Case Details
- Citation: [2021] SGCA 89
- Title: Iskandar bin Rahmat v Public Prosecutor
- Court: Court of Appeal of the Republic of Singapore
- Date of Decision: 21 September 2021
- Case Number: Criminal Motion No 21 of 2021
- Coram: Sundaresh Menon CJ; Judith Prakash JCA; Steven Chong JCA
- Applicant: Iskandar bin Rahmat
- Respondent: Public Prosecutor
- Legal Area: Criminal Procedure and Sentencing — Appeal
- Counsel for Applicant: Ravi s/o Madasamy (KK Cheng Law LLC)
- Counsel for Respondent: Winston Man and Ng Jun Chong (Attorney-General’s Chambers)
- Judgment Length: 12 pages, 6,976 words
- Procedural Posture: Application for leave to intervene in an unrelated pending criminal appeal (CA/CCA 36/2020)
- Primary Substantive Context: Mandatory death penalty for murder under s 300(a) of the Penal Code (Cap 224)
- Constitutional Arguments Intended to be Raised: Alleged violations of Article 12(1) and Article 93 of the Constitution, and/or separation of powers
- Key Statutory Provisions Mentioned: s 300(a) and related exceptions under s 300 of the Penal Code; s 394H CPC; s 6 CPC; s 60D of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act; s 96 Legal Professions Act
Summary
In Iskandar bin Rahmat v Public Prosecutor [2021] SGCA 89, the Court of Appeal dismissed an application by a convicted murderer for leave to intervene in an unrelated pending criminal appeal. The applicant, Iskandar bin Rahmat, had previously been convicted of two counts of murder under s 300(a) of the Penal Code and sentenced to the mandatory death penalty. His conviction appeal had been dismissed by the Court of Appeal in 2017, and he later acknowledged that the narrow avenues for review and constitutional challenge were foreclosed by the principle of finality.
Faced with that finality, Iskandar sought to intervene in another accused’s appeal (Teo Ghim Heng) in CA/CCA 36/2020, where Teo was advancing constitutional arguments challenging ss 299 and 300(a) of the Penal Code. Iskandar’s stated purpose was to support Teo’s constitutional challenge and, if successful, to use the outcome to mount a review application under s 394H of the Criminal Procedure Code. The Court of Appeal held that it had no jurisdiction to grant leave to intervene in an unrelated criminal appeal merely because the applicant had an interest in the point of law being argued.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
The applicant, Iskandar bin Rahmat, was convicted by the High Court of two counts of murder under s 300(a) of the Penal Code (Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed) and sentenced to the mandatory death penalty. On appeal, he challenged his convictions on the basis that his actions did not demonstrate an intention to cause death, but rather an intention to cause injuries sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, which he argued would fall under s 300(c) instead. He also relied on several exceptions under s 300, including Exception 2 (private defence), Exception 4 (sudden fight), and Exception 7 (diminished responsibility).
On 3 February 2017, the Court of Appeal dismissed Iskandar’s appeal and issued its judgment in Iskandar bin Rahmat v Public Prosecutor and other matters [2017] 1 SLR 505 (“Judgment”). After that final appellate determination, the applicant’s legal options became extremely limited. He acknowledged that he could not seek leave to make a review application under s 394H of the Criminal Procedure Code because his constitutional arguments would not satisfy the statutory requirement that the Judgment was demonstrably wrong. He also recognised that a constitutional challenge to s 300(a) via an originating summons in the High Court would amount to an abuse of process, as it would be a collateral attack on a decision made in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction.
In parallel, Iskandar pursued professional disciplinary avenues. On 14 February 2018, he wrote to the Law Society to complain that his trial counsel had failed to comply with his instructions in the conduct of his defence. The Law Society’s Inquiry Committee recommended that no formal investigation was necessary and that the complaint be dismissed. The Council informed him on 20 March 2019 that no further action would be taken. Dissatisfied, he filed HC/OS 716/2019 under s 96 of the Legal Professions Act seeking review of the Council’s determination and an order directing the Law Society to apply to the Chief Justice for appointment of a Disciplinary Tribunal. The High Court dismissed OS 716 on 10 October 2019, and the applicant’s appeal against that dismissal (CA/CA 9/2020) was also dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 5 July 2021.
