JANE REBECCA ONG v Estate of LIM LIE HOA ALSO KNOWN AS LIM LE HOA ALSO KNOWN AS LILY ARIEF HUSNI, deceased

"In my view, those principles should apply to s 335 of the IRDA as well." — Per Goh Yihan JC, Para 11

Case Information

• Citation: [2023] SGHC 33 (Para 0)
• Court: General Division of the High Court of the Republic of Singapore (Para 0)
• Date of hearing: 17 January 2023; date of decision: 15 February 2023 (Para 0)
• Coram: Goh Yihan JC (Judicial Commissioner) (Para 0)
• Case number: Bankruptcy No 2704 of 2020 (Summonses Nos 4139, 4144 and 4145 of 2022) (Para 0)
• Counsel for the applicants: Balakrishnan Ashok Kumar, Gloria Chan Hui En and Stanley Tan Sing Yee (BlackOak LLC) (Para 0)
• Counsel for the respondent in Summons No 4144 of 2022: Ivan Lim (Allen & Gledhill LLP) (Para 0)
• Area of law: Insolvency Law — Bankruptcy — Trustee in bankruptcy — Inspection of bankers’ books; Banking — Banker’s books — Proceedings — Civil (Para 0)
• Judgment length: Not stated in the extraction (Para 0)

Summary

This decision concerned applications by the private trustees of a deceased debtor’s estate for inspection and copies of bank statements held by three banks. The trustees said they needed the statements to investigate the estate’s affairs, especially the movement of sale proceeds from 16 East Sussex Lane, which they believed had been deposited into the deceased debtor’s personal bank accounts. The court granted the applications after hearing the parties on 17 January 2023. (Paras 2, 4, 6, 8)

The central legal question was whether the principles developed for company investigations under s 244 of the Insolvency, Restructuring and Dissolution Act 2018 (“IRDA”) should also govern applications under s 335 of the IRDA, which concerns the examination of bankrupts and others. The court held that they should. Applying the Celestial two-stage test, the court found that the trustees had shown a reasonable basis for seeking the documents and that the documents were reasonably required for their statutory functions. (Paras 11, 17, 18, 19, 29, 49)

The court also addressed the Bankers’ Books Exception under the Evidence Act and Banking Act. It held that the relevant bank statements fell within the statutory concept of bankers’ books, that the applications constituted legal proceedings for the purposes of s 175 of the Evidence Act, and that the court should exercise its discretion to permit inspection. The court therefore concluded that disclosure could be made without breaching banking secrecy, and the applications were allowed. (Paras 39, 41, 42, 45, 48, 49)

Why Did the Court Say the s 244 Principles Apply to s 335 of the IRDA?

The court began from the premise that there was no local decision directly on s 335 of the IRDA or its predecessor provision in the Bankruptcy Act. It therefore looked to analogous authorities, including foreign decisions and Singapore cases dealing with the company-insolvency provisions. The court’s reasoning was that the investigative function served by s 335 is sufficiently similar to the function served by the company-investigation provisions that the same principles should govern both. (Paras 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17)

"There does not appear to be a local decision on s 335 of the IRDA or its predecessor provision which was s 83 of the Bankruptcy Act (Cap 20) (2009 Rev Ed)." — Per Goh Yihan JC, Para 11

The court relied on In re Murjani, where Lightman J held that the principles applicable to a trustee’s application under the company-insolvency provision should equally apply to a trustee in bankruptcy under the corresponding bankruptcy provision. It also referred to Hong Kong authority in Ip Pui Lam Arthur and another v Alan Chung Wah Tang and others, where the court treated the bankruptcy and company provisions as essentially the same in terms of the discretion to be exercised. These authorities supported the proposition that the bankruptcy-examination power should not be read in isolation from the company-investigation jurisprudence. (Paras 12, 13)

