiction should be permitted.
The court approached the matter by applying established principles for interim injunctions, including the requirement that there be a serious question to be tried and that the balance of convenience favoured granting the injunction. Central to the substantive analysis was the question whether NFTs (and, in particular, the BAYC NFT) are capable of giving rise to proprietary rights that can be protected by a proprietary injunction. The judge drew on prior Singapore authority dealing with proprietary injunctions over digital assets, including CLM v CLN [2022] SGHC 46, and the reasoning in Ruscoe v Cryptopia Ltd (in liq) (a decision from New Zealand) to conclude that the claimant had a serious arguable case.
On the service and jurisdictional front, the court addressed the practical difficulties of suing an unknown person identified only by a blockchain-related pseudonym and considered whether substituted service out of jurisdiction could be authorised. Ultimately, the court granted the injunction and allowed the substituted service, enabling the claimant to proceed against the unknown defendant.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
The claimant, Janesh s/o Rajkumar, owned a particular NFT known as “Bored Ape Yacht Club” (“BAYC”) ID #2162 (the “Bored Ape NFT”). He described the NFT as unique and irreplaceable, part of a limited collection of 10,000 apes, each with distinct attributes. The claimant’s evidence emphasised both the cultural and economic value of BAYC NFTs and the technical features that purportedly support provenance and uniqueness on the Ethereum blockchain, including a unique token ID and hash recorded publicly on-chain.
According to the claimant, he acquired the Bored Ape NFT on 6 August 2021 via OpenSea, paying 15.99 ETH to a user operating under the pseudonym “victorjia_eth”. He was not a casual participant in the NFT ecosystem. He used NFTs as collateral in lending transactions on NFTfi, a platform that facilitates NFT-collateralised cryptocurrency loans through smart contracts. In these arrangements, the NFT would be transferred to an escrow account and held until repayment, and the lender would not be permitted to “foreclose” or obtain ownership or disposal rights over the NFT without first allowing the borrower reasonable opportunities to repay and retrieve the NFT.
The claimant’s practice was to insist on strict contractual terms designed to preserve his ability to retain the NFT. He explained that NFTfi’s smart program could automatically execute foreclosure if payment was not made by a stipulated date, and therefore he required lenders to agree not to exercise the foreclosure option and not to attempt to remove the NFT from escrow in a way that would deprive him of possession. The claimant stated that, in prior transactions, lenders complied with these terms and did not foreclose or attempt to dispose of the NFT.
Matters changed when the claimant began dealing with a person known only by the pseudonym “chefpierre.eth”, later referred to in the proceedings as “CHEFPIERRE”. The claimant did not know the identity behind the pseudonym and, given the urgency of the application, he sought relief without being able to identify the defendant. He alleged that after entering into a loan agreement with “chefpierre.eth” in early January 2022—where he obtained assurance that the NFT would not be foreclosed—subsequent events led to the claimant losing “possession” of the Bored Ape NFT. The claimant therefore applied for an injunction to restrain the defendant from dealing with the NFT.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The case presented two interlocking legal issues. First, on the substantive side, the court had to decide whether the claimant had a serious arguable case that the Bored Ape NFT (and NFTs generally) could be the subject of proprietary rights capable of supporting a proprietary injunction. This required the court to consider whether common law principles governing proprietary interests in assets could extend to digital tokens, particularly NFTs that are recorded on a blockchain and are capable of being transferred between wallets.
Second, on the procedural side, the court had to determine whether it had jurisdiction to hear and grant the application against an unknown defendant and whether the claimant could obtain substituted service out of jurisdiction. The defendant was not identified by name; the claimant’s only lead was the pseudonym “chefpierre.eth”. The court therefore had to consider the requirements for service, the circumstances in which substituted service is appropriate, and whether the statutory framework permitted service out of jurisdiction in a case involving an unknown defendant.
These issues were not merely technical. They affected whether the court could provide effective interim protection for alleged proprietary interests in a digital asset, and whether the claimant could bring the defendant before the court in time to prevent further dealing with the NFT.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
The judge began by situating the application within the broader development of Singapore law on proprietary injunctions over digital assets. The court noted that the rapid evolution of technology would increasingly generate disputes about new forms of property. The key legal question was whether the “fabric of the common law” could be extended, in a principled manner, to cover such disputes. In doing so, the court relied on the approach taken in earlier Singapore decisions, particularly CLM v CLN [2022] SGHC 46, which addressed whether stolen cryptocurrency assets could be protected by a proprietary injunction.
In CLM, the court had considered the reasoning in Ruscoe v Cryptopia Ltd (in liq) and concluded that the claimant there had a serious arguable case that stolen cryptocurrency assets were capable of giving rise to proprietary rights. The judge in the present case treated the issues as “similar” and therefore adopted a comparable analytical framework. The court’s focus was not to decide the final merits of whether the claimant’s proprietary rights existed, but to assess whether there was a serious question to be tried—an established threshold for interim injunctions.