While CA/CA 9 was still ongoing, on 11 June 2021 Iskandar filed the present application, CA/CM 21/2021 (“CM 21”), seeking leave to intervene in CA/CCA 36/2020 (“CCA 36”). CCA 36 concerned Teo Ghim Heng, whose appeal raised constitutional challenges to ss 299 and 300(a) of the Penal Code. Iskandar’s intended intervention was to add an additional constitutional argument not raised by Teo, namely that offenders convicted under s 299 have a “right to mitigate”, whereas offenders convicted under s 300(a) do not, despite overlap in the requirements of the two offences. He further alleged that the constitutional challenge engaged Article 12(1) and Article 93 of the Constitution and/or the separation of powers.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The sole issue before the Court of Appeal was jurisdictional: whether the Court had the jurisdiction to grant leave to the applicant to intervene in an unrelated pending criminal appeal. The applicant sought to characterise his motion as ancillary to the conduct of a primary criminal action (CCA 36), and he argued that the Court could adopt a procedure modelled on intervention rules in civil proceedings.
Related to this jurisdictional question were the constraints imposed by finality in criminal proceedings. The Court had to consider whether allowing intervention by a person who had already exhausted his own criminal appeal would effectively permit a collateral route to circumvent the strict conditions governing review applications under s 394H of the Criminal Procedure Code. The Court also had to assess whether the Criminal Procedure Code (including its general procedural provision) and the Court’s inherent powers could support the relief sought.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
The Court began by restating the basic concept of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction, it explained, refers to a court’s authority “to hear and determine a dispute that is brought before it”. It relied on prior authority, including Re Nalpon Zero Geraldo Mario [2013] 3 SLR 258, and earlier formulations of jurisdictional authority. The Court then identified the statutory source of its criminal jurisdiction: s 60D of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322). That provision sets out the matters constituting the Court of Appeal’s criminal jurisdiction, including appeals from decisions of the General Division in original criminal jurisdiction, petitions for confirmation, reviews, and various forms of motions and references under the Criminal Procedure Code.
Having identified the statutory framework, the Court emphasised that its criminal jurisdiction is not open-ended. It is conferred by statute and is tied to particular procedural modes: original, appellate, revisionary, or supervisory criminal jurisdiction. The Court noted that beyond those direct categories, it may hear applications for specific reliefs that are incidental to or supportive of a primary action invoking its criminal jurisdiction. This principle was drawn from Amarjeet Singh v Public Prosecutor [2021] 4 SLR 841, which the applicant relied on.
However, the Court held that the applicant’s motion did not satisfy the threshold requirement of being incidental to a primary criminal action in which the applicant was a party or in which the Court was exercising criminal jurisdiction in a way that could accommodate his intervention. The applicant had no pending criminal proceedings involving him. His own appeal had been dismissed in 2017, and he was not seeking relief in his own case. Instead, he sought to intervene in Teo’s appeal, which was “completely unrelated” to him.
The Court rejected the proposition that a common interest in a point of law automatically creates a right to intervene. It stated that litigants, including accused persons, do not have a right to intervene in an unrelated pending proceeding simply because they share an interest in the legal issue being considered. The Court warned that accepting such a position would open the floodgates to intervention applications, because almost any point of law canvassed in one case could potentially affect other cases. While the Court acknowledged that this is a function of the common law system, it refused to treat it as a licence to intervene.
In addressing the applicant’s procedural arguments, the Court considered the reliance on s 6 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which allows courts to adopt “such procedure as the justice of the case may require” provided it is not inconsistent with the CPC or other law. The applicant argued that the Court could adopt a procedure modelled on civil intervention rules under the Rules of Court (ROC), particularly O 15 r 6(2)(b)(ii) and O 15 r 6(3). The Court, however, accepted the Prosecution’s submission that s 6 did not assist because the intended intervention would be inconsistent with the CPC’s structure and with the jurisdictional limits governing criminal proceedings.