"Lightman J held that the principles which apply in the case of an application by the trustee under s 236 of the Insolvency Act 1986 (c 45) (UK) (similar to s 244 of the IRDA) in cases of insolvent companies must be equally applicable in the case of an application by a trustee in bankruptcy under s 366 of the same Act (which is similar to s 335 of the IRDA) (at 1508)." — Per Goh Yihan JC, Para 12

The court further noted that Singapore law had already adopted a relatively expansive approach to the company-investigation power in s 285 of the Companies Act, which had been used to assist liquidators in gathering facts, information and knowledge necessary to discharge their statutory functions. That broader approach made it natural to extend the same logic to s 335 of the IRDA. The court therefore concluded that the Celestial framework, developed in the company context, should be adopted for bankruptcies as well. (Paras 16, 17)

"the Singapore courts have adopted a relatively expansive approach towards s 285 of the Companies Act, which may be invoked to assist a liquidator in accumulating facts, information, and knowledge that would enable him to discharge his statutory functions" — Per Goh Yihan JC, Para 16

How Did the Court Apply the Celestial Two-Stage Test to the Trustees’ Request?

The court set out the Celestial test in two stages. First, the applicant must show some reasonable basis for believing that the person subject to the application can assist in obtaining relevant information or documents, and that the information or documents are reasonably, though not absolutely, required. Second, the court must balance the conflicting interests involved in deciding whether to grant the order. The court expressly stated that these principles should be applied to s 335 of the IRDA. (Paras 18, 19, 11)

"The first stage of the test set out in Celestial is that, as a threshold requirement under s 285 of the Companies Act, the liquidator has to show that there is some reasonable basis for his belief that the person who is the subject of the application can assist him in obtaining relevant information and/or documents, and that the information and/or documents are reasonably (but not absolutely) required." — Per Goh Yihan JC, Para 18

On the first stage, the court found that the trustees had a reasonable basis for seeking the bank statements because they were investigating the whereabouts of the sale proceeds of 16 East Sussex Lane. The court accepted that the sale proceeds were substantial and that there was a plausible basis to believe that they had been deposited into the deceased debtor’s bank accounts. The bank statements and the cashiers’ orders from the sale would therefore be the documentary trail needed to trace the funds. (Paras 6, 27, 29)

"Such deposit would be evidenced by OSP’s bank statements from the respondents and the cashiers’ orders from the sale of 16 East Sussex deposited into the Bank Accounts." — Per Goh Yihan JC, Para 27

The court also found that the documents already in the trustees’ possession were incomplete and heavily redacted, and therefore insufficient for the necessary investigation. That factual finding was important because it showed that the trustees were not seeking the statements out of curiosity or for a fishing expedition; rather, they needed complete records to perform their statutory role. The court treated this as satisfying the “reasonably required” limb of the first stage. (Para 29)

"In particular, I was of the view that the documents in the applicants’ current possession, including the heavily redacted bank statements, were incomplete and insufficient for them to conduct their necessary investigations." — Per Goh Yihan JC, Para 29

On the second stage, the court balanced the competing interests and concluded that the applicants should prevail. The respondents’ concern was that disclosure without consent or a court order might breach banking secrecy. But the court held that the statutory framework itself contemplated disclosure where the conditions of the Bankers’ Books Exception were met, and that the trustees’ need to investigate the estate outweighed the confidentiality concern in the circumstances. (Paras 37, 41, 48, 49)

"The second stage of the test set out in Celestial requires that the courts balance the conflicting interests involved in deciding whether to grant the order under s 285 of the Companies Act." — Per Goh Yihan JC, Para 19

What Were the Facts That Led the Trustees to Seek the Bank Statements?

