Case Details
- Citation: [2022] SGHC 264
- Title: Janesh s/o Rajkumar v Unknown Person (“CHEFPIERRE”) [2022] SGHC 264
- Court: High Court of the Republic of Singapore (General Division)
- Originating Claim No: Originating Claim No 41 of 2022
- Summons No: Summons No 1800 of 2022
- Date of Judgment: 21 October 2022
- Date of Hearing: 13 May 2022
- Judge: Lee Seiu Kin J
- Plaintiff/Applicant: Janesh s/o Rajkumar
- Defendant/Respondent: Unknown Person (“CHEFPIERRE”)
- Legal Areas: Civil Procedure — Injunctions; Civil Procedure — Service
- Core Relief Sought: Proprietary injunction restraining dealing with a specific NFT; substituted service out of jurisdiction against an unknown defendant
- Statutes Referenced: Bankruptcy Act; First Schedule of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act; First Schedule of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969
- Cases Cited (as per metadata): [2005] SGHC 150; [2016] SGHCR 7; [2022] SGHC 264; [2022] SGHC 46
- Judgment Length: 45 pages; 12,712 words
Summary
In Janesh s/o Rajkumar v Unknown Person (“CHEFPIERRE”), the High Court considered whether a proprietary injunction could be granted to restrain an unknown defendant from dealing with a specific Non-Fungible Token (“NFT”)—a Bored Ape Yacht Club NFT (the “Bored Ape NFT”). The claimant, who said he had lost “possession” of the NFT, sought urgent interim relief to prevent further dealings that might frustrate his ability to recover the asset. The case sits at the intersection of traditional equitable remedies and the evolving question of whether digital tokens can be treated as property capable of supporting proprietary relief.
The court also had to address procedural hurdles: whether it had jurisdiction to hear the application against an unknown person, and whether substituted service out of jurisdiction should be permitted. Applying the established framework for interim injunctions (including the requirement of a “serious question to be tried” and the balance of convenience), the court accepted that the claimant had an arguable case that the NFT could give rise to proprietary rights. It further found that the practical need for urgent restraint and the risk of dissipation weighed in favour of granting the injunction, subject to the procedural service requirements being met.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
The claimant, Janesh s/o Rajkumar, owned a particular NFT known as the Bored Ape Yacht Club (“BAYC”) ID #2162 (the “Bored Ape NFT”). He described the NFT as unique and irreplaceable, part of a larger BAYC collection of 10,000 artworks. According to his evidence, the BAYC NFTs are highly valued and function not merely as collectibles but also as status symbols, with ownership by well-known celebrities. The claimant’s affidavit emphasised the rarity and distinctive traits of his specific token, including characteristics such as “jovial mouth”, “red fur”, “beanie hat”, “bored eyes”, and a “purple background”, as well as the “virgin ape” attribute said to preserve potential for future derivative projects.
Technically, the claimant explained that each BAYC NFT is minted on the Ethereum blockchain and has a unique hash number and token ID recorded on-chain, which serves as publicly verifiable proof of provenance. He provided the hash number associated with his Bored Ape NFT. The claimant also relied on marketplace information (including OpenSea) to support the uniqueness and rarity of the token’s traits. In his narrative, these features supported the proposition that the NFT was not fungible in the way ordinary cryptocurrencies might be, and that it could not simply be replaced by another token of similar value.
Before the dispute, the claimant used the Bored Ape NFT as collateral in NFT-collateralised cryptocurrency lending transactions. He was an active user of NFTfi, a platform that facilitates loans secured by NFTs through smart contracts. The claimant said he would only deal with reputable lenders and would insist on specific protective terms. These terms included: (a) transferring the NFT to NFTfi’s escrow account until full repayment; (b) requiring the lender to grant reasonable extensions if repayment was late; (c) prohibiting the lender from using the “foreclose” option without first giving the claimant reasonable opportunities to repay and retrieve the NFT; and (d) preventing the lender from obtaining ownership or any right to sell or dispose of the NFT. The claimant said he had successfully completed multiple loans under these safeguards without any lender attempting to foreclose or remove the NFT from his possession.