Crucially, the Court viewed the applicant’s intended use of the intervention as a mechanism to circumvent the finality of his own conviction. The applicant’s stated plan was to support Teo’s constitutional challenge and then, if Teo succeeded, to use that outcome to pursue a review under s 394H. The Court considered that allowing intervention on this basis would undermine the strict conditions for review and would permit a collateral attack on the correctness of the applicant’s conviction. This concern reinforced the Court’s conclusion that the motion lacked a jurisdictional basis and that there were no exceptional circumstances warranting the exercise of any inherent power to override those limits.
Although the judgment extract provided is truncated after the initial discussion of jurisdictional categories, the reasoning visible in the extract is clear: the Court treated jurisdiction as a threshold question. Without a statutory or incidental basis linking the applicant’s motion to the Court’s criminal jurisdiction in a manner contemplated by the CPC and the Supreme Court of Judicature Act, the Court could not grant leave to intervene. The Court’s approach reflects a disciplined view of criminal procedure: procedural flexibility cannot be used to create a new pathway around the finality of criminal appeals and the narrow scope of review.
What Was the Outcome?
The Court of Appeal dismissed CM 21. It held that it had no jurisdiction to permit the applicant to intervene in an unrelated criminal appeal on the basis of his interest in the point of law being considered in that appeal.
Practically, the decision meant that Iskandar could not participate in Teo’s constitutional appeal as an intervener, and therefore could not rely on Teo’s eventual outcome as a procedural stepping stone through intervention. The applicant remained confined to whatever limited avenues remained available to him under the law governing review and constitutional challenges, subject to the principle of finality.
Why Does This Case Matter?
This case is significant for criminal procedure and appellate practice because it clarifies the limits of intervention in criminal appeals and reinforces the jurisdictional discipline of the Court of Appeal. For practitioners, the decision underscores that intervention is not a matter of convenience or shared legal interest; it is a procedural mechanism that must fit within the court’s jurisdictional framework. Even where a constitutional issue is potentially relevant across multiple cases, the Court will not treat that as sufficient to justify intervention in unrelated proceedings.
The judgment also highlights the relationship between finality and constitutional litigation. The applicant’s strategy—supporting a constitutional challenge in another case with the aim of later seeking review—illustrates how litigants may attempt to create indirect routes around the strict requirements of s 394H CPC. The Court’s refusal to allow intervention in these circumstances signals that finality will be protected, and that procedural ingenuity will not be used to erode statutory safeguards.
From a broader perspective, Iskandar bin Rahmat v Public Prosecutor provides a useful template for analysing jurisdictional questions in criminal motions. Lawyers should pay close attention to (i) the statutory source of criminal jurisdiction (here, s 60D of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act), (ii) whether the relief sought is incidental to a primary criminal action properly invoking that jurisdiction, and (iii) whether the proposed procedure would be inconsistent with the CPC’s design and the principle of finality.
Legislation Referenced
- Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap. 322), s 60D
- Criminal Procedure Code (Cap. 68), s 6
- Criminal Procedure Code (Cap. 68), s 394H
- Penal Code (Cap. 224), s 300(a)
- Penal Code (Cap. 224), s 300(c)
- Penal Code (Cap. 224), s 300 (Exceptions 2, 4 and 7)
- Legal Professions Act (Cap. 161), s 96
- Constitution of the Republic of Singapore, Article 12(1)
- Constitution of the Republic of Singapore, Article 93
- Rules of Court (2014 Rev Ed), O 15 r 6(2)(b)(ii) and O 15 r 6(3)
Cases Cited
- Iskandar bin Rahmat v Public Prosecutor and other matters [2017] 1 SLR 505
- Amarjeet Singh v Public Prosecutor [2021] 4 SLR 841
- Re Nalpon Zero Geraldo Mario [2013] 3 SLR 258
- Muhd Munir v Noor Hidah and other applications [1990] 2 SLR(R) 348
- Iskandar bin Rahmat v Public Prosecutor [2021] SGCA 89 (this case)
- Teo Ghim Heng (CCA 36/2020) (not separately reported in the extract)
- [2019] SGHC 105
- [2021] SGCA 85
- [2021] SGHC 133
Source Documents
This article analyses [2021] SGCA 89 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.