The factual background began with the death of the deceased debtor on 8 August 2009. Under her will dated 9 July 2009, OSP was appointed executor and trustee of the estate. Later, on 17 December 2020, the plaintiff applied for an administration order in bankruptcy for the estate and for the applicants to be appointed as joint and several private trustees. The court’s narrative shows a progression from estate administration to bankruptcy administration, which framed the trustees’ investigative powers. (Paras 3, 4)

"The Deceased Debtor died on 8 August 2009, following which Mr Ong Siauw Ping (“OSP”) was appointed as executor and trustee of the Estate, pursuant to the last will and testament of the Deceased Debtor dated 9 July 2009." — Per Goh Yihan JC, Para 3

The trustees’ investigation focused on a property at 16 East Sussex Lane. The court recorded that the total sale proceeds of that property amounted to $35,088,000 before fees and taxes. The applicants believed that the proceeds had been deposited into OSP’s personal bank accounts with the respondent banks. That belief was the factual foundation for the request for complete and unredacted bank statements. (Paras 6, 8)

"The total sale proceeds of 16 East Sussex amounted to $35,088,000 before accounting for the relevant fees and taxes." — Per Goh Yihan JC, Para 6

The applicants had already requested copies of the relevant bank statements since June 2022. The court noted that they sought the complete and unredacted statements to determine the whereabouts of the sale proceeds. The respondents, however, said they could not provide the statements without OSP’s consent or a court order. That impasse is what brought the matter before the court. (Para 8)

"the applicants have since June 2022 requested copies of, among others, the complete and unredacted bank statements of OSP’s Bank Accounts to determine the whereabouts of the sale proceeds of 16 East Sussex" — Per Goh Yihan JC, Para 8

What Did Each Side Argue About Disclosure and Banking Secrecy?

The applicants argued that they required the relevant bank statements to ascertain the estate’s affairs, dealings and property. Their position was that the statements were necessary to trace the sale proceeds and to understand what had happened to the estate’s assets. In substance, they said that without the statements they could not properly perform the investigative function entrusted to them by the bankruptcy administration order. (Para 8)

"The applicants required the Relevant Bank Statements to ascertain the Estate’s affairs, dealings, and property." — Per Goh Yihan JC, Para 8

The respondents’ position was narrower. They did not dispute that the statements existed or that they were the relevant banks. Rather, they said they were not able to provide copies without OSP’s consent or a court order. The court also recorded that the respondents were concerned about being in breach of banking secrecy requirements if they disclosed the statements without judicial authorisation. That concern was addressed through the statutory exception analysis. (Paras 8, 37)

"the respondents were concerned about being in breach of banking secrecy requirements if they were to disclose the Relevant Bank Statements without a court order." — Per Goh Yihan JC, Para 37

The court’s answer to the respondents’ concern was not to deny the existence of banking secrecy, but to locate the disclosure within the statutory framework that permits inspection of bankers’ books in legal proceedings. Once the court was satisfied that the statutory conditions were met, the secrecy concern no longer barred disclosure. The court therefore treated the issue as one of statutory permission rather than absolute confidentiality. (Paras 39, 41, 48)

How Did the Court Interpret the Bankers’ Books Exception?

The court analysed the Bankers’ Books Exception in three steps: whether the documents are bankers’ books, whether the proceeding is a legal proceeding, and whether the court should exercise its discretion to order inspection. This structured approach was important because it linked the Evidence Act and the Banking Act to the trustees’ substantive insolvency application. The court expressly adopted this three-step analysis. (Para 41)

"In my view, the application of the Bankers’ Book Exception should be analysed in three steps: (a) whether the documents concerned fall within the definition of “bankers’ books” under the EA, (b) if so, whether the proceeding in which the application for inspection was made is a “legal proceeding” under the terms of s 175(1) of the EA, and (c) if so, whether the court should exercise its discretion to order inspection." — Per Goh Yihan JC, Para 41

On the first step, the court relied on Wee Soon Kim Anthony v UBS AG for the proposition that any form of permanent record maintained by a bank in relation to a customer’s transactions, including correspondence, falls within “other books” in the definition of bankers’ books. It also referred to La Dolce Vita Fine Dining Company Ltd v Zhang Lan and others for the proposition that the entry must relate to the transactions of the bank. On that basis, the relevant bank statements were plainly within the statutory concept. (Para 42)