Matters changed when the claimant began dealing with a person known only by the pseudonym “chefpierre.eth” (the defendant, described in the proceedings as “Unknown Person (‘CHEFPIERRE’)”). The claimant did not know the defendant’s true identity at the time of filing, though he believed that the pseudonym was associated with regular Twitter activity and that the identity could be obtained with time. In early January 2022, the claimant approached “chefpierre.eth” to discuss a loan. He reiterated his strict terms regarding the Bored Ape NFT and obtained assurance that the NFT would not be “foreclosed”. On 6 January 2022, he entered a loan agreement for 45 ETH for 90 days at 33% per annum interest, and he later repaid this loan.
After repayment, “chefpierre.eth” offered another loan in March 2022. The judgment (as reflected in the structure and issues identified) indicates that the claimant’s central complaint was that he ultimately lost “possession” of the Bored Ape NFT and needed urgent court intervention to prevent the defendant from dealing with it. Because the defendant’s identity was unknown, the claimant sought both an injunction and permission for substituted service out of jurisdiction, so that the proceedings could proceed and the interim relief could bind the defendant in practical terms.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The first major issue was jurisdictional and procedural: whether the court had the jurisdiction to hear the application against an unknown person and to grant the requested interim relief in circumstances where the defendant could not be identified at the time of filing. This involved questions about the court’s power to make orders against a defendant described by a pseudonym, and the adequacy of service mechanisms to ensure that the defendant could be bound by the injunction.
The second key issue concerned the substantive basis for a proprietary injunction. The court had to decide whether the claimant had a serious arguable case that the Bored Ape NFT (or NFTs generally) could be capable of giving rise to proprietary rights recognised by the common law, such that equitable proprietary injunctions could be granted to protect those rights. This required the court to engage with the broader question of whether digital assets can be treated as “property” for equitable purposes, and whether the particular characteristics of an NFT supported that classification.
The third issue related to the interim relief test and practical considerations. Even if there was a serious question to be tried, the court had to consider whether the balance of convenience favoured granting the injunction. This included assessing the risk of irreparable harm, the likelihood that the asset could be dissipated or dealt with in a manner that would frustrate the claimant’s ability to recover it, and whether the injunction was proportionate.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
The court’s analysis began with the framework for granting interim injunctions. In Singapore, the starting point is the well-established test requiring the claimant to show (i) a serious question to be tried, (ii) that damages would not be an adequate remedy in the circumstances (often discussed through the lens of irreparable harm), and (iii) that the balance of convenience favours granting the injunction. The court also had to ensure that the injunction sought was coherent and enforceable, particularly where the subject matter is a digital asset and where the defendant is unknown.
On the proprietary injunction question, the court drew heavily on its earlier reasoning in CLM v CLN ([2022] SGHC 46) and on the analytical approach in Ruscoe v Cryptopia Ltd (in liq) (a New Zealand decision). In CLM, the court had considered stolen cryptocurrency assets (Bitcoin and Ethereum) and concluded that the claimant could establish a serious arguable case that stolen cryptocurrency could be capable of giving rise to proprietary rights protected by a proprietary injunction. The present case extended that reasoning to NFTs. The court treated the question as one of principle rather than mere novelty: modern technology should not automatically fall outside the reach of established legal doctrines, provided the doctrine can be extended in a principled manner.
Crucially, the court examined whether NFTs are capable of being treated as property in a way that supports proprietary relief. The claimant’s evidence emphasised uniqueness and irreplaceability, and the court considered whether those features meaningfully distinguish NFTs from fungible tokens. The court also considered the public verifiability of provenance on the blockchain and the token’s on-chain identifiers. While the judgment’s excerpt does not reproduce all reasoning, the structure of the decision indicates that the court addressed whether the Bored Ape NFT, and NFTs in general, could give rise to proprietary rights. The court ultimately found that the claimant had at least a serious arguable case on this point, satisfying the threshold for interim proprietary relief.