On the question of whether NFTs are capable of giving rise to proprietary rights, the judge examined the claimant’s evidence about the nature of the Bored Ape NFT. The claimant argued that the NFT was unique and irreplaceable, and that it was recorded on the Ethereum blockchain with a unique hash and token ID, providing publicly verifiable proof of provenance. The court also considered the practical realities of NFT ownership and transfer: NFTs can be transferred between blockchain addresses, and dealing with them can effectively deprive the claimant of the asset. These features supported the argument that NFTs could be treated as identifiable property for the purposes of proprietary relief.
Importantly, the court’s analysis was sensitive to the proprietary injunction’s function. A proprietary injunction is designed to restrain dealing with property in which the claimant asserts a proprietary interest. The court therefore considered whether the claimant’s pleaded case—based on his ownership and the alleged loss of possession—could plausibly establish a proprietary basis. The judge concluded that the claimant had met the “serious arguable case” threshold. This meant that the court was satisfied that the claim was not frivolous or speculative and that the legal question of proprietary rights in NFTs was arguable on established principles.
Having found a serious question to be tried, the court turned to the balance of convenience. In interim injunction applications, even where there is a serious question to be tried, the court must consider whether the injunction is appropriate in all the circumstances, including the risk of irreparable harm and the practical effect of granting or refusing relief. The judge considered that NFTs, particularly unique NFTs, are not easily replaceable. If the defendant continued dealing with the NFT, the claimant’s ability to recover the asset could be undermined, and the practical value of the claim could be diminished. The court therefore found that the balance of convenience favoured granting the injunction.
The procedural issues were addressed in parallel. The court had to consider whether it could grant relief against an unknown person and whether substituted service out of jurisdiction was permissible. The judge recognised that suing an unknown defendant is inherently difficult, but the court’s jurisdiction and the statutory service framework exist to ensure that claimants can seek effective interim relief where the defendant cannot be identified in time. The court considered the statutory provisions referenced in the judgment, including the First Schedule of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act and the First Schedule of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969, as well as the Bankruptcy Act (as referenced in the metadata), to determine the proper basis for service and the court’s authority to make orders for substituted service.
Substituted service is typically justified where personal service is impracticable or where the claimant has taken reasonable steps to locate the defendant. Here, the claimant’s evidence indicated that the defendant’s identity was unknown, but the pseudonym “chefpierre.eth” was linked to online activity and could, with time, be traced. The court accepted that, given the urgency and the risk of further dealing with the NFT, substituted service was necessary to ensure that the injunction could have practical effect. The court therefore granted the application for substituted service out of jurisdiction.
What Was the Outcome?
The High Court granted the proprietary injunction restraining the defendant from dealing with the Bored Ape NFT. The practical effect of the order was to prevent the unknown defendant from transferring, disposing of, or otherwise acting in a manner that would defeat the claimant’s asserted proprietary interest in the NFT while the substantive dispute proceeded.
In addition, the court granted the application for substituted service out of jurisdiction. This enabled the claimant to serve the proceedings on the unknown defendant using an alternative method approved by the court, thereby allowing the case to move forward despite the defendant’s identity being unknown at the time of filing.
Why Does This Case Matter?
Janesh s/o Rajkumar v Unknown Person (“CHEFPIERRE”) is significant because it reinforces and extends Singapore’s willingness to treat certain digital assets as capable of supporting proprietary remedies. While the court did not finally determine the existence of proprietary rights, it held that the claimant had a serious arguable case that an NFT could be protected by a proprietary injunction. This is an important development for practitioners seeking urgent interim relief in disputes involving NFTs, especially where the asset is unique and where blockchain-based transfers can rapidly frustrate recovery.
The decision also matters procedurally. It demonstrates that the court can authorise substituted service out of jurisdiction even where the defendant is unknown, provided the claimant can show urgency and a reasonable basis for the service approach. For litigators, this is particularly relevant in the NFT and cryptocurrency context, where defendants may operate under pseudonyms and identities may be difficult to ascertain quickly.
From a precedent perspective, the case builds on CLM v CLN and aligns Singapore’s approach with persuasive reasoning from other common law jurisdictions, such as Ruscoe. For lawyers advising clients in digital asset disputes, the judgment provides a structured pathway: (i) establish a serious arguable case that the asset is capable of proprietary protection, (ii) show that the balance of convenience favours interim relief, and (iii) ensure that service arrangements are tailored to the practical realities of identifying and notifying defendants.
Legislation Referenced
- Bankruptcy Act
- First Schedule of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act
- First Schedule of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969
Cases Cited
- [2005] SGHC 150
- [2016] SGHCR 7
- [2022] SGHC 264
- [2022] SGHC 46
Source Documents
This article analyses [2022] SGHC 264 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.