"any form of permanent record maintained by a bank in relation to the transactions of a customer, including correspondence between a bank and a customer, would fall within the scope of “other books” in the definition of “bankers’ books” under s 170 of the EA." — Per Goh Yihan JC, Para 42

On the second step, the court relied on Success Elegant Trading v La Dolce Vita Fine Dining Co Ltd and others and another appeal, which held that “legal proceeding” in s 175(1) refers to the very application for disclosure, provided the applicant demonstrates a right to discovery independent of s 175. The court accepted that the present applications satisfied that requirement because the trustees were acting under their statutory investigative powers and were not relying on s 175 as the sole source of entitlement. (Para 45)

"“legal proceeding” referred to in s 175(1) of the EA “would refer to the very application for disclosure, in which the applicant demonstrates a right to discovery independent of s 175” (at [92])." — Per Goh Yihan JC, Para 45

On the third step, the court exercised its discretion in favour of disclosure. It reasoned that the trustees had shown a proper investigative purpose, that the statements were necessary to trace substantial sale proceeds, and that the respondents’ banking secrecy concern was addressed by the statutory exception. The court therefore held that the relevant bank statements could be disclosed pursuant to the Bankers’ Books Exception. (Paras 48, 49)

"Accordingly, I was satisfied that the Relevant Bank Statements could be disclosed to the applicants pursuant to the Bankers’ Books Exception." — Per Goh Yihan JC, Para 48

Why Did the Court Consider the Trustees’ Need to Investigate the Estate So Strong?

The court treated the trustees’ investigative need as strong because the estate involved a substantial asset trail and the trustees were trying to determine the whereabouts of the sale proceeds. The sale proceeds were large, and the court accepted that bank statements and cashiers’ orders would be the best evidence of whether the proceeds had been deposited into the relevant accounts. That made the request concrete and targeted rather than speculative. (Paras 6, 27)

"Such deposit would be evidenced by OSP’s bank statements from the respondents and the cashiers’ orders from the sale of 16 East Sussex deposited into the Bank Accounts." — Per Goh Yihan JC, Para 27

The court also emphasised that the materials already held by the applicants were incomplete and heavily redacted. That meant the trustees could not reconstruct the financial trail from what they already had. The court’s reasoning shows that the need for disclosure was assessed against the practical realities of tracing funds in an insolvency context, where partial records may be insufficient to reveal the true position. (Para 29)

"In particular, I was of the view that the documents in the applicants’ current possession, including the heavily redacted bank statements, were incomplete and insufficient for them to conduct their necessary investigations." — Per Goh Yihan JC, Para 29

The court’s conclusion on necessity was not merely that the statements would be useful, but that they were reasonably required for the trustees to perform their statutory function. That distinction mattered because the Celestial test does not require absolute necessity; it requires reasonable requirement. The court found that threshold satisfied on the facts before it. (Paras 18, 29, 49)

How Did the Court Deal with the Respondents’ Banking Secrecy Objection?

The respondents’ concern was that disclosure without consent or a court order might breach banking secrecy. The court did not dismiss that concern as irrelevant. Instead, it treated it as a reason to examine whether the statutory exception applied. Once the court concluded that the bank statements were bankers’ books, that the applications were legal proceedings, and that discretion should be exercised in favour of disclosure, the secrecy objection fell away. (Paras 37, 41, 45, 48)

"the respondents were concerned about being in breach of banking secrecy requirements if they were to disclose the Relevant Bank Statements without a court order." — Per Goh Yihan JC, Para 37

The court’s approach shows that banking secrecy is not an absolute bar where Parliament has created a specific mechanism for inspection in legal proceedings. The Bankers’ Books Exception is the mechanism that reconciles confidentiality with the administration of justice. In this case, the trustees’ need to investigate the estate’s affairs was a classic example of why the exception exists. (Paras 39, 41, 48)

Accordingly, the court held that the relevant bank statements could be disclosed under the statutory exception. That conclusion was the practical answer to the respondents’ concern: the banks were not being asked to act unlawfully, but to comply with a court-sanctioned disclosure order within the statutory framework. (Para 48)

What Was the Court’s Final Conclusion on the Applications?