Having found a serious question to be tried, the court then turned to the balance of convenience. The analysis focused on the practical realities of blockchain-based assets. If the defendant were free to deal with the NFT, the claimant’s ability to recover the asset could be undermined, and the harm might not be adequately compensable by damages. The court considered that NFTs can be transferred and that the risk of further dealing is immediate and difficult to reverse. In that context, an injunction serves a protective function by preserving the status quo and preventing dissipation.
Finally, the court addressed the procedural question of substituted service out of jurisdiction. Because the defendant was unknown and identified only by a pseudonym, traditional service methods were not straightforward. The court therefore had to consider whether substituted service was permissible and appropriate under the relevant procedural regime, including the statutory framework referenced in the metadata (notably the First Schedule of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act and the First Schedule of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969, as well as the Bankruptcy Act). The court’s reasoning (as reflected in the decision’s headings) indicates that it carefully considered whether the claimant had taken reasonable steps to identify the defendant and whether the proposed service method would be likely to bring the proceedings to the defendant’s attention. The court’s willingness to permit substituted service underscores that, in technology-driven disputes, procedural flexibility may be necessary to ensure effective access to justice and meaningful interim protection.
What Was the Outcome?
The court granted the application for an injunction restraining the defendant from dealing with the Bored Ape NFT. The practical effect of the order was to prevent the unknown defendant from transferring, disposing of, or otherwise dealing with the NFT in a manner that could frustrate the claimant’s proprietary claim. Given the court’s acceptance that the claimant had a serious arguable case that the NFT could be protected by proprietary injunction, the injunction was a means of preserving the claimant’s position pending the determination of the substantive dispute.
In addition, the court granted the application for substituted service out of jurisdiction. This enabled the claimant to proceed against an unknown defendant despite difficulties in identifying the true person behind the pseudonym. The combined effect of the injunction and substituted service was to ensure that interim relief could be effective in practice, rather than being undermined by procedural limitations inherent in disputes involving blockchain-based identities.
Why Does This Case Matter?
Janesh s/o Rajkumar v Unknown Person (“CHEFPIERRE”) is significant because it reinforces Singapore’s approach to extending established property and equitable doctrines to digital assets. By treating the claimant’s case as raising a serious arguable question that NFTs can be the subject of proprietary injunctions, the decision provides a doctrinal pathway for future claimants seeking urgent interim relief in NFT-related disputes. This is particularly relevant where the asset is unique, irreplaceable, and at risk of rapid transfer.
For practitioners, the case highlights two practical lessons. First, the evidential framing matters: claimants should be prepared to explain why the token is unique or otherwise capable of supporting proprietary protection, including how blockchain identifiers and provenance features support the claim. Second, procedural strategy is critical. Where defendants are anonymous or pseudonymous, claimants must be ready to seek substituted service and demonstrate that the proposed service method is reasonable and likely to bring the matter to the defendant’s attention.
More broadly, the decision contributes to the growing body of jurisprudence on proprietary injunctions in the context of crypto-assets. It builds on CLM v CLN and aligns Singapore’s reasoning with comparative analysis such as Ruscoe v Cryptopia. While the case does not finally determine the substantive merits of the proprietary claim, it lowers the threshold for obtaining interim protection by recognising that the common law and equity can respond to technological change in a principled way.
Legislation Referenced
- Bankruptcy Act
- First Schedule of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act
- First Schedule of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969
Cases Cited
- [2005] SGHC 150
- [2016] SGHCR 7
- [2022] SGHC 46 (CLM v CLN)
- [2020] 2 NZLR 809 (Ruscoe v Cryptopia Ltd (in liq))
- [2022] SGHC 264 (Janesh s/o Rajkumar v Unknown Person (“CHEFPIERRE”))
Source Documents
This article analyses [2022] SGHC 264 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.