The court concluded that the Celestial principles should apply to s 335 of the IRDA, that the trustees had met the two-stage test, and that the Bankers’ Books Exception permitted disclosure. The court therefore granted the applications and made the orders prayed for. The reasoning was cumulative: each doctrinal step reinforced the next, and the result was a complete answer to the trustees’ request. (Paras 11, 18, 19, 48, 49, 50)

"Taken holistically, the second stage of the test in Celestial as applied to s 335 of the IRDA applied in favour of the applicants." — Per Goh Yihan JC, Para 49

The court’s final statement was direct and unqualified. It said that, for all of the reasons given, the applications were granted. That is the operative outcome of the case and the practical endpoint of the court’s analysis. (Para 50)

"For all of the reasons, I granted the Applications sought." — Per Goh Yihan JC, Para 50

The court also recorded at the outset that, after hearing the parties on 17 January 2023, it had already granted the applications and made the orders prayed for in each of them. The written grounds therefore explain and justify an order that had already been announced at the hearing. (Para 2)

"After hearing the parties on 17 January 2023, I granted the Applications and made the orders prayed for in each of them." — Per Goh Yihan JC, Para 2

Why Does This Case Matter for Insolvency Practitioners and Banks?

This case matters because it clarifies that the investigative logic developed for company insolvency is not confined to companies. Trustees in bankruptcy under s 335 of the IRDA can rely on the same broad principles when seeking information from third parties who may hold relevant documents. That gives insolvency practitioners a clearer route to obtain records needed to trace assets and investigate dealings. (Paras 11, 16, 17, 18, 49)

It also matters because it explains how the Bankers’ Books Exception operates in an insolvency context. Banks are often caught between confidentiality obligations and court-ordered disclosure. This decision shows that where the statutory conditions are met, the court can authorise inspection and copying of bank records without treating banking secrecy as an absolute obstacle. (Paras 39, 41, 42, 45, 48)

Finally, the case is practically important because it confirms that incomplete or heavily redacted records may justify a further disclosure order where they are insufficient for a proper investigation. For trustees, that means they can seek fuller records when partial disclosure does not allow them to trace funds. For banks, it underscores the importance of responding to such requests through the statutory framework rather than by relying solely on secrecy concerns. (Paras 8, 29, 37, 48)

Cases Referred To

Legislation Referenced

• Insolvency, Restructuring and Dissolution Act 2018 (2020 Rev Ed): ss 335, 327(1)(a), 327(1)(c), 39(1), 39(2), 22(1)(a), 244, 312(a)(i) (Paras 9, 11, 14, 17, 18, 19)
• Evidence Act 1893 (2020 Rev Ed): ss 170, 175 (Paras 39, 41, 42, 45)
• Banking Act 1970: s 47; para 7 of Part 1 of the Third Schedule (Para 9)
• Bankruptcy Act (Cap 20) (2009 Rev Ed) (Para 11)
• Companies Act (Cap 50) (Para 16)
• Insolvency Act 1986 (UK) (Para 12)
• Bankruptcy Ordinance (Hong Kong) (Para 13)
• Companies Ordinance (Hong Kong) (Para 13)

Source Documents

• Original Judgment — Singapore Courts
• Archived Copy (PDF) — Litt Law CDN
• View in judgment: "In my view, those principles should..."
• View in judgment: "I therefore concluded that it was..."
• View in judgment: "In my view, those principles should..."
• View in judgment: "For all of the reasons, I..."

This article analyses [2023] SGHC 33 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.